JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. 1. This petition has been filed for quashing the First Information Report being Bagodar P.S. Case No. 217 of 2014 corresponding to G.R. No. 2733 of 2014 arising out of Complaint Case No. 1156 of 2014 for the alleged offence under sections 498(A)/323/506/34 of the IPC section 3/ 4 of the D.P. Act, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih. 2. The complaint case was filed by the O.P. No. 2 alleging therein that the complainant was married to the accused No. 1-Karan Kumar Sinha @ Ramchandra Prasad @ Deepak Kumar S/o Din Dayal Prasad @ Dinanath Prasad with Hindu rites and customs. Further it is stated that before marriage, he had stated to the family of the complainant including complainant that no dowry would be demanded. Further the complainant went to her sasural at Dariyaganj after marriage and subsequently a baby was born namely Aditya @ Himanshu. Further it has been alleged that in laws family started demanding Rs. 3 lacs as Dowry from her. It has been further alleged that when she showed her inability to bring this amount from her Naihar then the accused no. 5 Pramod Prasad @ Pramod Kumar who is Chacha sasur of the complainant and a school teacher threatened that either bring this amount of Karan would be married somewhere else to get dowry. Further it has been alleged that accused no. 1 to 4 started torture upon her but accused no. 5 even threatened to kill her by setting her fire. It has further been alleged that they even tried to kill her by sprinkling kerosene oil but somehow she was saved. Further on 21.05.2014 a panchayati was convened with all the parties under Mukhiya-pati. But all in vain and accused persons adamant on their demand and threatened for dire consequences, if the demand is not fulfilled. 3. Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that for the same allegation, the O.P. No. 2 has filed the FIR at Nawada which was filed on 23.05.2014 which is registered as Nawada (Nagar) P.S. Case No. 269 of 2014. She further submits that for the same allegation the complaint was filed on 12.07.2014 at Giridih. She further submits that the learned court sent the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for its registration and investigation. She further submits that for the same allegation the complaint was filed on 12.07.2014 at Giridih. She further submits that the learned court sent the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for its registration and investigation. By order dated 13.07.2016 this Court has stayed the further proceeding in connection with Bagodar P.S. Case No. 217 of 2014, G.R. No. 2733 of 2014. She submits that for the same offence two FIRs have been instituted against the petitioners and the petitioners are the husband and inlaws of the O.P. No. 2. She relied in the case of T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 . Paragraph nos. 21, 27, 28 and 35 of the said judgment are quoted herein-below: “21. The learned Solicitor-General relied on the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) (referred to as “Narang case”) to contend that there can be a second FIR in respect of the same subject-matter. In that case the contention urged by the appellant was that the police had committed illegality, acted without jurisdiction in investigating into the second case and the Delhi Court acted illegally in taking cognizance of that (the second) case. A reference to the facts of that case would be interesting. Two precious antique pillars of sandstone were deposited in the Court of Ilaqa Magistrate, Karnal, as stolen property. One N.N. Malik filed an application before the Magistrate seeking custody of the pillars to make indetail study on the pretext that he was a research scholar. It appears that the then Chief Judicial Magistrate of Karnal (H.L. Mehra), was a friend of Malik. At the instance of Mehra the said Ilaqa Magistrate ordered that the custody of the pillars be given to Malik on his executing a bond. About three months thereafter Malik deposited two pillars in the Court of Ilaqa Magistrate, Karnal. After some time it came to light that the pillars returned by Malik were not the original genuine pillars but were fake pillars. An FIR was lodged against both Malik and Mehra under Section 120-B read with Sections 406 and 420 IPC alleging conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust and cheating. CBI after necessary investigation filed charge-sheet in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against both of them. Ultimately on the application of the Public Prosecutor the case was permitted to be withdrawn and the accused were discharged. CBI after necessary investigation filed charge-sheet in the Court of Special Magistrate, Ambala, against both of them. Ultimately on the application of the Public Prosecutor the case was permitted to be withdrawn and the accused were discharged. Sometime later the original genuine pillars were found in London which led to registering an FIR in Delhi under Section 120-B read with Section 411 IPC and Section 25(1) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 against three persons who were brothers (referred to as “the Narangs”). The gravamen of the charge against them was that they, Malik and Mehra, conspired together to obtain custody of the genuine pillars, got duplicate pillars made by experienced sculptors and had them substituted with a view to smuggle out the original genuine pillars to London. After issuing process for appearance of the Narangs by the Magistrate at Delhi, an application was filed for dropping the proceedings against them on the ground that the entire second investigation was illegal as the case on the same facts was already pending before the Ambala Court, therefore, the Delhi Court acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case on the basis of illegal investigation and the report forwarded by the police. The Magistrate referred the case to the High Court and the Narangs also filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, dismissed the application of the Narangs and thus answered the reference. On appeal to this Court, it was contended that the subject-matter of the two FIRs and two charge-sheets being the same, there was an implied bar on the power of the police to investigate into the subsequent FIR and the Court at Delhi to take cognizance upon the report of such information. This Court indicated that the real question was whether the two conspiracies were in truth and substance the same and held that the conspiracies in the two cases were not identical. It appears to us that the Court did not repel the contention of the appellant regarding the illegality of the second FIR and the investigation based thereon being vitiated, but on facts found that the two FIRs in truth and substance were different - the first was a smaller conspiracy and the second was a larger conspiracy as it turned out eventually. It was pointed out that even under the Code of 1898, after filing of final report, there could be further investigation and forwarding of further report. The 1973 Cr.P.C. specifically provides for further investigation after forwarding of report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. and forwarding of further report or reports to the Magistrate concerned under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. It follows that if the gravamen of the charges in the two FIRs “the first and the second” is in truth and substance the same, registering the second FIR and making fresh investigation and forwarding report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. will be irregular and the court cannot take cognizance of the same. 27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 28. 28. Coming to the facts of this case, which are not free from political overtones, the incident which gave rise to registering of FIRs, took place on 25-11-1994 on the occasion of the visit of the Minister to Alakkandy Complex at Kuthuparamba, Tellicherry Road (Kannur District) for inauguration of the evening branch of Cooperative Urban Bank. The events that developed there led to firing by the police at two places: (i) in the vicinity of the Town Hall for which FIR was lodged and Crime No. 353 of 1994 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 332, 353, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC, Section 3(2)(e) of the PDPP Act and Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, was registered and (ii) in the vicinity of Police Station Kuthuparamba in respect of which FIR was filed and Crime No. 354 of 1994 of Kuthuparamba Police Station under Sections 143, 147, 148, 307 and 427 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 3(2)(e) of the PDPP Act was registered. While the investigations on the basis of the said FIRs were pending, the report of Mr. K. Padmanabhan Nair, Inquiry Commission, was submitted to the Government. On 30-6-1997, the Additional Chief Secretary wrote to the Director General of Police that the Government had accepted the report of the Commission and directed that legal action be taken against those responsible on the basis of the findings of the Commission. On 2- 7-1997, the Director General of Police, however, wrote to the Inspector General of Police (North Zone) to register a case immediately and have the same investigated by a senior officer. Two days thereafter, the Inspector General of Police added his own remarks - “firing without justification by which people were killed amounted to murder” - and ordered the Station House Officer to register a case under the appropriate sections and forward the investigation copy of the FIR to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (North Zone) for urgent personal investigation. On the date when the Additional Chief Secretary wrote to the Director General of Police, the investigations initiated in the said two crimes relating to the same incident were in progress. The investigating agency should have taken advantage of the report of the Commission for a proper further investigation into the case. On the date when the Additional Chief Secretary wrote to the Director General of Police, the investigations initiated in the said two crimes relating to the same incident were in progress. The investigating agency should have taken advantage of the report of the Commission for a proper further investigation into the case. On the facts which might come to light during investigation, if necessary, the investigating agency should have altered the offences under appropriate section of the relevant Acts and concluded the investigations. In view of the orders of the Director General of Police to register a case and on the further direction of the Inspector General of Police, the officer in charge of the police station registered Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station. A comparison and critical examination of the FIRs in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 on one hand and FIR in Crime No. 268 of 1997 on the other, discloses that the date and place of occurrence are the same; there is alluding reference to the deaths caused due to police firing in the FIRs in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994. In any event, that fact was evident on the scene of occurrence. The narration of events, which we need not repeat here, is almost the same. The additional averments in Crime No. 268 of 1997 are based on the findings in the report of the Commission. Having regard to the test laid down by this Court in Narang case with which we are in respectful agreement, we find that in truth and substance the essence of the offence in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 is the same as in Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station. In our view, in sending information in regard to the same incident, duly enclosing a copy of the report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Inspector General of Police for appropriate action, the Additional Chief Secretary adopted the right course of action. In our view, in sending information in regard to the same incident, duly enclosing a copy of the report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Inspector General of Police for appropriate action, the Additional Chief Secretary adopted the right course of action. Perhaps the endorsement of the Inspector General of Police for registration of a case misled the subordinate police officers and the said letter with regard to the incident of 25-11-1994 at Kuthuparamba was registered again under Section 154 Cr.P.C. which would be the second FIR and, in our opinion, on the facts of this case, was irregular and a fresh investigation by the investigating agency was unwarranted and illegal. On that date the investigations in the earlier cases (Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994) were pending. The correct course of action should have been to take note of the findings and the contents of the report, streamline the investigation to ascertain the true and correct facts, collect the evidence in support thereof, form an opinion under Sections 169 and 170 Cr.P.C. as the case may be, and forward the report/reports under Section 173(2) or Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. to the Magistrate concerned. The course adopted in this case, namely, the registration of the information as the second FIR in regard to the same incident and making a fresh investigation is not permissible under the scheme of the provisions of Cr.P.C. as pointed out above, therefore, the investigation undertaken and the report thereof cannot but be invalid. We have, therefore, no option except to quash the same leaving it open to the investigating agency to seek permission in Crime No. 353 or 354 of 1994 of the Magistrate to make further investigation, forward further report or reports and thus proceed in accordance with law. 35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside.” 4. Per contra, Mr. Tarun Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P. No. 2 submits that only the F.I.R. is under challenge and the investigation has not yet started and there was stay granted by this Court and this Court may not interfere at this stage under section 482 Cr.P.C. He tried to distinguish the two F.I.R. filed by the O.P. No. 2 and submits that in both the cases, the allegations are different. 5. On perusal of the F.I.R. which was filed at Nawada it appears that it was also filed under sections 498(A), 494 IPC and the present one which has been referred also the allegations are almost similar. Moreover, the complaint petition was filed without any affidavit. 6. In view of the above facts and considering the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, on perusal of both the F.I.R. it appears that the allegations are similar and the complaint filed at Giridih is not on affidavit. It is admitted that that the case is arising out of the complaint and the complaint which is registered as complaint case and on receipt of the said complaint, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Giridih has written at the margin of the complaint that the police will investigate the case as per the provision of section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is not the separate order. It has been clearly written on the said petition by way of writing at the margin thereof. It has been clearly written on the said petition by way of writing at the margin thereof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2015) 6 SCC 287 has held that there should be application of judicial mind while passing the order under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 27, has held that the Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. It has Further been held that the said application which has been filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. should be supported by an affidavit and the purpose of filing such affidavit is to prevent abuse of the process which has become more common these days and also held that there was no prior invocation of Section 154(3) while filing this petition before the court under Section 156(3). Thus, the order and the action of the learned Court sending the complaint to the police for its registration under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the FIR is not in consonance with the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As it is clear that the order is bad in law moreover for the same offence earlier FIR has been lodged at Nawada which is not in accordance with law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala (Supra). 7. In view of the above facts and considering the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties, this petition succeeds. 8. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Bagodar P.S. Case No. 217 of 2014 corresponding to G.R. No. 2733 of 2014 arising out of Complaint No. 1156 of 2014 for the alleged offence under sections 498(A)/323/506/34 of the IPC section 3/ 4 of the D.P. Act, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih is quashed. 9. Cr. M.P. No. 660 of 2015 stands allowed and disposed of.