JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this appeal, the claimants-appellants have approached this Court for enhancement of compensation awarded to appellants-claimants by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Senior District Judge, Ghaziabad ('Tribunal', for short), vide judgment/award dated 12.5.2008 in M.A.C.P. No.204 of 2004 (Smt. Raj Bala And Others vs. Parvesh Kumar And Another) whereby claimants/appellants was awarded Rs.9,87,300/-, with 7% rate of interest as compensation. 2. Heard Shri Devendra Dhama, learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and Shri Pawan Kumar Singh for the respondents-Insurance Company. None appears for the owner. 3. The accident involving the vehicle, though denied by the driver in his evidence, has been held by the Tribunal to be involved in the accident and the finding of fact that the accident occurred on 11.2.2004 involving the vehicle insured by the respondents has attained finality. Secondly, the finding of facts that the deceased, namely, Suresh Chandra, aged about 46 years worked in Nagar Telephone Nigam Ltd, Tugalkabad, New Delhi and left his widow, two sons and a daughter are also not in dispute. The income of the deceased is also not in dispute. The twin questions raised for our consideration for which this Court is called upon to decide are findings of the Tribunal as to whether the deceased driving motorcycle was a contributor to the accident had taken place to the tune of 50% and whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was in consonance with the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in catena of decisions for computing compensation. 4. As far as the compensation to be granted is concerned, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has submitted that in the State of Uttar Pradesh Rule 220 of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 2011, came into force in the year 2011 and hence, no future loss of income could be granted as in this case accident occurred in the year 2007. The Apex Court has held that future loss of income has to be awarded whether the rules specify or not. This is an accident of the year 2007. Just because the rules are silent, the claimants cannot be deprived of this benefit. In catena of decisions even prior to the year 2011 future loss of income was considered to be added to income of deceased. This is an accident of the year 2007. Just because the rules are silent, the claimants cannot be deprived of this benefit. In catena of decisions even prior to the year 2011 future loss of income was considered to be added to income of deceased. We cannot accept the submission of Sri Pawan Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company as in catena of decisions which are binding on this Court namely Pappu Deo Yadav Vs. Naresh Kumar, AIR 2020 SC 4424 , Erudhaya Priya Vs. State Express Transport Corporation Ltd., AIR 2020 SC 4284 and Karthik Subramanian Vs. B. Sarath Babu & Anr., reported in 2021 ACJ 993 have laid down the principle that future loss of income has to be granted. 5. As far as the negligence is concerned, Shri Dhama, learned counsel for the appellants, has taken us to the evidence of four witnesses and the evidence of the driver of the opponent, who has stepped into the witness box. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that 50% decided to be contribution of appellants in view of the judgment in the case of Archit Saini and another vs. Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd., AIR 2018 (SC) 1143 is bad particularly when the Tribunal has returned the finding to this effect that the deceased was on correct side. The evidence of PW4, namely, Sunil Kumar, is on record, where the witness has deposed that it was one way path and the accident occurred in side lane where the driver of the opponent could not have come with his tempo and, therefore, it is submitted that in view of the judgments quoted herein below the finding holding the deceased to be guilty of 50% is bad, (a) Khenyei vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & others, (2015) 0 Supreme(SC) 397; (b) T.O. Anthony vs. Karvarnan and others, (2008) 0 Supreme(SC) 157 (c) Rahisa Begum Since Deceased and another vs. Susheel Chandra Gupta and another, 2021 LawSuit (All) 805; and (d) Meera Devi and another vs. HRTC and others, (2014) 0 Supreme(SC) 194. 6. It has also been contended by Shri Dhama, learned counsel for the claimants that there was no negligence on the part of the deceased and the finding of fact of the Tribunal is bad in the eye of law. 7. 6. It has also been contended by Shri Dhama, learned counsel for the claimants that there was no negligence on the part of the deceased and the finding of fact of the Tribunal is bad in the eye of law. 7. Shri Pawan Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Insurance Company, has vehemently submitted that from the site-plan, it can be seen that the accident had not taken place on the one-way road. It was the evidence of the driver of the said vehicle and that too in the findings returned by the Tribunal, therefore, it is just and proper that the road was not one-way. The deceased had contributed to the accident, which had taken place. It is further submitted that the Tribunal has shown leniency in not considering the deceased to be 100% negligent. 8. The term 'negligence' means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 9. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under : "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (section 110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, (2005) 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 22. 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." (Emphasis added) 10. In view of the judgments relied by counsel for the appellants and the factual scenario, we are unable to accept the submissions of Shri Pawan Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the Insurance Company that the accident occurred due to co-authorship of the deceased. 11. In such view of the matter, the impact of the motorcycle, which according to the witnesses and even the finding returned by the Tribunal was on its correct side, we would consider the alternative submission of Shri Pawan Kumar Singh that it was not a one way road when there is a clinching evidence that the driver of the motorcycle was driving the motorcycle on correct side, this is also finding of fact by the Tribunal. The site-plan according to the decision of Archit Saini (supra) can not be the sole conclusion of the negligence. Hence, submission of Shri Pawan Kumar Singh cannot be acceded as is against weight of evidence on record. Even if we go by the submission of Shri Pawan Kumar Singh, a bare scanning of the siteplan would also not permit us to accept his submission as site-plan goes to show that it is against the version of the driver of the tempo, which is a light vehicle, but it is bigger in size in comparison to the motorcycle and driver of the tempo should have been more cautious while driving the same in a bye-lane. Therefore, we hold that finding of fact of the Tribunal is bad in the eye of law. 12. As far as compensation is concerned, the matter is very simple. The Tribunal could not have deducted HRA. Learned counsel for the appellant even pointed out to us that when we scan the record it transpires that salary of the deceased was considered after deducting HRA, which is against the mandate of Apex Court in the case of Vimal Kanwar and others vs. Kishore Dan and others (2013) 7 SCC 476 . 13. We, therefore, are in full agreement with Shri Pawan Kumar Singh that the income tax has rightly been deducted. 13. We, therefore, are in full agreement with Shri Pawan Kumar Singh that the income tax has rightly been deducted. The amount, which would be considered to be datum figure would be Rs.26,800/-. As the deceased was a permanent employee and below the age of 50 years, 30% would have been added for future loss of income as we are unable to accept the submission of Shri Pawan Kumar Singh that no addition for future income can be granted as even in Malarvizhi and others vs. United India Insurance Co.Ltd and another [ (2020) 4 SCC 228 ] and in Yadava Kumar vs. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co.Ltd, [ (2010) 10 SCC 341 ] it is held in judgment of National Insurance Company vs. Pranay Sethi [2014 (4) TAC 637 (SC)], would apply retrospectively also. Hence the addition will have to be granted. 1/3 should be deducted for personal expenses of the deceased. Multiplier of 13 would be just and proper as the appellant was in the age group of 50 Years as per Apex Court judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation [2009 (2) TAC 677 (SC)]. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that due to inadvertance, medical expenses are shown as Rs.10,00,000/- should be read as Rs.1,00,000/- as the deceased survived for two days, though, we award the medical expenses to be Rs.80,000/- as it is awarded by the Tribunal. Under the non-pecuniary heads, Rs.15,000/- shall be awarded for loss of estate, Rs.15,000/- for funeral expenses and Rs.40,000/- shall be awarded under the head of loss of consortium with upward remission of 10% every three years, rounded off lump-sum Rs.1,00,000/- as per Pranay Sethi (supra). 15. Hence, the total compensation, in view of the above discussions, payable to the appellants-claimants is being computed herein below : i. Annual Income Rs.26,800/- x 12 Rs.3,21,600/- ii. Percentage towards Future-Prospects (30%) Rs.96,480/- iii. Total Income Rs.3,21,600/- + Rs.96,480/- Rs.4,18,080/- iv. Income after deduction of 1/3 Rs.4,18,080/- - Rs.1,39,360/- Rs.2,78,7200/- v. Multiplier applicable 13 vi. Loss of dependency Rs.2,78,720/- x 13 Rs.36,23,360/- vii. Medical Expenses Rs.8,000/- viii. After adding Non-pecuniary Damages Rs.36,23,360/- + Rs.1,00,000/- Rs.37,23,360/- ix. Total Compensation Rs.38,03,360/- 16. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Loss of dependency Rs.2,78,720/- x 13 Rs.36,23,360/- vii. Medical Expenses Rs.8,000/- viii. After adding Non-pecuniary Damages Rs.36,23,360/- + Rs.1,00,000/- Rs.37,23,360/- ix. Total Compensation Rs.38,03,360/- 16. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under : "13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court." 17. Learned Tribunal has awarded rate of interest as 6% per annum but we are fixing the rate of interest as 7.5% in the light of the above judgment. 18. No other grounds were urged when the matter was heard. 19. The appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within a period of 8 weeks from today with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. 20. The Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within a period of 8 weeks from today with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. 20. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani v/s The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2007 (2) GLH 291 and this High Court in total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimant for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimants to withdraw the amount without producing the certificate from the concerned Income-Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount. 21. The records and proceedings be sent back to the Tribunal for disbursement.