JUDGMENT : RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. 1. Heard Sri Peeta Raman, learned counsel representing Smt S. Priyanka, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri C.B. Adarsh Kumar, learned counsel representing Sri K.V. Raghu Veer, learned standing counsel for the respondents 1 and 2. 2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs: “It is hereby prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order of direction particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus: (i) Calling for the records of the proceedings dated 19.07.2019 and 20.07.2019 of the respondents 1 and 2 respectively also declare the action of the 1st respondent in instructing the 2nd respondent to terminate petitioner's contract as Special Officer vide Rc. No. 47/APSSA/KGBV/2019, dated 19.07.2019 and also the consequential action of the 2nd respondent in terminating petitione's contract as Special Officer vide Rc. No. 667/APSSA/KGBVs/A2/2019, dated 20.07.2019 in furtherance of 1st respondent proceedings dt.19.07.2019 and further the action of the 2nd respondent in directing the 3rd respondent to provide fresh appointment to petitioner as Contract Residential Teacher instead of reinstating her as Special Officer as illegal, arbitrary, discriminative besides violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.” 3. The petitioner has challenged the proceedings dated 19.07.2019 of the 1st respondent and 20.07.2019 of the 2nd respondent as also the action of the 2nd respondent in directing the 3rd respondent to provide fresh appointment to the petitioner as Contract Residential Teacher (CRT). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was selected and appointed as a Special Officer on contract basis on 13.12.2013 under erstwhile Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now known as Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan) (for short “SSA”) and was posted at Kurichedu of Prakasam District. Due to some personal grudge, a news item was published in Andhra Jyothi daily news paper on 27.11.2018 under the caption of “KGBV LO VIDHYARTHINULA AAKALI KEKALU” (In KGBV students raising hungry cries), responding to which, GCDO visited the KGBV on 03.12.2018 and thereafter the petitioner's contract as a Special Officer was terminated vide proceedings in Rc. No. 667/APSSA/KGBVs/A2/2019 dated 20.07.2019 of the 2nd respondent under the instruction of the 1st respondent-State Project Director vide proceedings Rc. No. 47/APSSA/KGBV/2019 dated 19.07.2019. He further submitted that vide proceedings Rc. No. 667/APSSA/KGBVs/A2/2019 dated 20.07.2019 of the 2nd respondent under the instruction of the 1st respondent-State Project Director vide proceedings Rc. No. 47/APSSA/KGBV/2019 dated 19.07.2019. He further submitted that vide proceedings Rc. No. 1359/APSSA/KGBV/A2/2019, dated 13.12.2019, the 3rd respondent appointed the petitioner as Contract Residential Teacher on out-sourcing basis pursuant to which the petitioner joined on 23.12.2019, and since then she is discharging the duties as Contract Residential Teacher. 5. Challenging the impugned orders, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that any opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner. There is gross violation of the principles of natural justice. A detailed enquiry before terminating the petitioner's contract was not conducted. He submitted that instead of providing fresh appointment to the petitioner as CRT, she should have been reinstated as a Special Officer. He has placed reliance on the judgments in the cases of V.P. Ahuja vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 239 , B. Yogeswaramma vs. Collector, Collectorate Office, Srikakulam District and Others, 2017 (4) ALD 615 (DB). 6. Sri C.B. Adarsh Kumar, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that the petitioner was engaged as a Special Officer on contract basis for a period of 11 months and 28 days vide last engagement on 01.05.2019. Such engagements are revived or terminated based upon the performance of the individual. He further submitted that on 27.11.2018 a news article KGBV was published and taking note thereof the 1st respondent-the State Project Director deputed an inspection team which visited the institution on 29.11.2018 and submitted a report of highly irregular functioning in the institution. The Project Officer had also directed the GCDO to inspect and report who submitted report observing serious lapses. The Joint Secretary, KGBV also reported on 10.01.2019 that the CRTs were irregular in the institution and absent and the Special Officer was not taking care of the students. Based on those reports the State Project Director deputed the Deputy Director, I.E. to inspect and report. The Deputy Director, I.E submitted report on 16.07.2019 pointing many lapses. In view of such reports, the first respondent directed the 2nd respondent to terminate the contract of the petitioner and the second respondent issued the order dated 20.07.2019. 7. Based on those reports the State Project Director deputed the Deputy Director, I.E. to inspect and report. The Deputy Director, I.E submitted report on 16.07.2019 pointing many lapses. In view of such reports, the first respondent directed the 2nd respondent to terminate the contract of the petitioner and the second respondent issued the order dated 20.07.2019. 7. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent further submitted that clause No. 7 of the contract agreement specifically provided that in case of improper conduct and/or unsatisfactory performance by the employee, contract shall be terminated without any notice and no compensation shall be paid in such cases. The termination of the petitioner's contract as Special Officer was in terms of the contract agreement to which the principles of natural justice are not attracted. He further submitted that it was on the petitioner's representation to the Government, which in turn was forwarded to the 1st respondent on 20.09.2019, that on the humanitarian ground the proceedings dated 13.12.2019 were passed to re-engage the staff including the petitioner as CRT in any other KGBV. The petitioner joined on 23.12.2019 as CRT. The writ petition therefore deserves dismissal. 8. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The petitioner's appointment as a Special Officer under erstwhile Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now known as Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan) and posting at Kurichedu of Prakasam District was on contract base accepted by the petitioner subject to the terms and conditions in the contract agreement. 10. Para No. 7 of the Contract Agreement dated 01.05.2019 provided as under: “7. Termination In case of improper conduct and/or unsatisfactory performance by the signatory having regard in particular to the Terms of Reference mentioned above, Sarva Shikasha Abhiyan shall terminate this contract without any notice and no compensation shall be payable in such case.” 11. Para No. 7 of the Contract agreement thus clearly provided that in case of improper conduct/and or unsatisfactory performance by the employee, the contract shall be terminated without any notice and compensation. 12. Para No. 7 of the Contract agreement thus clearly provided that in case of improper conduct/and or unsatisfactory performance by the employee, the contract shall be terminated without any notice and compensation. 12. With respect to the contention of the petitioner's counsel as regards violation of the principles of natural justice, it is settled law that every judicial, quasi judicial or even administrative order having civil consequences, adversely affecting a person is required to be passed after affording opportunity of hearing to the person concerned to enable him to defend and to place his version against the proposed decision and the material sought to be used against him. But this principle to afford opportunity of hearing is for the benefit and protection of the person concerned, on the first principle that no man be condemned unheard and therefore the applicability of the principles of natural justice can also be waived by the person concerned. 13. The petitioner by accepting the terms and conditions of the contract agreement, condition No. 7 referred to above, cannot now complain the violation of the principles of natural justice of affording opportunity of hearing. The acceptance of such condition amounted to waiver of the opportunity of hearing/notice before termination of contract, to which the petitioner would not be entitled, unless by reason of some statute, rules or regulations governing the service conditions, the petitioner was or became entitled to such opportunity. Any such statute, rules or regulations has not been placed before the court. 14. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Others, (2006) 3 SCC 276 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that “it is true that the principle of natural justice is based on two pillars: (i) nobody shall be condemned without hearing and (ii) nobody shall be a judge in his own cause. It is, however, well known that the principles of natural justice can be excluded by a statute. It can also be waived.” 15. The court does not find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that before passing the order of termination of contract a regular enquiry should have been conducted. Any provision for holding any regular detailed enquiry with respect to contract employees, as in the present case, has not been placed before the court. 16. The court does not find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that before passing the order of termination of contract a regular enquiry should have been conducted. Any provision for holding any regular detailed enquiry with respect to contract employees, as in the present case, has not been placed before the court. 16. In State of Punjab vs. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Rules of disciplinary action are to the advantage of regular employees, and the absence of their applicability, is to the disadvantage of temporary employees. The expression “temporary employee” therein included contractual employee. Paragraph 46.4 of Jagit Singh (supra) reads as under: “46.4 Temporary employees (irrespective of their nomenclature) are also never governed by any rules of disciplinary action. As a matter of fact, a daily-wager is engaged only for a day, and his services can be dispensed with at the end of the day for which he is engaged. Rules of disciplinary action, are therefore to the advantage of regular employees, and the absence of their applicability, is to the disadvantage of temporary employees, even though the judgment in State of Haryana vs. Jasmer Singh, seems to project otherwise.” 17. In V.P. Ahuja (supra), upon which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance was a case of a probationer. The petitioner's appointment was on a contract basis from time to time subject to the terms of the contract agreement. 18. The case of B. Yogeeswaramma (supra) upon which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance to contend that the termination of the petitioner's service based on the reports of the respondents behind the back of the employee without regular departmental enquiry was unsustainable, is not applicable as in B. Yogeeswaramma (supra) the contract agreement itself under Condition No. 10 provided that the services of the employee therein could be terminated on giving one month notice or pay in lieu thereof and shall also be subject to the disciplinary control. There was non-compliance with condition No. 10 of the contract agreement and the order impugned therein was passed without holding a regular departmental enquiry. 19. There is another aspect of the matter. The impugned orders were passed on 19.07.2020 and 20.07.2020. There was non-compliance with condition No. 10 of the contract agreement and the order impugned therein was passed without holding a regular departmental enquiry. 19. There is another aspect of the matter. The impugned orders were passed on 19.07.2020 and 20.07.2020. Thereafter, the petitioner was given fresh appointment on the post of CRT vide order dated 13.12.2019 pursuant to which the petitioner also joined on 23.12.2019. The present writ petition challenging the orders dated 19.07.2020 and 20.07.2020 was filed only in the month of July, 2021 almost one year of the impugned orders. Even prior to filing of the writ petition, the petitioner accepted fresh appointment and joined duty on 23.12.2019 itself to new appointment. 20. For all the aforesaid reasons, this court is not inclined to invoke its extraordinary and discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. 22. Consequently, the Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, shall also stand closed.