JUDGMENT Tarlada Rajasekhar Rao, J. - The present Writ Petition is filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India to declare the action of the respondent Nos.1, 3, 5, 6 & 7 in not granting permission to the Writ Petitioners and other street vendors to re-start night food courts at service road, near old jail road, opposite to women's college, Visakhapatnam even after Covid-19 period is arbitrary, illegal and violative of articles 14 & 21 of the Constitution of India and also violative of Section 12 of the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) act, 2014 (in short, 'the act 7 of 2014') and consequently prayed to direct the respondents to grant necessary permissions to re-start night food courts. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that petitioner has formed into a Society and got it registered under Section 9 of Societies Registration act, 2001 in the name and style of Central Park Food Truckers Welfare association. They were eaking out their livelihood by carrying on the business of selling food items by obtaining permission from the concerned authorities. Basing on the direction issued by the 1st respondent vide order dated 18.03.2020 in Rc.No.47/2020H5UCD/GVMC, they have temporarily stopped the business due to Covid-19 pandemic. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner association made a representation in Spandana portal on 03.01.2022 requesting to permit to do business i.e., running of food courts at service road, near old jail road, opposite to women's college, Visakhapatnam etc as the Covid-19 pandemic has come to normalcy. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the 1st respondent-Municipal Commissioner has rejected the application made in Spandana portal, without assigning any reason. 4. aggrieved by the same, the petitioner association filed the present Writ Petition seeking a direction to the respondents to allow them to run the night food courts. The matter was listed on 13.04.2022 for the first time. at the request of the counsel for the 1st respondent, the matter was again listed on 18.04.2022. 5. Heard both sides. 6. at the time of hearing, learned counsel for the 1st respondent raised the following contentions:- i) The Writ Petition is not maintainable as it was filed by the association and he relied on the Order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ appeal No.91 of 2022 dated 15.03.2022. 5. Heard both sides. 6. at the time of hearing, learned counsel for the 1st respondent raised the following contentions:- i) The Writ Petition is not maintainable as it was filed by the association and he relied on the Order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ appeal No.91 of 2022 dated 15.03.2022. ii) The Writ Petition is not maintainable as no Writ of Mandamus can be issued by this Court as there is no infringement of legal right and he relied on the judgment of this Court in 'Vadlamani Srinivas @ Srinivas V. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and two others. 2013 LawSuit (aP) 19' (iii) The petitioner herein cannot rely on the internal proceedings of the authorities in the said context learned counsel for the 1st respondent relied on the Judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court (from Gouhati) (D.B.) in 'Union of India & Others V. Vartak Labour Union 2011 LawSuit (SC) 176'. (iv) It is further stated that the petitioner association does come under the definition of street vendors as per the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) act, 2014. Thus, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition. First contention: Regarding maintainability of the Writ Petition by the association. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the Writ Petition is maintainable as in similar circumstances this Court has allowed the Writ Petition and he relied on the Judgment of this Court in, 'Guntur Footpath & Thopudu Veedhiballu Chiruvyaparula Sangham V. State of andhra Pradesh (2021) 2 aLT 286 .' He further relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court in, 'akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented by its assistant General Secretary on behalf of the association V. Union of India and others (1981) aIR SC 298' and prayed to allow the Writ Petition by directing the respondents to grant necessary permissions to the petitioner to start night food courts. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the Judgment of this Court in W.P.No.3865 of 2020 dated 16.02.2021 in, 'Guntur Footpath & Thopudu Veedhiballu Chiruvyaparula Sangham V. State of andhra Pradesh (2021) 2 aLT 286 ', wherein this Court has not decided the issue of maintainability of the Writ by the association. But the Writ Petition was filed by the association. But the Writ Petition was filed by the association. The said Writ Petition was allowed and Mandamus was issued against the respondents directing them not to interfere with the business of the persons therein in accordance with the provisions of the act 7 of 2014. Para no.63 in the judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court in, 'akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented by its assistant General Secretary on behalf of the association V. Union of India and others (1981) aIR SC 298' is extracted as hereunder:- 'Para No.63. a technical point is taken in the counter affidavit that the 1st petitioner is an unrecognised association and that, therefore, the petitioner to that extent, is not sustainable. It has to be overruled. Whether the petitioners belong to a recognized union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under article 32. Our current proccssual jurisprudence is not of individualistic anglo-Indian mould. It is broad based and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation', and 'representative proceedings'. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognized association maintaining the Writ Petitions'. Hence, in the light of the above judgment of the Hon'ble apex Court, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent is untenable and rejected. The petitioner society can maintain the Writ Petition. Second contention: No Writ of Mandamus can be issued as there is no infringement of legal right by relying on the judgment in 'Vadlamani Srinivas @ Srinivas V. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and two others'. 2013 LawSuit (aP) 19 9. The petitioner society can maintain the Writ Petition. Second contention: No Writ of Mandamus can be issued as there is no infringement of legal right by relying on the judgment in 'Vadlamani Srinivas @ Srinivas V. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and two others'. 2013 LawSuit (aP) 19 9. For the above said contention, this Court relies on the judgment reported in, 'Shaik Dastagiri and another V. The Executive Officer, Udaygiri Gram Panchayat and another 2002 SCC OnLine aP 196' wherein it is held that the right to carry on trade or profession is a fundamental right under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge in the said judgment has relied on the following judgments:- In 'Sodan Singh V. New Delhi Municipal Committee aIR 1989 SC 1988 ', 'ahmedabad Municipal Corporation V. Nawab Khan aIR 1997 SC 152 ', 'N. Jagadeesan V. District Collector, North arcot aIR 1997 SC 1197 ' and in other cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the common law right of trading on pavements of streets also forms part of the right under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. If properly regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or repassing and for no other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition as otherwise the very object of laying out roads - to facilitate traffic - may be defeated. allowing the right to trade without appropriate control is likely to lead to unhealthy competition and quarrel between traders and travelling public and sometimes amongst the traders themselves resulting in chaos. If the matter is examined in this light, it will appear that the principles stated in 'Saghir ahmad's case aIR 1954 SC 728 ' in connection with transport business applies to the hawker's case also. Street trading is a recognized as a fundamental right. 10. as per the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, the Writ of Mandamus can be issued only when there is infringement of the legal right. Here, in the present case the right to carry on trade and profession is a fundamental right. Where, in this case, the respondents were not given permission to carry on trade or profession. Here, in the present case the right to carry on trade and profession is a fundamental right. Where, in this case, the respondents were not given permission to carry on trade or profession. Hence, it is invasion of the fundamental right as held in, 'Shaik Dastagiri and another V. The Executive Officer, Udaygiri Gram Panchayat and another 2002 SCC OnLine aP 196.' Hence, the citation relied by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent is in favour of the petitioner herein. 11. as per the afore stated judgment, carrying on trade or business is a fundamental right. When such right is violated a Writ Petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable. Hence, the contention raised by the petitioner in 'Vadlamani Srinivas @ Srinivas V. Union of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and two others 2013 LawSuit (aP) 19' is not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case, for the raised contention. Third contention: The petitioner herein cannot rely on the internal proceedings of the authorities. 12. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submits that the letter addressed by the 1st respondent to the 5th respondent to consider for the open of the food court by the petitioner association is an internal proceeding which cannot be relied by the petitioner association. He relied on the judgment cited supra, he stated that the petitioner cannot agitate before this Court seeking a direction to grant permission for running the food court. It is a known law that the internal departmental communications and notings in department files donot have the sanction of law and does not create any enforceable right. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the above proceedings to the extent that the 1st respondent has recommended the VMRDa to consider for a restart of the food court. The 1st respondent ought not be oblivious of the fact that it is only a recommendation by the 1st respondent to the 5th respondent to consider the case of the petitioner for restart of the food court after Covid-19 pandemic. However, the 5th respondent has declined the said recommendation of the 1st respondent. Hence, the present Writ Petition. Fourth contention: 13. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent has raised another ground that the members of the petitioner-association does come under the definition of street vendors. However, the 5th respondent has declined the said recommendation of the 1st respondent. Hence, the present Writ Petition. Fourth contention: 13. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent has raised another ground that the members of the petitioner-association does come under the definition of street vendors. It is appropriate to extract the relevant provisions in act No.7 of 2014. They are extracted as hereunder: Section 2(d) Mobile Vendors: Mobile Vendors means street vendors who carry out vending activities in designated area by moving from one place to another place vending their goods and services; Section 2(k) Stationary Vendors: Stationary Vendor means street vendors who carry out vending activities on regular basis at a specific location; Section 2(l) Street Vendor: Street Vendor means a person engaged in vending of articles, goods, wares, food items or merchandise of everyday use or offering services to the general public, in a street, lane, sidewalk, footpath, pavement, public park or any other public place or private area, from a temporary built up structure or by moving from place to place and includes hawker, peddler, squatter and all other synonymous terms which may be local or region specific; and the words 'street vending' with their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly; Section 3 Survey of street vendor sand protection from eviction or relocation: (1) The Town Vending Committee shall, within such period and in such manner as may be specified in the scheme, conduct a survey of all existing street vendors, within the area under its jurisdiction, and subsequent survey shall be carried out at least once in every five years. (2) The Town Vending Committee shall ensure that all existing street vendors, identified in the survey, are accommodated in the vending zones subject to a norm conforming to two and half per cent of the population of the ward or zone or town or city, as the case may be, in accordance with the plan for street vending and the holding capacity of the vending zones. (3) No street vendor shall be evicted or as the case may be, relocated till the survey specified under sub-section (1) has been completed and the certificate of vending is issued to all street vendors. Section 12. (3) No street vendor shall be evicted or as the case may be, relocated till the survey specified under sub-section (1) has been completed and the certificate of vending is issued to all street vendors. Section 12. Rights of Street Vendors:- (1) Every street vendor shall have the right to carry on the business of street vending activities in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in the certificate of vending. Section 13. Right of street vendor for a new site or area on relocation: Every street vendor, who possess a certificate of vending, shall, in case of his relocation under section 18 be entitled for new site or area, as the case may be, for carrying out his vending activities as may be determined by the local authority, in consultation with the Town Vending Committee. 14. On the conspectus of above definitions, there is no gain saying that the petitioner association does not come under the purview of street vendor. The above said definitions make it clear that the Street Vendors can carry on business in a street, lane, sidewalk, footpath, pavement etc. The vending zone also includes a footpath, side walk, pavement, embankment, portion of street also. The contention raised by the respondents that the petitioner association are not the street vendors and ought to have carried on business in the road margin is not tenable as per the judgment in, 'Guntur Footpath & Thopudu Veedhiballu Chiruvyaparula Sangham V. State of andhra Pradesh (2021) 2 aLT 286 ' and 'Shaik Dastagiri and another V. The Executive Officer, Udaygiri Gram Panchayat and another 2002 SCC OnLine aP 196' and every street vendor shall have the right to carry on the business of street vending activities in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in the certificate of vending. Therefore, merely on the ground that the petitioner association members have allegedly encroached into the road or carried on business on a road margin is not by itself a ground to throw them out of their business. In the afore cited judgment i.e., 'Guntur Footpath & Thopudu Veedhiballu Chiruvyaparula Sangham V. State of andhra Pradesh, (2021) 2 aLT 286 ' the learned Judge has held that act 7 of 2014 is a special act and it will prevail over the provisions of the Municipal Corporation act. 15. In the afore cited judgment i.e., 'Guntur Footpath & Thopudu Veedhiballu Chiruvyaparula Sangham V. State of andhra Pradesh, (2021) 2 aLT 286 ' the learned Judge has held that act 7 of 2014 is a special act and it will prevail over the provisions of the Municipal Corporation act. 15. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the submissions of both learned counsels and on a perusal of the material on record, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the Writ Petition by directing the petitioner association to file an application under Section 3 of act 7 of 2014 to the concerned authority and the concerned authority shall process the application in accordance with law, within a reasonable time, i.e., not more than three (3) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and shall consider the application in a positive manner as the right to carryon business is a fundamental right. 16. With the above direction the Writ Petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 17. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.