JUDGMENT : Heard Sri V. Ravi Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B. Srinivasarao, learned Asst. Govt. Pleader for Services - I. 2. This writ petition has been filed for the following relief : “...to issue appropriate Writ Order or Direction more particularly one in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the 1st Respondent in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner vide G.O. Rt. No.757 Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 25.07.2017 though the list of prohibited properties was communicated after Petitioner’s transfer from S.R.O, Jangareddygudem on 29.09.2014 for an alleged incident pertaining the period prior to the year 2014 and continuing the proceedings at the instance of Vigilance Commission even after a lapse of more than six (6) years from the date of alleged incident, as being erroneous, based on mistake of fact, arbitrary, illegal, vitiated by delay and lapses, contrary to time limit stipulated for completion of enquiries in G.O. Ms. No. 679, dated 01. 11. 2018 and provisions of Rule 20 of A.P.C.S (CC&A) Rules, 1991 and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and consequently set aside the charge memo issued in G.O. Rt. No.757, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 25.07.2017 accordingly in the interest of justice and to pass such order or orders...” 3. Sri V. Ravi Chandran, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was initially recruited and appointed by direct recruitment as Sub-Registrar Grade-II in the Registration and Stamps Department and joined service on 05.06.1995. He worked as Sub-Registrar, SRO’s Office, Jangareddygudem, during the period from 27.06.2011 to 30.09.2014 and later he was transferred and promoted as District Registrar, vide G.O.Ms.No.211, dated 12.05.2006 and was working as such. 4. The 1st respondent-State of Andhra Pradesh initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, vide G.O.Rt.No.757, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 25.07.2017, on the only charge that the petitioner admitted certain documents for registration relating to the properties mentioned in the prohibited list as per the records and kept pending without mentioning reasons in the Minute Book and without informing the superior officers. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a common enquiry was ordered against the petitioner and other two persons, i.e., petitioner’s predecessor and successor in office. 5. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply / written statement of defence on 12.07.2018, inter alia, denying in the statement of imputations of misconduct. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a common enquiry was ordered against the petitioner and other two persons, i.e., petitioner’s predecessor and successor in office. 5. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply / written statement of defence on 12.07.2018, inter alia, denying in the statement of imputations of misconduct. It was stated that the Anti Corruption Bureau (in short “A.C.B”) had conducted surprise check proceedings on the Office of Sub-Registrar, Jangareddygudem on 08.04.2015 and seized 9 pending documents which were long pending and admitted by Sri M. Jeevan Babu and Sri D. Jaya Raju, the petitioner’s predecessors and successors respectively. The surprise check was conducted by A.C.B long after petitioner’s transfer. Under Section 22A of the Registration Act, 1908, the District Collector was required to publish the list of prohibited properties in gazette notification, which notification was issued only after the petitioner’s transfer from Sub-Registrar’s Office, Jangareddygudem. In the absence of notification, documents were kept pending as varying information was provided by the Tahsildars. The factum of pendency of documents was recorded in the Minute Book and the concerned District Registrar was also informed by way of submission of periodical reports. The time limit prescribed in Circular Memo dated 31.05.2010 is not applicable. In the reply, the petitioner further submitted that during his tenure, out of 23,340 documents, 577 were kept pending, out of which 570 were released and 7 were kept pending and those documents could not be released contrary to the rules. Giving detailed reply to each specific document and in view of the reply, the petitioner requested the 1st respondent to drop further action. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that after the petitioner’s reply, it was tentatively decided to drop further action against the petitioner, however, the disciplinary authority without independently exercising the powers, under Rule 23 of APCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991, referred the matter to the Vigilance Commission, where the matter is kept pending at the instance of the Vigilance Commission. The petitioner is due to retire from service with effect from 30.04.2023 and is deprived of promotion to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps on the ground of pendency of disciplinary proceedings. 7. The petitioner is due to retire from service with effect from 30.04.2023 and is deprived of promotion to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps on the ground of pendency of disciplinary proceedings. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the 1st respondent ought to have considered the petitioner’s written statement of defence, and dropped further action, instead of keeping the matter pending at the instance of the vigilance commission, the advice of which is not binding on respondent No.1 and the vigilance commission has also no role to play. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in connection with another incident pertaining to the year 2008, disciplinary proceedings are also pending against the petitioner, vide T.E.C.No.06 of 2012, dated 30.07.2012 and assailing the same, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 23086 of 2020, which is pending before this Court. 9. Challenging the impugned proceedings, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned charge sheet / charge memo is vitiated by inordinate and unexplained delay in as much as, the alleged incident is pertaining to the year prior to 2014 and charges were framed on 25.07.2017 and in fact, inquiry is yet to be commenced. The continuation of the disciplinary proceedings is contrary to the stipulated time limit of 3 and 6 months, for completion of enquiries in simple and complicated cases respectively. He has placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of Amirudhsinhji v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 2390 , Union of India v. Anil Kumar Sarkar, (2013) 4 SCC 161 and State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 . 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in view of the explanation / the written statement of defence of the petitioner, there is no valid ground to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings and charges cannot be proved against the petitioner. 11. Sri B. Srinivasarao, learned GP for Services – I, representing the respondents, submitted that on receipt of the information that the Sub-Registrar, O/o. Sub-Registrar, Jangareddygudem, West Godavari District, Sri Digumarthi Jaya Raju, is indulging in corrupt practices by employing private persons unauthorizedly and collecting excess amounts / bribes from the public, who approached them for registration of their documents and other official favour, a surprise check was conducted by Anti Corruption Bureau officials on 08.04.2015. During the surprise check, the Deputy Superintendent of Police seized the attested copies of 9 pending documents which were long pending from the tenure of Sri M.V. Jeevan Babu, Sub-Registrar, and during the tenure of the petitioner also many documents were admitted by Sri D. Jaya Raju, Sub-Registrar, and the petitioner, relating to the prohibited list and were kept pending without properly mentioning the reason for keeping those documents pending in the Minute Book, and further the pendency of those documents was not informed to the District Registrar. 12. He further submitted that the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, furnished his detailed report on the surprise check, on 18.06.2016 to the Government and recommended to initiate departmental action for major penalty for violation of Conduct Rules under Rule 24 of A.P.Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The Government on careful examination of the matter through Memo, dated 27.07.2016, requested the Director General, ACB to furnish the draft articles of charges in respect of all the three Officers along with relevant materials / documents to the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Deputy Inspector General, Registration and Stamps, Eluru for initiation of disciplinary action and requested the Deputy Inspector General, Registration and Stamps, to take immediate action after receipt of the articles of charges from the Director General, ACB and conclude the disciplinary action as per vigilance scheme. The common disciplinary proceedings were initiated, vide G.O.Ms.No.311, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 25.07.2017 and charges were framed against the petitioner and two others, vide G.O.Rt.No.755 to 757, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 25.07.2017 with a direction to submit their written statement of defence within the specified period. The petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 12.07.2018 denying the charge framed against him as also raising his defence. Through Memo, dated 28.05.2019, the Chief Vigilance Officer and Additional Secretary to Government, directed the Director and Inspector General, Registration and Stamps to offer his specific remarks on the contention of the petitioner in his written statement of defence dated 12.07.2018, and accordingly, those remarks were furnished by respondent No.2. 13. Through Memo, dated 28.05.2019, the Chief Vigilance Officer and Additional Secretary to Government, directed the Director and Inspector General, Registration and Stamps to offer his specific remarks on the contention of the petitioner in his written statement of defence dated 12.07.2018, and accordingly, those remarks were furnished by respondent No.2. 13. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that as per the guidelines of the Department, the Sub-Registrar should not admit the documents, if the properties are mentioned in the prohibition list and as per the Circular Memo No.G1/3/7867/2010, dated 31.05.2010 of the Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, the documents should be disposed of by the concerned Registrar within 7 working days, but the petitioner failed to inform about the pendency of 8 documents that were admitted and did not take any action for their disposal as per the Letter No.G1/290/2015, dated 24.04.2015 of the District Registrar, Eluru, West Godavari. Consequently, the petitioner exhibited lack of integrity, devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of a member of service and thereby contravened Rule 3 (1) and 2 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and instructions issued, vide Circular Memo No.G1/3/7867/2010, dated 31.05.2010 and hence, the article of charge was framed against him through G.O.Rt.No.757, dated 25.07.2017. He has also submitted that the petitioner submitted his written statements of defence, dated 12.07.2018, 06.09.2019 and 22.02.2021 to the respondents and when steps were being taken to proceed further, the petitioner approached this Court and filed writ petition. 14. Learned Government Pleader further submitted that the Deputy Inspector General (Registration & Stamps), Eluru Range, Eluru, in his letter dated 29.01.2020 furnished the defence statement of another charged Officer Sri M.V. Jeevan Babu, former Sub-Registrar of Jangareddygudem. The specific remarks on the contentions raised by the petitioner were also submitted to the Government by the 2nd respondent, vide letter dated 20.08.2020. He submitted that the petitioner made another representation dated 05.11.2020 to the Special Chief Secretary (R&S) Revenue Department, A.P. Secretariat, the 1st respondent raising certain defences with respect to the approved / authenticated list of prohibited properties. He submitted that the petitioner made another representation dated 05.11.2020 to the Special Chief Secretary (R&S) Revenue Department, A.P. Secretariat, the 1st respondent raising certain defences with respect to the approved / authenticated list of prohibited properties. A personal hearing was held by the Special Chief Secretary, Revenue Department, on the request of the petitioner on 02.03.2021 at 12.30 pm and after hearing the petitioner the issue was again referred to the 2nd respondent, i.e., the Commissioner and Inspector General, Registration& Stamps, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada for remarks, pursuant to which, the remarks were submitted by the 2nd respondent on 26.03.2021, on the representation of the petitioner. 15. The Government has appointed the Deputy Inspector General (Registration & Stamps), Kakinada, as Inquiring Authority, vide G.O.Rt.No.451, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 15.07.2021 to enquire into the charges framed against the charged officers and to submit report to the Government, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order. The Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, was also requested to nominate a Presenting Officer to present the case before the Inquiry Officer. 16. It has been submitted by the learned Government Pleader that the delay in appointing the Inquiry Officer is due to examination of various representations submitted by the petitioner in consultation with the Head of the department/2nd respondent and following the mandatory provisions in consultation with the competent authority, as per A.P. Vigilance Scheme and non-receipt of written statement of defence from one of the charged officers and not because of any deliberate or wilful delay. He further submitted that after receipt of the enquiry report from the Enquiring Authority, further action will be taken, in accordance with law, in terms of Rules 21 (b) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991. 17. Learned Government Pleader submitted that in view of the facts submitted, there is no inordinate delay nor unexplained delay and the charge memo or the disciplinary proceedings deserve not to be quashed on the ground of alleged delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings and / or alleged long pendency. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India, (2006) 8 SCC 776 and Government of A.P. and Ors. V. Appla Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 in support of his contentions. 18. He has placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India, (2006) 8 SCC 776 and Government of A.P. and Ors. V. Appla Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 in support of his contentions. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply, reiterating the submissions with respect to delay, has re-submitted that there is no substance in the charge and the charge cannot be proved in view of the defence taken in the written statement of defence. 19. I have considered the submissions, advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. 20. The points which require consideration in view of the submissions advanced are as under : i. When and under what circumstances the disciplinary proceedings may be quashed in the exercise of writ jurisdiction on the ground of delay?; and ii. Whether the present departmental proceedings against the petitioner deserve to be quashed on the ground of delay, if any? 21. Both the points are taken together. 22. The undisputed facts, as submitted by the learned counsel for the parties, are that a surprise check was conducted by the Anti Corruption Bureau on 08.04.2015 in the Sub-Registrar’s Office, Jangareddygudem, of which a detailed report was furnished to the Government on 18.06.2016. The Government decided to initiate departmental action on three persons through Memo dated 27.07.2016, requesting the Director General, ACB to furnish draft articles of charges along with relevant material to the disciplinary authority for initiation of disciplinary action, with further request to DIG, Registration and Stamps, to take immediate action in the matter after receipt of the articles of charges and to conclude the disciplinary action as per vigilance scheme. The common disciplinary proceedings were initiated, vide G.O.Ms.No.311, dated 25.07.2017, and charges were framed against the petitioner and two others, vide G.O.Rt.No.755 to 757, dated 25.07.2017. With respect to the petitioner, the charge memo was issued, vide G.O.Rt.No.757, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Department, dated 25.07.2017. The charged officers also vide letter dated 29.01.2018 requested to furnish certain documents to submit their written statement of defence. The petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 12.07.2018. Through Memo, dated 28.05.2019, the Chief Vigilance Officer and Additional Secretary to Government directed the Inspector General, Registration and Stamps, to offer his specific remarks, which were furnished to the 2nd respondent. The petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 12.07.2018. Through Memo, dated 28.05.2019, the Chief Vigilance Officer and Additional Secretary to Government directed the Inspector General, Registration and Stamps, to offer his specific remarks, which were furnished to the 2nd respondent. The petitioner submitted his further written statements of defence on 06.09.2019 and 22.02.2021, which fact is not mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, but is mentioned in para-8 of the counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent, and which has not been disputed, although the petitioner has filed a reply affidavit. The petitioner himself filed the last written statement of defence on 22.02.2021. 23. Another charged employee Sri M.V. Jeevan Babu, submitted his defence statement on 29.01.2020. The Enquiry Officer has been appointed on 15.07.2021. The petitioner had submitted one more representation on 05.11.2020 to the Special Chief Secretary. Personal hearing was also accorded to the petitioner on his request by the Special Chief Secretary, Revenue Department on 02.03.2021. After hearing the petitioner, the issue was again referred to C&IG, R&S, Andhra Pradesh for remarks, who submitted his remarks on 26.03.2021. 24. From the events of the dates as mentioned above, there appears to be no inordinate or unexplained delay in initiation or in non-completion of the enquiry proceedings. 25. The main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioner is on the point of delay in disciplinary proceedings for its quashment, placing reliance on the G.O.Ms.No.679, General Administration (Services-C) Department, dated 01.11.2008 (Ex.P9) to submit that instructions were issued for expeditious completion of enquiries and normal time of 3 months and 6 months is allowed in simple and complicated cases respectively. 26. The said G.O.Ms.No.679, dated 01.11.2008, reads as under : “GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT Public Services – Disciplinary Cases – Completion of inquiries – To adhere to the time schedule – Instructions – Reiterated. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (SERVICES-C) DEPARTMENT G.O.Ms.No. 679 Dated: 01-11-2008. Read the following: (1) Circular Memo.No:35676/Ser-C/98, G.A.(Ser-C) Dept., dt.1-7-1998. (2) Memo.No.51883/Ser-C/2002-2, G.A.(Ser-C) Dept., dt.19-04-2002. (3) Circular Memo.No:36500/Ser-C/05, G.A.(Ser-C) Dept., dt.19-4-2006. ***** ORDER: On allegations made against the Government employees disciplinary cases are initiated in accordance with the rules in force, and wherever necessary inquiring authorities are appointed to inquire into the articles of charge against such employees. Read the following: (1) Circular Memo.No:35676/Ser-C/98, G.A.(Ser-C) Dept., dt.1-7-1998. (2) Memo.No.51883/Ser-C/2002-2, G.A.(Ser-C) Dept., dt.19-04-2002. (3) Circular Memo.No:36500/Ser-C/05, G.A.(Ser-C) Dept., dt.19-4-2006. ***** ORDER: On allegations made against the Government employees disciplinary cases are initiated in accordance with the rules in force, and wherever necessary inquiring authorities are appointed to inquire into the articles of charge against such employees. Instructions were issued for expeditious completion of the inquiries and a normal time of 3 months and 6 months is allowed in simple and complicated cases, respectively. Where the inquiries are not completed as per the allowed time, the Secretary to Government of the administrative Department concerned at Government level shall review all the disciplinary cases against employees in respect of Head of the Departments under his control and also at the field level and shall submit a note to the Chief Secretary to Government duly recording the reasons for non-completion of the inquiries and to circulate the same to the Hon’ble Chief Minister. It is also the responsibility of the inquiring authority to complete the inquiry within the allowed time, otherwise, such inquiring authority shall be held responsible for the delay, which deserves penal action. 2. Several representations have been received from employees associations that there are abnormal delays in completion of inquiries and this is causing lot of frustration among the employees. Government have reviewed the issue and decided to issue further instructions in the matter. 3. Government direct that the disciplinary cases initiated against the Government employees shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and the existing instructions read above shall be adhered to. The Departments of Secretariat shall review the status position of the pending disciplinary cases against all the employees with which they are concerned and submit a note to the Chief Secretary to Government as per the instructions in force. It is also the responsibility of the inquiring authorities to complete the inquiry as per the allowed time. The Competent Authority, after receipt of the inquiry report shall conclude the disciplinary proceedings within 6 months of its initiation and in case of abnormal delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings, action shall be initiated against concerned inquiring authority. 4. All the Departments of Secretariat, Heads of Departments and District Collectors should follow the above instructions scrupulously and bring it to the notice of all the concerned for strict implementation of the above orders. 4. All the Departments of Secretariat, Heads of Departments and District Collectors should follow the above instructions scrupulously and bring it to the notice of all the concerned for strict implementation of the above orders. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH)” 27. A perusal of the G.O.Ms.No.679, dated 01.11.2008, shows that it provides that disciplinary cases initiated against the Government employees shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and the instructions to be adhered to, are, a normal time of 3 months and 6 months in simple and complicated cases respectively. The period prescribed is a normal time stipulated and not the fixed time limit beyond which enquiry cannot be proceeded. It also does not show the consequences, if the enquiry is not completed within the normal time, stipulated therein, on the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. The only consequence, at best from G.O.Ms.No.679, dated 01.11.2008 for non-completion of the enquiries within the normal time may be that an action may be initiated against the concerned enquiring authority for non-completion of inquiries within such time. This is not to say that the enquiry is not to be completed within the normal time provided, but to say that if it is not so completed, merely on that ground the enquiry cannot be quashed. The issue requires to be considered in the light of the law laid down in various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. The Law on the points is no more res integra. 29. In the case of Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), on the question of delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held in paras-9, 10 and 11 as under : “9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing. Now, let us see what are the factors in favour of the respondent. They are: (a) That he was transferred from the post of Superintendent of Nabha Jail and had given (sic up) charge of the post about six days prior to the incident. While the incident took place on the night intervening 1-1-1987/2-1-1987 the respondent had relinquished the charge of the said office on 26-12-1986. He was not there at the time of incident. (b) The explanation offered by the Government for the delay in serving the charges is unacceptable. There was no reason for the Government to wait for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's report when it had with it the report of the Inspector General of Prisons which report was not only earlier in point of time but was made by the highest official of the prison administration, Head of the Department, itself. The Inspector General of Prisons was the superior of the respondent and was directly concerned with the prison administration whereas the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not so connected. In the circumstances, the explanation that the Government was waiting for the report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is unacceptable. Even otherwise they waited for two more years after obtaining a copy of the said report. Since no action was taken within a reasonable time after the incident, he was entitled to and he must have presumed that no action would be taken against him. Even otherwise they waited for two more years after obtaining a copy of the said report. Since no action was taken within a reasonable time after the incident, he was entitled to and he must have presumed that no action would be taken against him. After a lapse of five and a half years, he was being asked to face an enquiry. (c) If not in 1992, his case for promotion was bound to come up for consideration in 1993 or at any rate in 1994. The pendency of a disciplinary enquiry was bound to cause him prejudice in that matter apart from subjecting him to the worry and inconvenience involved in facing such an enquiry. 10. Now what are the factors against the respondent. (i) That the respondent was never suspended nor was he served with a memo of charges nor even with a questionnaire in that behalf till March 1992 when he was questioned by the Secretary to the Home Department and charges served in July 1992. He had suffered no discomfort or inconvenience on account of delay. (ii) The charges are very grave. The charges are not only that he was lax in discharge of his duties but that he acceded to every demand of theirs and that in violation of the prison rules, had allowed a number of terrorists to gather in one cell. He is said to be responsible for creating the atmosphere which led to the said attempt. His sympathies towards them are said to be evident from the fact that he accepted a farewell party from them on his transfer from the post of Superintendent of the said jail. In the attempted escape, one prison official lost his life besides two terrorists. The earliest report of the incident — the report of Inspector General of Prisons dated 9-1-1987 — does specifically find the respondent responsible for the incident. It is prima facie evidence against the respondent. In the interest of administration and of justice, it is necessary to find out the truth in the matter. (iii) There is no allegation in the writ petition that any of the witnesses whom the respondent wanted to examine in his defence are since dead or have become unavailable and that the said fact would cause prejudice to his case. In the interest of administration and of justice, it is necessary to find out the truth in the matter. (iii) There is no allegation in the writ petition that any of the witnesses whom the respondent wanted to examine in his defence are since dead or have become unavailable and that the said fact would cause prejudice to his case. Indeed, death or non-availability of terrorists who made the attempt to escape and the repair of the jail may prejudice the case of the Government rather than the defence of the respondent. Similarly, the mere fact that some persons who could have been examined as witnesses have retired or have been transferred cannot be said to cause prejudice to the respondent. It is not stated that they have become unavailable. (iv) Pending the writ petition, the enquiry was proceeded with and by the date of the impugned judgment, the Government had completed its evidence. Only the defence evidence remained to be adduced whereafter the enquiry officer would have made the report. 11. The principles to be borne in mind in this behalf have been set out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. Though the said case pertained to criminal prosecution, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that “ultimately the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — balancing test or balancing process — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case”. It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case.” 30. In P.D. Agrawal (supra), in paragraphs – 26 to 30, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : “26. In State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514] whereupon Mr Rao placed strong reliance, this Court opined that by reason of delay of 12 years in initiating the disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent officer could not defend himself properly. In that case there was no satisfactory explanation for such a long delay. There was also doubt as regards the involvement of the delinquent officer. 27. In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal [ (1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 : (1995) 29 ATC 546 ] however, this Court refused to set aside those disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated after a delay of 5 1/2 years. Distinguishing the decision of this Court in Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514] it was stated : (SCC p. 574, para 9) “9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five-and-a-half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing.” 28. In Addl. Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646] this Court held : [SCC (L&S) p. 648, para 7] “7. In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case, such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen.” 29. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the appellant did not raise the question of delay before any forum whatsoever. He did not raise such a question even before the disciplinary authority. He not only took part therein without any demur whatsoever, but, as noticed hereinbefore, cross-examined the witnesses and entered into the defence. 30. The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.” 31. In V. Appla Swamy (supra), in paragraphs – 11 to 13, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under : “11. It may be true that there was some delay on the part of the appellants to conclude the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that only by reason thereof the entire departmental proceedings became vitiated. It may be true that there was some delay on the part of the appellants to conclude the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that only by reason thereof the entire departmental proceedings became vitiated. The High Court thus, in our opinion, was required to consider the question as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the nature of the charges levelled against the respondent as also the explanation offered by the appellants in this behalf, it was a case where the entire proceedings should have been quashed. The High Court in its impugned judgment did not address itself the said question. It, as noticed hereinbefore, from the very beginning proceeded on the premise that the pension was payable to the respondent on his retirement. The High Court furthermore did not determine the question as to whether a proceeding could have been initiated against the respondent in terms of Rule 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1963. If it is held that the second proceeding was maintainable in terms of the extant rules, ordinarily, the Tribunal or the High Court should not have interfered therewith. This aspect of the matter is concluded by the decisions of this Court in State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [ (1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319] and State of U.P. v. Harihar Bhole Nath [(2006) 13 SCC 460 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 686 : (2006) 11 Scale 322 ]. 12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are: (1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; (2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. 13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Secy. to Govt., Prohibition & Excise Deptt. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer. 13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Secy. to Govt., Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [ (1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745 ] ; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India [ (2006) 8 SCC 776 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 43 : (2006) 5 Scale 54 ] ; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey [ (1995) 3 SCC 134 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 648 : (1995) 29 ATC 538 ].” 32. In Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565 , the law pertaining to the delay in domestic enquiry has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras-8 to 12, which are reproduced as under : “8. The law does not permit quashing of charge-sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge-sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In case the charge-sheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the charge-sheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. (Vide State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514], State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal [ (1995) 2 SCC 570 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 541 : (1995) 29 ATC 546 ], Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey [ (1995) 3 SCC 134 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 648 : (1995) 29 ATC 538 ], Union of India v. Ashok Kacker [1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 : (1995) 29 ATC 145 ], Prohibition & Excise Deptt. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey [ (1995) 3 SCC 134 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 648 : (1995) 29 ATC 538 ], Union of India v. Ashok Kacker [1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 : (1995) 29 ATC 145 ], Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [ (1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745 ], State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [ (1998) 4 SCC 154 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 : AIR 1998 SC 1833 ], Food Corporation of India v. V.P. Bhatia [ (1998) 9 SCC 131 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 466], Supt. of Police v. T. Natarajan [1999 SCC (L&S) 646], M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475 ], P.D. Agrawal v. SBI [ (2006) 8 SCC 776 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 43] and Govt. of A.P. v. V. Appala Swamy [ (2007) 14 SCC 49 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 440].) 9. In Forest Deptt. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury [ (2009) 7 SCC 305 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 327] (SCC p. 310, para 16) this Court dealt with the issue and observed that delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. At the same time, if the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings should not (sic) be permitted to continue. 10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. In fact, charge-sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [ (1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943 ], Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh [ (1996) 1 SCC 327 ], Ulagappa v. Commr. [ (2001) 10 SCC 639 : AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2)], Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse [ (2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 826 : AIR 2004 SC 1467 ] and Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304].) 11. In State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra [ (2010) 13 SCC 311 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 380] (SCC pp. 315-16, para 10) this Court held that normally a charge-sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that to determine correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. (See also Union of India v. Upendra Singh [ (1994) 3 SCC 357 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 768 : (1994) 27 ATC 200].) 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings.” 33. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings.” 33. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been laid down that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay makes the task of proving charges difficult and is not also in the interests of the administration. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors which appear for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. The Court has to indulge in a process of balancing. 34. This Court does not find any averment in the writ petition as also in the reply affidavit nor it has been argued as to what prejudice is caused or is likely to be caused to the petitioner in defending his case on account of the alleged delay. Any such plea has not been raised by the petitioner’s counsel. 35. Considering the factors that, (i) The charge that the petitioner admitted the documents for registration relating to properties mentioned in the prohibited list, as per the reports and kept pending without mentioning reason in the Minute Book and without informing his superiors and by the act he exhibited lack of integrity, devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming member of service, prima facie, cannot be said a simple charge; (ii) The petitioner has already submitted his written statements of defence on 12.07.2018, 06.09.2019 and lastly on 22.02.2021. (iii) The disciplinary proceedings are initiated not only against the petitioner, but against three officers. (iv) The Enquiry Officer has already been appointed with direction to complete the enquiry within the stipulated time frame. (iii) The disciplinary proceedings are initiated not only against the petitioner, but against three officers. (iv) The Enquiry Officer has already been appointed with direction to complete the enquiry within the stipulated time frame. (v) It was on the petitioner’s representation that the petitioner was afforded opportunity of personal hearing by the 1st respondent on 02.03.2021 and after hearing the petitioner the matter was sent to C&IG, R&S for remarks, which were submitted on 26.03.2021. (vi) It is no where been pleaded that the petitioner was ever suspended, as such he had suffered no discomfort or inconvenience on account of delay; (vii) there is also no allegation in the writ petition that any of the witnesses whom the petitioner wanted to examine in his defence are since dead or have become unavailable and the said fact would cause prejudice to his case. It is also not his case that the witnesses, names mentioned in the list of witnesses along with memorandum of charges have become unavailable; (viii) One more disciplinary proceeding is pending against him pertaining to the year 2008, vide T.E.C No.06 of 2012, dated 30.07.2012, and applying the balancing process, this Court finds that it is more appropriate and in the interests of administration that the enquiry be allowed to be completed. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner though submitted that the 1st respondent ought to have taken an independent decision on the statement / representation submitted by the petitioner instead of keeping the matter pending at the instance of the Vigilance Commission the advice of which according to him is not binding, but has not pointed out any specific provision or rules in this regard. 37. In Amirudhsinhji (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a case against the appellants therein was registered on 19.03.1995 under the Arms Act. The Departmental Promotion Committee (for short “DPC”) did not give any prior approval on his own to record any information about the commission of offence under TADA. On the contrary, DPC made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for promotion, to proceed under TADA. The question was as to why he did so though he had jurisdiction vested in him by the provisions of 28A (1) of TADA. On the contrary, DPC made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for promotion, to proceed under TADA. The question was as to why he did so though he had jurisdiction vested in him by the provisions of 28A (1) of TADA. The Hon’ble Apex Court found that that was a case of power conferred upon one authority being really exercised by another and held that if statutory authority has been vested with jurisdiction, he has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If the discretion is exercised under the directions or in compliance with some higher authority instructions, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion together. This judgment is not attracted as it could not be shown that under any statutory rule one authority exercised the jurisdiction at the directions of or in compliance of instructions of some higher authority. 38. In Anil Kumar Sarkar (supra), upon which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the disciplinary proceedings are commenced only when the charge sheet is issued. In the light of the facts of the said case, as no charge sheet was served on the employee when the Departmental Promotion Committee (for short “DPC”) met to consider his promotion and the “Procedure of the Sealed Cover” was adopted, it was held that the “procedure of sealed cover” could not be adopted, as per the rules applicable. The sealed cover procedure is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc., but the disciplinary / criminal proceedings are pending against him at the relevant time and hence, findings of his entitlement to the benefits are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over. The reliance placed in the case of Anil Kumar Sarkar (supra), is misconceived, as in the present case, there is no prayer of the petitioner for granting promotion on the ground that there was no commencement of departmental proceedings on the date he became due for promotion. 39. In the enquiry, charge may not be proved, as according to the petitioner, he has made such a defence that the charge is not made out, but that is the subject matter of enquiry on the evidence to be led. At this stage, the Court will see only the charge as it stands, prima facie. 39. In the enquiry, charge may not be proved, as according to the petitioner, he has made such a defence that the charge is not made out, but that is the subject matter of enquiry on the evidence to be led. At this stage, the Court will see only the charge as it stands, prima facie. 40. In Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that normally a charge sheet is not quashed prior to the conducting of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that to determine correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. 41. For all the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petition lacks merit. No case for interference is made out. 42. The respondents are directed to conclude the disciplinary proceedings, as expeditiously as possible, say within a period of 6 months, from the date of production of copy of this judgment before the respondents, in accordance with law, subject to cooperation of the petitioner in enquiry. 43. Writ Petition is dismissed with the directions as aforesaid. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.