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2022 DIGILAW 494 (BOM)

Ranjan Mahmulal Mulla v. Chief Executive Officer, Ichalkaranji Nagarparishad

2022-02-23

RAVINDRA V.GHUGE

body2022
JUDGMENT : P.C. :- 1. This matter was heard extensively on 16/02/2022, 17/02/2022 and 21/02/2022. 2. By this petitioner the petitioner has challenged the judgment of the Industrial Court dated 17/04/2018 by which Revision (ULP) No.172 of 2014 filed by the respondent- Municipal Council, has been allowed and the judgment delivered by the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.12 of 2006, dated 09/07/2014, has been quashed and set aside. 3. The respondent-Municipal Council had suspended the petitioner on 04/04/2003, pending disciplinary action. On 18/07/2005, after conducting a full-fledged domestic enquiry, a second show-cause notice proposing the punishment of dismissal from service was issued to the petitioner. On 28/07/2005, the petitioner replied to the show-cause notice. On 28/11/2005 the petitioner was dismissed from service by way of punishment. 4. The petitioner preferred Complaint (ULP) No.12 of 2006 before the Labour Court. By judgment dated 09/07/2014, the complaint was partly allowed. By invoking clause (f) below Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, “the Act of 1971”), the Labour Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal from service and granted reinstatement with continuity and 20% backwages. The respondent approached the Industrial Court by preferring the Revision Petition under Section 44 of the Act of 1971 and by the impugned judgment, the Revision was allowed. The judgment of the Labour Court was quashed and set aside. 5. The petitioner has formulated grounds from clause (i) to clause (xvi), which are reproduced verbatim hereinunder:- “i. The impugned order is patently bad in law and erroneous. ii. The impugned order is bad on facts and is inequitable. iii. It is an error to allowed the said revision application. iv. The said revision application ought to have been rejected. v. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge, erred in appreciating the evidence of the Respondent who were present on the spot at the time of incident. vi. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge has not consider that Respondent admitted that on leave application it is mentioned that the leave of the Petitioner is granted and sanitary inspector sign the same. vii. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge erred in considering that at the cross examination Respondents evidence not support the case of Respondent. viii. vi. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge has not consider that Respondent admitted that on leave application it is mentioned that the leave of the Petitioner is granted and sanitary inspector sign the same. vii. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge erred in considering that at the cross examination Respondents evidence not support the case of Respondent. viii. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge erred in considering the evidence of Kumar Lokare, Bapu Javale and Yashwant turned hostile and did not support the respondent. ix. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge erred in considering that complainant has unblemished service record. x. The Petitioners submit that the learned Judge erred in considering that the Respondent has not lead separate evidence regarding the past record of the Petitioner but learned judge only relied upon the written submission of the Respondent regarding past record of the Petitioner. xi. The Petitioners submit that as a revision court learned Industrial Court had only limited scope but learned judge act beyond his scope while deciding the Revision. xii. The impugned judgment and order is bad on facts and is inequitable. xiii. The entire approach is patently bad in law and erroneous. xvi. The facts and circumstances of the case have not been properly appreciated. xvi. Even otherwise also the impugned Judgment and Order is bad in law and on facts and the same is therefore liable to be quashed and set aside.” 6. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, therefore, strenuously canvasses that the petitioner has not committed any misdeed and is not guilty of having committed any misconduct. He deserves the relief of reinstatement in service with continuity and 20% backwages, as are granted by the Labour Court. 7. The learned Advocate representing the respondent- Council submits that the Labour Court had set aside the findings of the Enquiry Officer and as a consequence, the enquiry stood vitiated. The Municipal Council recorded evidence before the Labour Court and by conducting a de-novo enquiry, it proved the charges against the petitioner. There were three charges levelled against the petitioner. The first charge was of reporting for duties, without carrying the tools required for performing his duties as a ‘safai kamgar’, on 05/03/2003 in Section Nos.22 and 23 in between 6.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m., in the Health Department. There were three charges levelled against the petitioner. The first charge was of reporting for duties, without carrying the tools required for performing his duties as a ‘safai kamgar’, on 05/03/2003 in Section Nos.22 and 23 in between 6.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m., in the Health Department. As such, he did not have his equipments to sweep and mop the floor and as a consequence, the entire sections were littered. The second charger which was very serious, was of producing a forged document before the Industrial Court in an earlier proceedings, indicating that he had been on sanctioned leave on 05/03/2003. Thirdly, on 05/03/2003, without performing the work of sweeping, moping and cleaning, he was moving around in various sections and instigating the safai workers to refrain from performing work. 8. He further submits that the petitioner attempted to mislead the Labour Court by stating that his past service record is clean and unblemished. The Council produced a document, which was exhibited as C-12 alongwith the written statement and, which indicated that on 03/03/1999 and 04/03/1999, the petitioner had reported for duties in a drunken state and had misbehaved with office staff as well as the nurses and outraged their modesty. He was suspended pending disciplinary action. He tendered a written apology on 29/05/1999, admitting the misdeeds that he had committed and prayed that he should be reinstated in service. His apology was accepted in order to give him a chance to reform himself and in order to safeguard the interest of the nurses, he was removed from the said Department. 9. Having considered the submissions of the learned Advocates, I have gone through the judgment of the Labour Court and the record. It is apparent that a serious charge was proved against the petitioner, after the Council led the evidence. The first error in law and on facts that was committed by the Labour Court was in the light of the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Colour-Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. ( 1998 (3) SCC 192 ) wherein the law has been crystallized that if a charge of serious nature is levelled upon an employee, Item 1(g) would not be applicable and cannot be invoked. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. ( 1998 (3) SCC 192 ) wherein the law has been crystallized that if a charge of serious nature is levelled upon an employee, Item 1(g) would not be applicable and cannot be invoked. Item 1(g) reads as under:- “for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the employee, so as to amount to a shockingly disproportionate punishment.” 10. The Labour Court itself has concluded that the petitioner is guilty of misrepresentation, not before any authority, but before the Industrial Court itself. His application, seeking leave on 05/03/2003, was never sanctioned and a fraudulent acknowledgment was prepared by the petitioner, which was attempted to be passed of as a proof of leave having been sanctioned. Such an attempt is of a grave and serious nature and Item 1(g) would not be applicable. 11. The Labour Court has concluded that the punishment awarded to the petitioner could be interfered with under Item 1(f) with regard to utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of a domestic enquiry or with undue haste. This clause is also not attracted in the case, since the enquiry was vitiated and the employer has led evidence to prove the charges before the Labour Court. 12. Standing Order 25(6) of the Model Standing Orders, Schedule I(A) framed under the Bombay/Maharashtra Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules 1959 mandates that the Manager, while awarding the punishment under the Standing Orders, shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, previous record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. In the light of this legal position, the argument that the past service record was not mentioned in the charge-sheet, needs to be put to rest. 13. The law on the punishment being commensurate to the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct, is now well settled. If the past record is blemished, it amounts to an aggravating factor. If the past service record is clean, it amounts to a mitigating factor. The employer has to consider the past service record as per the Standing Orders only at the time of quantifying the punishment to be awarded to an employee by considering the gravity and seriousness of the proved misconducts, in the backdrop of the service record. If the past service record is clean, it amounts to a mitigating factor. The employer has to consider the past service record as per the Standing Orders only at the time of quantifying the punishment to be awarded to an employee by considering the gravity and seriousness of the proved misconducts, in the backdrop of the service record. Such a past service record is not required to be mentioned in the charge-sheet and there is no law that mandates that the past record must be mentioned in the charge-sheet. In fact, the past record ought not to be mentioned in the charge-sheet because the Enquiry Officer has to conduct an enquiry with an independent mind, without being influenced or prejudiced that the charge-sheeted workman is a person habituated to committing misconducts. The possibility of the Enquiry Officer getting prejudiced against the charge-sheeted workman in the light of the reference to the blemished past service record in a charge-sheet, cannot be ruled out. The Enquiry Officer has to conduct an enquiry strictly with reference to the charges levelled upon an employee and the onus and burden lies on the Management to prove the charges against him. 14. Considering the past service record is within the domain of the employer and that too, only at the stage when the employer has to take a decision with regard to the quantum of punishment to be awarded to the employee in view of the 42nd amendment to the Constitution (see Union of India Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991 AIR 471)and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B.Karunaka, (1994 Supp(2) SCC 391). 15. The Labour Court, in the instant case, has fallen in a patent error by concluding that the charge-sheet did not mention the past record of the employee and the employer has, therefore, committed a grave error in law and that the past service record is not proved to be blemished before the Enquiry Officer. Such conclusions are against the tenets of law and deserve to be set aside, forthwith. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Munna Lal Jain ( 2005(10) SCC 84 ) has concluded that merely because a Court finds that the punishment awarded to an employee is disproportionate, would not empower the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Munna Lal Jain ( 2005(10) SCC 84 ) has concluded that merely because a Court finds that the punishment awarded to an employee is disproportionate, would not empower the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The punishment awarded must be so disproportionate to the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct proved, after considering the past service record, that judicial conscience must be shocked by the punishment awarded. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has used the term that the quantum of punishment must be shockingly disproportionate to the gravity and the seriousness of the misconduct. 17. In the present case, the proved misconduct of producing a forged document before the Industrial Court, is a grave and serious misconduct. The past service record of reporting on duties in a drunken state and abusing medical staff and nurses, is a seriously aggravating factor. These aspects of the case were completely lost sight of by the Labour Court. The judgment of the Labour Court granting reinstatement in service with continuity and 20% backwages is an unsustainable judgment on account of grossly erroneous conclusions. 18. In the above fact situation, the judgment of the Industrial Court allowing the Revision and dismissing the complaint by quashing the judgment of the Labour Court, is fair and proper. There is no perversity in the impugned judgment, calling for any interference. 19. This petitioner being devoid of merits, is, therefore, dismissed.