JUDGMENT : ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI, J. 1. Rule. 2. These petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India have been filed by the petitioners against the orders dated 21.07.2020 passed below Exh.11 in Regular Civil Suit Nos. 22, 12, 20, 17, 16 and 21 of 2018 by the learned Principal Civil Judge, Matar. By the said applications O.39 R.(1) and O.38 R.5 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the petitioners had prayed for injunction as well as the retiral benefits, which came to be rejected. 3. Though served and sufficient opportunity was given, the respondent has chosen not to appear before the Court, leaving no option but to proceed with the matter. 4. Heard, Mr. Ramnandan Singh, learned advocate for the petitioners. The bone of contention of the learned advocate for the petitioners is that since the petitioners do not fall within the definition of ‘Workman’ as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) and were working in Managerial capacity, suit is the only remedy, however, the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate such an aspect of the matter and thereby, has materially erred in rejecting the applications. Accordingly, he urged that these petitions may be allowed in the interest of justice, setting aside the impugned orders and to grant the reliefs prayed for vide applications Exh.11. 5. Regard being had to the submissions advanced and considering the material on record vis-a-vis perusing the impugned orders, following facts emerge: (i) The petitioners were appointed in Apar Limited. (ii) Later, the company became GE Apar Lighting Pvt. Ltd. and the services of the petitioners came to be confirmed in the said company. (iii) then the petitioners were re-designated as Officer respectively. (iv) thereafter, the petitioners were promoted to the senior Officer posts. (v) then the company transferred to CEMA Electric Lighting (India) Pvt. Ltd. and the services of the petitioners were transferred with the acquiring company without any break/interruption. (vi) in 2018 termination letters with notice pay were issued to the petitioner, which were accepted by the petitioners with objection. (vii) suit came to be filed by the petitioners for various reliefs. (viii) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1079 of 2018 and allied matters, in view of settlement between the parties, the same came to be disposed of vide order dated 29.03.2019. (ix) Misc. (vii) suit came to be filed by the petitioners for various reliefs. (viii) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1079 of 2018 and allied matters, in view of settlement between the parties, the same came to be disposed of vide order dated 29.03.2019. (ix) Misc. Civil Application No. 1 of 2019, filed by the employees who were not part of the Union, for recall of aforesaid order, came to be rejected vide order dated 08.07.2019. Following order was passed: “No case is made out to recall the order dated 29.3.2019 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1079 of 2018 in Special Civil Application No. 3376 of 2018, keeping it open for the applicant to take appropriate measure in accordance with law. Application is rejected.” 5.1 In the light of the aforesaid factual background, if the orders impugned herein are referred to, the learned trial Judge has mentioned that “under Section 2(p) r/w. Rule 62 under the provisions of ID Act, settlement has been arrived at between the Workmen Union and the defendant company and the said settlement was treated as part of the order and the parties were directed to abide by the said settlement and hence also, the civil Court has not jurisdiction to decide the application of the plaintiff.” 5.2 At this juncture, it would be apt to reproduce the order dated 29.03.2019 passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 1079 of 2018, which reads as under: “Learned advocates for the parties states that parties have arrived settlement under Section 2(P) r/w Rule 62 under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 outside the Court. In view of the settlement between the parties, the appeals as well as civil applications are disposed of with a direction to parties respectively to abide by terms and conditions of the settlement and the settlement is treated as part of the order.” 5.3 In view of the aforesaid order passed in the letters patent appeal as well as taking into consideration the observations made by the learned trial Judge in the impugned orders as aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly mentioned so. 5.4 Further, it appears that the petitioners were working with the respondent company as Senior Officer/Officer - Tube Drawing/Officer. 5.4 Further, it appears that the petitioners were working with the respondent company as Senior Officer/Officer - Tube Drawing/Officer. Now, if the definition of “Workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the ID Act is referred to, the same reads as under: “2(s) Workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person: (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957). (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison. (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding [ten thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 5.5 Thus, the definition excludes a person, more particularly, who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. In the instant case, a perusal of the material available reveal nothing on record to substantiate the fact that the petitioners were working in Managerial Capacity and/or as the Administrative Officer. Section 2(s) of the ID Act excludes the persons who are employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, however, as said earlier, there reveals nothing to show that the petitioners were working in such a capacity so as to exclude them from the definition of Workman. Section 2(s) of the ID Act excludes the persons who are employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, however, as said earlier, there reveals nothing to show that the petitioners were working in such a capacity so as to exclude them from the definition of Workman. Further, merely because a person is fetching more remuneration than the outer limit as provided in the aforesaid definition at clause (iv), is not a bar him to include him in the definition of Workman. It is trite that, it is not the nomenclature but the nature of duty, which is required to be taken into consideration while deciding the question as to whether a person falls under such definition of Workman or not. 5.6 Accordingly, an in-depth perusal of the impugned orders reveals no error, much less an error apparent on the face of it which requires interference at the hands of this Court. 5.7 At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , wherein, the Court has considered in detail the scope of interference by this Court to hold and observe that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court Suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power would be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, read as under: “57. Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. As noted above, prior to the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could issue prerogative writs in exercise of their original jurisdiction. [See: 1986 (Supp.) SCC 401 at Page 469)] 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P. and Others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 ] 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. [State of U.P. and Others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 ] 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. 60. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. [See: Surya Dev Rai (supra) and Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR 1955 SC 233 ] 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, within the bounds of their authority. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 5.8 Thus, exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be with a view to keep the tribunals/Courts within the bounds of their authority, to ensure that law is followed by tribunals/Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and/or when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 5.9 The Apex Court in a recent decision in Puri Investments vs. Young Friends and Co. and Others, MANU/SC/0290/2022 has observed as under: “13. There was no perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 5.9 The Apex Court in a recent decision in Puri Investments vs. Young Friends and Co. and Others, MANU/SC/0290/2022 has observed as under: “13. There was no perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Considering. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 5.10 Thus, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be given a shape of appeal in disguise. 6. For the forgoing observations and discussions, these petitions fail and are dismissed accordingly. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. 6.1 Nonetheless, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioners to move appropriate forum with appropriate applications, which shall be decided in accordance with law and on merits.