JUDGMENT : Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J 1. By this Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the CrPC, the appellant herein calls in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment dated 4.5.2016 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Kondagaon in Special Sessions Case No.46/2013 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Section 366 of the IPC 10 years RI with fine of Rs.500/- Section 376 of the IPC Imprisonment for life Section 342 of the IPC RI for one year with fine of Rs.500/- Section 506 (Part-2) of the IPC RI for 7 years with fine of Rs.500/- Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.500/- with usual default stipulations. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 11.12.2012 around 8 pm when the prosecutrix (PW-5), aged about 14 years, went near the Badi for urination, the appellant pressed her mouth, threatened to kill her and took her forcibly to his uncle’s house and gave her water mixed with some sedative and thereafter committed sexual intercourse. In the next day, during night, she somehow managed to flee and came to her mother’s house and narrated the incident to her mother (PW-4), elder brother (PW-1) and maternal uncle (PW-2). Thereafter the FIR was lodged on 14th December, 2012 at Police Station Kondagaon vide Ex.-P/7 and the reason for delay in lodging the report is mentioned as non-availability of any senior member in the family. 3. During investigation, the spot map (Ex.-P/9) was prepared by the ASI (PW-10) DS Nishad. The prosecutrix was medically examined vide Ex.-P/10 and undergarments of the prosecutrix were also examined vide Ex.-P/11. (PW-8) Smt. Anita Panna, Patwari, has prepared the spot map Ex.-P/12. The accused/appellant in the medical examination was found capable to perform sexual intercourse vide Ex.-P/13. The appellant’s undergarments were also examined vide Ex.-P/14. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. In the FSL report vide Ex.- P/20, on undergarments of the accused/appellant and the prosecutrix as well as vaginal slides ‘A’, ‘B’,’C’, no stain of semen and human sperm was found. 4. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to the Special Judge under the POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, the appellant pleaded false implication. 5. 4. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to the Special Judge under the POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, the appellant pleaded false implication. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 20 documents. The appellant has not produced any defence witness and exhibited two documents. 6. After completion of trial and after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above, against which this Appeal has been preferred by him. 7. Shri Ashok Varma, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant has been falsely implicated and the trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. The FIR was lodged belatedly after the prosecutrix and her family negotiated with the family of the accused/appellant, and after Panchayat meeting, delayed report was lodged. The age of the prosecutrix is not legally proved by the prosecution and no ossification test was conducted during investigation. From the entire prosecution case itself, it appears that there was some love affair between the accused/appellant and the prosecutrix, as one love letter (Ex.-P/8) was seized from the possession of the prosecutrix (PW-5). Due to quarrel and denial of marriage after the Panchayat meeting, the delayed FIR was lodged. The case of the prosecution is not medically corroborated. Thus, learned counsel prays to allow the Appeal and acquit the appellant. 8. Per contra, learned State Counsel would support the impugned judgment on submission that the trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence and rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offences. The finding is well merited and it does not call for any interference. Therefore, the Appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and have gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (henceforth ‘the Act, 2012’), or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of victim is significant and essential ingredients to prove such charge and the gravity of offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the Act, 2012 defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 11. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 , it was observed that there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, their Lordships held that it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix, and the relevant paras 22 & 23 reads thus : 22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2007 Rules”). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under: “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age.—(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be, the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these Rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining— (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year, and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these Rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these Rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this Rule. (6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.” 12. Reverting to the factual matrix of the present case, the learned trial Court in para-14 of the impugned judgment assessed the age of the victim on the date of incident i.e. 11.12. 2012 as 14 years and wrongly shifted the burden on the accused that he has not adduced any evidence on the basis of which it could be said that Prosecutrix was more than 18 years 13. In Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 , it was held that in cases where the statute does not provide for the burden of proof on the accused, it always lies on the prosecution. 14. In Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 , it was held that in cases where the statute does not provide for the burden of proof on the accused, it always lies on the prosecution. 14. The Prosecutrix (P.W.5) deposed that her date of birth recorded in the School register is 24/04/1998 and she specifically stated in her cross examination that on the basis of Mark-sheet, she disclosed the date of birth, though prosecution has seized the mark-sheet vide Ex.P-6, seizure memo, from the Prosecutrix, but during trial such document was neither exhibited nor proved. Further, (P.W.-5) Prosecutrix is unable to state as to on what basis her date of birth was recorded in the school register. No one was examined from the School to that effect. Prosecution has neither proved the School register nor other evidence was brought to determine the age of the victim on the date of the incident. Although a specific procedure has been stipulated to determine the age of the victim, but the prosecution has failed to prove the age according to such procedure established by law. 15. In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584 , it was observed thus at para-23:- “23. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in the ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder: (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register; (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact; (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.” 16. In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [1988 Supp SCC 604], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus : (SCC p. 619, para 15) “15. ………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………... To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded…………………………………………..” 17. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377 , it was observed thus:- “28. It is also a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.” 18. Considering the aforesaid principles, and looking to the evidence that only the victim has stated about her date of birth and she has supplied such information on the basis of mark-sheet, and the marksheet was not proved during trial, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the age of the victim on the date of the incident. In the circumstances, the benefit of doubt regarding suspicious age of the victim, which is not proved, is extended to the appellant and the conviction imposed upon the appellant under Section 4 of the Act, 2012 is held to be bad in law. 19. Prosecutrix (P.W.-5) would not depose that during the course of the incident, the appellant had threatened to kill her, though such fact was mentioned in the F.I.R. (Ex.P-7), but such fact was not stated in the Court statement by the prosecutrix. FIR is not the substantive piece of evidence, it can corroborate or contradict the evidence of the informant (See : Sohan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 4466 ). FIR is not the substantive piece of evidence, it can corroborate or contradict the evidence of the informant (See : Sohan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 4466 ). So, the conviction imposed upon the appellant under Section 506 Part -II of the I.P.C. is also not sustainable. 20. Now, for the remaining Sections 342, 366 & 376 of the IPC, if we examine the evidence of the Prosecutrix (PW-5), she clearly deposed that on the date of incident at about 7-8 pm, when she went to her back courtyard (Baadi), the appellant suddenly came and caught her and pressed her mouth and forcibly took her to his uncle’s house at School Para, and gave her water mixed with some sedative and forcefully committed sexual intercourse. In the morning, when she gained consciousness, she found that the door was locked from the outside, and in the night when the appellant opened the door, she somehow ran away to her house and narrated the incident to her mother (PW-4), and brother (PW-1). She further stated that her mother and brother had gone in the night to the house of appellant, but they had beaten her mother, and after one day she had lodged the F.IR. (Ex-P/7). In the cross examination, nothing significant was elicited in favour of the accused. The Prosecutrix remained unrebutted in her cross-examination and was found fully reliable about the incident 21. Dr. Manisha Goyal (PW-7) had examined the prosecutrix (PW-5) on 15.12.2012 and proved her report (Ex. P-10), in which the following was recorded : “mild laceration with induration present in vaginal orifice lower side. Torn lags of hymen present. No bleeding. Vagina admitting 2 finger with difficulty. Signs of sexual intercourse.” 22. Dr. T.R. Kunwar (PW-9) had examined the appellant vide Ex.-P/13, and found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. 23. The defence has not put forth any question as to the love affair between the appellant and the prosecutrix to demonstrate that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. The love letter was seized vide Ex.-P/8. Perusal of the same would show that the appellant himself tried to compel the prosecutrix. Considering the entire fact situation of the case and the testimony of the prosecutrix, it appears that delay of some days in lodging the FIR (Ex.-P/7) is not fatal. The love letter was seized vide Ex.-P/8. Perusal of the same would show that the appellant himself tried to compel the prosecutrix. Considering the entire fact situation of the case and the testimony of the prosecutrix, it appears that delay of some days in lodging the FIR (Ex.-P/7) is not fatal. Mother of the prosecutrix (PW4) also supported the version of the prosecutrix (PW-5) and stated that her daughter informed the incident stating that the appellant forcibly took her to the house of Motiram (PW-6) and committed sexual intercourse. Thereafter she went to the house of Motiram and Motiram (PW-6) had asked them to marry the prosecutrix with the appellant, which she refused because the prosecutrix is younger in age. Motiram (PW-6) and the appellant had beaten her. Thereafter she called meeting in the village and in the said meeting, compromise was arrived at. Thereafter the appellant again forcibly took away the prosecutrix and committed sexual intercourse. So, they have lodged the FIR. 24. It is settled law that when the version of the prosecutrix was found consistent right from the very beginning and the evidence of prosecutrix is found to be reliable, conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix. In the present case, we do not find any reason to doubt the credibility or trustworthiness of the evidence of the prosecutrix. Her evidence is of sterling quality. So, corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law. In various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the said proposition. 25. In the matter of State of H.P. v. Asha Ram, (2005) 13 SCC 766 , the following has been observed at para-5:- “5. .................................... It is now a well-settled principle of law that conviction can be founded on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The evidence of a prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is vital, unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is vital, unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is also a well-settled principle of law that corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given circumstances. The evidence of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. Even minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.” 26. In the matter of Phool Singh v. State of M.P., (2022) 2 SCC 74 , the following has been observed at para-10:- “10. In Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 129, it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. In paras 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under : (SCC pp. 37-38) “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1725].)” 27. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1725].)” 27. Having considered the aforesaid propositions and having found that the evidence of the prosecutrix is duly corroborated by the medical evidence, as also the evidence of (PW-4), mother; (PW-1) brother and (PW-2), her maternal uncle, we are of the view that the prosecution has successfully established its case that the appellant forcibly had taken away the prosecutrix, confined her and committed rape. Therefore, conviction imposed on the appellant under Sections 366, 376 and 342 of the IPC deserves to be and is hereby affirmed. Conviction under Section 506 (Part-2) of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Act, 2012 deserves to be set aside. 28. From the aforesaid appreciation and the conclusion arrived at in the preceding paragraphs, conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants under Section 4 of the Act, 2012 and under Section 506 (Part-2) of the IPC are set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the said charges. 29. The appellant is in jail since 15.12.2012 and the date of incident is 11.12.2012. As per Section 376 of the IPC, Pre-amendment, the offence is punishable for a term which shall not be less than 7 years but which may for the life or for a term which may extend to 10 years. 30. Considering the attending facts and circumstances of the case, we find it appropriate to reduce the sentence under Sections 366 and 376 of the IPC to the period already undergone by him, which is more than 9½ years. Ordered accordingly. The sentence awarded under Section 342 of the IPC requires no interference and the same is affirmed. 31. The appellant be released forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case. The fine amount imposed under Sections 366 and 342 of the IPC by the trial Court shall remain intact. 32. Resultantly, the Appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.