JUDGMENT : MARLI VANKUNG, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned senior counsel for the respondents. 2. This is a second appeal under Section 100 CPC against the impugned Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl in CMA No. 409/2019 in connection with RFA No. 17/2019. 3. Brief facts of the case is that Sangkungi (L), who was the mother of the appellant and the respondent No. 1 had a land and a building thereon covered by LSC No. 102 of 1967 at Venghlui, Aizawl, Mizoram. After the demise of Sangkungi (L) on 18 January 2008 , her husband Thantluanga Zadeng applied for an Heirship Certificate on behalf of his daughter Smt. Margaret Malsawmkimi Zadeng (the respondent No. 1 herein) before the then Subordinate District Council Court (in short ‘SDCC’) Aizawl, Mizoram which was registered as Heirship Certificate Application No. 187 of 2008. The application was filed on 19.03.2008 and Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 was instantaneously granted on 19.03.2008 in favour of the present respondent No. 1 in respect of the land covered under the LSC No. 102 of 1967. Thantluanga Zadeng then also died during 2008. Thereafter appellant preferred a First Appeal against the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008, which was registered as RFA No. 26 of 2018 and since it was filed beyond the period of limitation, a connected application for condonation of delay i.e. CMA No. 557 of 2018 was also filed. However, since the question was raised by the respondent for impleading her late father, Thantluanga Zadeng (late) as a necessary party, the First Appeal i.e. RFA No. 26 of 2018 was withdrawn by the appellant and the ld. First Appellate Court granted a liberty to file a fresh appeal, vide its Order dated 12.09.2019. Subsequently, a fresh appeal was filed by the appellant which was registered as RFA No. 17 of 2019. Since the appeal was filed beyond the limitation period, an application for condonation of the delay of 4196 days was also filed and registered as CMA No. 409 of 2019. 4. That the said CMA No. 409/2019 and RFA No. 17 of 2019 were thereafter dismissed with the impugned Order dated 21.06.2021 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-II, Aizawl, Mizoram. 4. That the said CMA No. 409/2019 and RFA No. 17 of 2019 were thereafter dismissed with the impugned Order dated 21.06.2021 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-II, Aizawl, Mizoram. Being aggrieved with the impugned Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 passed in CMA No. 409 of 2019 with RFA No. 17 of 2019 and also the impugned Order dated 19.03.2008 passed in Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008; the appellant preferred this second appeal. 5. This court on 01.12.2021, upon hearing the learned counsel for the appellant who relied on the Apex Court decision rendered in Shyam Sunder Sarma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal and Others, 2005 (1) SCC 436 , formulated the following substantial question of law: (i) Whether the ld. Trial Court could have come into a finding on questions of fact without any evidence being adduced. (ii) Whether the Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 could have been given to the Respondent No. 1 by the ld. Trial Court while there was a non-joinder of necessary parties. (iii) Whether the Order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the ld. Trial Court for issuing the Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 and the Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 passed by the ld. First Appellate Court are based on evidence on record. (iv) Whether the Order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the ld. Trial Court for issuing the Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 and the Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 passed by the ld. First Appellate Court are in contrary to the Mizo Customary Law or against the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014. (v) Whether the First Appellate Court could have refused to condone the delay in filing the Regular First Appeal, regard being had to the explanation made by the appellant in his application for the delay in filing the appeal. 6. Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel representing the appellant submits that with regards to point Nos. (i) (ii) and (iii), there was no evidence taken when the learned Trial Court made its finding and that the ld. Trial Court had passed the impugned Order dated 19.03.2008 and issued the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 without issuing any prior notice and without affording opportunity to any party including the present appellant who is an interested party pertaining to the subject matter i.e. land and building thereon covered by LSC No. 102 of 1967. Trial Court had passed the impugned Order dated 19.03.2008 and issued the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 without issuing any prior notice and without affording opportunity to any party including the present appellant who is an interested party pertaining to the subject matter i.e. land and building thereon covered by LSC No. 102 of 1967. He submits that the appellant is the son of the deceased and is therefore, a necessary party while the Heirship Certificate No. 187/2008 was issued. That, the present appellant should have been impleaded in deciding the Heirship Certificate No. 187/2008. This is a grave violation of the principles of natural justice and the doctrine of audialterampartem as well. He has cited the decision of this court in Lalfakawma Fanai vs. Lalrempuii Fanai in RFA No. 24/2021 and this court’s order dated 25.03.2021 in I.A.(C) No. 40/2021 in RFA No. 13/2021 wherein it was held that issue of notice is mandatory. 7. Regarding point No. (iv), the learned counsel has highlighted the Customary Law prior to 2014 and pointed out Section 109 Sub Clause 3, which basically states that the youngest son will be given the title of legal heir because he is supposed to support the aged parents. In the case of a rich father has more than one son the youngest son will receive the lion’s share. The learned counsel also highlighted Section 31 of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 which basically states that the youngest son should have a share in the property of the deceased father’s/mother. 8. Regarding point No. (v), the learned counsel submits that he has given sufficient cause for the delay of 4196 days which he has made it clear in his appeal petition submitted before the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, from paragraph Nos. 3 to 7 along with the requisite documents as to why there was a delay of 496 days. The reasons being that the Heirship Certificate No. 187/2008 was issued without any notice and thus he got to know about the Heirship Certificate belatedly only in the year 2018 when he had filed an FIR against the instant respondent no. 3 to 7 along with the requisite documents as to why there was a delay of 496 days. The reasons being that the Heirship Certificate No. 187/2008 was issued without any notice and thus he got to know about the Heirship Certificate belatedly only in the year 2018 when he had filed an FIR against the instant respondent no. 1 in connection with the dispute regarding dismantlement of his garage within the LSC No. 102 of 1967, wherein, he was informed that the LSC No. 102 of 1967 was actually in the name of the respondent No. 1: That previously, the appellant and the respondents resided in the same house within the LSC No. 102 of 1967. A loan was taken by the respondent No. 1 with the knowledge of the appellant by mortgaging the LSC No. 102 of 1967 wherein, the appellant was under the impression that the LSC was still in the name of their deceased mother even though his wife was made the Guarantor. On learning about the Heirship Certificate issued and the mutation of the LSC No. 102 of 1967 against the name of the respondent No. 1, the appellant had immediately consulted a counsel and obtained copy of the impugned Heirship Certificate No. 187 0f 2008 through RTI. However, due to his financial difficulties/constrain, he could not pay the requisite lawyer fees immediately and it was only in the beginning of the year 2018 that an appeal RFA No. 26/2018 along with CMA No. 557/2018 could be filed. However, the above mentioned RFA and CMA was withdrawn since the deceased respondent No. 2 was not impleaded as a party and a fresh RFA No. 17/2019 with CMA No. 409/2019 was filed. Because of the above reasons, there was a delay of 4196 days, however, the learned First Appellate Court then dismissed the RFA17/2019 with CMA No/ 409/2019 on 21.06.2021. The Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 was made based on the presumtion that the appellant had known about the Heirship Certificate since his wife had acted as the Guarantor when the loan was taken and on the presumption that the present appellant was financially sound and could have engaged a legal counsel without delay. The Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 was made based on the presumtion that the appellant had known about the Heirship Certificate since his wife had acted as the Guarantor when the loan was taken and on the presumption that the present appellant was financially sound and could have engaged a legal counsel without delay. That the appellant in good faith had then not made any application for Heirship Certificate since the said LSC was mortgaged against the loan taken by the respondent for renovation of the house within the said LSC. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex court in the case of Laxmi Ram (Dead) by L.Rs. and Others vs. Bietshwar Singh and Others, (2008) 10 SCC 697 and Kochukakkada Aboobacker (Dead) by LRs. and Others vs. Attah Kasim and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 389 . 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited the following Supreme Court cases, wherein it has explained that the condonation of delay, a sufficient cause is sufficient and it is not the number of days that needs to be looked into. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex court in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 , Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 195 and Sethi Coke Industries vs. Jamshed Ali (MD) and Another, 2013 (4) GLT 929. He submits that the question of consideration of the case on merit should not be denied due to the rejection of the condonation of delay that he has a sufficient grounds for contesting the case regarding issue of Heirship Certificate No. 187/2008 being the youngest son of the deceased and he has prayed that this matter may be remanded back to the Trial Court for re-trial by adducing necessary evidence. 10. Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned senior counsel for the opposite party on the other hand submits that the merit of the case is not to be looked into at this stage and only no. (v) needs to be discussed at this stage. 10. Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned senior counsel for the opposite party on the other hand submits that the merit of the case is not to be looked into at this stage and only no. (v) needs to be discussed at this stage. He submits that the delay of 4196 days is not to be condoned as per the reasoning made by the learned Lower Court, where the learned Lower Court has rightly observed that the Guarantor of the loan taken against the LSC No. 102 of 1967 is the wife of the appellant and it is not possible that she would not know about the Heirship Certificate No. 187/2008 issued. Both their parents died in 2008 and a loan of 20 lakhs was taken after three years of their death in 2011. It is not possible for a loan to be taken in the name of the deceased person and without the Heirship Certificate being issued. It is therefore can be presumed that the appellant and his wife knew about the Heirship Certificate. It is also clear that there cannot be any financial constrain as stated by the appellant since his wife was a Government employee and was the Secretary, State Election Commission. He was also having land at ITI and Rangvamual. Thus, the excuse given that he was under financial constrain is unbelievable and the learned Lower Court has also not accepted such an explanation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex court in the case of Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 and Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 . That day to day explanation is not given as such general explanation cannot be excepted., He has pointed out that the appellant has taken almost 12 years for filing this appeal and even though the limitation act does not mentioned anything about the limitation for Heirship Certificate Article 137 of the Limitation Act mentioned that for any other matters should be 3 years. He has also pointed out that Section 100 of CPC, the second appeal can be filed if there is the substantial question of law, which is not defined in CPC. He has also pointed out that Section 100 of CPC, the second appeal can be filed if there is the substantial question of law, which is not defined in CPC. However, in the present case, there is no substantial question of law to be looked into since it is with regard to only condonation of delay and he has cited the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 and State Bank of India and Others vs. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92 . He also pointed out that under Section 32 of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 on the demise of the wife and if she is survived by the husband, the property will devolve to the husband. In the present case the surviving husband of the deceased has rightly made the application for issuing the Heirship Certificate in the name of his only daughter. 11. Mr. B. Lalramenga, learned counsel for the appellant has further pointed out that Section 137 of the Limitation Act does not come to interplay in this case since this is an appeal against the order of the learned Court and that at the time of filing the application, the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 was not applicable. 12. Having considered the submissions made by both the parties and on careful perusal of the documents on record, this Court finds that with regards to the substantial question of law, it would be appropriate to first discuss S. (v) which is with regards to the condonation of delay of 4196 days which will have a resultant effect on the other points above. I have carefully gone through the explanation given by the appellant for the delay in filling the appeal against the order dated 19.03.2008 in Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 and the grounds on which the Learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge in the CMA No. 409/2019 in RFA No. 17 of 2019 had dismissed the CMA No. 409/2019 in RFA No. 17 of 2019 by the impugned Order dated 21.06.2021. 13. From the documents on record it is clear that that no notice was issued to the appellant when the Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 dated 25th March 2008 was issued in favour of the respondent. 13. From the documents on record it is clear that that no notice was issued to the appellant when the Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 dated 25th March 2008 was issued in favour of the respondent. The application for Heirship Certificate in favour of the Respondent No. 1 was submitted on 19.03.2008 by Thantluanga Zadeng in respect of the property of his deceased wife Sangkungi i.e. LSC No. 102 of 1967 and the Magistrate, Sub, District Council Court on 19.03.2008 passed its order ex parte for issuing the Heirship Certificate as prayed for. Thus it can be held that the appellant did not know about the impugned Heirship certificate at this stage. 14. I also find that the merely because in 2012 the wife of the appellant had stood as a guarantor in the bank loan taken by the respondent No. 1, wherein the respondent No. 1 had mortgaged the LSC No. 102 of 1967 it cannot be presumed that the appellant knew of the Heirship Certificate issued in favour of the respondent No. 1. Unless evidence is showing that the wife of the appellant was informed or made aware of the same it would not be appropriate to assume that all the connected documents for obtaining the Bank loan was scrutinized by the wife of the appellant and therefore she should know that an Heirship Certificate in favour of the respondent was obtained by the respondent No. 1. It is seen from the documents available that an application was made by the appellant for obtaining the information whether the respondent was issued an Heirship Certificate against the landed property of their deceased mother and the State Information officer on 8th October 2018 vide letter no. H/11025/2/18-DTE(REV)RTI/VOL-1, had informed the appellant that the LSC No. AZL 102 of 1967 was no longer in the name of Pi Sangkungi but was mutated in the name of the respondent No. 1 and a copy of the Heirship certificate was then given to him. Thus it can be held from the documents available that the appellant got to know of the Heirship Certificate belatedly on receiving information through RTI Act. The appellant has explained that he had then not made any application for Heirship Certificate since the said LSC was mortgaged against the loan taken by the respondent for renovation of the house within the said LSC. 15. The appellant has explained that he had then not made any application for Heirship Certificate since the said LSC was mortgaged against the loan taken by the respondent for renovation of the house within the said LSC. 15. I also find that the explanation given that a further delay in filing the appeal after the knowledge of the Heirship Certificate was due to financial constraint in paying the advocate fees reasonably acceptable. The lawyer’s fees amounting to Rs. 1.5 lakhs is a substantial amount and such amount may not be readily available for payment in a short notice and I find it prudent to accept this explanation even if the wife of the appellant was then a state Civil Service Officer holding a high post or that he was also having land at ITI veng and constructing a huge building at Rangvamual. It is seen from the documents on record that when the lawyer’s fee was paid to his lawyer the above mentioned RFA and CMA for condonation of delay were promptly filed. 16. The apex court in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy (supra) has elucidate the principles to be kept in mind while considering an application for condonation of delay, it held that “it is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 17. In view of the above ruling of the Apex Court and the aforementioned findings I am of the considered view that in the instant case the reasons for delay in filing the appeal petition as explained by the appellant are acceptable. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 17. In view of the above ruling of the Apex Court and the aforementioned findings I am of the considered view that in the instant case the reasons for delay in filing the appeal petition as explained by the appellant are acceptable. I find that the ends of justice will be met if the appellant is given a chance to be heard with regards to the issuance of Heirship Certificate against the property of the deceased mother of both the parties Late Smt. Sangkungi: (19) As pointed out by the learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code does not specify the question of law involved in the Second appeal and the Apex Court in State Bank of India and Others vs. S.N. Goyal (supra) held that: “13.........There cannot, therefore, be a strait-jacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case.” “15..............These lapses or technical errors lead to injustice and also give rise to avoidable further appeals to this court and remands by this court, thereby prolonging the period of litigation. Care should be taken to ensure that the cases not involving substantial questions of law are not entertained, and at the same time ensure that cases involving substantial questions of law are not rejected, as not involving substantial questions of law.” However in the instant case in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Shyam Sunder Sarma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal and Others (supra) wherein the Apex Court upheld the view that filing of an appeal against the decree by the appellant and the dismissal of the appeal though for default, since a dismissal for default or on the ground of it being barred by limitation cannot be equated with a withdrawal of the appeal and since the instant appeal has not been decided on merits it can be held that the instant point involves a substantial question of law.” 18. On coming to a finding that sufficient explanation has been given for the condonation of delay in filling an appeal against the ex-parte order dated 19.03.2008 in Heirship Certificate Application No. 187 of 2008, I find that the questions of law mentioned in S. (i) (ii) and (iv) above should be decided on merit only after the parties are given the opportunity to adduced evidence in the court. 19. With regards to S. (iii) The appellant is the son of the deceased Sangkungi and the Heirship Certificate issued in favour of the respondent no. 1 is in respect of the property of the late mother of the appellant and the respondent no. 1, the parties in dispute are thus siblings and I am of the considered view that the appellant is therefore a necessary party while considering the issue of the Heirship Certificate. A similar view was taken by the co-ordinate bench of this court in Lalfakawma Fanai vs. Lalrempuii Fanai (supra). 20. In view of the above findings, the Judgment and Order dated 21.06.2021 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl in CMA No. 409/2019 in connection with RFA No. 17/2019 along with the Order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the ld. Trial Court for issuing the Heirship Certificate No. 187 of 2008 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the court of Senior Civil Judge considering the value of the subject matter of the suit, to take appropriate steps by issuing notice to the parties concerned and give a chance to the appellant to contest the suit. 21. RSA No. 2 of 2021 is thus allowed and stands disposed of.