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2022 DIGILAW 493 (JHR)

Pradeep Kumar Upadhaya S/o Late Mahesh Dutt Upadhaya v. State of Jharkhand

2022-04-22

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2022
ORDER : 1. The petitioner is aggrieved of the judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 2013 by which the appellate Court rejected his challenge to the judgment of conviction under section 138 of N.I. Act. 2. In T.R. No. 279 of 2013 which proceeded on Complaint Case No. 37 of 2009, the petitioner was charged under section 138 of N.I Act on the allegation that under an agreement with the complainant that in lieu of Rs. 4 lacs taken as loan he would give Rs. 7 lacs to the complainant. The agreement was executed in the year 2002 and in connection to the said agreement the petitioner issued two cheques each for Rs. 2 lacs which on presentation by the complainant were returned from bank with endorsement of insufficient fund. The petitioner was convicted by the trial Judge and sentenced to R.I for two years and fine of Rs. 2 lacs with a further stipulation to undergo S.I. for six months in default of payment of the fine amount. As noticed above, the judgment dated 31st May 2013 passed in T.R. No. 279 of 2013 was challenged by the petitioner but the appeal preferred by him has been dismissed. 3. In the order dated 18th April 2022, the statements made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the complainant were recorded which read as under: “Mr. Rajesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that an amount of Rs. 4,10,000/- has already been paid to the legal heirs of the complainant who died during pendency of the present criminal revision petition. Mr. Vishnu Prabhakar Pathak, the learned counsel who appears for the legal heirs of the complainant states that as per the instructions received by him from the legal heirs of the complainant the said amount has been paid to them.........” 4. A settlement between the parties and, that too, in the matters which are likely to disturb peace and harmony in the community particularly between friends, family members and other acquaintances, the Courts need not insist upon the legal framework and even in cases where the offences are not compoundable the compromise between the parties is taken due consideration. 5. In Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “29. 5. In Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 6. In view of the aforesaid, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded against the petitioner in T.R. No. 279 of 2013 which were affirmed by the appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 2013 are set-aside on compromise. 7. Criminal Revision No. 251 of 2016 is allowed. 8. I.A. No. 3203 of 2020 stands disposed of.