JUDGMENT : ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA, J. 1. Heard Mr. P. Borah, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. U.K. Nair, learned senior counsel for the respondents no. 2, 4, 5 and 6 being the authorities under the Army Welfare Education Society and Army Public School, Basistha and Mr. K. Gogoi, learned counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 3 being the authorities under the Union of India. 2. The petitioner herein was appointed as a Chowkidar in the Army Public School, Basistha as per the communication of appointment dated 25.06.1992 issued by the Col GS at HQ 51 Sub Area, C/O 99 APO. The communication of appointment clearly reads as follows: “.....2. Shri Sochita Nand Sah of 313 Copy ASC may please be appointed as Chowkidar in the Army School, Basistha.” 3. Pursuant to such method of appointment, the petitioner served as a Chowkidar in the Army Public School, Basistha. Subsequently, by a communication dated 03.05.2013 of the Brig. Chairman of the Army Public School, Basistha, the petitioner was informed that the appointment given to him was not regular but it was always temporary in nature. Secondly, the petitioner was informed that the post of Chowkidar had been abolished and as such, no fresh appointment to such post of Chowkidar was required. Pursuant to the communication dated 03.05.2013, the engagement of the petitioner as a Chowkidar in the Army Public School, Basistha was dispensed with. 4. When we look at the provisions of the communication dated 03.05.2013 conjointly with the communication of appointment dated 25.06.1992, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the communication of appointment dated 25.06.1992 provided that the appointment of the petitioner was not regular and it was always a temporary in nature. 5. However, Mr. U.K. Nair, learned senior counsel tries to explain the situation by contending that all the engagements in the Army Public School, Basistha are contractual in nature and therefore, in general, it is temporary. 6. We express no view on that, but reiterating that the communication of appointment dated 25.06.1992 specifically does not provide that the appointment was temporary in nature. But as regards the other reasoning as to why the service of the petitioner was required to be dispensed with and that the post of Chowkidar had been abolished, we have to look at the issue from a different perspective. But as regards the other reasoning as to why the service of the petitioner was required to be dispensed with and that the post of Chowkidar had been abolished, we have to look at the issue from a different perspective. It is the stated stand of the respondent authorities in the Army Public School, Basistha that although earlier the school authorities were engaging a person as a Chowkidar, but the subsequent decision is to engage a private security agency for the purpose and therefore, the post of Chowkidar in the circumstance required was to be abolished and also by implication it stood abolished. 7. Mr. U K Nair, learned senior counsel for the respondent in the Army Public School, Basistha by referring to a judgment of this Court rendered in Prabhu Nath Pandey and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 2000 (1) GLT 470 raises the contention that the Army Public School, Basistha is not an instrumentality of the state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, this writ petition is not maintainable. For the purpose, reliance is placed on paragraph 11 of the judgment rendered in Prabhu Nath Pandey (supra). 8. In order to appreciate the contention, we extract the paragraph 11 of the judgment of Prabhu Nath Pandey (supra): “(11) Thus, the law is now settled by the apex Court and a Division Bench of this court that in the absence of statutory requirement the contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced against an employer and the remedy is to sue for damages. The exceptions to the aforesaid rule are the case of public servant dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the constitution, reinstatement of a dismissed worker under the Industrial Law, a statutory body acting in breach of statutory obligations. In the present case, the petitioners have not made out a case that by any statutory requirement, they were to continue in service. No case also has been made out that they hold civil posts under the state or the Union and that they have been terminated from service in contravention to Article 311 of the constitution. These cases are also not the cases of workers under Industrial Law. The A.W.E.S. or Army School Narengi are also not statutory bodies created by the statue. These cases are also not the cases of workers under Industrial Law. The A.W.E.S. or Army School Narengi are also not statutory bodies created by the statue. The case of the petitioners, therefore, do not fall within the exceptions laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nandganj sihori Co. Ltd. Rae Bareli versus Badri Nath dixit. If, therefore, the employer does not want the services of the petitioners any longer the court cannot grant specific enforcement of the contracts of the service between the petitioners and A.W.E.S. or the Army School, Narengi by quashing the impugned notices terminating their services.” 9. A reading of the provisions in paragraph 11 of the said judgment makes it discernable that the conclusion thereof was in respect of the schools under the Army Welfare Education Society or Army Schools and that if the employer does not want the service of the employees any longer, the Court could not grant specific enforcement of the contract of service between the employee and the said authorities. The said proposition made, have laid down the law in respect to the maintainability of a petition for specific enforcement of a contract service between the employer and employee but does not make it discernable that the said proposition is with regard to the maintainability of a writ petition against the Army Welfare Educational Society or the Army Schools being not an instrumentality of the state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 10. In this context reference is also made to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava and others, (2020) 14 SCC 449 and Paragraph 12 of the judgment in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab and others, (2012) 12 SCC 331 which expands the concept of instrumentality of the state under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and ventures into the realm of an authority performing a public duty in order to appreciate the maintainability of a writ petition: “15. Writ application was clearly maintainable in view of aforesaid discussion and more so in view of the decision of this Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 456 in which this Court has considered the issue at length and has thus observed: (SCC pp. Writ application was clearly maintainable in view of aforesaid discussion and more so in view of the decision of this Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 456 in which this Court has considered the issue at length and has thus observed: (SCC pp. 336-337, paras 13 & 14) “13. In the aforesaid case [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 ] this Court was also considering a situation where the services of a Lecturer had been terminated who was working in the college run by the Andi Mukti Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust. In those circumstances, this Court has clearly observed as under: (V.R. Rudani case [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 ], SCC pp. 700-701, paras 20 & 22) “20. The term “authority” used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. *** 22. Here again, we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: “To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract”. [Ed. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states: “To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract”. [Ed. S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edn., Stevens & Sons Ltd., London 1980) at p. 540.] We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available “to reach injustice wherever it is found”. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellant on the maintainability of the writ petition.” The aforesaid observations have been repeated and reiterated in numerous judgments of this Court including the judgments in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645 and Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the appellant Mr Parikh. 14. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned judgment of this Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge [Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2009 SCC Online P&H 11755] as also the Division Bench [Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 13111] of the High Court cannot be sustained on the proposition that the writ petition would not maintainable merely because the respondent institution is a purely unaided private educational institution. The appellant had specifically taken the plea that the respondents perform public functions i.e. providing education to children in their institutions throughout India.” 16. It is apparent from the aforesaid decisions that the writ application is maintainable in such a matter even as against the private unaided educational institutions.” “12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. It is apparent from the aforesaid decisions that the writ application is maintainable in such a matter even as against the private unaided educational institutions.” “12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, in view of the judgment rendered by this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust, (1989) 2 SCC 691 there can be no doubt that even a purely private body, where the State has no control over its internal affairs, would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, for issuance of a writ of mandamus. Provided, of course, the private body is performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities.” 11. The aforesaid proposition laid down by the Supreme Court settles the issue that a writ petition is also maintainable against a private Educational Institution performing public duty. 12. But in the instant case, considering the nature of issue raised, we are of the view that the said question of maintainability of the petition raised need not be answered and the issue raised can be answered in another manner without adverting to the said question. We have noticed that subsequent to the communication dated 03.05.2013 which is the basis of discontinuing the service of the petitioner as a Chowkidar in the Army Public School, Basistha, as because, the school authorities were of the view that they want to revert back to a different method of providing security to the school i.e. by handing over the responsibility to a private security agency, the further requirement of the post of Chowkidar would not be there, there was also a notice dated 07.05.2012 of the Brig. Chairman by which the petitioner was given the option to submit an application for an appointment against any other available post within the Army Public School, Basistha for which he may be duly qualified for. By another communication dated 01.03.2013, the petitioner was again advised to apply for appointment against any other post by informing that he cannot continue as a Chowkidar inasmuch as the security of the school had been outsourced to a private security agency and therefore, there was no further requirement of the post of Chowkidar in the Army Public School, Basistha. 13. 13. In response thereof, it is the stand of the respondents in the Army Public School, Basistha that against such offers being provided to the petitioner, the petitioner did not favourably respond and on the other hand, made a representation dated 20.04.2013 which apparently does not appear to be in response to the two offers made to the petitioner as indicated above. 14. This writ petition has been instituted at that stage and is pending for almost ten years as of now. 15. If the respondents in the Army Public School, Basistha dispensed with the service of the petitioner as a Chowkidar as because the authorities were of the view that the security of the school would be handed over to a private security agency and therefore, there would not remain any further requirement of the post of a Chowkidar and in that circumstance, had given an offer to the petitioner to apply against any other available post, it fundamentally cannot be said that the respondent authorities had acted in any illegal manner or had adversely affected the legal right of the petitioner within the realm of the existing labour laws. 16. From such point of view, we do not find that the petitioner would be entitled to any relief as sought for in this writ petition by way of a direction to the respondent authorities to allow the petitioner to work as a Chowkidar in the respondent Army Public School, Basistha but at the same time, the interest of justice would also be met that if the petitioner is now allowed to respond to the aforesaid two offers contained in the communications dated 07.05.2012 and 01.03.2013 requiring him to make a representation seeking employment against any available posts. The petitioner is accordingly given the liberty to make such representation. In the event the representation is made, the respondents in the Army Public School, Basistha shall give a reasoned consideration to the same by taking note of the situation as it may prevail when the representation is submitted and may pass any order as may be applicable as per law. 17. It is requested that the requirement of passing the reasoned order be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the representation. 18. 17. It is requested that the requirement of passing the reasoned order be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the representation. 18. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, we do not go into the question of maintainability of this writ petition and the question is kept open for any further deliberation. 19. Writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms.