JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. 2. By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “A. The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ of certiorari and / or any other appropriate writ, direction and order to quash and set aside the order dated 31.12.2018 passed by Principle Senior Judge, Gir Somnath Veraval, and further be pleased to condone the delay of 9 days depositing the sum of Rs.2,500/- before the District Service Legal Authority. B. Pending hearing and final disposal of the petition, Your Lordships be pleased to injunct the respondents herein from changing, altering or transfer either the possession and title of the suit property in any manner, and further be pleased to direct the respondents to maintain status quo with respect to the suit property.” 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Pratik K. Khubchandani with learned advocate Mr. Dhaval D. Vyas for the petitioner. 3.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gir Somanth Veraval passed the order on 31.12.2018, inter alia, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner to condone the delay caused in depositing costs of Rs. 2,500/- with the District Legal Service Authority, imposed while condoning delay in restoring Special Suit No. 59 of 2009. 3.2. It is further contended that the suit was at the stage of leading evidence, wherein the petitioner was informed by his advocate that on account of establishment of Principal District Court & Additional Court at Veraval during the year 2016, certain matters were in the process of being transferred and the next date of leading evidence in the suit would be informed to upon completion of the process of transfer. 3.3. It is further contended that matter was listed on 01.09.2016 for further evidence. At that time, neither petitioner nor his advocate remained present. Therefore, as a consequence, the suit came to be dismissed for non-prosecution vide order dated 01.09.2016. 3.4. It is further contended that the status of the suit proceeding from the advocate, the petitioner was informed that the suit came to be dismissed for default. Hence, Civil Misc. Application No. 2 of 2017 was filed for restoration of the suit along with an application under Section 5 was preferred. 3.5. 3.4. It is further contended that the status of the suit proceeding from the advocate, the petitioner was informed that the suit came to be dismissed for default. Hence, Civil Misc. Application No. 2 of 2017 was filed for restoration of the suit along with an application under Section 5 was preferred. 3.5. It is contended that vide order dated 13.12.2018, the application for condonation of delay was allowed and suit was restored back to file on a condition that the petitioner would pay a sum of Rs.2,500/- before the District Legal Services Authority within 7 days. 3.6. It is further urged that the petitioner was unable to deposit the amount of Rs.2,500/- within stipulated time of 7 days. Therefore, the petitioner has preferred an application seeking condonation of delay of 9 days at Exh.9 in depositing the said amount, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 31.12.2018. Hence, this petition is filed. 3.7. Referring to the averments made in the petition, the learned advocate states that petitioner was ready to pay Rs.2,500/- as cost after 9 days in stead of 7 days, but the said request was turned down by the learned Trial Court. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the application should not be rejected on the technical ground without giving an opportunity to show the cause. 4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner has further submitted that the application filed seeking condonation of delay of 9 days in depositing the cost ought to have been liberally construed inasmuch as the learned Trial Judge ought to have appreciated the effect of rejecting the application would be to reject a good case at the threshold and cause injustice. 4.2. Learned advocate for the petitioner has also submitted that it is a bona fide mistake, and petitioner inadvertently failed to deposit the amount of cost as necessitated to pay within stipulated time. 4.3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of D.V. Paul v. Manisha Lalwani reported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 546, wherein it was held that “Where there is a bona fide mistake in complying with the court directives, petition for extending time for the same, should be allowed.” 5. Having heard the learned advocate for the petitioner and considering the impugned order as well as the material on record, it is an undisputed fact that the learned Trial Court has exercised the discretion while condoning the delay of 7 days on a condition to pay the cost of Rs.2,500/- within 7 days but the same is not complied with and later when the petitioner moved to condone the delay in paying the cost, the said request was rejected. It is settled principle of law that the matter should be heard on merits rather than throwing away on mere technicality. 6. Learned Counsel has further relied upon the decision in the case of D.V. Paul (supra), wherein in para 34 it is observed that “That apart the fact that the appellant had offered to deposit the amount of Rs.10,000/- afresh also shows that there was no deliberate inaction on his part so as to disentitle him to the relief of extension of time. Further at para 35; “In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we consider it to be a fit case where extension of time for making of the deposit by the Trial Court ought to be granted. We accordingly allow the prayer for extension of time to make the deposit of Rs.10,000/- by eight weeks from today. The extension is, however, subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/-. We make is clear, that in case the appellant deposits a total sum of Rs.20,000/- within two months from today the suit filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed as directed by the High Court in the appeal mentioned above failing which the decree passed by the Trial Court shall revive and be executed in accordance with law.” 7. In the present case, it is observed by the Court that the petitioner is ready to pay the cost. In the circumstance, there is some substance in arguments advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Gowri Ammal v. Murugan and others reported in 2006 (3) CTC 418 , it is observed that, wherein duty of Court is to administer justice and in such process rigorous of procedural law will have to be loosened and substantive justice should be administered and not procedural justice. Procedure is meant to facilitate administration of real justice and not to defeat the same. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Rakesh Kumar vs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in (2015) 180 PLR 466, wherein it is held by referring decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 , that, this Court had an occasion to examine whether the restriction placed by the amendment of Section 148 on the power of the Court to grant extension of time beyond 30 days was reasonable. This Court held that a power that is inherent in the Court to pass orders that it considers necessary for meeting the ends of justice and preventing abuse of the process of the Court cannot be taken away by putting an upper limit on the period for which an extension can be granted. Extension beyond the maximum period of 30 days was accordingly held permissible in the following lines: “The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the Court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the Court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to fully operate. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for the reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the Court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the Court. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 31.12.2018 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gir Somnath, Veraval is quashed and set aside and the delay of 9 days in depositing the sum of Rs. 2,500/- before the District Service Legal Authority is hereby condoned, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall deposit Rs.5,000/- before the concerned District Service Legal Authority, over and above the aforesaid amount of Rs.2,500/- (totaling of Rs.7,500/-) within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the writ of this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly.