JUDGMENT : 1. This petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 22.07.2015, passed by Respondent No.1. 2. Heard, learned Advocate, Mr. Jit P. Patel, for the petitioner and learned Advocate, Mr. R.C. Jani, for the Respondent. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner came to be appointed by Respondent No.1 on the post of Assistant Junior Clerk on 08.08.2008 by way of compassionate appointment, as the father of the petitioner expired on duty. The appointment of the petitioner was on fixed pay and for the period of five years only. 3.1 As per the knowledge of the petitioner, an exam being Course on Computer Concepts (in brief, ‘CCC’), which is a basic computer training course, was required to be passed for the purpose of regularization of services. 3.2 As per the say of the petitioner, the petitioner appeared for the said examination and he was issued a certificate on 05.02.2011. 3.3 It is the case of the petitioner that he has not obtained any benefit on the basis of the said certificate. It is also the case of the petitioner that as soon as he came to know that the said certificate is not genuine, he immediately wrote a letter to the Respondent-Authority and requested that the said certificate may not be considered for regularization of his services. 3.4 In the meantime, the petitioner passed CCC+ examination from a government recognized institution and he also produced the said certificate before the Respondent-authority. 4. At this stage, learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, appearing for the petitioner submitted that either without issuing any show-cause notice or conducting any departmental inquiry, the Respondent-Authority terminated his services. 4.1 Learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, pointed out that a private complaint, being Criminal Case No. 434 of 2015, has already been filed with the concerned Magisterial Court at Ahmedabad for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1-Authorities without holding any departmental inquiry or without affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner cannot be sustained. 4.1.1 A copy of the impugned order dated 22.07.2015 passed by the Respondent-Authority is produced at Page-11 of the compilation. Thus, the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1-Authorities without holding any departmental inquiry or without affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner cannot be sustained. 4.1.1 A copy of the impugned order dated 22.07.2015 passed by the Respondent-Authority is produced at Page-11 of the compilation. 4.2 It was further submitted that the order dated 22.07.2015 is stigmatic in nature and therefore, the same cannot be termed as the simpliciter order of termination of services. In fact, the impugned order is stigmatic and punitive in nature, for which the Respondent-Authority were required to conduct a departmental inquiry. 4.3. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, Dated: 17.02.2021, rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 270 of 2021. 4.4 It was, therefore, urged that the impugned order be quashed and set aside. 5. On the other hand, learned Advocate, Mr. Jani, appearing for the Respondent-Authority strongly opposed this petition. 5.1 Referring to the the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Respondent-Authority, learned Advocate, Mr. Jani, invited the attention of this Court to the appointment letter of the petitioner, which is produced at Page-30 of the compilation, and submitted that as per the terms and conditions of the appointment order, the services of the petitioner can be terminated under certain circumstances, without either giving any notice or without conducting any departmental inquiry. 5.2 It was, further, submitted that the petitioner was required to pass CCC examination conducted by any government recognized institution. However, the petitioner, though, did not pass any such examination, he produced false / forged certificates and thereby, he tried to misguide the Respondent-Authority. 5.3 Learned Advocate, Mr. Jani, also referred to the documents, which are placed on record at Pages-62 and 63 of the compilation. 5.4 Learned Advocate, Mr. Jani, also referred to the averments made by the petitioner in Paragraph-5 of the memo of the petition and submitted that the petitioner, in fact, admitted to have produced false / forged certificates before the Respondent-Authority. Thus, in the facts of the present case, as per the terms and conditions of the appointment of the petitioner, the Respondent-Authority was not required to either issue any notice or to conduct any departmental inquiry before terminating the services of the petitioner. 5.5 Learned Advocate, Mr. Thus, in the facts of the present case, as per the terms and conditions of the appointment of the petitioner, the Respondent-Authority was not required to either issue any notice or to conduct any departmental inquiry before terminating the services of the petitioner. 5.5 Learned Advocate, Mr. Jani, relied on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, Dated: 09.07.2015, rendered in CWP No. 23089 of 2011 in the case of ‘MANDEEP SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS’, more particularly Paragraph-9 thereof, and submitted that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner is simpliciter and not stigmatic in nature and therefore, no departmental inquiry was required to be conducted. 5.6 It was, therefore, urged that the Respondent-Authority have committed no error in passing the impugned order and therefore this petition be dismissed. 6. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and having perused the material on record, it emerges from the record that the petitioner was appointed on ad hoc basis for the period of five years, on fixed salary vide order dated 08.08.2008 passed by the Respondent-Authority. 6.1 A copy of the aforesaid letter is produced at Page-30 of the compilation. 6.2 From the record, it also emerges that the petitioner has completed five years’ service and for the purpose of regularization of his services, he is required to pass CCC examination and to submit the certificate issued by the government recognized institution towards the same. Therefore, the petitioner produced the certificate of having passed CCC examination before the Respondent-Authority. 6.2.1 Here, it is the case of the petitioner that after the submission of the aforesaid certificate, he came to know that the concerned institution was not recognized by the government and therefore, he requested the Respondent-Authority not to consider the said certificate for the purpose of regularization of his services. 6.2.2 It appears that, in the interregnum, the petitioner passed CCC+ examination from a government recognized institution. A copy of the said certificate / notification dated 02/03.01.2015 is produced at Page-15 of the compilation. 6.2.3 The petitioner, thereafter, informed the Respondent-Authority that he has passed CCC+ examination from the government recognized institution. 6.3 It is the case of the petitioner that despite the above, the Respondent-Authority did not regularize his services and instead passed the impugned order dated 22.07.2015, terminating his services. 6.2.3 The petitioner, thereafter, informed the Respondent-Authority that he has passed CCC+ examination from the government recognized institution. 6.3 It is the case of the petitioner that despite the above, the Respondent-Authority did not regularize his services and instead passed the impugned order dated 22.07.2015, terminating his services. 6.4 Now, if, the impugned order dated 22.07.2015 is carefully examined, then, it reveals that the Respondent-Authority passed the impugned order on the ground that the petitioner produced false / forged certificates before it and for the said purpose, a private complaint has already been filed with the concerned Magisterial Court and on the very same ground, the services of the petitioner came to be terminated vide impugned order dated 22.07.2015, without either issuing any notice or conducting any departmental inquiry. 6.5 If, the impugned order dated 22.07.2015 is carefully seen, this Court is of the considered view that the order dated 22.07.2015 is stigmatic in nature and therefore, before passing such an order, the Respondent-Authority were required to conduct a departmental inquiry or affording an opportunity of hearing. 6.6 At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the decision rendered by this Court Dated: 26.02.2019, in Special Civil Application No. 12071 of 2018, wherein, the Coordinate Bench of this Court in similar case, where, an FIR was filed against the concerned petitioner, who was appointed on the post of Clerk for the fixed period of five years, his services came to be terminated by the concerned authority without conducting any departmental inquiry. In the said matter, after considering the various decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Coordinate Bench of this Court quashed and set aside the order of termination passed by the concerned authorities and directed to reinstate the concerned petitioner on the same post with continuity of service and other consequential benefits. 6.6.1 The relevant observations made by the Coordinate Bench of this Court reads thus : “5. The position of law in relation to effecting termination of service of an employee, even if on the fixed pay, by passing a stigmatic order without following principles of natural justice came to be delineated and discussed by this Court in Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.17872 of 2017 decided on 30th November, 2017. In that case, petitioner was appointed as Beat Guard. In that case, petitioner was appointed as Beat Guard. The allegations were raised against him inter alia that he had stolen two passbooks, that he mentioned wrong information in the Register to allow trucks to pass-by illegally. It was stated in the order leading to his termination of service that he used the pass-book for illegal purpose for which it was stolen and due to the act of negligence, caused damage to the forest's properties to a large extent. It was mentioned in the order that if the petitioner was to continue in service, it would entail greater loss and that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service since the petitioner was found to be negligent and careless in discharge of his duties. 5.1 The law on the aspect was discussed with reference to the decisions of the Apex Court. In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 5 SCC 152 ], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: “Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry.” (para 29) (emphasis supplied) 5.2 The above statement of law that if the order is punitive and stigmatic in nature, even if the employee concerned is a temporary employee or holding the post as on probation, his dismissal or removal would warrant a regular inquiry and fullfledged compliance of natural justice, emanaged from the early decision of the Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India [ (1984) 2 SCC 369 ]. In that case, the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the Court to go behind the formal order of discharge so as to find out the real cause of action. In that case, the appellant was an IPS Officer, undergoing training as a probationer, arrived late by about 22 minutes at the place, even though prior intimation was sent about the time on which, the candidates were required to reach the venue. The incident of delayed reporting was considered to be one by the authorities calling for an inquiry and an explanation was sought for from the petitioner and all other probationer trainees who had arrived late. On the basis of explanation, the Director recommended the Government for discharge of the appellant from service. The Government passed order of discharge on the basis of recommendation of the Director with whom, the only ground prevailing was that the appellant did not show any sign of repentance. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits. 5.3 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits. 5.3 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. In such circumstances, the Apex Court stated, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged, to go beyond the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court held, “If …. …. …. the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground where the aggrieved officer is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2). It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2).” (Paras 11 and 13) 5.4 It is the foundation of the order which really matters. The Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal (supra) stated that if from the record and the attendant circumstances of the present case it becomes clear that the real foundation for the order of discharge of the appellant-probationer was the alleged act of misconduct, the impugned order would amount to termination of service by way of punishment and in absence of any enquiry held in accordance with Article 311(2), it was liable to be struck down. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all. 5.5 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [ (1980) 2 SCC 593 ] stated and observed thus, "53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." (Emphasis supplied) (Para 9) 5.5.1 Having delineated the aforesaid principles, the Apex Court held that the order in the case before it could not be treated as a simple order of retrenchment and that it was an order passed by way of punishment. It was held that such order of dismissal which was passed without holding a regular departmental inquiry cannot be allowed to be sustained. 5.6 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.7 In Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi (supra), it was thereafter observed and held, “6. When the impugned order is assessed, evaluated and considered in light of the aforesaid principles, it is even not necessary to adopt the process of lifting of veil. It is not necessary to remove the facade even, for, the order in these very recitals could be manifestly said to be based on allegations of misconduct. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, eventhough the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, eventhough the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. Even if the temporary, ad-hoc or probationer employee is driven out of service on the ground of misconduct without holding inquiry and stigma is caste on his career by the punitive order, it is also a facet of behaving with hire and fire attitude by the employer.” 5.8 Also stand to support the petitioner another decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No.1095 of 2016 decided on 21st September, 2016 in which, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that the order ex facie indicated that the basis of the order of termination was criminal complaint lodged against the petitioner. As the order was passed without compliance of natural justice, it was required indulgence of the Court, stated the Court, after discussing the position of law in that regard. 6. In light of the aforesaid principles and the position of law on the aspect, if the facts of the present petitioner are revisited, the petitioner was appointed on 28th September, 2012 as Junior Clerk for a fixed period of five years. His tenure was to come to an end as per appointment order on 28th September, 2017. Pursuant to F.I.R. being C.R. No.I09 of 2016 registered on 19th December, 2016, the petitioner was supplied to the impugned order of termination is dated 21st August, 2017.” 6.6.2 When the aforesaid order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court was challenged by way of Letters Patent Appeal No. 996 of 2021 before the Division Bench, while confirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench dismissed the same vide order dated 18.11.2021. 6.7 In another decision relied on by the learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, for the petitioner in Letters Patent Appeal No. 270 of 2021, Dated: 17.02.2021, the Division Bench has observed as under : “1. 6.7 In another decision relied on by the learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, for the petitioner in Letters Patent Appeal No. 270 of 2021, Dated: 17.02.2021, the Division Bench has observed as under : “1. Appellant is the original respondent, who is aggrieved by the judgement and order passed by the learned Single Judge on 27.09.2019 in Special Civil Application No. 9447 of 2019, whereby it quashed and set aside the termination order dated 01.04.2019 passed by the District Development Officer, Panchmahal District Panchayat. The Court also directed reinstatement of respondent within the period eight weeks on the original post with continuity of service and 100% salary for the interregnum period along with consequential benefits. 2. According to the appellant, respondent had been appointed as Additional Assistant Engineer (Civil), Class-III at Halol on 01.06.2018 on contractual basis with a fixed salary for the period of five years. The services were liable to be terminated in the case of misconduct or indiscipline and breach of conditions of Gujarat Panchayat Service [Discipline and Appeal] Rules, 1998. 3. It is averred and alleged that respondent was caught red handed by Anti Corruption Bureau, while accepting a bribe of Rs.30,000/- on 18.02.2019, which was within one year of appointment order. This incident was brought to the notice through a communication dated 28.03.2019. It was also noticed that he was in police custody from 19.02.2019 to 28.02.2019 and was enlarged on regular bail pursuant to the order passed by learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Halol, District: Panchmahal. His explanation was called for on 20.03.2019 by issuing a notice as to why his services be not terminated. As his involvement was in a serious case of accepting the bribe, assessment of his performance at the end of every year is a must. XXX XXX XXX 10. In the instant case, without disturbing the right of the employer, in any manner, as has been also directed by the learned Single Judge, which has not precluded, the employer to proceed against the respondent in accordance with law, as the sole issue, which has been raised before this Court is already decided by this Court, we see no reason to entertain this petition.” 6.8 In Special Civil Application No. 6062 of 2019, the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.09.2021 quashed and set aside the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioner therein. 6.8.1 The relevant observations reads as under : “6. Under the circumstances and in light of the aforesaid undisputed fact, the impugned order 31.01.2019 passed by the respondent authority is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on his original post. It is clarified that the reinstatement is only for the purpose of holding the departmental inquiry. The grant of consequential benefits would depend on the ultimate outcome of the departmental proceedings.” 6.9 In Special Civil Application No. 9810 of 2020 also, in almost similar case, this Court vide order dated 04.02.2022 quashed and set aside the order of termination by observing as under : “6. Considering the aforesaid, the communication dated 30.03.2020 is quashed and set aside. 7. The petitioner shall be permitted to resume his duties as Talati-cum-Mantri on the same terms and conditions as he was appointed by the order dated 10.03.2017. 8. Since the engagement of the petitioner was for a period of five years, this engagement shall inure till 10.04.2022. For the interregnum, from 27.01.2020 till the actual date on which the petitioner is permitted to resume his duty, the amount as per the terms of the engagement shall be paid to the petitioner for the intervening period. 9. It will be open for the respondent Panchayat to take appropriate decision with regard to his continuance in services post 10.04.2022 or before that after holding an appropriate inquiry if thought fit.” 6.10. In the case of ‘MANDEEP SINGH‘ (Supra), the Punjab and Haryana High Court considered the terms and conditions of the order of appointment and thereafter, by relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph-9, observed as under; “9. We find that the High Court did not consider the question of stigma or the effect of any enquiry held before CWP-23089-2011 [12] the order of termination was passed. The question whether the enquiry purportedly held provided the motive or the foundation was required to be considered by the High Court in detail. That has not been done. The question whether the termination of service is simpliciter or punitive has been examined in several cases e.g. Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna and Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. That has not been done. The question whether the termination of service is simpliciter or punitive has been examined in several cases e.g. Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna and Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. The recent two decisions of this Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences and Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences after survey of most of the earlier decisions touching the question observed as to when an order of termination can be treated as simpliciter and when it can be treated as punitive and when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during the period of probation. The learned counsel on either side referred to and relied on these decisions either in support of their respective contentions or to distinguish them for the purpose of application of the principles stated therein to the facts of the present case. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee after referring to various decisions it was indicated as to when a simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations of misconduct and when complaints could be only as a motive for passing such a simple order of termination. In para 21 of the said judgment a distinction is explained thus: (SCC pp. 71-72) "21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as 'founded' on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid." From a long line of decisions it appears to us that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categorise or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service.” 6.11 Thus, from the aforesaid observations made by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that as to whether an order of termination simpliciter or punitive is ultimately to be decided having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. 6.12 In the present case, as observed herein above, the order of termination is passed against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner produced forged / false certificates of having passed CCC examination for which a private complaint has already been filed with the concerned Magisterial Court and therefore, this Court is of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the impugned order of termination passed by the Respondent-Authority is stigmatic and punitive in nature and hence, the Respondent-Authority was required to conduct departmental inquiry before passing the same. 7. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 22.07.2015 passed by the Respondent-Authority is, hereby, QUASHED and set aside. 7.1 The Respondent-Authority is DIRECTED to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service within the period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 7.2 However, it is clarified that the petitioner SHALL NOT be entitled to any monetary benefit for the interregnum period. 7.1 The Respondent-Authority is DIRECTED to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service within the period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 7.2 However, it is clarified that the petitioner SHALL NOT be entitled to any monetary benefit for the interregnum period. 7.3 It is, further, clarified that it shall be OPEN to the Respondent-Authority to proceed against the present petitioner in accordance with law, by conducting appropriate departmental inquiry. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs. Direct service is permitted.