JUDGMENT : Suman Shyam, J. Heard Mr. H. Gupta, learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant. We have also heard Ms. S. Jahan, learned Addl. P.P. Assam appearing on behalf of the State. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30-04-2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh in Sessions Case No. 35/2018 whereby, the sole appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC for committing the murder of his wife Naina Patnaik and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and also to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation. 3. The prosecution case, in a nutshell, is that on 20-10-2017, at around 04:00 p.m. the accused had poured kerosene upon his wife Naina and set her on fire with the intention to kill her. The victim had sustained 70% burn injury and after 6/7 days, she succumbed to her injuries while receiving treatment in the hospital. On 20-10-2017, Sri Satya Patnaik, i.e. the father of the victim had lodged an ejahar before the Officer-in-Charge (O/C), Chabua Police Station reporting the incident with a request to investigate the matter. In the said ejahar, it was mentioned that the accused had been torturing the victim in various ways after a few days of their marriage and at around 04:30 p.m. on 20-10-2017, following a quarrel between them, the accused had poured kerosene on the person of his wife Naina and set her ablaze. Having learnt about the incident, they immediately took Naina to Kharjan T.E. Hospital but the Doctor referred her to the Assam Medical College & Hospital, Dibrugarh as she had sustained grievous injuries. Naina was taken to the hospital in a critical condition. 4. On receipt of the ejahar dated 20-10-2017, Chabua P.S. Case No. 272/2017 was registered under Section 307 IPC and the matter was entrusted to S.I. Tapan Das for carrying out investigation. After 6/7 days of the occurrence, the victim succumbed to her burn injuries at the Assam Medical College & Hospital (AMCH), Dibrugarh, as a result of which, Section 302 IPC was added. After completing the investigation the Investigating Officer (I/O) had submitted charge-sheet against the accused. Based on the charge-sheet the learned trial court had framed charge under Section 302 IPC against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to him but since the accused had claimed innocence, the matter went for trial. 5. After completing the investigation the Investigating Officer (I/O) had submitted charge-sheet against the accused. Based on the charge-sheet the learned trial court had framed charge under Section 302 IPC against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to him but since the accused had claimed innocence, the matter went for trial. 5. The prosecution case is basically based on the dying declarations of the victim. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined as many as 07 witnesses including the Doctor (PW-7), who had conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body and the I/O (PW-6), who had conducted the investigation. The prosecution has also heavily relied upon the oral dying declarations of the victim brought on record by the PWs-2 and 5, i.e. the parents of the victim as well as the dying declaration recorded by the I.O. i.e. PW-6 (Exhibit-4) so as to prove that it was none other than the accused who had set the victim ablaze with the intention to kill her. After recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. While denying all the incriminating circumstances put to him, the accused had also stated that he did not set his wife ablaze and also did not know how his wife had caught fire but when she screamed, he tried to save her. The defense side, however, did not adduce any evidence. On conclusion of trial and on evaluation of the evidence brought on record, the learned trial court had convicted the accused/ appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. 6. By referring to the materials available on record, Mr. Gupta, learned amicus-curiae has argued that the oral dying declarations were brought on record by the PWs-2 and 5 for the first time during recording of their evidence and hence, their testimonies on such count were not believable. Insofar as the dying declaration recorded by PW-6 is concerned, here also, submits Mr. Gupta, there is no opinion of the Doctor certifying that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make such a statement. Mr. Gupta has further argued that neither any doctor nor Magistrate had recorded the dying declaration and there is no explanation for not doing so. Gupta, there is no opinion of the Doctor certifying that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make such a statement. Mr. Gupta has further argued that neither any doctor nor Magistrate had recorded the dying declaration and there is no explanation for not doing so. Contending that the dying declaration recorded by the I/O (Ext-4) is too perfect to be true, the learned amicus curiae has argued that it will be unsafe for the court to award a conviction only on the dying declarations without there being any corroborating evidence available on record. In support of his above arguments, Mr. Gupta has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Paparambaka Rosamma & Ors. Vs. State of A.P. reported in (1999) 7 SCC 695 . 7. As an alternative argument, the learned amicus curiae has submitted that even if it is held that the accused was responsible for the death of his wife, even then, the materials available on record clearly indicate that there was a quarrel between the accused and his wife immediately before the occurrence. As such, it is evident that the incident had taken place due to grave and sudden provocation and without any premeditation on the part of the accused. He submits that there is nothing on record to show that the accused had any intention to cause death to the deceased and therefore, his conviction be converted into one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and a lesser punishment be awarded to the accused. To support the above argument, Mr. Gupta has placed reliance on two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of B.N. Kavatakar & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka , reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 304 and Sayaji Hanmant Bankar Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 477 to contend that since the accused had suffered only 70% burn injury and the death took place due to septicemia, that too, after 07 days in hospital, the present is a case which would come within the fold of Exception IV of Section 300 of the IPC. 8. Responding to the above argument, Ms. Jahan, learned Addl. P.P. Assam submits that the oral dying declaration of PWs-2 and 5 finds due corroboration from the evidence of PW-6. 8. Responding to the above argument, Ms. Jahan, learned Addl. P.P. Assam submits that the oral dying declaration of PWs-2 and 5 finds due corroboration from the evidence of PW-6. The PW-1 has also deposed that he had heard the victim saying that she was set ablaze. Therefore, it could not be said that there is no corroborating evidence in support of the dying declarations brought on record by the prosecution. The learned Addl. P.P. Assam, however, submits that even if the dying declarations are ignored by this Court, even then, the evidence brought on record clearly establishes all the links in the chain of circumstances so as to prove that the incident took place inside the house of the accused and he was present in the house at that point of time. She submits that the explanation furnished by the accused while recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. does not find support from the evidence on record and therefore, it is clear that the accused Section 106 of the Evidence Act.had failed to offer any plausible explanation in discharge of his burden under Under the circumstances, submits Ms. Jahan, the charge brought against the accused under Section 302 IPC stands fully established by circumstantial evidence. On such ground, the learned Addl. P.P. Assam has prayed for dismissing the appeal. 9. We have considered the submission made by learned counsel for both the sides and have also gone through the materials available on record. Let us now refer to the evidence brought on record by the prosecution. 10. PW-1 Sri Dilip Tanti is a neighbour of the accused and he has deposed that the incident took place on 20-10-2017. After finishing work, when he went to the house of Chandana Tanti, he had heard a commotion coming from the house of Sunil Tanti. Hearing the commotion, people had assembled there and he also rushed to the spot and saw that the people had broken the door and brought Naina out from the house. Sunil was also inside and he was also brought out. Naina was burnt. People took her to the hospital. Naina informed that she was set ablaze. Initially she was taken to the Garden Hospital and thereafter, she was taken to the Assam Medical College & Hospital, Dibrugarh. After 5/6 days Naina died. Her father Satya Patnaik had lodged ejahar. Sunil was also inside and he was also brought out. Naina was burnt. People took her to the hospital. Naina informed that she was set ablaze. Initially she was taken to the Garden Hospital and thereafter, she was taken to the Assam Medical College & Hospital, Dibrugarh. After 5/6 days Naina died. Her father Satya Patnaik had lodged ejahar. The police had recorded his statement and seized one kerosene lamp from the house of the accused vide seizure Exhibit-1, which contains his signature. In his cross-examination, PW-1 has deposed that he did not know as to how Naina had caught fire and who had set her ablaze. 11. PW-2 Satya Patnaik is the father of the deceased and also the informant in this case. PW-2 has deposed that on the day of the incident, he had heard commotion coming from the house of the accused person. He went there and saw that the victim was in flames and she was coming out of the house. The victim had informed that the accused had set her in flames. He had asked the victim about the accused and then she informed him that the accused was inside the house. PW-2 has stated that they opened the door and brought the accused and thereafter, confronted him by asking as to why he has set his daughter on fire, but the accused did not reply. Many people had gathered on the spot. He took the victim on his motorbike to the garden hospital and from there, she was taken to the AMCH, Dibrugarh in an ambulance. Meanwhile, police arrived and he had lodged the ejahar at the Police Station after admitting the victim in the Medical College & Hospital. PW-2 has also confirmed that Exhibit-2 was the ejahar containing his signature and the same was written by a lady from Chabua. He has stated that after one week the victim had succumbed to her injuries. This witness has further deposed that the victim had informed him that the accused person used to assault her and he did not allow her to leave the house. On the relevant day, they had a fight and the accused had set her ablaze. The police had seized one kerosene lamp which was lying in the house vide seizure list Exhibit-1, which contains his signature Exhibit-1(2). On the relevant day, they had a fight and the accused had set her ablaze. The police had seized one kerosene lamp which was lying in the house vide seizure list Exhibit-1, which contains his signature Exhibit-1(2). In his cross-examination, PW-2 has stated that the incident took place on 20th and on the same day, he had lodged the ejahar. He did not know as to how the accused had set ablaze his daughter nor did he know how his daughter was set in flames. This witness has also admitted that he had not stated before the police that the accused had set his daughter ablaze. 12. Smti. Sanjana Tanti (PW-3) is a co-worker of the victim Naina Patnaik and she has deposed that on the day of the occurrence, at about 02:00 p.m. while she was returning home, she saw people gathering and asked as to what had happened. Then the people told her that Naina Patnaik had sustained burn injury and she had been taken to the hospital. 13. PW-4 Sri Mahanta Kumar is a co-villager of the accused. This witness has deposed that the occurrence took place at about 03:00 p.m. He saw people gathering in a ‘chariali’ of their village. He had also seen that people apprehended the accused. He asked them as to why they had apprehended the accused person and they replied that the accused had set his wife on fire. Later on, police came and recorded his statement. 14. PW-5 Smti. Anshia Patnayak is the mother of the victim. She has deposed that on the day of the occurrence, at about 03:00 p.m. she heard from the villagers that there was a commotion in the house of the accused person. Then, she, along with her husband went to the house of the accused and saw burn injuries on her daughter. She was outside the house and the accused was inside the house. She asked her daughter as to how she had sustained the burn injuries and her daughter told that her husband, i.e. the accused had set her on fire. According to PW-5 her husband PW-2 was also with her when the victim had told her so. Then, she along with her husband (PW-2), took the victim to the garden hospital in a motorbike which belonged to a villager. According to PW-5 her husband PW-2 was also with her when the victim had told her so. Then, she along with her husband (PW-2), took the victim to the garden hospital in a motorbike which belonged to a villager. In the garden hospital, the doctor had asked her daughter as to how she had sustained burn injuries and the victim had informed the doctor that her husband had set her on fire. Then the doctor had informed the police about the incident. The police arrived and recorded her statement in the garden hospital and thereafter, she was referred to the AMCH, Dibrugarh. The victim was in AMCH, Dibrugarh for 07 days, where-after she had succumbed to her injuries. Thereafter, her husband had lodged an ejahar reporting the incident. The police had recorded her statement. The PW-5 has further stated that the victim has a daughter aged about 1½ years. 15. PW-6, S.I. Tapan Das was the Police Officer who had conducted investigation in connection with Chabua P.S. Case No. 272/2017. PW-6 has deposed that on 20-10-2017, he was posted at Chabua Police Station as Sub-Inspector (S.I.). On that day, one Satya Patnaik had lodged a FIR in the Chabua Police Station which was registered as Chabua P.S. Case No. 272/2017 under Section 307 IPC and he was asked to conduct investigation. During the course of the investigation, he had gone to the place of occurrence, recorded the statements of the witnesses, prepared a sketch map as shown by the informant. He had also seized the kerosene lamp made of glass bottle from the house of the accused vide seizure list Exhibit-1 and material Exhibit-1 is the kerosene lamp. Then he went to the Kharjan Tea Estate Hospital where the victim was taken immediately after the incident and recorded the statement of the witnesses present there. He had learnt that the victim had been sent to the AMCH, Dibrugarh. He had recorded the statement of the victim Naina at the Kharjan T.E. Hospital and Exhibit-4 is the said statement which he had recorded on 21-10-2017, wherein, the victim had stated that the accused person had poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze. He was informed on 25-10-2017 by the Borbari Outpost that the victim has succumbed to her injuries at the AMCH. He was informed on 25-10-2017 by the Borbari Outpost that the victim has succumbed to her injuries at the AMCH. PW-6 has also deposed that when he went to the place of occurrence on 20-10-2017, he saw that the accused was apprehended by the local villagers. He then brought the accused to the Police Station, recorded his statement, arrested him and then forwarded him to the court for judicial custody. Finding sufficient materials, against the accused, he had submitted charge-sheet (Exhibit-5), which contains his signature Exhibit-5(1). In his cross-examination, PW-6 has admitted that he had not recorded the statement of the persons named Sri Bipul Nanda and Sri Jyotish Patnayak whose houses had been shown as ‘D’ and ‘E’ in the sketch map because they were not present at that time. While recording the statement of the victim, he had not asked the doctor regarding the state of mind of the victim and as to whether, she was capable of giving statement since the Doctor was not present at that time. 16. Dr. Subhajyoti Deka (PW-7) was working as Associate Professor, Department of Forensic Medicine, AMC, Dibrugarh on 26-10-2017 when the dead body of the deceased Naina Patnaik was brought for postmortem examination. PW-7 has proved the Postmortem Report Exhibit-6 as well as the Inquest Report by identifying his signature. According to the evidence adduced by PW-7, the victim had suffered approximately 70% burn injury. He has opined that the death of the victim is due to septicemia as a result of burn comprising 70% of the total body surface area. The time since death was approximately 18 to 24 hours. In his cross-examination, the PW-7 has stated that he had detected only burn injury and he did not detect any other injuries. 17. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution side, it appears that the I/O PW-6 had recorded the statement of the victim on the next day of the incident, i.e. on 21-10-2017.On that day, the victim was admitted as a patient in the AMCH, Dibrugarh. Since the learned amicus curiae has vociferously assailed the dying declaration (Exhibit-4) recorded by the I/O, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the statement of the victim recorded in Exhibit-4 hereunder: “My name and address are as mentioned above. I, Smti Naina Patnaik, earn my livelihood by working in the Tea Estate. Since the learned amicus curiae has vociferously assailed the dying declaration (Exhibit-4) recorded by the I/O, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the statement of the victim recorded in Exhibit-4 hereunder: “My name and address are as mentioned above. I, Smti Naina Patnaik, earn my livelihood by working in the Tea Estate. My husband had married earlier and his first wife left him and since after our marriage, quarrel often took place between us and we have a 1 year old daughter. He always used to assault me under the influence of alcohol and on 20/10/2017 in the evening (though I do not remember the time) he assaulted me after consuming alcohol and quarrel took place between us with regard to financial crisis in the family and he beat me up with cane stick suspecting me of having an affair with other person. He set fire to me by pouring kerosene from the open lamp and since I sustained grievous injury, I was taken to nearby Kharjan Hospital but I was sent to Assam Medical College for treatment and at present, my condition is very critical.” 18. The I/O (PW-6) had initially stated that he had recorded the statement of the victim at the Tea Garden Hospital but later on he has deposed that the dying declaration of the victim was recorded by him on 21-10-2017. The said position is reflected from Exhibit-4 itself. From the evidence available on record, it also transpires that the victim was shifted to the AMCH, Dibrugarh on 20-10-2017 and therefore, the I/O had recorded her statement when she was admitted in the AMCH. 19. It is to be noted herein that AMCH is a Medical College Hospital located in a busy district head quarter of Assam. Therefore, there can hardly be any doubt about the fact that in a busy hospital of this nature, large number of doctors and medical attendants would be on duty round the clock. Likewise in a major district head quarter such as Dibrugarh, it is not possible to believe that there would not be a single Magistrate on duty at any given point of time. Notwithstanding the same, there were neither any medical personnel nor any Magistrate present while recording the statement of the victim. Likewise in a major district head quarter such as Dibrugarh, it is not possible to believe that there would not be a single Magistrate on duty at any given point of time. Notwithstanding the same, there were neither any medical personnel nor any Magistrate present while recording the statement of the victim. There is also no plausible explanation by the I/O (PW-6) as to why a Magistrate or a doctor could not have been called while recording the statement of the victim. There is no doctor’s certificate available on record to show that the victim was not only conscious but also in a fit state of mind at the time of recording the dying declaration. Although, the victim was alive and receiving treatment at the AMCH for almost six days after the incident, there is no explanation as to why no attempt was made to record her dying declaration by a Magistrate after obtaining Medical Certificate. On a careful reading of Ext-4 we also find that the same appears to be little too perfect to be true. 20. In the case of Paparambaka Rosamma & Ors. (Supra) relied upon by the learned amicus it has been held that in the absence of medical certification to show that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the victim was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration. That was a case where the victim had suffered 90% burn injury and the dying declaration was not only recoded by a Magistrate but the Medical Officer had also certified at the end of the declaration that the patient was conscious while recording her dying declaration. In that case also the prosecution story was based on the dying declaration of the victim. However, the Apex Court had observed that it would be unsafe to convict the accused based on such oral dying declaration. 21. Insofar as the oral dying declarations brought on record by the PWs-2 and 5, we find that they had not stated before the I/O regarding the oral dying declarations. However, both these witnesses had deposed before the court for the first time mentioning about the dying declaration of the victim. 21. Insofar as the oral dying declarations brought on record by the PWs-2 and 5, we find that they had not stated before the I/O regarding the oral dying declarations. However, both these witnesses had deposed before the court for the first time mentioning about the dying declaration of the victim. According to their deposition, PWs-2 and 5 had reached the place of occurrence together. However, it appears that there is substantial variance in their version insofar as the dying declaration is concerned. PW-2 has stated that on reaching there, he saw that the victim was in flames and she was coming out of the house. It was at that time the victim had told him that the accused had set her on fire. PW-5 on the other hand had stated that on reaching the place of occurrence she had found her daughter outside the house and the accused was inside the house. On being asked, her daughter had told that the accused had set her on fire. 22. PW- 1 is the only other witness who had projected a dying declaration of the victim but he did not say so before the I/O while recording his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This witness had also not stated before the court that the victim had named the accused as the person who had set her on fire. Moreover, according to PW-1, when he went to the place of occurrence, he had seen that people had assembled in the house of the accused. They broke open the door and brought Naina and accused out of the house. Naina was burnt and people took her to the hospital. PW-1, however, did not mention about the presence of PWs- 2 and 5 at the place of occurrence. If the testimonies of PWs1, 2 and 5 are read in conjunction, then substantial doubt would arise as to whether PWs2 and 5 had reached the place of occurrence soon after Naina was taken out of the house in a burnt condition and had actually heard her speak about the accused having set her on fire. 23. If the testimonies of PWs1, 2 and 5 are read in conjunction, then substantial doubt would arise as to whether PWs2 and 5 had reached the place of occurrence soon after Naina was taken out of the house in a burnt condition and had actually heard her speak about the accused having set her on fire. 23. It is to be noted here-in that evidence available on record suggests that hearing the commotion, a number of people had gathered in the house of the accused soon after the incident and brought Naina out of the house in a burnt condition and later on they, took her to the hospital. But none of those persons had heard the victim make any dying declaration implicating the accused. 24. According to PWs- 2 and 5 the victim had told the T.E. doctor that her husband had set her on fire. Therefore, the T.E. doctor would have been the best independent witness to bring on record the dying declaration of the victim. However, for reasons not discernable from the materials on record, the T.E. doctor was not examined as a witness. 25. PWs-2 and 5 being the parents of the victim, they can be seen as interested witnesses in this case and therefore, their evidence has to scanned by the court very cautiously. From a careful analysis of the materials available on record, we find that there is also an element of doubt as regards the voluntariness and truthfulness of the dying declarations. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the nature of evidence brought on record, the dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution for conviction of the accused does not inspire the confidence of this court. 26. It is no doubt correct that the evidence brought on record by the prosecution clearly establishes the date, time and place of occurrence. From the evidence brought on record, it is also established that the victim had caught fire inside her house and at that time, the accused was also present in the house. 26. It is no doubt correct that the evidence brought on record by the prosecution clearly establishes the date, time and place of occurrence. From the evidence brought on record, it is also established that the victim had caught fire inside her house and at that time, the accused was also present in the house. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that in a case of this nature, where the incident has happened inside the house and behind the close doors, there would be a burden upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to offer plausible explanation as to the circumstances under which the victim had caught fire. However, that by itself would not relieve the prosecution of the burden to establish the charge brought against the accused beyond reasonable doubt by adducing cogent evidence. 27. The above issue fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 wherein, it was observed that the burden of the prosecution to prima-facie establish the charge brought against the accused would never shift even in cases where the crime is committed in secrecy, inside the confines of a house but in view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it would merely lessen the burden upon the prosecution. The relevant observations in paragraph 15 of the said decision is reproduced here-in-below for ready reference: “15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.” 28. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.” 28. In the instant case, there is no doubt about the fact that a burden was cast upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to offer an explanation as to how the deceased had caught fire. However, it cannot be said that the accused had failed to offer any plausible explanation. Rather, as noted above, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused has not only denied his involvement but has also stated that when he heard his wife scream, he tried to save her and had also doused the fire but her clothes had caught fire. In the fact and circumstance of the case it cannot, therefore, be said that the explanation offered by the accused was totally improbable. The learned trial court had rejected the defense of the accused by holding that the same was untrue. However, the reason for arriving at such a conclusion has not been recorded by the learned trial court in any detail. 29. In the case of Reena Hazarika Vs. The State of Assam reported in (2019) 13 SCC 289 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that Section 313 Cr.P.C. confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence. While highlighting the importance of this right, the Apex Court has observed that the court would have a duty to consider the defense of the accused and failure to consider the defense taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in the facts of a case, may even vitiate the conviction. As noted above, a perusal of the impugned judgment goes to show that the learned trial court has not recorded proper and sufficient reason for rejecting the explanation furnished by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 30. The Supreme Court has, in a number of judicial pronouncements, cautioned that the Court must be careful in awarding conviction solely on the basis of dying declaration. The said issue has been adequately dealt with in Paparambaka Rosamma (Supra) . In the case of Arun Bhanudas Pawar Vs. The Supreme Court has, in a number of judicial pronouncements, cautioned that the Court must be careful in awarding conviction solely on the basis of dying declaration. The said issue has been adequately dealt with in Paparambaka Rosamma (Supra) . In the case of Arun Bhanudas Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 11 SCC 232 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that oral dying declaration made the deceased ought to be treated with care and caution since the maker of the statement cannot be subjected to any cross-examination. Likewise, in State of Rajasthan Vs. Lichman & Anr. reported in (2014) 12 SCC 670 , it has been observed that oral dying declaration can form the basis of conviction if the deponent is found to be in a fit condition to make the declaration and if it is found to be truthful. The court must, as a matter of prudence, look for corroboration of oral dying declaration. 31. After a careful analysis of the evidence brought on record, we are of the considered opinion that although it is probable that the accused, in a state of inebriation, might have had an altercation with his wife, where-after she, in all probability, was set ablaze by the accused by pouring kerosene oil. However, in criminal law jurisprudence, suspicion cannot take the place of proof. Unless the prosecution succeeds in establishing the charge beyond reasonable doubt by adducing cogent evidence, conviction for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The failure on the part of the prosecution to examine the relevant witnesses and record a dying declaration by observing the requirement of law raises a serious doubt on the prosecution story. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the prosecution has failed to establish the chain of circumstances so as to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 32. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we hold that the accused is entitled to acquittal on benefit of doubt. Ordered accordingly. Since we have already held that the charge brought against the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt, it would no longer be necessary for this Court to consider the alternative argument of conversion of conviction made by the learned amicus curiae. We are informed that the accused is presently in jail. Ordered accordingly. Since we have already held that the charge brought against the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt, it would no longer be necessary for this Court to consider the alternative argument of conversion of conviction made by the learned amicus curiae. We are informed that the accused is presently in jail. As such, he be forthwith released from jail, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. Send back the LCR. Before parting with the record, we wish to put our appreciation on record as regard the assistance rendered by the learned amicus curiae Mr. H. Gupta and direct the Registry to pay just remuneration to him as per the notified rate.