ORDER : 1. The impugned judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior, upholds conviction of Anju @ Chand Khan under section 394 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery. He has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs. 500/-. 2. The impugned judgment acquits Jitendra Kushwah @ Jeetu and Rafik @ Rakib. The State has not preferred any appeal against their acquittal. The fourth accused, Kamlesh @ Lature Jatav, whose conviction was upheld by the High Court, did not file any appeal against his conviction, and we have been informed that he has been released on completion of sentence. Possibly, he was also involved in some other case. 3. On the question of the appellant’s involvement, testimony of the injured victim, who was also the informant, Suresh Kori (PW-1), is significant. On midnight of 15.2.2012, Suresh Kori returned from Delhi and had parked the truck that he had driven, in front of the truck owner’s house in Dabra. Suresh Kori had then proceeded towards his house situated in Deedar Colony on foot when two persons accosted him in front of Happy Sardar’s house. One of them was tall, and the other was short with a wheatish complexion. They took Rs. 6800/- in cash and two mobile phones out of his pocket. Thereupon, two more persons, armed with pickaxes, joined them. They inflicted wounds on his head and right leg. Suresh Kori had returned to the truck owner’s house and thereafter went to the police station for reporting the complaint. He was given medical treatment before he went home. He identified the present appellant - Anju @ Chand Khan, Kamlesh @ Lature Jatav, and Rafik @ Rakib, but he could not identify Jitendra Kushwah @ Jeetu. At the same time, he had claimed that all of them had committed the offence, and further, the accused were threatening him to compromise else they would kill him. 4. The injuries suffered by Suresh Kori have been confirmed by Dr. Harish Arya (PW-8), who had examined him on 15.2.2012 and deposed about the three injuries, including incised wounds on the right side of his forehead and right ankle. 4. The injuries suffered by Suresh Kori have been confirmed by Dr. Harish Arya (PW-8), who had examined him on 15.2.2012 and deposed about the three injuries, including incised wounds on the right side of his forehead and right ankle. The occurrence is also corroborated by Banwari Jatav (PW-6), an accountant working with the truck owner, and Deendayal (PW-2), the helper of the truck, as they had met Suresh Kori immediately after the occurrence and he informed them that he had been robbed of Rs. 6800/- and two mobiles and injuries had been inflicted upon him by pickaxes. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the fact that the test identification parade took place almost three months after the appellant was arrested. Further, in the crossexamination, Suresh Kori stated that the accused persons were arrested on the next day of the incident. He was called to the police station and asked if the arrested persons were the same who had accosted him. On seeing them, Suresh Kori stated that these were the same boys. 6. There is no doubt that Suresh Kori had identified the appellant as one of the perpetrators in Court. However, Suresh Kori was also candid as he accepted in his cross-examination that he had identified the perpetrators at the police station the day after the incident. In this background, the identification of the appellant in the test identification parade on 25.5.2012 before Naib Tahsildar, Dabra, Gwalior has been challenged. 7. The identity of the accused is relevant under section 9 [Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts.—Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose.] of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, as a general rule, the substantive evidence of the witness is a statement made in Court. Therefore, as a general rule, the substantive evidence of the witness is a statement made in Court. The purpose of conducting a test identification parade is that the person who claims to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identifies the perpetrator without tutoring or aid from any source. Investigating agencies also resort to the identification parade to ensure that the person accused is the actual culprit. Test identification parade does not have any specific statutory backing in the form of a mandate in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in the Evidence Act. Test identification parade primarily strengthens the prosecution’s case as it acts as a circumstance corroborative of identification in Court. Some decisions of this Court do hold that the identification of the accused for the first time in Court, when the accused was not otherwise known to the witness, especially in cases where the interaction was for a very brief duration, should put the Court on caution as in such situations, dock identification is contestable by its very nature. Prior test identification aims to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of evidence. Accordingly, it would be a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration in cases of dock identification without prompt test identification parade when the accused are strangers to the witness. At the same time, this rule of prudence is not absolute and is subject to the exception when in the facts the Court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness. Corroboration can be in the form of other circumstantial and material evidence brought on record. The law on this subject succinctly summarized in Rajesh alias Sarkari and Another v. State of Haryana, [ (2021) 1 SCC 118 ] is reproduced below : “43.1. The purpose of conducting a TIP is that persons who claim to have seen the offender at the time of the occurrence identify them from amongst the other individuals without tutoring or aid from any source. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eyewitness to the crime. 43.2. There is no specific provision either in CrPC or the Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Evidence Act”) which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. An identification parade, in other words, tests the memory of the witnesses, in order for the prosecution to determine whether any or all of them can be cited as eyewitness to the crime. 43.2. There is no specific provision either in CrPC or the Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Evidence Act”) which lends statutory authority to an identification parade. Identification parades belong to the stage of the investigation of crime and there is no provision which compels the investigating agency to hold or confers a right on the accused to claim a TIP. 43.3. Identification parades are governed in that context by the provision of section 162 CrPC. 43.4. A TIP should ordinarily be conducted soon after the arrest of the accused, so as to preclude a possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before it is held. 43.5. The identification of the accused in Court constitutes substantive evidence. 43.6. Facts which establish the identity of the accused person are treated to be relevant under section 9 of the Evidence Act. 43.7. A TIP may lend corroboration to the identification of the witness in Court, if so required. 43.8. As a rule of prudence, the Court would, generally speaking, look for corroboration of the witness’ identification of the accused in Court, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. The rule of prudence is subject to the exception when the Court considers it safe to rely upon the evidence of a particular witness without such, or other corroboration. 43.9. Since a TIP does not constitute substantive evidence, the failure to hold it does not ipso facto make the evidence of identification inadmissible. 43.10. The weight that is attached to such identification is a matter to be determined by the Court in the circumstances of that particular case. 43.11. Identification of the accused in a TIP or in Court is not essential in every case where guilt is established on the basis of circumstances which lend assurance to the nature and the quality of the evidence. 43.12. The Court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. 43.12. The Court of fact may, in the context and circumstances of each case, determine whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the accused for refusing to participate in a TIP. However, the Court would look for corroborating material of a substantial nature before it enters a finding in regard to the guilt of the accused.” In the present case, even if we are to ignore the test identification parade on 25.5.2012, identification by Suresh Kori on the next day after the occurrence would be a corroborative fact as it is not disputed or denied by the defence. In fact, the identification was deposed to by Suresh Kori in his crossexamination. Moreover, the appellant’s involvement is also proved by the recovery of the mobile phone, which was robbed and taken from Suresh Kori. 8. Suresh Kori recognized the two mobile phones, which are marked Exh. A-1 and Exh. A-2. He also gave the mobile numbers of the sim cards in the two phones, which fact remained unchallenged. Deendayal (PW-2) deposed that he owned the second mobile phone, and he had given it to Suresh Kori for charging. P.S. Tomar (PW-10), who was the investigating officer, has deposed that he had recorded the disclosure statement of the appellant, and one mobile phone of Samsung was produced by him and seized vide seizure memo Exh. P-5. The seizure was from the house of the appellant. Gyan Singh (PW-3), father of Suresh Kori, confirms the recovery of the mobile phone on 29.2.2012 from the house of the appellant. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Gyan Singh described the seizure from the house of Bhajju Jatav must be rejected. The witness made an apparent mistake, which was corrected in his cross-examination by the public prosecutor. Gyan Singh identified his signatures on the seizure memo Exh. P-5. 9. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in affirming the conviction of the appellant. 10. On the aspect of the quantum of sentence, we are informed that the appellant has suffered actual incarceration for more than three and a half years. He was released on bail for over six and a half years. Learned counsel for the State has drawn our attention to the counter affidavit filed by the State, which states that the appellant was involved in three other criminal cases. He was released on bail for over six and a half years. Learned counsel for the State has drawn our attention to the counter affidavit filed by the State, which states that the appellant was involved in three other criminal cases. On this aspect, it is to be noted that in one case, the appellant was acquitted in the year 2013, in the second matter relating to the year 2011, the offence was compounded in 2014, and in the third matter, which relates to the year 2015, fine of Rs. 100/- was imposed. Given the aforesaid position, we are inclined to modify and reduce the sentence imposed. The appellant, it is directed, shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years and pay a fine of Rs. 500/- with the stipulation that the appellant will undergo simple imprisonment for one month in the event of default in payment of the fine. The appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. Accordingly, we dismiss the present appeal to the extent of upholding the conviction of the appellant Anju @ Chand Khan under section 394 of the Penal Code but convert/reduce the sentence as stated in paragraph 10 above.