JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. Heard. 1. This appeal is against the judgement and decree dated 7th October, 2017 passed by the Court of District Judge, Ambikapur in Civil Suit No. A/14/2011 wherein suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract as also for cancellation of sale deed made in favour of Sujit Singh (defendant No.2)respondent No.7 herein be declared null and void and agreement for sale dated 23/08/2010 be executed for enforcement of sale deed in his favour. 2. The brief facts of this case as pleaded is that the plaintiff Lalan Singh entered in to an agreement with late Manglu for purchase of land bearing khasra No.273, 289, 290, 287 & 288 admeasuring 0.121, 0.299, 0.166, 0.214 & 0.146 respectively total five plots, total area 0.946 hectare for a consideration of Rs.16 lakhs. The agreement Ex.P-1 was executed on 23rd August, 2010. The agreement was registered with Sub Registrar office. The plaintiff contended that out of sale consideration of Rs.16 lakhs, Rs.5 lakhs was paid as earnest money. The plaintiff contented that 16 point form was required to be submitted as per the norms of the State Government to get the sale deed registered, the same seller was required to obtain. The seller further agreed that in case of death of anyone, the legal heir would be bound to execute the sale deed and whenever the sale is required, the sale would be made in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that 16 point form was not supplied to the plaintiff for registration of the sale deed and when he enquired from the respective Patwari, the same was said to have been already obtained by the seller. The plaintiff contended that on different dates i.e. on 26/05/2011, 6/06/2011 and 28/06/2011 the plaintiff wanted to get the sale deed registered and contacted the respondent but the respondent was not found at his home, eventually the sale deed could not be registered. It was stated that the defendant was avoiding the execution of sale deed, had at the same time obtained the 16 point form and sold it in favour of defendant No.2 Sujit Singh for a consideration of Rs.16 lakhs on 29/04/2011. It was stated that the defendant was avoiding the execution of sale deed, had at the same time obtained the 16 point form and sold it in favour of defendant No.2 Sujit Singh for a consideration of Rs.16 lakhs on 29/04/2011. Plaintiff therefore contended that since earlier agreement was existing and the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No.2 be declared as null and void and without any effect and prayer was made that sale be executed in favour of the plaintiff as per the agreement. 3. Manglu the original seller filed his written statement and denied the execution of agreement and all the plaint averments were also denied. Since execution of the agreement was denied, consequently receipt of earnest money of Rs.5 lakhs was also denied. In the additional pleading, defendant No.1 contended that the agreement was outcome of fraud and defendant Manglu being an illiterate and at the instance of one Raj Thakur he was told that he was to stand as a witness in a transaction, therefore he went to the Sub Registrar Office and taking advantage of it, the signature were obtained on the agreement of sale. It was further contended that the defendant Manglu had not received any amount by way of earnest money and the agreement was outcome of fraud. It was further contended that despite the fact the agreement though was outcome of fraud, the execution was not carried out within the stipulated time, therefore the agreement had lost its efficacy. Averments were made that the sale deed as sought to be executed was at instance of Sanjay Agrawal who was dealing in the business of sale and purchase of the land therefore presence of Raj Thakur, a broker of land was recorded therefore the execution of the agreement is doubtful. 4. Defendant No.2 the purchaser contended that he had no knowledge about existence of earlier agreement of sale and he first time came to know of such fact when he received the summons from the court. It was further contended that after the terms of sale were settled, the said purchase was made by him, the defendant No.2, so he was a bona fide purchaser. It was further contended that after the terms of sale were settled, the said purchase was made by him, the defendant No.2, so he was a bona fide purchaser. It was further contended that the sale deed was not executed within the stipulated period of time, as such the earlier agreement had lost its efficacy as the plaintiff did not show any willingness to get the sale deed executed. Consequently, the defendant No.2 was the purchaser who purchased the land for a valuable consideration. 5. On the basis of the pleading, the learned trial court framed 9 issues. Primarily issue No.1 and 2 were with respect to whether the agreement of sale was executed in respect of subject land on 23/08/2010 for a sale consideration of Rs.16 lakhs and whether Rs.5 lakhs whether was paid as earnest money. The Court gave its finding in negative. With respect to the issue of readiness and willingness, the court held that it is not been proved. For the subsequent sale deed dated 29/04/2011 in respect of issue No.5 and 6, the Court held that the sale deed dated 29/04/2011 cannot be said to be nullity and it was found that the defendant No.2 was found to be bona fide purchaser of the property in concern. Further the court at issue No.8 held that whether the plaintiff taking the advantage of defendant's illiteracy, got the forged agreement dated 23/08/2010 executed, it held in negative and eventually the suit was dismissed. Therefore, present appeal by the plaintiff. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that Ex.P-1 agreement dated 23/08/2010 was a registered agreement and sale consideration was fixed to Rs.16 lakhs and out of it Rs.5 lakhs was paid as earnest money. She would submit that though the agreement has been said to be outcome of fraud and the defendant No.1 signed it as a witness but such contention was contradicted by submission of the defendant No.1 Manglu itself. It is stated that if at one point of time it is stated that agreement was fraud, then alternately the defence raised that the time was essence of the contract simultaneously, cannot be entertained. It is stated no averments have been made to deny the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. It is stated that if at one point of time it is stated that agreement was fraud, then alternately the defence raised that the time was essence of the contract simultaneously, cannot be entertained. It is stated no averments have been made to deny the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. She further submits that written statement of DW-2 Sujit Kumar the subsequent purchaser, similar contradictory statement have been made that at one point of time it is said that he was not aware of earlier existing agreement dated 23/08/2010 but in the examination and cross-examination it would reflect that the agreement was very well within his knowledge i.e. defendant No.2. Therefore it is stated the subsequent purchaser was aware of the fact that earlier agreement was existing in respect of the same property. 7. Referring to the suggestion given to the witness, counsel would submit that many admissions were made and though it was tried to be suggested that the transaction was benami but no pleading to this effect is on record. She further relies on (2015) 3 SCC 138 in between Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana to submit that payment of Rs.5 lakhs which was statement made in chief was never challenged in the cross-examination and in absence of any cross-examination the submission would be admissible. It is further stated that the defendant No.1 who died during the pendency of the suit but subsequently his legal heirs did not enter in the witness box, so adverse inference is required to be drawn as per the law down in (2021) 2 SCC 718 in between Iqbal Basith & others Vs. N. Subbalakshmi & others. She further would submit that neither the financial capacity nor readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract were challenged and only some traces in the cross-examination were tried to be shown which cannot be taken to be full proof fact that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to fulfill his part of contract. It is further submitted that until 16 point form is obtained, the sale deed could not have been registered. It is stated this form was not obtained by vendor Manglu so initially he did not perform his part of contract. It is further submitted that until 16 point form is obtained, the sale deed could not have been registered. It is stated this form was not obtained by vendor Manglu so initially he did not perform his part of contract. It is contended therefore the specific word in the agreement existed as and when the sale deed would be executed was dependent on obtaining the 16 point form would mean to show that the time was not the essence of contract. 8. Referring to certain suggestion made to the PW-2, it is contended that amount of Rs.5 lakhs was paid to one Raj Thakur would mean to show the existence of contract. Referring to the statement of defence, it is stated that defendant No.2 though claimed to be bona fide purchaser at one time however he has raised a defence that the time was essence of contract so such plea could not have been developed unless and until the defendant No.2, the subsequent purchaser was in know of the fact of existence of earlier agreement in respect of the same subject property with the plaintiff. Referring to subsequent sale deed Ex.D-1 it is further submitted that 16 point form while was issued, the original seller was aware of the fact and information was sought for about sale consideration and the said form was obtained wherein Manish Kumar is a witness and he was witness to the subsequent sale deed too, therefore the defendant No.2 cannot claim that he was not aware of the fact that earlier agreement existed. She therefore would submit that the finding arrived at by the learned court below therefore is completely perverse and is liable to be set aside. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.7 would submit that the Ex.P-1 which is an agreement on which the plaintiff/appellant claim his right is doubtful. It is stated there is no averment in the plaint is made about role played by one Raj Thakur though he is a party to agreement and the contents would read to show that it was executed on 23/08/2010. It is stated six months time as agreed in agreement came to an end on 23/02/2011. It is stated there is no averment in the plaint is made about role played by one Raj Thakur though he is a party to agreement and the contents would read to show that it was executed on 23/08/2010. It is stated six months time as agreed in agreement came to an end on 23/02/2011. It is stated therefore the sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 after 6 months of time was executed and since he had no knowledge of agreement it would mean that status of purchaser was bona fide, as the sale to respondent No.7 was on 29/04/2011. The counsel would submit that there is no allegations against respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) that knowing full well that earlier agreement is existing, he purchased the land. It is stated as per averments of the plaint itself, the respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) was a bona fide purchaser. The counsel would further submit that the plaint averments further do not show that respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) was in know of the fact about any existence of agreement for sale. Referring to the statement of PW-1 he would submit that he admitted the fact that the defendant is the sole owner and he is in possession which the defendant No.2 had purchased and in absence of any pleading that the defendant No.2 was in know of the earlier existence of contract, the evidence cannot be looked into. He placed his reliance (2011) 12 SCC 695 in between National Textile Corporation Limited Vs. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar Jagad & ors. and (2012) 8 SCC 148 in between Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another to submit that particular pleading would be necessary and the parties cannot be allowed to travel beyond their pleading. 10. He would further submit that respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) was bona fide purchaser and since the plaintiff failed to comply his part of contract within the stipulated time as such the purchase made by the defendant No.2 after expiration of the period would be saved under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1963') He refers to (2015) 8 SCC 695 in between Padmakumari & ors. Vs. Dasayyan & ors. Vs. Dasayyan & ors. He further submits that perusal of the 16 point form which is enclosed in the subsequent sale deed, no date is shown and if it is seen alongwith the Ex.P-1 the agreement, the agreement did not disclose the condition that after obtaining the permission of 16 point form sale deed would be executed. Therefore the agreement did not contain any clause of execution of sale deed after the 16 point form is availed consequently obtaining such 16 point document was not a condition precedent. Referring to statement of the defendant No.1 he would submit that the non-existence of the agreement as has been held by the learned trial court is well merited qua the reason that the defendant Manglu who was illiterate man was made to sign the document but receipt of Rs.5 lakhs sale consideration by him has not been proved as the witness PW-2 has stated that the amount was paid before the Registrar but the Ex.P-1 do not support the same. 11. The counsel would further submit that the plaintiff when contended that amount was paid, the burden would be on him to prove the same and he relies on (2011) 12 SCC 220 in between Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami & anr. and (2004) 9 SCC 468 in between Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul & Another Vs. Pratima Maity & others. He would submit that by whom the amount was given who has received it is all ambiguous. Therefore, in the circumstances very existence of the agreement though registered, payment of consideration is not proved, in a result the order of the learned court below do not require any interference. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the record and the evidence. 13. As per the plaint allegation and the agreement Ex.P-1 a property was agreed to be sold by the defendant Manglu in favour of Lalan Singh bearing khasra Nos. 273, 287, 288, 289, 290 total admeasuring 0.946 hectare for a sale consideration of Rs.16 lakhs. The agreement purports Rs.5 lakhs was received as an earnest money. The said agreement is registered. The registration is proved by witness PW-3 Devendra Kumar Sahu the person from office of Sub Registrar. 273, 287, 288, 289, 290 total admeasuring 0.946 hectare for a sale consideration of Rs.16 lakhs. The agreement purports Rs.5 lakhs was received as an earnest money. The said agreement is registered. The registration is proved by witness PW-3 Devendra Kumar Sahu the person from office of Sub Registrar. The contents of the agreement Ex.P-1 read with statement of Lalan Singh PW-1 would show that amount of Rs.5 lakhs was paid out of total consideration of Rs.16 lakhs and Rs.11 lakhs was agreed to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. The agreement contains presence of one Raj Thakur as a consenting party who had given the consent to such sale. 14. The witness PW-1 in his statement averred that in the said agreement dated 23/08/2010, before him Manglu had scribed his thumb impression, thereafter Raj Thakur had signed the same. A specific question was put to PW-1 that how Raj Thakur came to be a party to Ex.P-1. Explaining the same it was stated that Manglu had brought Raj Thakur with him for reason that over the subject land he was in possession. Therefore to get his consent his signature were obtained on agreement of sale. In the written statement of defendant No.1 the original seller had denied the execution of the agreement Ex.P-1. In the additional pleading it is stated that the agreement is outcome of fraud and actually no agreement was executed. He stated that he was persuaded to go to Registrar office to put his thumb impression as a witness in some document but instead the said agreement was got signed. He further stated that the said agreement has been scribed to take over the land of defendant. At para 19 of the written statement further defendant No.1 (since dead) further stated that the time was essence of contract in such sale agreement. The witness PW-1 to the agreement had proved the signatures and would be a primary evidence. The signatures on document were proved to have been scribed coupled with the fact it was registered with Sub-Registrar. So mere defence to say no such agreement was executed cannot be given a precedence over a registered document unless proved otherwise by cogent evidence. The witness PW-1 to the agreement had proved the signatures and would be a primary evidence. The signatures on document were proved to have been scribed coupled with the fact it was registered with Sub-Registrar. So mere defence to say no such agreement was executed cannot be given a precedence over a registered document unless proved otherwise by cogent evidence. Further the question comes to fore if the agreement was said to be outcome of fraud, at the same time how the plea can be entertained that the time was essence of contract. 15. PW-1/plaintiff in his statement para 22 stated that in order to solve the dispute he got the signature of Raj Thakur as he was in possession over the said land. This appears to be logical to infer in case of purchase, the purchaser would like to purchase a land without any dispute. Therefore nothing unusual appears to hold to draw any adverse inference only because of signature of third party was taken on agreement for the reason he was shown to be in possession on part of land. 16. It was also stated that plaintiff has sufficient means as he had a business of utensils and would pay amount from the income generated from ancestral land about 25 acres from which he had received the amount. The cross-examination to PW-1 at para 20 the suggestion was given that according to the agreement the registry was to be executed within six months from 23/08/2010, therefore the inference would be that if at the one hand defence is raised that agreement is out come of fraud, then the suggestion in cross examination that the time was essence of contract would show by implication the existence of agreement was substantiated as both the plea were mutually destructive. Further the suggestion was given that registry could not be done within 6 months. At the same time it is stated because of fact Mangul could not get 16 point document as such registry could not be made. Further the witness stated after 16 point form was obtained Manglu was selling it to Sujit Singh. So the evidence as has come would show Manglu could not execute the sale for want of 16 point document shows that execution of sale was dependent on obtaining the 16 point document to infer that time was not the essence of contract. Further the witness stated after 16 point form was obtained Manglu was selling it to Sujit Singh. So the evidence as has come would show Manglu could not execute the sale for want of 16 point document shows that execution of sale was dependent on obtaining the 16 point document to infer that time was not the essence of contract. The affiliation with one Vinod Agrawal and Sanjay Agrawal though was suggested but was denied by PW-1. 17. The plaintiff further at para 4 and 7 has contended that after the agreement, in order to execute the sale deed, 16 point document was required to be obtained for registration of sale-deed. In the examination-in-chief, PW-1 at para 8 stated that though the agreement to execute the sale deed was for six months but it was interdependent on the fact that on receipt of 16 point document sale-deed could be executed. It was further stated the 16 point document could not be obtained by seller as such sale deed could not be executed. He further stated that thereafter he tried to contact patwari on 10/05/2011 when he came to know that 16 point document was already obtained, thereafter he served a notice to the respondent Manglu on 19/05/2011. In the cross-examination at para 21 he further stated that because of the fact 16 point document could not be obtained by Manglu, therefore the Registry could not be done. Further suggestion when was given to PW-1 that when the sale deed was not executed within six months despite it he has not taken any steps, in answer to it the witness volunteered that he had sent the notice. Therefore the facts would show that sale deed was interdependent on obtaining the 16 point document at the behest of seller. There is no evidence on record that the seller had sent the notice or intimation to the proposed purchaser after he obtained document of 16 point. Therefore the evidence on record suggests that vendor did not perform his part of contract as such the vendee cannot be held responsible to say that he has not performed his part of contract. 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (dead) & ors. Vs. Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar reported in (2008) 4 SCC 464 at para 11 has held under:- 11. 18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (dead) & ors. Vs. Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar reported in (2008) 4 SCC 464 at para 11 has held under:- 11. It is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property, there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. 8....even where the parties have expressly provided that time is the essence of the contract, such a stipulation will have to be read along with other provisions of the contract....., for instance, if the contract were to include clauses providing for extension of time in certain contingencies or for payment of fine or penalty for every day or week, the work undertaken remains unfinished on the expiry of the time provided in the contract, such clauses would be construed as rendering ineffective the express provision relating to the time being of the essence of contract.” In the instant case since 16 point document, was to be obtained by seller and without which the sale-deed could not be registered, in absence of any evidence that Manglu had informed the plaintiff when such document was obtained, the period of six months for execution of saledeed cannot be treated as the time was the essence of contract. Accordingly, we hold that the agreement was executed in between the plaintiff and the erstwhile seller Manglu which is proved as Ex.P-1. 19. When PW-1 the purchaser was cross-examined by respondent No.7 (the defendant No.2), suggestion was given at para 28 that money of Rs.5 lakhs though was given to Manglu but no separate receipt was taken. Thereafter the witness volunteered that he got the agreement registered. Further suggestion was given that the signature of Raj Thakur was obtained on the agreement for the reason that he would get the sale deed executed, as such his signature was obtained. Further suggestion was given that Raj Thakur is not the owner of land. Further the suggestion was also made to the witness by the respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) that after six months of the execution of the agreement despite the fact Manglu refused to execute the sale deed but the purchaser did not serve any notice. In answer to it witness volunteered that he had sent the notice but the same could not be served. In answer to it witness volunteered that he had sent the notice but the same could not be served. The nature of suggestion so given by the defendants only points out that amount of Rs.5 lakhs was stated to be given to Manglu. The presence of Raj Thakur is justified for the reason that he was in possession over part of the land as explained by plaintiff. Therefore if the existence of execution agreement itself was denied, then the kind of suggestion would only destroy such defence of defendants to draw adverse inference of same facts. 20. Apart from the contents of registered agreement Ex.P-1, wherein payment of Rs.5 lakhs is shown, in the statement of purchaser PW-1 payment of Rs.5 lakhs as a earnest money was stated. However no cross-examination has been made to challenge such payment of earnest money. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 3 SCC 138 has held that when there is no cross-examination on a factual matrix and that remained unchallenged that ought to be believed by the court. It further lays down that section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by opposite party and the scope of that provision is enlarged by section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned; (1) to test his veracity. (2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. 21. The defendant No.1 the original seller at one point of time raised a defence that the agreement is outcome of fraud at the same time raises a defence that the time was the essence of contract. While the respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) the purchaser had raised a defence that since within six months of agreement the sale deed was not executed, and stated that time was the essence of contract. While the respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) the purchaser had raised a defence that since within six months of agreement the sale deed was not executed, and stated that time was the essence of contract. Further more, suggestion was made by respondent No.7 (defendant No.2) that the money of Rs.5 lakhs was given to one Raj Thakur would only fortify the existence of a registered agreement Ex.P-1 and further would go to show transaction took place in between the parties. It is obvious that when a document is registered, then in order to shake the credibility of the document admissible cogent evidence should be brought on record as otherwise the presumptive value of correctness would follow with the registered document. 22. Another defence which was raised by witness of purchaser i.e. DW-1 is that the plaintiff was defacto face of Sanjay Agrawal who primarily wanted to purchase the land and tried to show that it was a benami transaction. No pleadings have been made to this effect by either of the defendants. The witness on behalf of purchaser PW-2 Vinod Agrawal has deposed about execution of agreement dated 23/08/2010 which was registered. Narrating the execution process it is stated that first Lalan Singh had put his thumb impression, thereafter Raj Thakur had signed and subsequent thereto the Sub- Registrar asked Manglu whether he has received Rs.5 lakhs and Manglu then admitted to have received Rs.5 lakhs. It is stated after such satisfaction the Sub Registrar had registered the document. Registration of agreement is proved by the witness PW-3, the person from the office of Sub Registrar. In a suggestion given by defendant No.1 to plaintiff that Vinod Agrawal wanted to purchase the land for himself, the plaintiff denied the same. Another suggestion was given that Manglu had agreed to sell the land to Lalan, the plaintiff, at the rate of Rs.5 lakhs, to such suggestion it was replied that it is wrong to say that agreement to sale was for Rs. 5 lakhs and witness volunteered that it was for Rs.16 lakhs. The suggestion of benami transaction though was suggested to PW-2 at para 17 he denied the same. Further at para 22 this witness further affirmed that on the date of agreement Lalan had paid Manglu Rs.5 lakhs. 5 lakhs and witness volunteered that it was for Rs.16 lakhs. The suggestion of benami transaction though was suggested to PW-2 at para 17 he denied the same. Further at para 22 this witness further affirmed that on the date of agreement Lalan had paid Manglu Rs.5 lakhs. Further suggestion was given to him at para 23 which he denied that Vinod Agrawal and Sanjay Agrawal including Lalan Singh paid amount of Rs.5 lakhs to Raj Thakur and got an agreement executed in the name of Manglu. Therefore, if the suggestion is given that amount was paid to Raj Thakur and Rs.5 lakhs was paid the question of denial of agreement would be apposite plea which otherwise would prove the existence of agreement. 23. No witness on behalf of the original seller or his legal heir entered into witness box to prove his defence. Therefore when such position arises, the Supreme Court in matter of Iqbal Basith & ors. Vs. N. Subbalakshmi & ors. reported in (2021) 2 SCC 718 has occasion to deal with such situation. It held that when the original defendant did not appear in person to depose, then adverse inference is required to be drawn. At para 10 of its order the Court held as under:- "10.In Iswar Bhai C. Patel vs. Harihar Behera, (1999) 3 SCC 457 this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 462, para 17) “17…..Having not entered into the witnes box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of the principles contained in Illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” 24. The defence further has been raised by the original seller that since 16 point document was not obtained and the plaintiff did not show his capacity of having fund the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The Supreme Court in the matter of (2017) 4 SCC 654 in between A. Kanthamani Vs. Nasreen Ahmed has occasion to interpret the expression readiness and willingness. It held that while examining the question as to how and in what manner the plaintiff is required to prove his financial readiness so as to enable him to claim specific performance of the contract and the agreement. Nasreen Ahmed has occasion to interpret the expression readiness and willingness. It held that while examining the question as to how and in what manner the plaintiff is required to prove his financial readiness so as to enable him to claim specific performance of the contract and the agreement. It is not required always to prove possession of sufficient money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing transaction. The Court at para 24 and 25 held as under:- “24.The expression "readiness and willingness" has been the subject matter of interpretation in many cases even prior to its insertion in Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. While examining the question as to how and in what manner, the plaintiff is required to prove his financial readiness so as to enable him to claim specific performance of the contract/agreement, the Privy Council in a leading case which arose from the Indian Courts (Bombay) in Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy, AIR 1950 PC 90 , approved the view taken by Chagla A.C.J., and held inter alia that " it is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce the money or vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction to prove his readiness and willingness.” 25. The following observations of the Privy Council are apposite: (Jamsetji case 1949 SCC On line PC 81 “21…………..Their Lordships agree with this conclusion and the grounds on which it was based. It is true that the plaintiff 1 stated that he was buying for himself, that he had not sufficient ready money to meet the price and that no definite arrangements had been made for finding it at the time of repudiation. But in order to prove himself ready and willing a purchaser has not necessarily to produce the money or to vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction. The question is one of fact, and in the present case the Appellate Court had ample material on which to found the view it reached. Their Lordships would only add in this connection that they fully concur with Chagla A.C.J. when he says: "In my opinion, on the evidence already on record it was sufficient for the court to come to the conclusion ' that plaintiff 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Their Lordships would only add in this connection that they fully concur with Chagla A.C.J. when he says: "In my opinion, on the evidence already on record it was sufficient for the court to come to the conclusion ' that plaintiff 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was not necessary for him to ' work out actual figures and satisfy the court what specific amount a bank would have advanced on the mortgage of his property and the pledge of these shares. I do not think that any jury-- if the matter was left to the jury in England--would have come to the conclusion that a man, " in the position in which the plaintiff was, was not ready and willing to pay the purchase price of the shares which he had bought from defendants 1 and 2." For the foregoing reasons, their Lordships answer question(4) in the affirmative.” (Emphasis supplied)” 25. Now coming back to the statement of PW-1 at para 16 in chief he has stated to have possessed with available fund with him from the business of utensils and the income of his ancestral property about 25 acres. Further in the cross-examination at para 19 he stated that his father has sold part of certain land to some one and the money is with him. Further more when the existence of the agreement is denied by seller, the defence cannot be entertained that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. 26. The Supreme Court in 2021 SCC OnLine 365 Kadupugotla Varalakshmi v. Vudagiri Venkata Rao held that when a defence is raised in the written statement about the non-existence of the agreement, the defence cannot be entertained that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Further in Silvey v. Arun Varghese (2008) 11 SCC 45 the Court held that when a false plea has been taken by the defendant about the non execution the agreement then the conduct of the parties would be relevant to exercise the discretion for decreeing the suit for specific performance. Further in Silvey v. Arun Varghese (2008) 11 SCC 45 the Court held that when a false plea has been taken by the defendant about the non execution the agreement then the conduct of the parties would be relevant to exercise the discretion for decreeing the suit for specific performance. Again in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd (2012) 5 SCC 712 , the Supreme Court held that when a contract itself was denied the defendant could not have raised the other plea that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Later, in A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed (2017) 4 SCC 654 the Court held that it was not necessary to show that the plaintiff has money in his account to purchase the property. 27. Further question falls for consideration as to whether the subsequent purchaser who had purchased the same was bona fide purchaser and would be protected under Section 19 (b) of Specific Relief Act of 1963. The purchaser Sujit Singh contended that they had purchased the property for the reason that the time limit period of contract of sale executed earlier with the plaintiff had expired and the time was the essence of contract. The defendant No.1 at para 7 of the written statement has categorically pleaded that the agreement was outcome of fraud and along with it defence is raised that the time was essence of contract. The defendant No.2 Sujit Singh at para 13 has pleaded that the suit was filed on the basis of the agreement but agreement contained a clause that sale deed should have been executed within six months and plaintiff himself has failed to abide by his obligation within a period of six months to get the sale deed, therefore, the agreement has lost its value. It is stated under these circumstances, the subsequent sale deed in his favour was executed beyond the period of six months and claimed the subsequent sale deed to be valid. 28. The defendant Sujit Singh, DW-1 who was the sole witness examined in the case. In the examination-in-chief he has stated that Manglu had not executed any agreement in favour of plaintiff or any third person and he came to know about existence of the agreement after he received the notice from court. 28. The defendant Sujit Singh, DW-1 who was the sole witness examined in the case. In the examination-in-chief he has stated that Manglu had not executed any agreement in favour of plaintiff or any third person and he came to know about existence of the agreement after he received the notice from court. He further averred at para 6 of the examination-in-chief, the earlier agreement was outcome of fraud. 29. In the cross-examination of witness DW-1, at para 8 has averred that before the written statement was filed he had not seen the document i.e. the agreement filed by the plaintiff. He further averred that before the written statement was filed he had not seen the agreement executed by Manglu in favour of plaintiff. This statement if is considered with the pleading in the written statement of the defendant, at para 7 it is specifically pleaded that in the agreement executed in between plaintiff and erstwhile seller Manglu, time was the essence of contract. So the necessary inference could be drawn that the agreement executed in between plaintiff and the seller Manglu (since deceased) was in knowledge of subsequent purchaser therefore the nature of statement has come in cross-examination. Further the document Ex. D-1 which is a subsequent sale deed by Manglu in favour of Sujit Singh shows that the copy of 16 point document was obtained and clause 14 of it shows that in respect of the sale consideration parties were directed to obtain information from the seller. In the said document of 16 point information one Manish Kumar is the witness. The sale agreement dated 23rd August, 2010 (Ex.P-1) executed in between Manglu and the plaintiff, which is a registered one, also shows Manish Kumar was one of the witness. 30. Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act of 1963 protects the bona fide purchaser for a value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. The respondent Sujit Singh raised a defence under Section 19 (b) of the Act, 1963. At the same time defence is raised in written statement that earlier agreement between Manglu and plaintiff i.e. Ex.P-1 is out come of fraud. 31. The Supreme Court in the case of L.N. Gadodia and sons and another Vs. The respondent Sujit Singh raised a defence under Section 19 (b) of the Act, 1963. At the same time defence is raised in written statement that earlier agreement between Manglu and plaintiff i.e. Ex.P-1 is out come of fraud. 31. The Supreme Court in the case of L.N. Gadodia and sons and another Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner { (2011) 13 SCC 517 } at para 24 has held that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact lies on him. This rule (which is also embodied in section 106 of the Evidence Act) expects such a party to produce the best evidence before the authority concerned, failing which the necessary inference is required to be drawn. The defendant tried to avoid the earlier agreement with the allegation of fraud but at the same time raised the defence that the time was the essence of the contract in the written statement. In the cross-examination specific admission exists that before the written statement was filed he had not seen the document Ex. P-1. So if the document Ex.P-1 was not seen before filing of written statement then defence that the time was essence of contract how could have been raised. The contradictory stand in written statement and evidence only would negate the bona fide which is an available defence under Section 19 (b) of the Act, 1963 to the defendant. 32. The Supreme Court in the matter of Padmakumari and others Vs. Dasayyan and others { (2015) 8 SCC 695 } at para 23 has dealt with such situation and held that when the subsequent purchaser did not have the knowledge and paid the amount in bona fide and good faith without notice of original contract then protection can be granted. However, in the instant case the existence of original contract Ex. P-1 appears to be was very much in the knowledge of the defendant Sujit Singh. Consequently, despite knowing this fact when he purchased the same, the defence of Section 19 (b) of the Act of 1963 could not be availed by him and consequences would follow. 33. In view of the foregoing discussions, we allow the appeal. The judgement and decree of the Court below is set aside. The plaintiff is entitled for the decree for specific performance of suit in accordance with the Ex. 33. In view of the foregoing discussions, we allow the appeal. The judgement and decree of the Court below is set aside. The plaintiff is entitled for the decree for specific performance of suit in accordance with the Ex. P-1 dated 23rd August, 2010 and the sale deed dated 29/04/2011 (Ex.D-1) is annulled. 34. A decree be drawn accordingly. The cost of the appeal shall also be borne by the respondents.