A. v. Surender Kumar VS State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Spl. Public Prosecutor
2022-07-26
K.SURENDER
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant is convicted for the offence under Sections 7 and also under Section 13 (1) (d) punishable under Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act of 1988”) vide judgment in Calendar Case No.8 of 2004, dated 04.03.2008 passed by the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for demanding and accepting bribe of Rs.1,000/- from the de facto complainant/P.W.1. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed. 2. Briefly stated the case of the prosecution is that P.W.1 was running M/s. Bhanu Engineering works at Ranigunj, Secunderabad. On 14.08.2004 at about 12.00 noon, in the absence of P.W.1, accused officer visited the shop and asked the person in the shop about the business details and informed the person in the shop to inform P.W.1 to meet him in his office on 20.08.2003. When P.W.1 met the accused officer on the said day, AO demanded Rs.1,000/- as mamool for not inspecting his shop in future and not to point out any irregularities in inspection reports and further not to harass him. PW1 was not willing to pay the bribe amount, as such he gave a written complaint to the ACB on the same day at 11.00 a.m. 3. The trap was laid on 23.08.2003. The pre-trap proceedings were drafted under Ex.P9 in the office of ACB Range-I, Hyderabad in the presence of trap party. After concluding the pre-trap proceedings, the trap party proceeded to the Bombay Hotel and Bakery where AO asked PW1 to meet him, and reached the hotel around 4.00 p.m. PW1 went inside the Hotel whereas the other trap party members were waiting outside the hotel. Everything was visible from outside as there were no complete wall structure. Around 4.10 P.M, the accused officer arrived on his motorcycle and walked into the Bombay hotel and met P.W.1/complainant. Thereafter he received the amount and kept in his back pocket. The entire transaction of meeting PW.1 and receiving amount, placing the amount in his pocket was witnessed by the trap party members, as such, without even receiving pre-arranged signal, the trap party entered the hotel and DSP confronted the accused officer regarding receiving of bribe.
Thereafter he received the amount and kept in his back pocket. The entire transaction of meeting PW.1 and receiving amount, placing the amount in his pocket was witnessed by the trap party members, as such, without even receiving pre-arranged signal, the trap party entered the hotel and DSP confronted the accused officer regarding receiving of bribe. The accused officer was taken to the first floor of the hotel and post trap proceedings under ExP10 were concluded by 8.30 p.m., after conducting test on the hands of AO. The investigation was thereafter handed over to the inspector, who concluded investigation and filed chargesheet for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988. The charges were also framed under the said provisions and after conclusion of trial the accused officer was found guilty. 4. Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri V. Jitender Rao, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there is no proof of demand by the accused officer. Further, the reason for demand as mentioned in the complaint Ex.P1 was that it was towards mamool, so that he will not inspect the shop in future and not to point out any irregularities in the preparation of inspection reports and not to harass P.W.1. However, when he was examined before the court, he stated that he went to the office of accused officer on 20.08.2003 and met him for the reason of pending returns and asked time for filing the said returns, for which reason Rs.1,000/- was demanded by AO for not taking any action. In view of the improvement made regarding non-filing of the returns, which was not mentioned earlier, there is an improvement regarding demand of bribe. 5. In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana, (2002) 4 SCC 574 held that the version regarding the demand was an improvement in the earlier statements as such the demand could not be conclusively proved. In the said circumstances, the conviction recorded against the appellant was set aside. 6. The learned Senior Counsel also argued that material document which is Section 164 Cr.P.C statement of PW1 was suppressed by the ACB.
In the said circumstances, the conviction recorded against the appellant was set aside. 6. The learned Senior Counsel also argued that material document which is Section 164 Cr.P.C statement of PW1 was suppressed by the ACB. Though the witness stated that he was examined before the magistrate the said Section 164 CrPC statement was not provided for which reason of suppression of material documents, the accused officer is entitled to be acquitted. 7. Further there is no evidence to show that the accused officer was in any way authorized to inspect the premises and give any report regarding the business of P.W.1. Admittedly, P.W.1 was not present on the alleged date of demand on 14.08.2003. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Sejappa v. State by Police Inspector, Lokayukta, Chitradurga, (2016) 12 SC 150 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that proof of demand is a sine qua non to constitute an offence under Section 7 and mere recovery of tainted currency notes was not sufficient to convict the accused. 8. Learned senior counsel finally argued that the trap playing officer was not competent since he was not in the rank of DSP. In the judgment reported in the case of State Inspector of Police, Visakhapatnam v. Surya Sankaram Karri, (2006) 7 SCC 172 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if a document in possession of public functionary is not produced, which he has to, an adverse inference has to be drawn. When the inspector has failed to produce any document to show that he was competent to lay a trap, an adverse inference has to be drawn and the trap proceedings are vitiated on account of the incompetence of trap laying officer. However, the learned counsel also brought to the notice of this court the judgment in the case of Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though there was any irregularity in a proceeding, such irregularity should have been resulted in causing prejudice to the accused. Unless such prejudice is shown by the accused officer, such irregularity will not be of any consequence and cannot be said to vitiate the conviction.
Unless such prejudice is shown by the accused officer, such irregularity will not be of any consequence and cannot be said to vitiate the conviction. However, learned senior counsel submits that when the statute has specifically mentioned about the rank of police officer who can conduct a trap and when the same was not followed and further no document was filed to show that the trap laying officer was authorized, the said circumstances themselves go to show that the procedural law was not followed, for which reason the prosecution is bad. For the said reasons, AO is entitled to be acquitted. 9. The learned Special Standing Counsel for ACB would submit that the conduct of the accused officer going to the shop of P.W.1 on 14.08.2003 would itself show that he was a person in authority and had every reason to demand money. The prosecution case cannot be expected to be proved with mathematical precision. Discrepancies trivial in nature would always creep in during the course of investigation and the trial. When such discrepancies do not go to the root of the case, they can be ignored. From the evidence of call records collected by the ACB it is apparent that the accused officer was constantly in touch with P.W.1, and further on the day of trap, the entire trap party had seen the accused officer receiving money from P.W.1 and the same was recovered from his pant pocket. There is no explanation given by the accused officer at the time of post trap proceedings and in fact the accused officer had accepted that he had taken money from P.W.1 for which reason the presumption under Section 20 of the Act has to be raised. Since the accused officer has failed to rebut the presumption, the conviction recorded by the Special Judge is proper. In support of his contentions, he relied on the judgment reported in the case of Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 571 . 10. As seen from the complaint Ex.P1, it is stated in the body of the complaint that at 12.30 noon, on 20.08.2003, an amount of Rs.1,000/- was demanded from PW1 as mamool by AO at his office for not inspecting the shop of PW1 in future and not pointing out any irregularities and not to harass him.
10. As seen from the complaint Ex.P1, it is stated in the body of the complaint that at 12.30 noon, on 20.08.2003, an amount of Rs.1,000/- was demanded from PW1 as mamool by AO at his office for not inspecting the shop of PW1 in future and not pointing out any irregularities and not to harass him. However, the said complaint was received by the ACB office at 11.00 a.m. When it is the specific case of P.W.1 that demand was made at 12.30 p.m., how a complaint could be lodged at 11.00 a.m. itself was not explained by the prosecution. However, during the course of trial, P.W.1 stated that the demand was made at 10.30 a.m., pursuant to which he lodged a complaint. There is no explanation by PW1 as to how the time of 12.30 p.m. was mentioned in the complaint. It appears that the prosecution is suppressing the actual version and coming up with a tainted one. 11. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel, the version given for demand of bribe amount is improved during the course of trial. As seen from the complaint, it was stated that the said amount of Rs.1,000/- was towards mamool, so that no inspection would be done in future and no to point out any irregularities. But during his evidence in the court, PW1 stated that he went to the office of AO on 20.08.2003 as some returns were pending and asked the accused AO time to file such returns. There is any amount of improvement in between the reason for demand that was mentioned in the complaint and what is stated before the court. In the complaint Ex.P1, it is stated as follows; “On 14.08.203 at about 12.00 noon Mr. Surender Kumar, ACTO, Ranigunj Circle visited our shop asked about the business details and turnover and asked me to meet him on 20.08.2003 at about 12.30 noon in his office.
In the complaint Ex.P1, it is stated as follows; “On 14.08.203 at about 12.00 noon Mr. Surender Kumar, ACTO, Ranigunj Circle visited our shop asked about the business details and turnover and asked me to meet him on 20.08.2003 at about 12.30 noon in his office. Where he demanded to pay Rs.1,000/- as mamool to him so that he will not going to inspect my shop in future and not to point out any irregularities in the preparation of inspection reports and not to harass me.” However during trial he stated as follows : “On 20.08.2003 I went to the office of ACTO and met the AO in his office around 10.30 A.M. As some of my returns were pending I asked some time for filing the same. He asked Rs.1,000/- towards mamool from me for not taking any action against me. I requested for some time and came out of the office of AO.” 12. Admittedly, on 14.08.2003, there was no demand by the accused officer from PW1. According to P.W.1, there was one person in his shop when the accused officer allegedly went to his shop on 14.08.2003 and asked to meet him. Further, there is no mention about any inspection or verification of accounts in the complaint Ex.P1. However, he stated so during his examination before the Court that AO verified accounts on 14.08.2003. 13. No witness is examined by the prosecution to prove the any demand or verification on 14.08.2003. P.W.1 did not mention as to who was present on 14.08.2003 when the accused officer allegedly went to the shop and inspected the records. Further, the alleged Section 164 Cr.P.C statement was also not provided to the accused officer which resulted in not giving an opportunity to the accused officer to cross-examine P.W.1 on the basis of his previous statement. 14. The facts of the present case are similar to that of K. Shanthamma’s case (supra) decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The prosecution has made improvements regarding the reason for demand and further failed to provide either returns filed by P.W.1 or the documents that were allegedly inspected by the accused officer on 14.08.2003. 15. In the said circumstances, the demand of illegal gratification by the appellant/accused officer was not proved by the prosecution for which reason, the ingredients under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 are not proved.
15. In the said circumstances, the demand of illegal gratification by the appellant/accused officer was not proved by the prosecution for which reason, the ingredients under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 are not proved. In the absence of proof of demand, the recovery is of no consequence and accordingly, the appeal is liable to be allowed. 16. In the result, the impugned judgment in C.C.No.8 of 2004 dated 04.03.2008 is set aside and the accused is acquitted. Since the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled. 17. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.