ORDER : Satyen Vaidya By way of instant petitions, petitioners have prayed for grant of benefit of regularization of their services w.e.f. 1.4.2018. Since common questions of facts and law are involved, all these petitions are being decided by a common judgment. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the case are as under: 1. PETITIONER’S CASE (i) The facts in CWP 342 of 2021 are being considered hereunder for the sake of precision and also to avoid prolixity. (ii) Petitioners were appointed in 2006-07 against the posts of Lecturers School Cadre/ Lecturer School (New)/PGTs under a scheme formulated by the State Government known as Grant-in-aid to Parent Teachers Association Rules 2006 (for short, ‘2006 Rules’). (iii) State Government vide Notification dated 16.08.2013 decided to take over of services of petitioners on contract basis. Such decision became subject matter of challenge through Civil Writ Petitions filed before this Court. However, the controversy was set at rest by Judgment dated 9.12.2014 passed by a Division Bench of this Court ruling in favour of Government’s decision and thereafter way was cleared for taking over of services of teachers on contract basis. (iv) Services of petitioners were eventually taken over on contract basis vide orders dated 3.1.2015, 7.1.2015 and 15.1.2015. (v) On 11.5.2018 State Government issued Notification directing regularisation of all its contract employees who had completed 3 years contract service as on 31.3.2018. Petitioners though also were eligible for regularisation having rendered three years contract service as on 31.3.2018, but were not regularised purportedly for the reason that appeals against the judgment dated 9.12.2014 were pending before Hon’ble Supreme court. (vi) Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeals against judgment dated 9.12.2014 of this Court vide its judgment dated 17.4.2020 [reported in (2020) 5 SCC 732 ]. Petitioners submitted their detailed representation to the respondents. (vii) Services of petitioners were regularised w.e.f. 20.8.2020 vide orders dated 5.8.2020. 2. PETITIONER’S GRIEVANCE Petitioners claim regularisation w.e.f. 1.4.2018 in pursuance to decision of the Government dated 11.5.2018 alleging as under : (a) Discrimination with all other contract employees who got the benefit of regularisation from 1.4.2018 in pursuance to Government decision dated 11.5.2018 and consequent violation of Articles 14 of 16 of the constitution. (b) Arbitrary denial of rights of petitioners by respondents taking shelter of the pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court. (b) Arbitrary denial of rights of petitioners by respondents taking shelter of the pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court. (c) Arbitrary fixation of date of regularisation as 20.8.2020 in the case of petitioners despite dismissal of appeals by the Supreme Court. 3. RESPONDENT’S STAND AND JUSTIFICATION From the initial reply of respondents and their supplementary affidavits available on record following defences can be culled out: (a) PTA provided teachers were not regularised due to pendency of SLP 1426 of 2015. (b) The appointment of PTA lecturers was not in accordance with R & P Rules. Their initial appointment was under a Policy, whereas other lecturers appointed by the Government on contract basis were recruited as per R & P Rules through State Service Commission. (c) Though the Supreme Court and High Court had observed the initial appointments of petitioners under the 2006 Police as legal but there were no directions to regularise their services. (d) State has the power to take conscious decisions which cannot be interfered with. (e) The mode and purpose of appointment of PTA teachers was different, their engagement was made for particular school by the PTA of the School that too as a stop gap arrangement, whereas appointment of others was made through State Service Commission. (f) The regularisation cannot be claimed as matter of right from a particular date. Conscious decision is taken by the Government regarding regularisation and thereafter the regularisation is made from a particular date as decided. (g) In addition, it has also been contended at the stage of hearing that out of the teachers appointed under 2006 rules some were taken over on contract and some remained, therefore, they being a homogeneous class could not be discriminated inter-se. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the documents on file. 5. In the nature of controversy, we deem it necessary to advert to certain background facts. The 2006 Rules were framed to achieve one of the objectives of PTA to make arrangement for teachers etc. when there is shortage of staff in the institution on temporary basis. Some relevant clauses of 2006 Rules are extracted as under : 3. 5. In the nature of controversy, we deem it necessary to advert to certain background facts. The 2006 Rules were framed to achieve one of the objectives of PTA to make arrangement for teachers etc. when there is shortage of staff in the institution on temporary basis. Some relevant clauses of 2006 Rules are extracted as under : 3. Extent of Application : The provisions of these Rules shall be applicable to determine the eligibility and the quantum of grant-in-aid and release thereof to PTAs who make available teachers to an educational institution for the purpose of imparting education to its students. 6. Limit of Grant : The number of teachers in a subject in respect of whom grant may be given shall not exceed the number of posts in the subject which are vacant in an educational institution. 7. Educational Qualification : Grant-in-aid to a PTA shall not be admissible in respect of a teacher made available by it who does not fulfill the educational qualification fixed by the Government in respect of posts under it for teaching the same subject/classes. 6. Two things are abundantly clear from above provisions first, that the policy authorised PTAs to engage teachers with requisite qualifications prescribed by the Government in case of need against vacant posts and second the promise to pay grant-inaid to PTAs for sustaining services of such engaged teachers was extended. 7. It was in this background that petitioners were appointed by PTAs and were paid their respective emoluments from grant-in-aid provided by the State Government. Though no permanency was attached to such employment of petitioner, yet they were allowed to continue as teachers under 2006 Rules for years together without making regular appointments against vacant posts. 8. Government then took a conscious decision to take over the services of all such PTA-GIA employed teachers who had completed seven years of continuous service. Accordingly, services of petitioners were taken on Government contracts in January 2015. Noticeably, this decision of State Government was unsuccessfully challenged by certain private persons before this court and then the Supreme Court. It is important to notice that at that stage State Government justified and supported its decision by emphasizing its need and importance. Accordingly, services of petitioners were taken on Government contracts in January 2015. Noticeably, this decision of State Government was unsuccessfully challenged by certain private persons before this court and then the Supreme Court. It is important to notice that at that stage State Government justified and supported its decision by emphasizing its need and importance. In one of the petitions which laid challenge to above stated decision of the Government being CWP 7728 of 2013 the State Government by way of an affidavit submitted as under: “13. That it is relevant to submit that in case regular recruitments were made in the teaching sector the State Government would not have been in a position to maintain Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) as maximum part of financial resources would have been consumed in meeting the salary component of Regular teachers ……. 14. That with the passage of time the services of PTA and GIA, Para Teachers and PAT had to be continued as their engagement had obtaining desired results as the number of Schools had also drastically increased and the State was also facing financial constraints to engage regular teachers.” 9. In the context of issue in hand it cannot be ignored that since many years now, contract basis has been included as one of modes of recruitment by the State Government in many of its services by suitably amending the relevant R & P Rules. Noticeably, no separate cadre of contract employees has been created. These appointments are made against existing sanctioned cadre strength of regular posts. In almost all the cases of initial contract employment, the services of all such employees are being regularised after some span of time and for that purpose the State Government has been bringing into being different policies from time to time. The reasons obviously are financial constraints projected by the State Government vis-a-vis its constitutional and legal obligation to provide education to its citizens, as is also evident from one such admission on its part, as noticed above. How far such a stand of the State Government is legal or permissible is not being gone into by us in the instant case for the reason neither such proposition is before us for adjudication nor do we find necessary factual foundation herein. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the services of petitioners were taken on contract in the first instance and were subsequently regularised w.e.f. 20.8.2020. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the services of petitioners were taken on contract in the first instance and were subsequently regularised w.e.f. 20.8.2020. 10. In above noticed circumstances, the question before us is whether discriminating petitioners with other contract employees in terms of implementation of Notification dated 11.05.2018 is legally permissible? 11. Respondents have asserted with vehemence that the PTA-GIA teachers were not equal to other contract employees of the State Government as their respective mode and purpose of appointment were different. It has also been asserted that they formed a class within themselves and were not comparable to other contract employees who were appointed in accordance with R & P Rules. In support of such contention respondents have placed reliance on following excerpts of the judgments passed by Supreme Court in support of its stand justifying different treatment to petitioners: Prem Chand Somchand Shah v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 48 : 8. As regards the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 the position is well settled that the said right ensures equality amongst equals and its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Conversely discrimination may result if persons dissimilarly situate are treated equally. Even amongst persons similarly situate differential treatment would be permissible between one class and the other. In that event it is necessary that the differential treatment should be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. State of U.P. v. Dayanand Chakrawarty, (2013) 7 SCC 595 : 34. Further, as employees appointed from different sources, after their appointment were treated alike for the purpose of superannuation under Regulation 31, subsequently solely on the basis of source of recruitment no discrimination can be made and differential treatment would not be permissible in the matter of condition of service, including the age of superannuation, in absence of an intelligible differentia distinguishing them from each other. We therefore hold that the High Court by the impugned judgment [Dayanand Chakrawarty v. State of U.P., (2010) 6 All LJ 1] rightly declared the 2005 Regulations unconstitutional and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. T. Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680 : 13. It seems to us that the argument based upon Article 14 of the Constitution in fact turns on the same considerations as the argument that Article 16(1) is infringed by the aforesaid rule. What Article 14 provides is that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. What is meant by equality in this article is, equality amongst equals. It does not provide that what is aimed at is an absolute equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard in every conceivable circumstance of the differences such as age, sex, education and so on and so forth as may be found amongst people in general. Indeed, while the aim of this article is to ensure that invidious distinction or arbitrary discrimination shall not be made by the State between a citizen and a citizen who answer the same description and the differences which may obtain between them are of no relevance for the purpose of applying a particular law reasonable classification is permissible. It does not mean anything more. 12. We are not persuaded by above noted submissions made on behalf of respondents. A coordinate Bench of this Court has already upheld the legality and validity of initial appointment of petitioners herein and similarly placed persons in following terms while deciding CWP 6916 of 2011 Pankaj Kumar Vs State of Himachal Pradesh and others along with connected matter vide judgment dated 9.12.2014 by holding as under: “22. The Apex Court in the case titled as University of Rajasthan and Anr. Versus Prem Lata Aggarwal, reported in 2013 AIR SCW 989, held that an appointment by stop-gap arrangement cannot be regularised, but, at the same time, laid down the principle that if appointments are made under a particular scheme and continued for pretty long time, are entitled to regularisation in terms of policy……… 23. The teachers-appellants/writ respondents were not appointed as stop-gap arrangement, thus, are entitled to regularisation in terms of policy made by the Government while applying the ratio of judgment (supra)” 13. The teachers-appellants/writ respondents were not appointed as stop-gap arrangement, thus, are entitled to regularisation in terms of policy made by the Government while applying the ratio of judgment (supra)” 13. Further, while deciding the appeal against the aforesaid judgment dated 9.12.2014, Supreme Court in Chander Mohan Negi v. State of H.P., (2020) 5 SCC 732 observed as under: “12. Even with regard to the Para Teachers Policy under which various category of Teachers were appointed in the year 2003 pursuant to policy notified on 17-9-2003 it is clear from the record placed before this Court that all the persons who were recruited as Para Teachers were fully qualified as per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules i.e. the Himachal Pradesh Education Department Class III (School and Inspection Cadre) Service Rules, 1973. In view of the stand of the State that such policy was necessitated due to large number of vacant posts which have arisen year after year and which could not be filled since the State Selection Subordinate Board, Hamirpur, which was responsible for the selection of Teachers had come under a cloud and the selection process had come to a halt, such appointments cannot be rendered as illegal. Such aspect is also evident from the policy itself. Even in other category of the Grant-in-Aid to Parent Teacher Association Rules, all Teachers appointed under the Scheme fulfil the educational qualifications prescribed in the Rules. For such kind of Teachers, the Cabinet has taken decision to take over the Teachers on contract basis after completion of eight years of service which period was later reduced to seven years. It is also brought to our notice during the course of arguments that out of the total 6799 Teachers, 5017 Teachers were already taken over on contract basis by the State Government and only 1782 could not be taken over in view of the interim orders passed by this Court. 13. It is true that in the initial schemes notified by the Government, there was a condition that such appointees should not seek regularisation/absorption but at the same time for no fault of them, they cannot be denied regularisation/absorption. It is in view of the requirement of the State, their services were extended from time to time and now all the appointees have completed more than 15 years of service. It is in view of the requirement of the State, their services were extended from time to time and now all the appointees have completed more than 15 years of service. For majority of the appointed Teachers under the various schemes, benefit was already extended and some left over candidates were denied on account of interim orders passed by this Court. With regard to Primary Assistant Teachers, it is stated that all the candidates have completed Special Teacher Training Qualifying Condensed Course and also had obtained special JBT certificate after 5 years' continuous service in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Education Code, 1985. The judgments relied on by learned counsel Shri Prashant Bhushan also would not render any assistance to the case of the appellants herein for the reason that there was unexplained and inordinate delay on the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court and further having regard to explanation offered by the State about the need of framing such policies to meet the immediate requirement to fill up single teacher schools which were vacant for a very long time, having regard to topographical conditions, which is not even controverted by way of any rejoinder before the High Court. In such view of the matter, taking the totality of peculiar circumstances of these cases, we are of the view that the view expressed by this Court in the judgments relied on cannot be applied to the facts of the case on hand. All the appointed candidates are working for the meagre salaries pursuant to schemes notified by the Government. Except the vague submission that such schemes were framed only to make backdoor entries, there is no material placed on record to buttress such submission. Further it is also to be noted that though such schemes were notified as early as in 2003, nobody has questioned such policies and appointments up to 2012 and 2013. The writ petition i.e. CWP No. 3303 of 2012-A was filed in the year 2012 without even impleading the appointees as party respondents. In the writ petition, there was no rejoinder filed by the writ petitioners disputing the averments of the State as stated in the reply-affidavit. Having regard to the nature of such appointments, appointments made as per policies cannot be termed as illegal. In the writ petition, there was no rejoinder filed by the writ petitioners disputing the averments of the State as stated in the reply-affidavit. Having regard to the nature of such appointments, appointments made as per policies cannot be termed as illegal. Having regard to material placed before this Court and having regard to reasons recorded in the impugned order [Pankaj Kumar v. State of H.P., 2014 SCC OnLine HP 5944] by the High Court, we are of the view that no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment [Pankaj Kumar v. State of H.P., 2014 SCC OnLine HP 5944] of the High Court.” 14. Thus, the initial appointment of petitioners being under 2006 policy with requisite qualifications and petitioners having put in sufficient numbers of years of service, the step of the State Government to take their services on contract was a perfectly legal measure. Once their services were taken on contract, petitioners came at-par with those employees who were recruited on contract basis under the relevant R & P Rules. Employment on contract being only a mode of recruitment, no distinction could be drawn between the petitioners, who were taken on contract after rendering seven years' service as PTA-GIA teachers and the employees whose initial recruitment itself was on contract basis under the relevant R & P Rules. The distinction now drawn between these two categories by respondents on the ground that the latter were recruited though State Service Commission, whereas former through PTA-GIA is clearly misplaced. In both the cases the incumbents hold requisite qualification. The recruitment in either of the cases is in terms of apposite policies/rules. Thus, the given facts and circumstances of the case do not suggest any intelligible differentia on the basis of which respondents have sought to distinguish petitioners from other contract employees of the State Government and further there is total absence of any rational in relation to the object sought to be achieved. 15. The other ground pleaded by respondents justifying regularisation of petitioners from a subsequent date is the pendency of litigations, as detailed above. Such ground deserves to be rejected for the reasons firstly, that the litigation was not at the instance of petitioners and secondly, that even the stand of respondents herein, in the entire said litigation, was not adversarial to the case of petitioners. Such ground deserves to be rejected for the reasons firstly, that the litigation was not at the instance of petitioners and secondly, that even the stand of respondents herein, in the entire said litigation, was not adversarial to the case of petitioners. Petitioners cannot be penalized without any fault or default on their part. 16. The respondents have further contended that the State Government has absolute discretion to decide on its policy and as such no fault can be found in its decision to grant benefit of regularisation to petitioner w.e.f. 20.8.2020. In support of its contention reliance has been placed on following excerpts from the judgments passed by the Supreme Court : Govt. of A.P. v. N. Subbarayudu, (2008) 14 SCC 702 : 5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other at tending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case [ (1983) 1 SCC 305 as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal (2005) 6 SCC 754 . 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cutoff date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v Ramjee Prasad [ (1990) 3 SCC 368 , Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (1994) 4 SCC 212 , Ram rao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (2004) 2 SCC 76 , University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary (1996) 10 SCC 536 etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. Mohd. Ali Imam v. State of Bihar, (2020) 5 SCC 685 : 9. If we see the rationale of the impugned judgment [Hari Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar, 2017 SCC OnLine Pat 3091] as set out in para 29 onwards, we may notice that the same is predicated on the absence of arbitrariness in the applicability of the cut-off date of the amendment in the Triple Benefit Scheme Statute as well as the rationality behind it based on the date of the Cabinet decision granting Triple Benefit Scheme to such deficit grant colleges. We cannot find any fault with the reasoning in the impugned order 10. We must notice that firstly there was really no obligation for exercise of powers of the Government or University in the absence of the institutions being not constituent colleges, but only affiliated colleges. In order to support education, a decision was taken to provide deficit financing. There was again no requirement that the Triple Benefit Scheme ought to be extended to the employees of these colleges and was not so initially extended. In order to support education, a decision was taken to provide deficit financing. There was again no requirement that the Triple Benefit Scheme ought to be extended to the employees of these colleges and was not so initially extended. A second step was taken in this direction by extending the Scheme. The third step was the amendment of the Scheme. It can hardly be said that by taking these beneficial steps, the State Government is not liable to take into consideration the financial implications of the same, and that the benefits should be extended across the board. The amendments could have, in fact, been implemented prospectively, but were given part-retrospective effect based on the rationale of the date of the Cabinet decision. 11. Apart from this, there may be other considerations in the mind of the executive authority while fixing a particular date i.e. economic conditions, financial constraints, administrative and other circumstances, and if no reason is forthcoming from the executive for fixation of a particular date, it should not be interfered with by the Court unless the cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. In such cases, it has been opined that there must be exercise of judicial restraint and such matters ought to be left to the executive authorities, to fix the cut-off date, and the Government thus, must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. Even if no particular reasons are given for the cut-off date by the Government, the choice of cut-off date cannot be held to be arbitrary (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical (State of A.P.v. N. Subbarayu 2008 14 SCC 702 ). Himachal RTC v. Retired Employees Union, (2021) 4 SCC 502 : 17. In D.S. Nakara [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 , this Court had treated the pension retirees only, as a homogeneous class and all the pensioners governed by the 1972 Rules, were treated as a class, because payment of pension was a continuing obligation on the part of the State, till lifelong to the pensioners, unlike the beneficiaries of the Contributory Provident Fund. In the said case, it was never held that the pension retirees and the emplo yees in service, constitute a homogeneous class. In the said case, it was never held that the pension retirees and the emplo yees in service, constitute a homogeneous class. In [R.L. Marwaha v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 31 , this Court has held that fixing of a date for grant of benefit, must have nexus with the object sought to be achieved. There cannot be any dispute on the proposition. Further, Union of India v Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 relates to fixation of cut-off date, for grant of liberalised Pension Scheme. Even in Subrata Sen v. Un ion of India (2001) 8 SCC 71 , where a cut-off date was fixed for the purpose of applicability of revised pension scheme this Court has held that all retired employees constitute one homogeneous class and there cannot be cut-off date fixed to extend such benefits. All the above said cases which are referred to and relied on by the High Court are not relevant and cannot be pressed into service, to decide the issue which arises on the facts of this case. 18. Though there are long line of cases, where validity of fixation of cut-off date is considered by this Court, we confine and refer to the case law which is relevant to the facts of the case on hand. In [State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6 SCC 754 , while examining the validity of cut-off date fixed for grant of benefit of increased quantum of death-cum-retirement gratuity, this Court has held that the financial constraint pleaded by the Government, was a valid ground for fixation of cut-off date and such fixation was not arbitrary, irrational or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. While differentiating the facts with D.S. Nakara (1983) 1 SCC 305 , this Court held in para 29 of the judgment, which reads as under : (Amar Nath Goyal case [State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005 ) 6 SCC 754. “29. D.S. Nakara, which is the main stay of the case of the employees arose under special circumstances, quite different from the present case. It was a case of revision of pensionary benefits and classification of pensioners into two groups by drawing a cut-off line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to employees retiring on or after the cut-off date. “29. D.S. Nakara, which is the main stay of the case of the employees arose under special circumstances, quite different from the present case. It was a case of revision of pensionary benefits and classification of pensioners into two groups by drawing a cut-off line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to employees retiring on or after the cut-off date. The criterion made applicable was “being in service and retiring subsequent to the specified date”. This Court held that for being eligible for liberalised Pension Scheme, application of such a criterion is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it was both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. The reason given by the Court was that the employees who retired prior to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to classify them into separate classes/ groups for the purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on any intelligible differentia, which had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. However, it must be noted that even in cases of pension, subsequent judgments of this Court have considerably watered down the rigid view taken in D.S. Nakara as we shall see later in T .N. Electricity Board v. R. Veerasamy, (1999) 3 SCC 414 . In any event, this is not a case of a continuing benefit like pension; it is a one-time benefit like gratuity.” (emphasis in original) 17. We do not endorse such justification of respondents for the reason that it was not a policy decision separately taken for the petitioners. The policy decision had been taken on 11.5.2018 to regularise the services of all contract employees of State Government who had completed service of three years. No exception was carved for the petitioners. Thus, the policy was the same. The petitioners have been discriminated qua date of its implementation only. Whereas all other contract employees were regularised w.e.f. 1.4.2018, petitioners were regularised w.e.f. 20.8.2020, which in our considered view is clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and hence unsustainable. 18. It was also not a case of fixation of cut-off date. One of the reasons assigned by respondents for its inability to regularise petitioners from earlier date is the pendency of appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. It was also not a case of fixation of cut-off date. One of the reasons assigned by respondents for its inability to regularise petitioners from earlier date is the pendency of appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. That being so, it does not now lie in the mouth of respondents to turn around and try to justify its action by creating a fiction of class differentiation between the petitioners and other contract employees. It is not the case of respondents that even in the absence of pendency of appeals before Hon’ble Supreme Court the petitioners would have been differentiated with other contract employees of the State Government. 19. With due deference to the judgments relied upon by the respondents, we are of the considered view that the ratio laid down therein will not serve the cause of respondents for the reason firstly that, as held above, it was not a case of fixation of cut-off date for the entire class, secondly that the above referred judgments were passed in their own facts and lastly the only caveat generated is that the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary or the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result or it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical. We have no hesitation to hold that in the facts of instant case the impugned action of respondents is blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. In R L. Marwaha v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 31 , it has been held that fixing of a date for grant of benefit, must have nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The respondents, as noticed above, at one stage had themselves supported the cause of petitioners for granting them permanency of job on the premise of financial compulsions faced by it. They preferred contract employments or employments under special policies at initial stage than the recruitments on regular basis for the same reason of financial constraints. Once the courts upheld the contentions of respondents, they cannot be allowed to defeat the rights of petitioners by creating fictional separate class of employees. They preferred contract employments or employments under special policies at initial stage than the recruitments on regular basis for the same reason of financial constraints. Once the courts upheld the contentions of respondents, they cannot be allowed to defeat the rights of petitioners by creating fictional separate class of employees. Noticeably, the respondents have not declared any object for creating such imaginary classification and hence it is difficult nay impossible to find necessary nexus between the intelligible differentia and the object sought to be achieved. 20. It is also not a case where the respondents have not come out with reasons in support of its actions and financial constraint is not one of the mentioned reasons. Other reasons have already been held by us to be not qualifying the benchmark of reasonable classification and hence have been adjudged to be discriminatory and arbitrary. 21. Lastly another futile attempt has been made on behalf of respondents by contending that some of the PTA-GIA teachers were taken on contract and some were left out, therefore, they being homogeneous class cannot be differentiated. According to respondents the grant of claimed benefit of regularisation to petitioners will discriminate the PTA-GIA teachers whose services were not taken on contract. Again, we do not find any reason to subscribe to the view expounded by respondents. Petitioners are seeking the parity with other contract employees of the State Government on the premise of having formed the same class with them, whereas the rights, if any, of those who have not yet been taken on contract is not the subject matter of these petitions. Petitioners were taken on contract when they qualified the criteria of having served as PTA-GIA teachers for seven years. Petitioners cannot be compared with those who had not fulfilled the requisite criteria or were not taken on contract for any other reason. 22. In view of above discussion, the petitions are allowed. Respondents are directed to regularise the petitioners w.e.f. the due date i.e. 1.4.2018. Needless to say that the consequential benefits shall follow. The petitions are accordingly disposed of so also the miscellaneous pending applications(s), if any.