ORDER : 1. By way of present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has, inter-alia, challenged the order dated 10.3.2011 dispatched on 17.3.2011 passed by the learned Special Secretary Revenue Department in Revision Application No. MVV/JMN/JND/103/1999 whereby the revision application filed by the petitioner came to be rejected and the order dated 29.7.1999 passed by the District Collector, Junagadh whereby the Mutation entry Nos. 1680 and 1681 pertaining to the registered sale deeds in favour of the petitioner Company came to be cancelled under suo-motu proceedings. 2. The brief facts as relevant for the adjudication of the present petition are as under: 2.1 The petitioner Company purchased agricultural land bearing Survey No. 122 Paiki, admeasuring Are 6 and 17 gunthas situated at Village-Sanosara, Taluka Manavadar, District Junagadh from Ravjibhai Shamjibhai Adesara vide registered sale-deed bearing No. 84 dated 24.1.1996 and the same was mutated by way of Mutation entry No. 1680 dated 25.1.1996 and was certified on 26.2.1996. 2.2 The petitioner purchased the agricultural land bearing Survey No. 122 Paiki, admeasuring 5 Are and 20 gunthas situated at the same village from Smt. Sardaben Thobhanbhai Adesara vide registered sale-deed bearing No. 83 dated 24.1.1996 and the same was mutated by way of Mutation Entry No. 1681 on 25.1.1996 and the same was certified on 26.2.1996. Thereafter, the Taluka Development Officer vide its order dated 7/10.6.1996 allowed the application of the petitioner for conversion of the land in question from Agricultural purpose to Non-Agricultural purpose i.e. industrial purpose. 2.3 Thereafter, vide communication dated 22.11.1988, the District Collector requested the learned SSRD to initiate suo-motu proceedings against the Non-Agricultural order and accordingly show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and ultimately vide order dated 11.3.1999, the learned SSRD withdrew the said show-cause notice. 2.4 Thereafter, the District Collector initiated suo-motu proceedings against Mutation entry No. 1680 and 1681 for the breach of Section 54 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and vide its impugned order, cancelled both the entries which were in favour of the petitioner. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner preferred the aforesaid Revision Application before the learned SSRD, which came to be rejected. 3. Heard Mr. Vimal Purohit, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Nikunj Kanara, learned AGP for the respondent State. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner preferred the aforesaid Revision Application before the learned SSRD, which came to be rejected. 3. Heard Mr. Vimal Purohit, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Nikunj Kanara, learned AGP for the respondent State. Perused the material placed on record. 4. Mr. Vimal Purohit, learned advocate for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that as per the revenue records, the land was purchased by the Director of the Company, who is an agriculturist. It is also submitted that the petitioner has already got necessary NA permission from the competent authority for the use of the said land for industrial purpose and construction was made thereof. He has submitted taht the District Collector had requested the learned SSRD for cancellation of the NA permission upn which necessary Notice was issued to the petitioner. He has submitted that after hearing both the sides, the learned SSRD has ultimately withdrawn the show-cause notice challenging the NA permission granted to the petitioner. He has submitted that the NA permsision granted by the competent authority for conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose i.e. industrial purpose has been confirmed by the Government itself. He has submitted that when NA permission is already been granted and construction has been carried out by the petitioner over the land, the Collector has no authority to initiate any proceedings under the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance. He has also submitted that even under the provisions of Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, the land can be utilized for the industrial purpose. He has also submitted that there was a delay on the part of the Collector to initiate suo-motu proceedings when the transaction was already entered in the revenue record, almost prior to 3 and 1/2 years. He has also submitted that the Collector has no jurisdiction under Section 108(60 of the Land Revenue Code to initiate any proceedings under the other enactment. He has submitted that the action of the Collector in cancelling the entry is illegal one. 5. Mr. Purohit, learned advocate for the petitioner has also submitted that as the Company was facing some financial crisis and some proceeding under BIFR was undertaken against the Company, no immediate action could be taken challenging the impugned order of the SSRD. He has submitted that the action of the Collector in cancelling the entry is illegal one. 5. Mr. Purohit, learned advocate for the petitioner has also submitted that as the Company was facing some financial crisis and some proceeding under BIFR was undertaken against the Company, no immediate action could be taken challenging the impugned order of the SSRD. He has submitted that the time spent in conducting the matter is that Director of the Petitioner Company had passed away who was having knowledge regarding the entire matter and the new Director was no in a position to know everything. He has submitted that now the land is already been converted for agricultural purpose and, therefore, no one would be able to cultivate it. He has submitted that the delay has been explained by the petitioner. He has submitted that the impugned order of the Collector and the SSRD deserve to be set-aside in view of the fact that nature of the land has already been changed and the action initiated by the Collector, under RTS proceedings relating to another enactment is illegal exercise of power. He has prayed to allow the present petition. He has relied upon the following decisions: 1. Nikhil G. Patel - A partnership Firm and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, 2019 Law Suit (Guj) 708 2. Chimanlal Bhukandas vs. Special Secretary (Appeals) and Others, 2020 Law Suit (Guj) 1158 6. Per contra, Mr. Nikunj Kanara, learned AGP has vehemently submitted that the petition has been filed after almost 6 years after passing of the impugned order by the learned SSRD rejecting the revisions Application. He has submitted that the question of limitation would be applicable in the present petition and on this ground, the petition deserves to be dismissed. He has submitted that the reasons for delay are not satisfactory. He has submitted that NA permission was granted within a period of 6 months from the date of purchase of land by the petitioner. He has also submitted that since the land is covered under Section 4 of the Act, the sale deed itself is illegal and a Company cannot be an agriculturist. He has submitted that the manner in which the purchase as well as NA permission is obtained, is illegal one. He has also submitted that since the land is covered under Section 4 of the Act, the sale deed itself is illegal and a Company cannot be an agriculturist. He has submitted that the manner in which the purchase as well as NA permission is obtained, is illegal one. He has submitted that the learned Collector has not committed any error in cancelling the revenue entries No. 1680 and 1681 he has also supported the decision of the learned SSRD dismissed the revision application of the petitioner. He has prayed to dismiss the petition. 7. In rejoinder, Mr. Purohit, learned advocate has submitted that the petitioner has purchased the land by paying sale consideration and after following due procedure, he has obtained the NA permission. He has submitted that if NA permission is granted within 6 months from the date of purchase of the land, that cannot be considered to be illegal act on the part of the petitioner. He has submitted that once NA permission was approved by the State Government itself, the nature of the land cannot be considered at this stage. He has also submitted that whatever action has been initiated by the Collector, was not in consonance with the law and he has no authority to take any action under the other enactment while exercising power under the RTS proceedings. He has stated that the status of the present land is relevant under Section 54 of the Act. He has submitted that as per the revenue record itself, the land was purchased by the Director, who is an agriculturist and, therefore, there is no question of any breach of provision of the Act. 8. Having considered the submission made on behalf of both the parties coupled with the material placed on record and the decisions cited at bar, it emerges from the record that as a Director, the petitioner has purchased the land by registered sale deed and revenue entries were mutated and the same being certified at the relevant point of time. It also emerges that after purchase of the land, the petitioner has also got the NA permission from the competent authority and the Collector has informed the learned SSRD against the granting of NA permission and on that basis, the learned SSRD has issued show-cause notice to the petitioner. It also emerges that after purchase of the land, the petitioner has also got the NA permission from the competent authority and the Collector has informed the learned SSRD against the granting of NA permission and on that basis, the learned SSRD has issued show-cause notice to the petitioner. It also reveals that after hearing both the sides, ultimately the learned SSRD has withdrew the show-cause notice. Thus, the action of granting NA permission to the petitioner has been confirmed by the government itself. Therefore, the nature of the land has already been changed from agricultural to Non-agricultural purpose i.e. for industrial purpose. The version of the petitioner that it has made construction over the land for industrial purpose has not been denied by the respondent authority. It also reveals from the record that there was some proceedings under BIFR and Company was engaged in the said proceedings. 8.1 It also reveals from the record that after confirmation of the NA permission by the State Government, the learned Collector initiated the proceedings under the RTS proceedings, found breach of provision of Section 54 of the Act and has ultimately cancelled the revenue entries Nos. 1680 and 1681. Now, admittedly the Collector was exercising power under Land Revenue Code for cancellation of the revenue entry. He was not exercising the power under the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949. Now, it is well settled by catena of decisions that revenue authority exercising power with respect to RTS proceedings are invested with limited powers. They cannot assume to themselves certain powers not conferred on them by law nor can they assume jurisdiction not conferred on them by law and that in that view of the matter, the revenue authorities have no power to decide the validity of a transaction on the touchstone of a statutory provision occurring in some other enactment. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to decision of this Court in case of Chimanlal Bhukandas vs. Special Secretary (Appeals) and Others (Supra), wherein Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 , 13 and 14, this Court has observed as under: “8. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to decision of this Court in case of Chimanlal Bhukandas vs. Special Secretary (Appeals) and Others (Supra), wherein Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 , 13 and 14, this Court has observed as under: “8. The revisional authority, in the impugned order dated 28.4.2004, has observed that the mutation entry was made on the basis that Lilaben, wife of Madhubhai Premabhai and his only son, Laljibhai Madhubhai had predeceased him and on the basis of will the name of the petitioners' father has been entered in the year 1989. However, the heirs of Madhubhai Premabhai have given details of heirs other than Laljibhai Madhubhai. The revisional authority was of the view that in these circumstances it appears that the mutation entry No. 595 has been made by concealing the actual facts. The revisional authority has further observed that the applicant Chimanlal Bhukandas has not produced any details before the Collector to show that he falls within the definition of family of deceased Madhubhai Premabhai. Moreover, the original owner had passed away in the year 1973; whereas, the disputed entry has been made in the year 1989 after a period of sixteen years which also does not appear to be proper, inasmuch as, if the land was held under a will, the mutation entry could have been made immediately after 1973, but it was not done. The revisional authority has further observed that the applicant himself does not hold any land in any other place and has not produced any evidence to show that he is an agriculturist before the Collector. Thus, under the guise of a will, a non-agriculturist has attempted to become an agriculturist. Hence, there is a clear breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. On the question of delay in initiation of revisional proceedings, the revisional authority has held that in case of a matter which is contrary to the provisions of law and is illegal, the provisions of limitation would not affect the same. Based on the aforesaid findings, the revisional authority has upheld the order passed by the Collector and rejected the revision application and has further directed that fresh proceedings for making succession entry be initiated. 9. Based on the aforesaid findings, the revisional authority has upheld the order passed by the Collector and rejected the revision application and has further directed that fresh proceedings for making succession entry be initiated. 9. From the facts noted hereinabove, undisputedly, mutation entry No. 595 dated 30.5.1989 was taken in suo motu revision under sub-rule (6) of rule 108 of the rules, by issuance of a notice dated 2.4.1994, that is, after a period of approximately four and a half years from the date of certification of the said mutation entry, which was certified on 20.7.1989. While it is true that rule 108(6) of the rules does not provide for any limitation for exercise of powers of suo motu revision by the Collector; however, it is by now well settled that even where a statute does not prescribe any period of limitation, powers of suo motu revision have to be exercised within a reasonable time. In Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim (supra), in the context of proceedings under section 84C of the Tenancy Act, the Supreme Court has held that exercise of powers thereunder after a period of approximately one year, could not be said to have been exercised within reasonable time. This court, in Pushpaben Prabhudas Makhecha vs. State of Gujarat (supra) as well as in several other decisions, has held that suo motu power or revisional power under the Code or under any Act, where the period of limitation is not prescribed, should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the light of the settled legal position, this court is of the view that the exercise of powers of suo motu revision by the Collector under sub-rule (6) of rule 108 of the Code after more than four and half years from the date of the certification of the mutation entry, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a reasonable period of time. Under the circumstances, the impugned orders are required to be quashed set aside on this ground alone. 10. Under the circumstances, the impugned orders are required to be quashed set aside on this ground alone. 10. Another question that arises in the present case is that the show-cause notice dated 2.4.1994 under rule 108(6) of the rules came to be issued for breach of the provisions of sections 2(6) and 63 of the Tenancy Act and the provisions of the Fragmentation Act; however, in the impugned order dated 4.7.1995, the Collector has proceeded on the footing that though the testator has passed away in the year 1973, the mutation entry on the basis of the will was made only in the year 1989, which makes the same doubtful. In the show-cause notice, there is no such allegation regarding the mutation entry being suspicious on account of the same having been made on the basis of a will, a long time after the death of the testator. Under the circumstances, it is evident that in the impugned order the Collector has travelled beyond the show-cause notice. The revisional authority, in the impugned order dated 29.4.2004, has also observed that the mutation entry was made on the basis of misrepresentation and fraud. However, the petitioners have not been put to notice in this regard. Under the circumstances, both, the Collector as well as the revisional authority, were not justified in travelling beyond the scope of the show-cause notice and relying upon material which did not form part of the original show-cause notice, and thereby rendering the impugned orders unsustainable. 11. It may be further noted that in the present case, the proceedings initiated by the Collector are under rule 108(6) of the rules. Sub-Rule (6) of rule 108 of the rules reads thus: “(6) The Collector may call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer held under rules 106, 107 and sub-rules (1) to (5) of this rule for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of such proceedings and as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed in such proceedings.” Thus, the proceedings before the Collector were proceedings for taking a mutation entry in revision. However, the grounds for taking such mutation entry in revision are for breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the Fragmentation Act. This court in Evergreen Apartment Co-op. However, the grounds for taking such mutation entry in revision are for breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the Fragmentation Act. This court in Evergreen Apartment Co-op. Housing Society vs. Special Secretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat State (supra) has held that so far as proceedings under rule 108 of the rules, properly known as RTS proceedings are concerned, it is well settled that the entries made in the revenue record have primarily a fiscal value and they do not create any title. Such mutations have to follow either the documents of title or the orders passed by competent authorities under special enactments. Independently the revenue authorities, as mentioned in rule 108 of the rules, cannot pass orders of cancelling the entries on an assumption that the transaction recorded in the entry are against the provisions of a particular enactment. Whether the transaction is valid or not has to be examined by the competent authority under the particular enactment by following the procedure prescribed therein and by giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties likely to be affected by any order that may be passed. 12. A Division Bench of this court in Pagi Aataji Kacharaji vs. State of Gujarat (supra) has endorsed the above view and held that it is very clear that the scope of rule 108 of the rules is to deal with the entries made in the record of rights and dispute regarding legality of such entries. Mutation entries do not create any title to the property since such entries are only to enable the State for collection of tax. The right, title and interest as to the property should be established independently of the entries. 13. In Janardan D. Patel vs. State of Gujarat (supra), this court considered the scheme of the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and held that the revenue authorities exercising powers with respect to RTS proceedings are invested with limited powers. They cannot assume to themselves certain powers not conferred on them by law nor can they assume jurisdiction not conferred on them by law and that in that view of the matter, the revenue authorities have no power to decide the validity of a transaction on the touchstone of a statutory provision occurring in some other enactment. They cannot assume to themselves certain powers not conferred on them by law nor can they assume jurisdiction not conferred on them by law and that in that view of the matter, the revenue authorities have no power to decide the validity of a transaction on the touchstone of a statutory provision occurring in some other enactment. If any such question arises, the matter should be referred to the authority empowered to deal with such question under the said other enactment. In such situation, the correct procedure to be followed would be to refer the matter to the authority empowered under the other Act for its decision. The necessary mutation entry may be made only after the decision of that authority under the other Act is received. It would, however, not be open to revenue authorities in RTS proceedings to decide that question. 14. Thus, it is settled legal position that in RTS proceedings, viz. proceedings under rule 108(6) of the rules, the revenue authorities are vested with limited powers. Whether the transaction is valid or not has to be examined by the competent authority under the particular enactment by following the procedure prescribed therein and by giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties likely to be affected by any order that may be passed. In the facts of the present case, if the Collector was of the view that there is any breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act or the Fragmentation Act, proceedings could have been initiated under the relevant provisions of the said enactments. However, in proceedings under rule 108(6) of the rules, the question of breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act or the Fragmentation Act could not have been decided. Since the show-cause notice under rule 108(6) of the rules has been issued for breach of the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the Fragmentation Act, the very basis for taking the mutation entry No. 595 in suo motu revision is invalid and beyond the scope of powers under rule 108(6) of the rules. The impugned orders passed by the Collector as well as the revisional authority, therefore, cannot be sustained.” 9. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, exercise of power by the Collector, in this case also has no legal sanctity and further the exercise of suo-motu power was also no exercised within a reasonable period of time. The impugned orders passed by the Collector as well as the revisional authority, therefore, cannot be sustained.” 9. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, exercise of power by the Collector, in this case also has no legal sanctity and further the exercise of suo-motu power was also no exercised within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, on both the counts, the impugned order of the learned Collector as well as order passed by the learned SSRD rejecting the revision application deserve to be quashed and set-aside. 10. In view of the above, the present petition is liable to be allowed and accordingly it is allowed. The impugned order dated 29.7.1999 passed by the Collector, Junagadh cancelling the mutation Entries Nos. 1680 and 1681 and the impugned order dated 10.3.2011 passed by the learned Special Secretary Revenue Department in Revision Application No. MVV/JMN/JND/103/1999 rejecting the revision application of the petitioner, are hereby quashed and set-aside. The Authorities are directed to restore the Mutation Entry Nos. 1680 and 1681. 11. No order as to costs. Direct Service permitted.