JUDGMENT : 1. Assailing the legality, correctness, judicial propriety of the impugned judgment of conviction and award of sentence dated 03.06.2014 passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 03/2013 by the Special Judge (Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe {Prevention of Atrocities} Act), Dhamtari (C.G.) {for short trial court}, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous Imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of payment of fine additional Simple Imprisonment for 3 months. Under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 Rigorous Imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine additional Simple Imprisonment for 3 months. Facts of the case 2. The prosecution story in brief is that on 13.12.2012 prosecutrix has gone to village Baroli with her friends to witness a sports event. After the event is over, she stayed at night in the house of her friend Jyoti Korram. After having meal and watching TV she went to sleep alone. Her other friends went to witness cultural event in the night. Parents of her friend Jyoti were sleeping in the other room. At about 11 to 11:30 in the night, appellant came drunk and entered into the room held her hands and committed forcible intercourse. On shouting he gagged her mouth. Because of fear and shame she did not disclose the incident to anyone. On 12.01.2013 she disclosed the incident to her mother (PW-2) who in turn informed her father (PW-3). Upon which a social meeting was convened. On being advised to make report in the meeting, she lodged the report in the Borai Police Station on 13.01.2013. Upon which First Information Report (Ex.P-1) was lodged against the appellant. During the course of investigation, after obtaining the consent (Ex.P-2) from her, memo for medical examination was prepared and she was medically examined in the Government Hospital, Nagari vide Ex-P/18 and report was obtained. The undergarments (Ex.P-3) of prosecutrix was seized. They were medically examined. Spot map (Ex.P-6) was prepared. Caste certificate (Ex.P-4) of the prosecutrix was seized. Appellant was arrested and information of his arrest was given to his relatives. The admission (Dakhil Kharij) register (Ex-P/11C) of prosecutrix was seized. The undergarments (Ex.P-3) of prosecutrix was seized. They were medically examined. Spot map (Ex.P-6) was prepared. Caste certificate (Ex.P-4) of the prosecutrix was seized. Appellant was arrested and information of his arrest was given to his relatives. The admission (Dakhil Kharij) register (Ex-P/11C) of prosecutrix was seized. DVD cassette containing the statement of prosecutrix and Jyoti Korram was seized from Sohanlal Patel, Ajanta Photo Studio, Nagari in presence of witnesses. Call details of the mobile of appellant was received. Statement of witnesses were recorded. 3. After due investigation charge sheet under section 376, 506 of IPC and section 3 (2) (5) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short Special Act) was fled before the Competent Court. The appellant was charged for offence punishable under Sections 450, 376, 506 -B of IPC and 3 (2) (5) of Special Act, he abjured the guilt and claim to tried. Prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 30 documents. The statement of appellant under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was recorded. The learned trial Court after due appreciation of the evidence and material placed before it, convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated above and acquitted him for offences under section 506-B of IPC and 3 (2) (5) of Special Act, vide impugned judgment dated 03.06.2014 which is challenged before this Court by the appellant. Submissions on behalf of the appellant 4. Counsel for the appellant made the following submissions :- (a) The impugned judgment of conviction and award of sentence is patently erroneous, contrary to the evidence and material available on record is bad in law. The trial Court did not appreciate the evidence and material placed before it to its proper perspective and erroneously passed the impugned judgment of conviction. The trial Court committed an error of law as well as fact in marshaling the evidence brought by the prosecution to sustain the conviction. (b) He further submits that the statements of prosecution witnesses particularly prosecutrix (PW-1), does not inspire confidence. He submits that the medical evidence does not support the case of the persecution. The alleged incident said to have been committed on 13.12.2012 at about 11-11:30 PM and report was lodged on 13.01.2013 without any probable explanation of delay. The age of the prosecutrix has not been proved in accordance with law and she appears to be major. He submits that the medical evidence does not support the case of the persecution. The alleged incident said to have been committed on 13.12.2012 at about 11-11:30 PM and report was lodged on 13.01.2013 without any probable explanation of delay. The age of the prosecutrix has not been proved in accordance with law and she appears to be major. (c) He goes on to submit that the story put forth by the prosecution is improbable. He argues that as per prosecution story the prosecutrix was sleeping in the house of her friend. The parents of her friends were also sleeping in the same house in another room. Therefore it is not possible for any one to enter into the room of the prosecutrix without passing through the room in which the parents of her friend were sleeping. He further submits that the case is rested upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. However in the case in hand the testimony of the prosecutrix is full of contradictions and omissions. On any stretch of imagination her testimony is not credible, trustworthy and can not be relied upon to sustain conviction. To buttress his submissions he places his reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443 . (d) Lastly, he submitted that suspicion however grave may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a long gap between ‘may be’ proved and ‘must be’ proved. Looking to the evidence brought on record beneft of doubt must be extended to the appellant. In support of his submission reliance is placed on a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 . On the basis of above broad submissions, he prays that the appeal may be allowed and the appellant may be acquitted from all the charges. Submissions on behalf of the respondent State 5. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 . On the basis of above broad submissions, he prays that the appeal may be allowed and the appellant may be acquitted from all the charges. Submissions on behalf of the respondent State 5. On the other hand counsel for the State made the following submissions: (a) The learned trial Court was absolutely justified in holding the appellant guilty of the above stated offence as it has properly and meticulously examined the evidences and material placed before it and gave a categorical finding that it is the appellant who has committed the aforesaid offence and therefore the finding of conviction and award of sentence do not require any interference by this Court. (b) He also submits that the age of prosecutrix has been proved by the Lecturer Panchayat Rashik Manjari Nagwanshi (PW-8) who has proved the entry of age in admission (Dakhil Kharij) Register (Ex.P/11C) as 31.05.1996, therefore, there is no doubts with regard to age of prosecutrix. He further submits that the learned trial court after due appreciation of the evidence in this regard has given a categorical fnding that the age of the prosecutrix is 17 years and 6 months which does not require any interference by this court. (c) He further goes on to submit that the statement of prosecutrix (PW-1) is very categorical and it is a settled position of law that the conviction can be sustained only on the basis of statement of prosecutrix which inspire confidence. He further submits that the prosecutrix (PW- 1) has narrated the entire incident in unambiguous terms and because some variation is found it would not make her statement incredible or untrustworthy. Her statement has to be read as a whole thereafter its credence can be tested. The finding recorded by the trial court on the testimony of prosecutrix (PW-1) is not to be disturbed. (d) Lastly, he submits that even if medical report may not fully support the case of the prosecution, it would not make the entire case unreliable. He goes on to submit that prosecutrix is less than 18 years of age, therefore, when she informed about the happening of the offence to her mother, the report was lodged so even assuming there is delay in lodging the FIR that cannot be a ground to doubt on prosecution case. 6. He goes on to submit that prosecutrix is less than 18 years of age, therefore, when she informed about the happening of the offence to her mother, the report was lodged so even assuming there is delay in lodging the FIR that cannot be a ground to doubt on prosecution case. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival contentions and perused the record meticulously with utmost circumspection. Analysis and Conclusions with regard to age of prosecutrix 7. In order to prove the age of the prosecutrix, the prosecution has examined Rashik Manjari Nagwanshi (PW-8) who happens to be Teacher of School where prosecutrix was studying. This witness categorically stated that the name of prosecutrix is registered as Serial No.292 in the admission (Dakhil-Kharij) register and she has proved the date of birth of prosecutrix as 31.05.1996. This document is marked as Ex.P/11C. From the cross-examination of this witness nothing significant incriminating fact has been brought. Father of prosecutrix (PW-3) has also been examined. He has proved the birth certificate of prosecutrix issued by Registrar (Birth-Death), Dhamtari Government of Chhattisgarh as Ex-P/10. In this document the date of birth is mentioned as 31.05.1995. From perusal of Ex-P/10 and Ex-P/11C there is a difference in the year of birth of prosecutrix. However, date of birth is mentioned as 31st of May. Dr. Pushplata Singh (PW-15) conducted the ossification test of the prosecutrix and opined her age to be more than 17 years and less than 18 years. The learned trial court after due appreciation of evidence recorded a finding that the age of the prosecutrix was 17 years and 6 months at the time of incident. I do not see any perversity in this finding after deep scrutiny of the evidence in this regard. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court the prosecutrix was aged about 17 years 6 months on the date of incident relying on the case of Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 3467 Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 3467 Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VWPW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. Analysis and Conclusions with regard to credibility of evidence of prosecution 8. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of appellant basically examined Prosecutrix (PW-1), mother of prosecutrix (PW-2), father of prosecutrix (PW-3), Ku. Jyoti Korram friend of prosecutrix (PW-4) and Dr. Madhuri Wankhede (PW-16). Apart from above star witnesses Bhav Singh (PW-5), Bhanwar Singh (PW-6), Madanlal Markam (PW-7) who are the witnesses of social meeting were also examined. Dr. Madhuri Wankhede (PW-16) medically examined the prosecutrix. She gave her report Ex-P/18. She stated that prosecutrix was habitual to intercourse and no opinion of recent intercourse is possible. (PW-2) stated in her statement that prosecutrix told her about the incident. Father of prosecutrix(PW-3) stated that (PW-2) told her about the incident. Ku. Jyoti Korram (PW-4) stated that later she came to know about the incident. These witness are hearsay witnesses who came to know about the incident after a gap of about a month. The prosecutrix (PW-1) was examined and she has narrated the incident and was subjected to lengthy cross examination. It is well settled preposition of law that if the statement of the prosecutrix inspire confidence, the conviction can be sustained on the basis of sole testimony of prosecutrix. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 34 , in paragraphs 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under: “6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ] (SCC p. 403, para 21).] 7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635 ).” In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary and ors., (2019) 11 SCC 575 it is observed and held in paragraph 29 as under: “29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 ]. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 ]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. . [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30 ].” In a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Phool Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 2 SCC 74 , considering various case laws on the point that conviction can rest on the sole testimony of prosecutrix if it inspires confidence held in paragraph 11 as under :- “11. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sustained.” In case of Santosh Prasad ( Supra) cited by the counsel for the appellant the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 5.5 With the aforesaid decisions in mind, it is required to be considered, whether is it safe to convict the accused solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix? Whether the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and is of sterling quality? 6. Having gone through and considered the deposition of the prosecutrix, we find that there are material contradictions. Not only there are material contradictions, but even the manner in which the alleged incident has taken place as per the version of the prosecutrix is not believable. 6. Having gone through and considered the deposition of the prosecutrix, we find that there are material contradictions. Not only there are material contradictions, but even the manner in which the alleged incident has taken place as per the version of the prosecutrix is not believable. In the examination- in-chief, the prosecutrix has stated that after jumping the fallen compound wall accused came inside and thereafter the accused committed rape. She has stated that she identified the accused from the light of the mobile. However, no mobile is recovered. Even nothing is on record that there was a broken compound wall. She has further stated that in the morning at 10 O’clock she went to the police station and gave oral complaint. However, according to the investigating officer a written complaint was given. It is also required to be noted that even the FIR is registered at 4:00 p.m. In her deposition, the prosecutrix has referred to the name of Shanti Devi, PW1 and others. However, Shanti Devi has not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, when we tested the version of PW5 -prosecutrix, it is unfortunate that the said witness has failed to pass any of the tests of “sterling witness”. There is a variation in her version about giving the complaint. There is a delay in the FIR. The medical report does not support the case of the prosecution. FSL report also does not support the case of the prosecution. As admitted, there was an enmity/dispute between both the parties with respect to land. The manner in which the occurrence is stated to have occurred is not believable. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the solitary version of the prosecutrix – PW5 cannot be taken as a gospel truth at face value and in the absence of any other supporting evidence, there is no scope to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant and accused is to be given the benefit of doubt”. 10.In the light of above principle of law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is well settled preposition of law that the accused can be convicted only on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it is found credible and inspires confidence without any further corroboration. The testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) requires examination with great caution. The testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) requires examination with great caution. This court has to see that the testimony of prosecutrix inspires confidence, is of high quality and calibre, on the face value acceptable, cannot create a doubt and is unassailable looking from any angle. The statement should pass the test of “sterling witness” as held in case of Santosh Prasad (Supra). 11. Prosecutrix was examined as (PW-1) and stated in her examination in chief that she was alone in the room in the house of Jyoti (PW-4), parents of Jyoti were sleeping in other room. When she was sleeping, at about 11-11:30 in the night appellant came drunk, started doing wrong act. Appellant held her hand and on shouting gagged her mouth and made forcible physical relation which is called rape. After committing rape he went out of the room. She stayed in the house of Jyoti in the night. She went to sleep after Jyoti came. Next day in the morning at 8:00 am she first went to school. She did not intimated the incident to the parents of Jyoti in the night. She did not tell Khemeshwari about the incident. Khemeshwari went to School with her from house of Jyoti. After reaching home she did not tell anyone about the incident. After one month she told her mother (PW-2) about the incident. Thereafter the meeting was convened in the village and report was lodged. She was subjected to lengthy cross examination by appellant. In her cross examination she stated that parents of Jyoti were sleeping at a distance of about 20-25 feet from the room where she was sleeping. Appellant remained for 5-6 minutes in the room. Appellant woke her up, room was dark, appellant said nothing. Appellant removed her lower cloths. She was laying when appellant opened her cloths. Appellant did not fully remove the lower cloths. When appellant was removing her lower cloths she shouted, upon hearing her shout 2-3 people came in the room. Narayan and two other people came in the room and the appellant ran away. In front of those three people she wore the lower cloth. She did not try to harm appellant by nails. She did not raise alarm. She said those people that she is saved because of them. 12. Narayan and two other people came in the room and the appellant ran away. In front of those three people she wore the lower cloth. She did not try to harm appellant by nails. She did not raise alarm. She said those people that she is saved because of them. 12. On careful scrutiny and evaluation with great caution the statement of the prosecutrix the same does not inspire confidence of this court. The manner in which the alleged incident has taken place as narrated, the prosecutrix is not trustworthy or credible. In the examination-in-chief, the prosecutrix has stated the entire incident. However in cross examination she states that she did not raise any alarm at one point of time and also stated that she shouted and 2-3 people came and appellant ran away. It is also difficult to believe that appellant entered into the room silently removed her lower cloth and parents of Jyoti who were sleeping and they did not hear any noise. Even as per prosecutrix on her raising alarm 2- 3 people came but parents of Jyoti did not hear about it. Even the parents or Narayan (who came on hearing the shout of prosecutrix) were not examined. Strangely prosecutrix told nothing to her friend Jyoti when she came later in the night. Even in the morning prosecutrix did not say anything to parents of Jyoti or Khemseshwari with whom she went to School. From the statement of prosecutrix it does not appear that she made any kind of resistance. Therefore, looking to the testimony of prosecutrix in its entirety she failed to pass the tests of “sterling witness”. Apart from this there is a delay of about a month in lodging the FIR. The medical report does not support the case of the prosecution. FSL report also does not support the case of the prosecution. The manner in which the occurrence is stated to have occurred is not believable in practical situation. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this court finds it is difficult to believe the solitary testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) and she cannot be treated as a credible, trustworthy witness. In view of the above discussion and relying upon the judgment of Sujit Biswas (Supra) benefit of doubt must go in favour of the appellant. 13. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this court finds it is difficult to believe the solitary testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) and she cannot be treated as a credible, trustworthy witness. In view of the above discussion and relying upon the judgment of Sujit Biswas (Supra) benefit of doubt must go in favour of the appellant. 13. In fallout of above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution miserable failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal thus allowed and appellant is acquitted from all charges. Appellant is reported to be on bail, his bail bond is discharged.