JUDGMENT : The respondents/claimants herein are the dependants of the deceased – Martha Linga Reddy, and he died due to electrocution. Claiming compensation, respondents filed O.S.No.61 of 2001 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Nalgonda against the Central Power Distribution Company Ltd., (C.P.D.C.) Nalgonda, represented by its Officials. Vide judgment and decree dated 14.08.2003, the trial court decreed the suit and granted compensation. Assailing the same, the C.P.D.C./defendants in the suit filed the present appeal. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as per their array in the suit. 3. The plaint averments in brief are that one Martha Linga Reddy, was working as Supervisor on the poclainer owned by one Shekkhar Reddy. On 17.05.2001at about 3.30 am, when the said Martha Linga Reddy was going on scooter to Pangal village to call on the contractor, and that when he reached the fields of Balija-Pitchaiah, a current wire fell from the pole and he died on the spot due to electric shock. Police, Nalgonda- II Town registered a case under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The claimants, who are his wife, children, parents and unmarried sister of the deceased filed the present suit claiming compensation. Their case is that the deceased was earning an amount of Rs.10,000/- per month by working as supervisor on the poclainer, and hence claimed an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- with costs and future interest at 18% per annum. 4. The defendants filed written statement and denied the claim of the claimants. The defendants while not disputing that the deceased died due to electrocution, stated that there was heavy wind and rain on the intervening night of 16/17.5.2001 and on account of the same, the neutral conductor between the two polies situated at Balija-Pitchaiah lands, snapped, and fell on the ground, and that the deceased – Linga Reddy, who was going on scooter without light, contacted electric wire, and got electrocuted. Their case is that there is no negligence on their part. However, they admitted that the department has offered ex – gratia, but the claimants/plaintiffs have unnecessary approached the court. Therefore, sought to dismiss the suit. 5. Based on the rival contentions, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the deceased Linga Reddy was earning Rs.10,000/-per month? 2. Whether the electrocution of deceased Linga Reddy was due to negligence and improper maintenance of power lines by defendants? Therefore, sought to dismiss the suit. 5. Based on the rival contentions, the trial court framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the deceased Linga Reddy was earning Rs.10,000/-per month? 2. Whether the electrocution of deceased Linga Reddy was due to negligence and improper maintenance of power lines by defendants? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for compensation and if so to what amount? 4. To what relief? 6. In support of the case of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked. 7. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined, and no exhibits were marked. 8. Appreciating the entire evidence on record, the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 14.08.2001 held that on the date of incident absolutely there is no evidence to show that there was wind and gale and that the defendants could not prove their case. The trial court held that there is negligence on the part of the defendants in maintaining the electric lines. Further taking the income of the deceased as Rs.2,000/- per month, and after deducting 1/3rd towards his personal expenses, and by applying multiplier 16, granted compensation of Rs.2,71,656/- . Assailing the same, the respondents/C.P.D.C. Ltd., filed the present Appeal. 9. Sri R.Vinod Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the appellants submits that as per FIR , Ex.A-9, there was heavy gale and rain on the date of incident, due to which, the neutral conductor between the two polies situated at Balaji Pitchaiah land snapped and fell on the ground. The deceased who was going on scooter without light in the night, went and contacted the electric wire and got electrocuted. As such there is no negligence on the part of the appellants/defendants in maintaining the electric lines, and that the accident was occurred due to vis major only, i.e., by an irresistible force, which could not have been prevented even by exercise of prudence, diligence and care. Hence, the appellants cannot be made liable. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the suit and to allow the appeal. 10. Hence, the appellants cannot be made liable. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the suit and to allow the appeal. 10. Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants contended that based on the evidence, the trial court found that the accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the appellants/defendants and accordingly taking the income of deceased at Rs.2,000/- and deducting 1/3rd towards his personal expenses and by applying appropriate multiplier, granted compensation, and hence the same may not be interfered with. 11. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the rival submissions, the issue that arises for consideration is, ‘whether the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court warrants any interference?’ 12. There is no dispute that the deceased died due to electrocution. The case of the appellants/defendants is that there is no negligence on their part and that due to heavy rain and wind, the neutral wire between the two electric poles at the place of accident snapped and fell on road, and the deceased who was driving the scooter without light, came in contact and died due to electrocution. Their case is that it is act of vis major. 13. From the material on record it could be seen that immediately after the accident, Ex.A-9 FIR was registered and in the said document, it is mentioned that there is gale, and rain on the intervening night of 16/17.5.2001. But after the incident, a panchanama was conducted, and the inquest report was marked as Ex.A-12. A perusal of the said report does not disclose that there was any wetness on the ground due to rain or there was gale on the date of incident. In the said document it is mentioned that deceased was working on poclainer at SLBC canal connected work, and he was returning home on 17.5.2001 at about 3.30 a.m. Further D.W.1 official of the company deposed that he is not aware about the facts, but he only assumes that there was gale, and rain, which resulted in cutting of electric conductor and falling on the ground. Thus the contents of FIR with regard to gale and rain, are not corroborating with the inquest report, and the evidence of D.W.1. These circumstances clearly show that there is absolutely no evidence to show that there was gale and rain on the date of incident. Thus the contents of FIR with regard to gale and rain, are not corroborating with the inquest report, and the evidence of D.W.1. These circumstances clearly show that there is absolutely no evidence to show that there was gale and rain on the date of incident. Therefore, when there is no gale and rain, and in spite of the same, the snapping of neutral wire between the two electric poles at the place of accident and falling of live wire on the road, is nothing but negligence on the part of the appellants/defendants. Thus, the trial court rightly held that there is negligence on the part of the defendants in maintaining electric lines, which resulted in electrocution of the deceased. 14. The appellants/defendants sought to contend that the accident was due to vis major. Even assuming that it is an act of vis major, even then also, the appellants cannot escape liability, as it is a fact that the deceased died due to electrocution. The Apex Court in the decision reported in M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD vs. SHAIL KUMAR, 2002 LawSuit(SC) 35 considering similar facts where, due to rain, the road was inundated with water, and live wire was lying on the road and that deceased therein died due to electrocution. In those circumstances, the claimants claimed compensation. The defence taken by the electricity board therein was that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was for such diverted line. The Apex Court while not accepting the defence taken by the Board, held that that it is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electricity energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board and if the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensation the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy and that so long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension, the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under: “7. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under: “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English Common Law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330). Blackburn J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: "The rule of law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; and if he does so he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this. "Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule doesnot apply". (vide Page 535 Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decision in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc. {1994(1) All England Law Reports (HL) 53}. The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in CharanLalSahu v. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat State Rod Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher. By referring to the above two decisions a two Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. { 2001 (2) SCC 9 }. 12. By referring to the above two decisions a two Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. { 2001 (2) SCC 9 }. 12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that "where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on any one on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher." 15. In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendants cannot be sustained, and the same is hereby rejected. 16. The trial court considering the avocation of the deceased, and only taking his income as Rs.2,000/- per month, which is very reasonable, and by applying appropriate multiplier awarded compensation, and granted interest at the rate of 6% from the date of death, till the date of realization. 17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and for the foregoing reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court, and the appeal is devoid of any merits and the same is accordingly dismissed. 18. Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.