ORDER : Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 1.07.2010 (Annexure P-16), passed by Director General of Police, Himachal Pradesh, whereby revision petition having been filed by the petitioner, laying therein challenge to order dated 2.03.2009 (Annexure P-14) passed by Deputy Inspector General of police, Southern Range, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, whereby aforesaid authority while upholding the order dated 4.03.2008 passed by Disciplinary authority- Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan, thereby dismissing the petitioner from service, rejected the statutory appeal against the order of dismissal filed by the petitioner (Annexure P-13), petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying therein for following main reliefs:- “(a). To issue a writ of certiorari or direction in nature thereof, quashing the impugned orders dated 5.03.2008, 2.03.2008 and 1.07.2010 being Annexures P-12, P-14 and P-16 of the writ petition respectively, as unconstitutional and illegal and contrary to the law; (b). To issue a writ of mandamus, appropriate writ order or direction in nature thereof, directing the respondent department to reinstate the petitioner with effect from the illegal removal and low the petition are premature retirement with effect from 30/06/2008 with all the consequential benefits alongwith interest @ 18% per annum.” 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, which may be relevant for adjudication of the case at hand are that the petitioner was appointed as Constable in the year 1986 and thereafter he was promoted as Head Constable in July, 1993 and since then he had been uninterruptedly working in the police department till the time he was removed from the service vide order dated 4.03.2008(Annexure P-12) on account of his having remained absent from duty. While discharging duty of Head Constable at CIA Nahan, petitioner proceeded on medical leave for forty five days with effect from 14.04.2006 and as per sanctioned leave, petitioner was to resume office on 29.05.2006 but since he was unable to resume duty on account of his ailment, he telegraphically informed the department on 29.06.2006 that he was unable to resume duty till the time he was declared fit by the medical authorities. Record reveals that Office of Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan vide communications dated 6.06.2006 and 30.09.2006 advised the petitioner to resume duty but fact remains that petitioner not joined services and replied to the department that he was unable to report to the duty till the time he recovers. But respondents vide communication dated 4.11.2006, called upon the petitioner to furnish medical record, if any, with regard to his illness. Though, on 8.11.2006 petitioner furnished medical record to Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan (Annexure P-1) but aforesaid authority without considering the documents made available by the petitioner, passed order dated 13.11.2006 (Annexure P-2), thereby putting the petitioner under suspension. Vide aforesaid order aforesaid authority, who is Disciplinary authority/Appointing authority of the petitioner, directed District Inspector, Amar Singh, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for his having remained absent from duty without sanctioned leave. 3. In compliance to aforesaid directions, District Inspector, Amar Singh vide order dated 27.12.2006 furnished charge sheet against the petitioner (Annexure P-3), stating therein that why action be not taken against him for his having remained absent from the duty. Petitioner replied to aforesaid charge sheet vide communication dated 3.01.2007 (Annexure P-4), wherein he reiterated that he was unable to report to the duty on account of his illness, which fact is substantiated from medical record made available by him to the Disciplinary authority vide communication dated 8.11.2006(Annexure P-1). However, aforesaid District Inspector after having recorded the statement of prosecution witnesses (Annexure P-5 Colly) arrived at a conclusion that all the charges framed against the petitioner stand proved and as such, furnished fresh charge sheet upon the petitioner on 10.5.2007, reiterating that charges as were framed vide earlier charge sheet (Annexure P-3) stand proved and called upon the petitioner to produce evidence, if any in support of his claim within 72 hours. Vide communication dated 27.07.2006 District Inspector while acceding to the request made by the petitioner for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, also called upon him to give reply within seven days. Vide communication dated 31.07.2006 (Annexure P-8) petitioner sought further time of 25 days, enabling him to file reply and to cross-examine one of the prosecution witnesses. Finally, District Inspector, Amar Singh submitted Inquiry report undated (Annexure P-10), thereby holding petitioner guilty of willful absence and accordingly recommended Disciplinary authority to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. Vide communication dated 31.07.2006 (Annexure P-8) petitioner sought further time of 25 days, enabling him to file reply and to cross-examine one of the prosecution witnesses. Finally, District Inspector, Amar Singh submitted Inquiry report undated (Annexure P-10), thereby holding petitioner guilty of willful absence and accordingly recommended Disciplinary authority to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan vide communication dated 3.1.2008 (Annexure P-9) after having received inquiry report called upon the petitioner to explain within seven days that why he be not dismissed from the service on account of his having willfully remained absent from duty (Annexure P-9). Vide communication undated (Annexure P-11), petitioner submitted exhaustive reply to the show cause notice issued by the Disciplinary authority, whereby penalty of dismissal was proposed. In the aforesaid reply, petitioner specifically stated that inquiry is vitiated on account of issuance of charge sheet by incompetent officer. He claimed before Disciplinary authority that charge sheet, if any, in his case was to be issued by Disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, but since in the case at hand charge sheet has been issued by District Inspector, inquiry, if any, conducted pursuant to such charge sheet is not sustainable in the eye of law. However, facts remains that aforesaid objection raised by the petitioner was not paid any heed by the Disciplinary authority, who vide communication dated 4.03.2008 (Annexure P-12) dismissed the petitioner from service on the charge of willful absence. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of dismissal passed by Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan, petitioner preferred statutory appeal before the Deputy General Inspector of Police Southern Range, Himachal Pradesh (Annexure P-13), wherein he again raised the issue with regard to competence of District Inspector to issue charge sheet, but aforesaid authority ignoring all the grounds raised in the appeal upheld the order passed by Superintendent of Police, Nahan, thereby dismissing the petitioner from service on the charge of willful absence. Against aforesaid order petitioner approached Director General of Police by way of revision petition under Rule 16(32) of Police Rules (Annexure P-15) but same was also dismissed vide order dated 1.7.2010. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein reliefs, as have been reproduced hereinabove. 5. Against aforesaid order petitioner approached Director General of Police by way of revision petition under Rule 16(32) of Police Rules (Annexure P-15) but same was also dismissed vide order dated 1.7.2010. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein reliefs, as have been reproduced hereinabove. 5. Pursuant to the notices issued in the instant petition, respondents have filed reply, wherein facts, as detailed hereinabove, are not disputed. However, it has been stated that charge sheet was not issued by the incompetent officer, rather disciplinary proceedings stood initiated in the instant case pursuant to order dated 13.11.2006 passed by Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan, who is the Disciplinary authority. It has been further stated that District Inspector has merely acted at the behest of Superintendent of Police, because charges subsequently framed by him are the same, as stand mentioned in order dated 13.11.2006, issued by Disciplinary authority i.e Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan. 6. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record of the case. 7. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the orders impugned in the instant proceedings, following questions arise for adjudication of this Court:- “1. Whether the charge sheets dated 27.12.2006 and 10.05.2007 (Annexure P-6) for willful absence against the petitioner could be issued by District Inspector, especially when Appointing authority/Disciplinary authority of the petitioner is/was Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan?. 2. Whether District Inspector being enquiry officer after having conducted enquiry could issue second charge sheet, stating therein that since all the charges framed against the petitioner stands proved, he may file reply/evidence, if any, in support of his claim?. 3. Whether the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner commensurate with the offence alleged to have been committed by him?. 4. Whether the Appointing authority and thereafter revisional authority applied their judicial mind while rejecting the grounds raised by the petitioner in appeal and revision against the order of dismissal passed by Superintendent of Police, Sirmour at Nahan? 5. Last but most relevant question is “whether this Court is competent to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings or not while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?” 8. 5. Last but most relevant question is “whether this Court is competent to interfere in the disciplinary proceedings or not while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?” 8. Before exploring/ ascertaining the answer to aforesaid questions formulated by this Court, this Court finds it necessary to deal with the last question at first instance i.e. with regard to competence and scope of judicial review. 9. By now it is well that High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the Disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority, but that does not mean that in no circumstance court can interfere. The power of judicial review is available to the High Court under the Constitution and it can interfere with the conclusions reached in the disciplinary proceedings if it has reason to believe that there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case Kuldeep Singh versus Commissioner of Police and others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , wherein it has been held as under:- “6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority. 7. 7. In Nand Kishore vs. State of Bihar, (1978) 3 SCC 366 , it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such evidence which, and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer would be perverse. 8. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rama Rao. 1964 (2) LLJ 150 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain, 1969 (2) LLJ 377 and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 518 . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.” 10. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.” 10. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that normally the High Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded in enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse findings and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 11. Similar view has been taken by Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi versus Punjab National Bank and others (2009) 2 SCC 570 , wherein it has been held as under:- “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence”. 23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. 12. If the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court are read in its entirety, there is no complete ban for this Court to interfere in disciplinary proceedings while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but before exercising this jurisdiction this court is to satisfy itself whether enquiry report submitted by enquiry officer, which ultimately came to be made basis by Disciplinary authority to impose penalty upon the delinquent officer, is based upon evidence or there is no evidence to support the finding. 13. Now being guided by aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavour to find out whether enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer is supported by any evidence or same could be arrived at by man of ordinary prudence. 14. Mr. Onkar Jairath, learned counsel representing the petitioner while making this Court to peruse Clause 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules 1934, which is applicable to the State of H.P., contended that aforesaid provisions deals with authorized punishments. As per aforesaid provisions, no police officials shall be departmentally punished otherwise then as provided in these rules. It would be apt to take note of aforesaid Rule 16.1 hereinbelow” “16.1. Authorized punishments. - (1) No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided in these rules. (2) The departmental punishments mentioned in the second column of the subjoined table may be inflicted on officers of the various ranks shown in the heading Nos. 3 to 6, by the officers named below each heading in each case, or by any officer of higher rank :- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sr. (2) The departmental punishments mentioned in the second column of the subjoined table may be inflicted on officers of the various ranks shown in the heading Nos. 3 to 6, by the officers named below each heading in each case, or by any officer of higher rank :- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sr. No. Departmental punishment Inspectors Sergeants, Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors Head Constables Head Constables 1 Dismissal Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police, the Assistant Inspector General, Provincial Additional Police, designated as Commandant Provincial Additional Police, designated as Commandant, Provincial Additional Police, and the Assistant Inspector-General of Police (Traffic) Superintendents of Police, commandants of Punjab Armed Police and Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police Superintendents of Police; Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police; Deputy Superintendents in-charge of Railway Police Sub-Divisions, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore; Officers-in-charge of Police Constables Training Centres Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahaul and Spiti Superintendents of Police, Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police; Deputy Superintendents in-charge of Railway Police Sub-Divisions; Senior Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore; Officer-in-charge of Recruits Training Centres. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lahaul and Spiti 15. Mr. Onkar Jairath, learned counsel representing the petitioner submitted that as per aforesaid provisions penalty of dismissal, if any, upon constables/Head constables can only be levied by Superintendent of Police. While placing reliance upon the Rule 13(2) and 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Disciplinary authority is only competent to issue charge sheet against the delinquent officer and no order imposing penalty can be passed by such authority if inquiry is not conducted in mode and manner as prescribed under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules. 16. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Rule 13(2) and of the Rules herein below:- “13(2):- A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in Clause (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 notwithstanding that such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties.” 17. It is not in dispute that in the case of the petitioner Disciplinary authority is/was Superintendent of Police because at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings petitioner was working as Head Constable and as such, charge sheet, if any, qua the charge levelled against the petitioner could only be issued by Disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police. In the instant case, record reveals that Superintendent of Police vide order dated 13.11.2006 (Annexure P-2) after having noticed the reply filed by the petitioner put petitioner under suspension and directed District Inspector, Sh. Amar Singh to conduct disciplinary proceedings. 18. Though, Mr. Narender Guleria, learned Additional Advocate General while referring to aforesaid communication, vehemently argued that with the issuance of aforesaid communication, disciplinary proceedings stood initiated against the petitioner, but such plea of him deserves outright rejection being devoid of any merit. Bare perusal of aforesaid communication reveals that Superintendent of Police after having received reply of petitioner to the communication dated 4.11.2006 dismissed the claim of the petitioner that he was unable to resume duty on account of his illness and accordingly put him under suspension. Though, vide aforesaid order, authority passed the order with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceedings but interestingly, he delegated such power to District Inspector, who otherwise was not competent to issue charge sheet. As per Rule 13 of CCS(CCA) Rules, as reproduced hereinabove, it is only the Disciplinary authority, who could issue charge sheet. In the case at hand, District Inspector, Sh. Amar Singh issued charge sheet dated 27.12.2006 (Annexure P-3) giving therein details of allegations of willful absence against the petitioner. 19. Petitioner replied to the aforesaid charge sheet reiterating that he was unable to report to the duty on account of his illness, which is supported by documents related to his treatment duly signed by the Doctor, but interestingly District Inspector without taking cognizance of the reply filed by the petitioner proceeded to record statement of prosecution witnesses(Annexure P-5) and after conclusion of the evidence without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in defence, furnished fresh charge sheet dated 10.05.2007 (Annexure P-6), stating therein that charge framed against the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 27.12.2006 (Annexure P-5) stands proved with the statements made by the prosecution witnesses and in case petitioner wants to lead evidence, if any, in defence same can be furnished within 72 hours. Though, petitioner requested for extension of time to file reply, but District Inspector after having completed disciplinary proceedings furnished enquiry report (Annexure R-10), stating therein that charge of willful absence stands proved against the petitioner and as such, appropriate action in accordance with law be taken against him. 20. Now, question which remains to be decided at this stage is “whether procedure followed by Superintendent of Police, who is/was Disciplinary authority of the petitioner after putting petitioner under suspension is as per law or aforesaid authority adopted procedure unknown to the law?”. As has been taken note hereinabove, Superintendent of Police being Disciplinary authority of the petitioner ought to have issued charge sheet, but in the instant case he delegated such authority to District Inspector, who is subordinate to him. Apart from above, District Inspector being appointed as an enquiry officer in terms of order dated 13.11.2006 (Annexure P-2) passed by Superintendent of Police otherwise could not have issued charge sheet that too on two occasions, rather he being enquiry officer was only to ascertain correctness of the charges framed against the petitioner by way of charge sheet, if any, framed by the Disciplinary authority. However, in the instant case charge sheet was never submitted by Disciplinary authority but such power was delegated to District Inspector, who thereafter in the capacity of enquiry officer conducted disciplinary proceedings in most casual manner. As per Rule 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules, after framing of charge opportunity is required to be given to the delinquent officer to file reply and in case Disciplinary authority is not satisfied with the reply, it can proceed to appoint an enquiry officer, who with a view to ascertain correctness of the charge shall hold enquiry. Enquiry officer while affording time to prosecution to prove its case would also afford opportunity of cross-examination to the delinquent officer. After recording of evidence enquiry officer would draw enquiry report and shall submit the same to the Disciplinary authority, who after being satisfied with the correctness of the enquiry report would proceed accordingly. Disciplinary authority may agree or disagree with enquiry report but in case it agrees it shall issue notice to the delinquent officer to explain that why penalty proposed be not awarded. Disciplinary authority after having received reply, if any, on behalf of the delinquent officer may pass appropriate orders. 21. Disciplinary authority may agree or disagree with enquiry report but in case it agrees it shall issue notice to the delinquent officer to explain that why penalty proposed be not awarded. Disciplinary authority after having received reply, if any, on behalf of the delinquent officer may pass appropriate orders. 21. In the instant case, no proper procedure appears to have been followed by Disciplinary authority before initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. First of all, no charge sheet could be issued by District Inspector, who subsequently came to be appointed as an enquiry officer. There was no occasion, if any, for enquiry officer to first record evidence and thereafter serve another charge sheet to petitioner, calling upon him to adduce on record evidence, if any, in support of his claim. Rather, he after having recorded evidence of prosecution witnesses ought to have afforded an opportunity to the delinquent officer to cross-examine and lead evidence in defence and thereafter after closure of the evidence should have directly placed the enquiry report before the Disciplinary authority, enabling him/her to pass appropriate orders. Interestingly, in the case at hand enquiry officer served two charge sheets, firstly he served charge sheet dated 27.12.2006 (Annexure P-3) and thereafter ignoring reply to the aforesaid charge sheet filed by the petitioner, recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses and thereafter again served petitioner with another charge sheet dated 10.5.2007 (Annexure P-6), calling upon him to adduce evidence, if any, in support of his case, which procedure is totally unknown to the law. Moreover record reveals that while conducting enquiry pursuant to first charge sheet dated 27.12.2006, no opportunity of cross-examination was granted to the petitioner and as such, he was compelled to write to the Inquiry officer, who subsequently while issuing second charge sheet called upon petitioner to furnish evidence in support of his claim and cross-examine prosecution witnesses. 22. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, first two questions formulated by this Court stand answered with the conclusion that it is only disciplinary authority which can issue charge sheet to the delinquent officer and there is no provision under service jurisprudence to issue two charge sheets that too after appointment of enquiry officer and by the enquiry officer. 23. Though, Mr. 23. Though, Mr. Narender Guleria, learned Additional Advocate General while making this Court to peruse the record of enquiry made serious attempt to persuade this Court to agree with his contention that due procedure as prescribed under law was followed by the Disciplinary authority but having scanned entire material available on record, this Court finds no reason to agree with aforesaid submission made by learned Additional Advocate General. His second submission that mere issuance of second charge sheet will not vitiate the inquiry proceedings, is also liable to be rejected because it is not only factum of issuance of second charge sheet, which has weighed with this Court while answering first two questions but very first action of Superintendent of Police, who is disciplinary/ appointing authority of petitioner, to delegate the power of issuance of charge sheet to his subordinate i.e. District Inspector, which is not permissible under law, has persuaded this Court to agree with the submission of the petitioner. 24. Rule 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules clearly provides that whenever departmental proceedings are held against the Government servant under Rule 14 and Rule 15, Disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the charge sheet. Rule 14(4) clearly mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. Procedure as provided under Article 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules is strictly in conformity with the provisions contained under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and as such, if same is not followed, it would be violative of provisions contained under Section 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, which clearly provides that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following fair procedure in which he/she is to be given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Since in the case at hand, aforesaid procedure has been not followed, entire departmental proceedings stands vitiated and cannot be allowed to sustain. 25. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and Ors v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351 (alongwith connected matters), which reads as under : “40. Since in the case at hand, aforesaid procedure has been not followed, entire departmental proceedings stands vitiated and cannot be allowed to sustain. 25. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and Ors v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351 (alongwith connected matters), which reads as under : “40. Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India ensures that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service can be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The overwhelming importance and value of Article 311(1) for the civil administration as well as the public servant has been considered stated and re- stated, by this Court in numerous judgments, since the Constitution came into effect on 19th January, 1950. Article 311(2) ensures that no civil servant is dismissed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. To effectuate the guarantee contained in Article 311(1) and to ensure compliance with the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2), the Government of India has promulgated CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. “41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein were initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule 14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the charge sheet. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. We are unable to interpret this provision as suggested by the Additional Solicitor General, that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge sheet can be drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. We are unable to interpret this provision as suggested by the Additional Solicitor General, that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge sheet can be drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Such a charge sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance Minister. 45. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules provides for holding a departmental enquiry in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Clause (8) also makes it clear that when the Finance Minister is approached for approval of charge memo, approval for taking ancillary action such as appointing an inquiry officer/presiding officer should also be taken. Clause (9) in fact reinforces the provisions in clause (8) to the effect that it is the Finance Minster, who is required to approve the charge memo. Clause (9) relates to a stage after the issuance of charge sheet and when the charge sheeted officer has submitted the statement of defence. It provides that in case the charge sheeted officer simply denies the charges, CVO will appoint an inquiry officer/presiding officer. In case of denial accompanied by representation, the Chairman is to consider the written statement of defence. In case the Chairman comes to a tentative conclusion that written statement of defence has pointed out certain issues which may require modification/ amendment of charges then the file has to be put up to the Finance Minster. So the intention is clearly manifest that all decisions with regard to the approval of charge memo, dropping of the charge memo, modification/ amendment of charges have to be taken by the Finance Minister. 51. Ms. Indira Jaising also submitted that the purpose behind Article 311, Rule 14 and also the Office Order of 2005 is to ensure that only an authority that is not subordinate to the appointing authority takes disciplinary action and that rules of natural justice are complied with. According to the learned Addl. 51. Ms. Indira Jaising also submitted that the purpose behind Article 311, Rule 14 and also the Office Order of 2005 is to ensure that only an authority that is not subordinate to the appointing authority takes disciplinary action and that rules of natural justice are complied with. According to the learned Addl. Solicitor General, the respondent is not claiming that rules of natural justice have been violated as the charge memo was not approved by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, according to the Addl. Solicitor General, the CAT as well as the High Court erred in quashing the charge sheet as no prejudice has been caused to the respondent. 52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Addl. Solicitor General is not factually correct. The primary submission of the respondent was that the charge sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority is without authority of law and, therefore, nonest in the eye of law. This plea of the respondent has been accepted by the CAT as also by the High Court. The action has been taken against the respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS(CCA) Rules which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The term “cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalized upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in the case of P.V.Srinivasa Sastry & Ors. Vs. Comptroller and Auditor General & Ors. has held that Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalized upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in the case of P.V.Srinivasa Sastry & Ors. Vs. Comptroller and Auditor General & Ors. has held that Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, at the same time it is pointed out that “4……However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority.” It is further held that “4…….Any such rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holders of a civil post.” 26. Though, this court is of the definite view that entire disciplinary proceedings was vitiated on account of framing of charge sheet by incompetent officer but even if it presumed that disciplinary proceedings has acted in accordance with law, penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner does not commensurate with the offence alleged to have been committed by him. In the case at hand, charge against the petitioner was that he remained wilfully absent from duty. This court having scanned entire charge sheet vis-à-vis evidence led on record, has no hesitation to conclude that petitioner by way of placing medical record attempted to prove that he had rendered immobile on account of slip disc but interestingly department for no plausible reason rejected all the documents and without calling upon the petitioner to explain the documents rendered on record by him proceeded to dismiss him from service . Penalty of dismissal imposed by Disciplinary authority cannot be said to be justifiable in the case at hand, rather same being conscious shocking deserves to be interfered with. 27. Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules which reads as under deals with the dismissal of police officials:- “16.2. Dismissal. - (1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension. Dismissal. - (1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension. [(2) If the conduct of an enrolled police officer leads to his conviction on a criminal charge and he is sentenced to imprisonment, he shall be dismissed : Provided that a punishing authority may, in an exceptional case involving manifestly extenuating circumstances for reasons to be recorded and with the prior approval of the next higher authority impose any punishment other than that of dismissal Provided further that in case the conviction of an enrolled police officer is set aside in appeal or revision, the officer empowered to appoint him shall review his case keeping in view the instructions issued by the Government from time to time in this behalf.] (3) When a police officer is convicted judicially and dismissed, or dismissed as a result of a departmental enquiry, in consequence of corrupt practices, the conviction and dismissal and its cause shall be published in the Police Gazette. In other cases of dismissal when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be re-employed elsewhere, a full descriptive roll, with particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the Police Gazette.” 28. Bare perusal of aforesaid provision clearly reveals that penalty of dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. 29. State of Punjab versus Parkash Chand, Constable (1992)1 SLR 174, has held that absence without leave would not amount to the gravest act of misconduct. Punishment of dismissal of service should be awarded for gravest act of misconduct. However in the case at hand petitioner remained absent for 23 days, but yet Disciplinary authority proceeded to award gravest punishment of dismissal from the service, which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be justifiable, rather same being conscious shocking deserves to be quashed and setaside. Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of cases have repeatedly held that where punishment awarded by Disciplinary authority appears to be conscious shocking, it can interfere and quash the same. Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of cases have repeatedly held that where punishment awarded by Disciplinary authority appears to be conscious shocking, it can interfere and quash the same. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant para of aforesaid judgment herein:- “11. This court has in a number of cases gone into the matter in order to find as to what would really constitute a gravest act of misconduct. A number of cases have been, cited before us but we have chosen to pick up only one which deals with the question of absence without leave. In Darshan Singh's case (supra), the learned single Judge has held that absence without leave for almost 13 months would not in the circumstances of that case amount to the gravest act of misconduct.” 30. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 6723 of 2021, titled Union of India and others versus Ex. Constable Ram Karan, decided on 11th November, 2021, wherein it has been held as under:- “Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/ appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.” 31. The principles have been culled out by a three Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 , wherein it was observed as under:- “18. The principles have been culled out by a three Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 , wherein it was observed as under:- “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/ Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/ Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 32. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Another vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 as under:- 19.1. When charges of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 33. It is the classic case, wherein not only Disciplinary authority failed to apply its mind rather Appellate authority as well as revisional authority in stereotype manner passed the order without bothering to look into the correct position of law as well as ground taken in the appeal and the revision. Both the authorities without there being any application of mind and without there being cogent and convincing reason rejected the appeal and revision and upheld the order of dismissal passed by Disciplinary authority, which is otherwise not sustainable being based upon the charge sheet furnished by incompetent office. 34. Hon’ble Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi (supra), has categorically held that departmental enquiry is a quasi-judicial proceedings. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function and as such, it has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. If the orders passed by the Appellate authority and revisional authority are read juxtaposing each other there is nothing to suggests that both the authorities while considering appeal and revision filed by the petitioner made an attempt if any, to look into the legal grounds raised by the petitioner qua the competence of District Inspector to issue charge sheet and thereafter procedure followed by him while conducting disciplinary proceedings. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been categorically held that it is duty of Disciplinary authority/Appointing authority to record reasons while passing order but as has been discussed hereinabove, there is no cogent and convincing reasons assigned by all the authorities while imposing punishment of dismissal against the petitioner. 35. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court finds merit in the present petition and accordingly same is allowed and orders dated 5.03.2008, 2.03.2008 and 1.07.2010 being Annexures P-12, P-14 and P-16 are quashed and set-aside and petitioner is ordered to be reinstated in service from due date with all consequential benefits. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.