JUDGMENT : Alexander Thomas, J. The judgment rendered on 18.5.2022 in the WP(C).No.7271/2022 is the subject matter of challenge in the instant intra court appeal filed under Sec.5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. 2. The appellant herein is contesting respondent No.4 in the WP(C). R-1 herein is the writ petitioner and official respondents 2 to 4 in the W.A. are official respondents 1 to 3 in the WP(C). 3. Heard Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the W.A., Sri.Raju Joseph, learned counsel appearing for contesting respondent No.1 in the W.A. (writ petitioner) and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 2 to 4 in the W.A. 4. The prayers in the instant Writ Petition (Civil) WP(C).No.7271/2022 are as follows: "i) To issue a Writ of Mandamus or order or direction, directing the respondents 1 to 3 to provide adequate and effective police protection to the petitioner to evict the illegal trespassers to the property owned by the petitioner. ii) To issue a Writ of Mandamus or order or direction, directing the respondents 1 to 3 to register crime against respondent No.4 and their men for unlawful trespass and criminal intimidation and also for taking law into their hands. iii) Issue such other reliefs that may be deemed just and proper in the interest of justice." 5. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned judgment on 18.5.2022 disposing of the above WP(C) with the finding that the civil disputes between the writ petitioner and R-4 in the WP(C) (appellant herein) have been going on for quite a long time, and the same has been finalized as per Ext.P-2 judgment of the trial court, as confirmed by Ext.P-3 judgment of this Court in the Regular First Appeal, and further that the original suit filed by R-4 in the WP(C) (appellant herein) has been dismissed, and the counter claim filed by the writ petitioner has been substantially allowed by the grant of mandatory injunction. Further, it was also found, that the decree has been subjected to execution process, and the execution process has been duly completed, and the possession of the property was duly delivered to the writ petitioner as evident from Ext.P-4 delivery chit proceedings of the Execution Court. Further, it was also found, that the decree has been subjected to execution process, and the execution process has been duly completed, and the possession of the property was duly delivered to the writ petitioner as evident from Ext.P-4 delivery chit proceedings of the Execution Court. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge has held, that the disputes between the parties have already been duly finalized in the manner known to law, by the judgment and decree of both the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, and the execution process has also been duly completed by Ext.P-4. Therefore, the action on the part of R-4 in the WP(C) (appellant herein) in again trespassing into the property would amount to defeating the due process of civil litigation already finalized and executed in the manner known to law, and hence the learned Single Judge has ordered, that the respondent Station House Officer (SHO, Ernakulam Central Station) shall provide adequate police protection to the writ petitioner to carry out the directions contained in Ext.P-2 & P-3 judgments in the above concluded civil litigation. It is this judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge disposing the WP(C) as above, that is under challenge in the instant intra court appeal. 6. A brief reference to the facts of the case would be pertinent. Contesting respondent No.1 in the W.A. will be referred for convenience as the writ petitioner and R-4 in the WP(C) will be referred for convenience as the writ appellant. The writ petitioner (Sri.Narasimha Shenoy) is the brother of the writ appellant (Smt.Seetha Mohanan). Their father had altogether 6 children including the above parties. According to the writ appellant, the father is said to have executed a Registered Will in respect of the bequest of his property on 9.12.1983 as per Ext.P-1. Later, the father Sri.Narayana Shenoy, died on 1.11.1985. The writ appellant has taken up the case that the bequest of the subject property covered by Ext.P-1 Will is not legally enforceable inasmuch as, the subject property is ancestral property and not the self acquired property of the father. Further, she has also taken the stand that the father was not in a physical and mental condition to voluntarily execute the Will, and the Will is therefore vitiated, etc. 7. Further, she has also taken the stand that the father was not in a physical and mental condition to voluntarily execute the Will, and the Will is therefore vitiated, etc. 7. On these premises, the appellant had filed an original suit as O.S.No. 524/2005 before the Sub Court, Ernakulam, and the prayers in suit was for grant of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendant No.1 therein (writ petitioner) from alienating the plaint schedule properties or inducting strangers therein, and that the Will deed is to be declared as null and void, as it is not binding on the plaintiff, etc. The 1st defendant in the suit is the writ petitioner and the other siblings of the parties (1 Brother and 3 Sisters) were also impleaded as Defendant Nos.2 to 4 therein. Certain other additional parties were also impleaded as defendants. Defendant No.1 therein (writ petitioner) put up a counter claim therein, stating that the subject property has been unlawfully occupied by the plaintiff, and that he is entitled to get a mandatory injunction to evict her from the subject property, and for recovery of possession and damages etc. The Sub Court, after adducing evidence and elaborate trial, has dismissed the said Original Suit, O.S.No.524/2005 and has substantially allowed the counter claim of the writ petitioner as per Ext.P-2 judgment rendered on 5.1.2008. A reading of Ext.P-2 judgment of the Sub Court, especially the last paragraph, would clearly indicate that the Original Suit filed by the appellant has been dismissed, and the counter claim filed by the writ petitioner has been partly allowed, whereby the plaintiff therein (appellant herein) has been directed to vacate the eastern most room of Item No.1 of plaint schedule building occupied by her within 2 months by way of mandatory injunction, and in case of default, defendant No.1 therein (writ petitioner) was entitled to evict her through the process of law at the cost of the plaintiff, etc. Whereas, the counter claim for damages has been dismissed. 8. Aggrieved by Ext.P-2 judgment and decree, the unsuccessful plaintiff therein (appellant herein) has filed Regular First Appeal as R.F.A. No.101/2008 before this Court. The Division Bench of this Court, after elaborate consideration, has rendered Ext.P-3 judgment dated 3.12.2014 dismissing the said R.F.A. No.101/2008 (arising out of O.S.No.524/2005) and thus fully confirming the findings and directions of the trial court in terms of Ext.P-2. The Division Bench of this Court, after elaborate consideration, has rendered Ext.P-3 judgment dated 3.12.2014 dismissing the said R.F.A. No.101/2008 (arising out of O.S.No.524/2005) and thus fully confirming the findings and directions of the trial court in terms of Ext.P-2. Earlier, after the rendering of Ext.P-2 judgment by the trial court, defendant No.1 therein (writ petitioner) has filed Execution Petition as E.P.No.439/2008 (arising out of O.S.No.524/2005) for executing the decree. In view of the interim stay granted at the RFA stage, the Execution Petition was not proceeded with. After the dismissal of RFA as per Ext.P-3, execution proceedings were again set in motion. The Execution Court has completed the execution process, and the delivery of the subject property has been given in favour of the writ petitioner as can be seen from Ext.P-4 delivery chit rendered by the Execution Court in the above proceedings on 30.5.2016. 9. According to the writ petitioner, thereafter, he was in possession of the subject property. That, a reading of Ext.P-4 execution proceedings itself would make it clear, that at the time of execution proceedings, the plaintiff therein (appellant herein) had voluntarily vacated the property. (See page 152 of the paper book of this W.A.) Further that, the writ petitioner is a widower having no issues, and that he is now aged 78 years, and he is having various old age ailments. That, some time in 2019, due to illness and hospitalization requirement, he was forced to shift to Thrissur, where his other sister, Smt.Vimala Naik, is residing with her family. That, thereafter, he continued to reside in Thrissur for quite some time, as he found it difficult to stay alone in his residence at Ernakulam. That, since thereafter, the issues relating to COVID-19 pandemic had begun, he could not go back to Ernakulam, and some time in November, 2021, when he had gone back to his property, he found that the appellant had again unlawfully trespassed into the property and was, thus, in unlawful occupation of the said property, etc. That, since thereafter, the issues relating to COVID-19 pandemic had begun, he could not go back to Ernakulam, and some time in November, 2021, when he had gone back to his property, he found that the appellant had again unlawfully trespassed into the property and was, thus, in unlawful occupation of the said property, etc. That, thereafter, the writ petitioner had given Ext.P-5 representation/complaint dated 16.12.2021 before the respondent SHO complaining of the above unlawful occupation of the subject property by the appellant, and that the civil litigation proceedings have already been duly finalized, and execution proceedings are also completed, and that therefore, the Police should grant necessary police protection to ensure that he could remove the unlawful occupation of the appellant, etc. 10. Whereas, the case of R-4 in the WP(C) (writ appellant) is that the execution proceedings as per Ext.P-4 was only a paper formality, which was completed on 30.5.2016. On the next day itself, none other than the writ petitioner had invited the appellant to come back to the subject building, and that it was only because of his permission that she was in due occupation of the subject buidling since 31.5.2016 onwards. Further that, the petitioner is not voluntarily raising all these disputes, and that the other sister of these parties, namely, Smt.Vimala Naik, and her family members have instigated the petitioner to raise a false complaint as per Ext.P-5, to get the appellant evicted, so that Smt.Vimala Naik, and her family members can secure the subject property from the writ petitioner, who is a widower without issues. 11. Further, it is urged by the appellant that the version in the writ petition and Ext.P-5 complaint as if the appellant had been evicted completely since 30.5.2016, and that she had later unlawfully trespassed into the property when the writ petitioner had gone to Thrissur in 2019, etc are absolutely false. It is asserted by the appellant, that she has been residing in the subject building owned by the writ petitioner only because he permitted her to do so since 31.5.2016, the day after Ext.P-4 delivery proceedings dated 30.5.2016 of the Execution Court. It is asserted by the appellant, that she has been residing in the subject building owned by the writ petitioner only because he permitted her to do so since 31.5.2016, the day after Ext.P-4 delivery proceedings dated 30.5.2016 of the Execution Court. Further that, it is also urged that if at all the writ petitioner has any grievance, it can only be a fresh cause of action, for which he will have to file a fresh suit, in which case the appellant will have to adduce evidence that she has been residing in the subject building since 31.5.2016, after the completion of execution proceedings, only because of the permission granted by the writ petitioner, and further that she would also be able to prove that the petitioner has not been voluntarily raising all these disputes against her, and he is doing it only because of the instigation and provocation made at the behest of the other sister, namely, Smt.Vimala Naik and her family members. More importantly, it has been urged by the writ appellant, that these are disputed questions of facts, and therefore, it can be resolved only in a fresh suit that has to be filed by the writ petitioner, if at all he has a case that the appellant should be evicted, etc. 12. The learned Single Judge, after noting the conclusion of the civil litigative proceedings as per Exts.P-2 & P-3 judgments as well as the due completion of the execution proceedings as per Ext.P-4 which was rendered as early as on 30.5.2016, found that it will be highly improper to again drive a successful litigant, who is now aged 78 years, to again go back to the civil litigative proceedings. It is in this premise, that the learned Single Judge has granted the relief as above. 13. After hearing both sides, it has been noted that civil disputes between the rival parties have been going on atleast since 2005, even since the institution of Original Suit O.S.No.524/2005 on the file of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The nature of the disputes raised by the plaintiff therein (appellant herein) has already been referred to hereinabove. So also, the nature of the counter claim raised by defendant No.1 therein (writ petitioner) has also been mentioned. The nature of the disputes raised by the plaintiff therein (appellant herein) has already been referred to hereinabove. So also, the nature of the counter claim raised by defendant No.1 therein (writ petitioner) has also been mentioned. After a long drawn-out trial process, the adversarial parties went through the trial process and it culminated in Ext.P-2 judgment of the trial court, whereby the Original Suit filed by the writ appellant was dismissed, and the counter claim filed by the writ petitioner was substantially allowed with the grant of mandatory injunction as above. The execution proceedings was thereafter immediately set in motion by the writ petitioner herein. The Regular First Appeal was instituted by the unsuccessful plaintiff. The Regular First Appeal was heard in detail and the Division Bench of this Court, after elaborate consideration, has dismissed the said Regular First Appeal as per Ext.P-3 judgment rendered as early as on 3.12.2014. It is thereafter, that the pending Execution Petition proceedings were again set in motion, which culminated in the due delivery of the property to the writ petitioner herein, as evident from Ext.P-4 delivery proceedings rendered by the Execution Court on 30.5.2016. Therefore, it has to be noted that both the siblings have been at loggerheads in respect of the subject property for more than 11 long years, since the institution of suit up to the finalization of the execution proceedings. These are objective facts on record. When these parties had been at loggerheads, and in adversarial litigation for such a long drawn-out period, and the execution proceedings has been duly completed on 30.5.2016, it is very difficult to believe or probabilize the case of the writ appellant herein, that the delivery proceedings of the Execution Court in terms of Ext.P-4 was only a paper formality done on 30.5.2016, and that on the next day itself, i.e. on 31.5.2016, she was again told by the writ petitioner to come back and reside in the subject building owned by him. Moreover, the appellant has her residence with her husband at Thuravoor. 14. Moreover, the appellant has her residence with her husband at Thuravoor. 14. The sheet anchor of the case of the writ appellant is, that she was voluntarily invited by none other than the writ petitioner to come back and reside in the subject property, and that therefore, the case set up by him in Ext.P-5 complaint to the police as well as the present writ proceedings for police protection is absolutely false. In that regard, the ancillary case set up by the writ appellant is, that the writ petitioner is not voluntarily raising all these disputes against the appellant, and that he is instigated and provoked by the other sister, namely, Smt.Vimala Naik and her family members, etc. A reading of Exts.P-2 & P-3 judgments would indicate, that the siblings had serious disputes of opinion regarding the sharing of property, conseqeunt to the bequest made by their deceased father. The writ petitioner is aged 78 years and he is a widower without issues. Therefore, the fact that he would have gone to Thrissur to reside with the other sister, Smt. Vimala Naik, cannot be a ground for us to even remotely probabilise, that the writ petitioner is not voluntarily raising these pleas for police protection, and that he has been instigated by the other sister, etc. Moreover, in the adversarial civil litigative proceedings referred to in Ext.P-2, the appellant has no case that the writ petitioner has been instigated and persuaded by his other sister Smt.Vimala Naik to put up his claims as a defendant in that suit, and that his stand adversarial to the appellant in that civil litigation was not voluntary, but instigated as aforesaid. So, it is highly difficult to even remotely probabilise that the appellant is not now taking the present stand voluntarily, but only due to the pressure tactics and instigation of Smt.Vimala Naik. 15. The heart of the matter is that through a long drawn-out adversarial litigative battle, the parties have been at loggerheads for a very long time, which led to the institution of the civil suit and its culmination by Exts.P-2 & P-3 judgments, and ultimate completion of the execution proceedings in terms of Ext.P-4 delivery proceedings rendered by the Execution Court on 30.5.2016. 16. 16. In the light of these objective facts on record, it is very difficult for any ordinary prudent and reasonable person to believe the version, that on the next day after the delivery, i.e. on 31.5.2016, the writ petitioner would have invited the writ appellant to come back and reside in the very same property, from where she was evicted on the previous day, and that too after a long drawn-out litigative battle, and that too, when she has a residence with her husband. 17. Therefore, the factual pleas of the appellant have to be assessed in the context of this objective factual scenario which is looming large. True, that there has been some delay on the part of the writ petitioner in filing Ext.P-5 complaint before the Police, only on 16.12.2021. The writ petitioner has got a case, that since he was an elderly person having serious ailments, and none to look after him, especially after his wife's death, and as he was not having any children, the only way he could take care of himself was to shift to Thrissur, and to get the help of his other sister, Smt.Vimala Naik, in 2019. Further, that the COVID-19 pandemic issues had emanated since the early part of the year 2020, and he was not in a position to immediately come back to Ernakulam, where the subject building is suitated. That, he could later come back to Ernakulam in the 2nd week of November, 2021, and it was only then he became aware about the fact, that the appellant has again unlawfully occupied the subject building. Taking note of the aspects, that the writ petitioner is an aged person and is a widower without issues, the abovesaid factual pleas put up by the writ petitioner cannot be brushed aside as unbelievable or improbable. There may have been some delay on the part of the writ petitioner in filing Ext.P-5 complaint before the Police on 16.12.2201, after he came to the site on 15.11.2021. 18. Sri.Raju Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, has also pointed out, that in view of the fact that the disputes was between siblings, the writ petitioner did not want to take extreme steps, and some well-meaning members of the community had also tried to talk to both the parties concerned. 19. 18. Sri.Raju Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, has also pointed out, that in view of the fact that the disputes was between siblings, the writ petitioner did not want to take extreme steps, and some well-meaning members of the community had also tried to talk to both the parties concerned. 19. Therefore, we are not in a position to hold, that the delay in giving Ext.P-5 complaint, by itself should be a ground to refuse the exercise of writ discretion in this case. 20. The main objection now raised by Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant, is that the prayers made by the writ petitioner in the WP(C) are not maintainable. We note that the 1st prayer in the WP(C) mentioned above is, to say the least, not happily worded inasmuch as the prayer sought for therein is for a direction to evict the illegal trespassers to the property owned by the writ petitioner, etc. 21. Whereas, the learned Single Judge, very cautiously and guardedly, has couched and moulded the relief in the impugned judgment, by ordering that the respondent SHO shall provide adequate police protection to the writ petitioner to carry out the directions contained in Exts.P-2 & P-3 judgments. The 2nd prayer in the WP(C), for initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellant herein, etc. has not been granted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. The writ petitioner has not filed any intra court appeal to challenge the impugned judgment, to the extent it has denied the 2nd prayer in the WP(C). 22. Sri.Raju Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, would also submit on the basis of instructions of his party, that the petitioner is now not seriously pressing the 2nd prayer in the WP(C) inasmuch as he has secured the main relief in the WP(C), as per the impugned judgment. 23. Therefore, the objections raised by the writ appellant regarding the second prayer, will not be highly relevant for the present purpose. 24. Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant, has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in cases as in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ], State of M.P. & Anr. 24. Sri.Dinesh R.Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant, has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in cases as in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ], State of M.P. & Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ], Shaji v. State of Kerala [2018 (2) KLT OnLine 2091 (DB)], Raman v. State of Kerala [2019 (1) KLT OnLine 2057 (DB)], etc. Thansingh Nathmal’s case supra [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ] was a matter in relation to an assessment under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, which provided a hierarchy of taxing tribunals competent to decide question as to the liability of the tax-payer under the Act, with a right to have questions of law decided, etc. The assessee appellants who were assessed to sales tax, without resorting the machinery provided under the said Act, then moved the High Court under the writ jurisdiction and urged that the High Court to reopen the decision of the taxing authorities, etc. In para 7 thereof, their Lordships of the Apex Court have held that the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, and the appellants therein had moved the High Court challenging the competence of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, by invoking Art.226 jurisdiction and sought to, thus, re-open the decision of the taxing authorities on the question of fact. It is in this context the Apex Court has held in para No.7 thereof that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. It is in this context the Apex Court has held in para No.7 thereof that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But, it has been held therein that, the exercise of the jurisdiction and is discretionary and it is not to be exercised merely because it is lawful to do so and that, the very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations and resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute and that, ordinarily the High Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy, etc. There is no dispute, whatsoever, with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in para No.7 of Thansingh Nathmal’s case supra [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ], more so particularly, in the context of the factual disputes raised therein that arose out of a sales tax assessment matter. 25. It is well established that where there is equally and efficacious alternate remedy, then ordinarily, the High Court may not invoke the said jurisdiction, unless a rare and exceptional case is made out. 26. The decision of the Apex Court in State of M.P. & Another v. Bailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] also arose out of a sales tax matter. In para No.17 thereof the Apex Court has reiterated the abovesaid legal position that special remedy provided in Art.226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions and that the power under Art.226 is a discretionary power, especially, when it comes to the issuance of writs in a nature of mandamus, etc. The abovesaid decision also reiterates the abovesaid well established legal position of the matter regarding exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226. 27. The abovesaid decision also reiterates the abovesaid well established legal position of the matter regarding exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226. 27. Shaji v. State of Kerala [2018 (2) KLT online 2091] is a decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which dealt with the plea for police protection. Therein it has been noted by this Court that where there is disobedience or breach of an order of temporary injunction passed by the civil court under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the remedy open to the plaintiff/applicant is either to apply that court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking an order to attach the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach and for an order to detain such person in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. 28. It was also held therein that in appropriate cases, the plaintiff/applicant can invoke the inherent powers of the civil court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which includes the power to grant police protection to secure compliance of the order of temporary injunction and that when there are adequate provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, which enables the civil court to enforce and implement its orders, the plaintiff/applicant cannot be permitted to invoke discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been noted that the said decision has been rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the context of plea of disobedience or the breach of the order of temporary injunction passed by the civil court. 29. Raman v. State of Kerala [2019 (1) KLT online 2057] is a decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in a police protection matter. It was held that the petitioners therein, who obtained a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction from the competent court will be at liberty to approach the execution court for executing the decree and that in such a case, where the party, after securing the decree, has not approached the execution court for execution proceedings in respect of the execution of the decree, the discretionary remedy, under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, on a plea for police protection need not be entertained, etc. 30. 30. A reading of the said judgment in Raman's case supra would indicate that the petitioner therein, after securing the decree of the civil court had even set in motion execution proceedings and had then approached this Court for police protection. 31. Whereas, in the case in Illyas v. State of Kerala [ 2014(4) KLT 362 (DB)], the Division Bench of this Court has dealt with the plea in a writ proceedings for police protection, wherein, despite the decree and its execution, the defendants therein had again trespassed into the property and took possession of it. Therein this Court has held that police protection could be granted by repelling the contention of the other side that the petitioner should again take resort to the rigorous procedure of civil court litigation for possession of the property. A reading of the said judgment would indicate that the petitioner therein had secured a decree, which had become final after 3 stages of litigation, in a suit filed in 1996, which ultimately culminated in a judgment of the RSA on 21.10.2009. The petitioner therein had secured a decree of the civil court and have also secured delivery of the property in an execution proceedings. It is thereafter, that the respondents therein/defendants therein had trespassed into the subject property in gross violation of the decree. Therein the Division Bench of this Court has held that persons who do not obey the judgment of the civil court cannot insist that the petitioner should again be driven to the civil court for recovery of possession of his property. Under such circumstances, the plea in the writ petition for police protection was allowed by this Court. It will be pertinent to refer to the contents of para Nos.12 & 13 of the said judgment in Illyas v. State of Kerala’s case supra, [ 2014 (4) KLT 362 ], which read as follows:- “12. This is an instance where the civil rights of the parties have been determined, the property was delivered, the Ameen who has effected delivery of the property has reported to have taken physical possession of the property. On this basis, the Court has closed the execution petition as well. There is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the said statement and no contention can be urged by the respondents against the delivery receipts or the order passed by the Civil Court. On this basis, the Court has closed the execution petition as well. There is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the said statement and no contention can be urged by the respondents against the delivery receipts or the order passed by the Civil Court. The party respondents' contention is that they have obstructed delivery. If it was a case of obstruction, the petitioner could have approached the Execution Court for removal of obstruction, in which event Execution Court would have passed appropriate orders in the application submitted by the petitioner. No such event has happened. Therefore we are of the view that the version of respondents 4 to 6 are not believable and it is clear that they have trespassed into the property of the petitioner after they were evicted from the said building. In such an event, there is nothing wrong in the petitioner approaching the police for necessary assistance to restore possession of the building. 13. Perusal of the records clearly indicates that the petitioner had obtained a decree which had become final after three stages of litigation by judgment dated 21.10.2009 of this Court in R.S.A.No.797/2009. The suit was filed in 1996. Despite the decree being passed and executed, if the defendants again trespassed into the property, the police is bound to interfere in the matter and restore possession of the property to the petitioner. Petitioner has obtained a decree of Civil court and after delivery of property in execution proceedings the respondents have trespassed into the said property which is in gross violation of the decree passed. Persons who do not obey the judgment of the Civil court cannot insist that the petitioner should again be driven to the Civil court for recovery of possession of his property. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the writ petition is to be allowed.” 32. In that case, after conclusion of the civil litigative proceedings, execution proceedings was also finalised and delivery of the property was effected on 10.08.2010. It is thereafter, that the trespass was again taken place and this Court had then intervened by grant of police protection. 33. Jithesh v. State of Kerala [ 2013 (4) KLT 565 (DB)] is a decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court wherein the plea of police protection was considered. It is thereafter, that the trespass was again taken place and this Court had then intervened by grant of police protection. 33. Jithesh v. State of Kerala [ 2013 (4) KLT 565 (DB)] is a decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court wherein the plea of police protection was considered. It was held therein that even if a civil remedy is available to a party in respect of right, if the Court is of the considered view that driving the party to a civil court against an organized act will be ineffective, the writ court has the power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to grant police protection. It was held therein that, the petitioners’ plea for police protection in the writ proceedings was resisted by the respondents by contending that the petitioners right to property is disputed. The contention of the respondents therein was rejected by this Court and it was held that the petitioners are entitled to be in possession until their right is found otherwise by any competent authority or court of law and the said possession cannot be disturbed by unlawful acts, etc. It was also incidentally held therein that a purchase certificate issued under Sec.72K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, is attributed with statutorily conclusiveness as regards the title and possession and such a statutory certificate is conclusive proof of possession as well and unless the said purchase certificate is set aside by a competent authority or by a court of law, the statutory conclusiveness in terms of Sec.72K(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act has to be honoured and a person claiming on the basis of such certificate has to be taken as in possession of the property, etc. In para No.20 thereof, the Division Bench after referring to the case laws on the subject, has held that the dictum laid down therein is that even if a civil court remedy is available to a party in respect of a property right, if the Court is of the considered view that driving the party to a civil court against an organised act will be ineffective, then, the writ court has the power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to grant necessary police protection to protect the property of such affected person, in exercise of discretion, etc. 34. 34. Lastly, we would also refer to yet another decision of the Division Bench of this Court dealing with the plea of police protection in writ proceedings, namely, Baby v. Deputy Superintendent of Police [ 2019 (4) KLT 12 (DB)], wherein the Division Bench has held that, where there is flagrant violation of the orders of the execution court and the alternate remedy found to be not efficacious, then police protection could be ordered. In that case, the petitioner therein had purchased the subject property as per Ext.P1 title deed. The 3rd respondent therein had filed a civil suit claiming title over the property and the petitioner had filed a counter claim in the said suit. Even if the suit is pending, there was an injunction order in favour of the petitioner and the Munsiff had also earlier ordered police protection to enable the petitioner to take yield of the plaint schedule property. Later, Ext.P4 ex-parte decree was passed, the suit was dismissed and the counter claim was allowed. The 4th respondent therein, (husband of the 3rd respondent therein), had filed an application for dismissing the E.P. on the ground that he was living in the neighbouring property (A schedule thereto), over which he asserted title and contended that he is not a party to the suit and he is estranged from his wife, who is the judgment debtor. By order dated 18.03.2017, it was found that the 4th respondent therein had not produced any materials to show independent possession over the plaint schedule property, which is owned by his wife. The bone of contention was with regard to the B schedule property therein over which the petitioner had secured a valid decree on the basis of a title and even injunction in her favour during the pendency of the suit and the counter claim. Later, execution proceedings were also set in motion and the plea of the respondent to dismiss the execution petition on the ground of separate possession was declined by the execution court. Later, the execution court deputed the Commissioner to put up a barred fencing along with the boundary of the properties of the decree holder and the judgment debtor. The 3rd respondent therein, then filed an Original Petition (Civil) [O.P.(C)] under Art.227 before this Court, contending that the prayer for construction of fencing was beyond the scope of the decree. Later, the execution court deputed the Commissioner to put up a barred fencing along with the boundary of the properties of the decree holder and the judgment debtor. The 3rd respondent therein, then filed an Original Petition (Civil) [O.P.(C)] under Art.227 before this Court, contending that the prayer for construction of fencing was beyond the scope of the decree. The said objection was repelled in the O.P.(C), which found that the rejection of the objection, filed by the 3rd respondent therein, by the execution court was proper. The respondents therein, however, continued the illegal activities on the basis of the claim, which was rejected by the civil court, etc. The Division Bench of this Court, therein, held that the court is not inclined to relegate the petitioner to the execution court, whose orders have been flagrantly violated by the party respondents and that discretionary remedy under Art.226 could be invoked. It was specifically found by this Court that the court is not convinced that there is any cause to decline discretion in the matter and accordingly this Court directed the execution court that if the execution proceedings of pending or already closed, then to restore it suo-moto and then to depute a Commissioner to supervise the erection of the fence or a wall, as decided by the petitioner, in accordance with the decree and the police was directed to afford necessary protection to carry out the same, etc. It will be pertinent to refer to para No.8 of Baby v. Deputy Superintendent of Police’s case supra [ 2019 (4) KLT 12 (DB)], which reads as follows:- “8. We are neither inclined to relegate the petitioner to the Execution Court; whose orders have been flagrantly violated by the party respondents nor are we hesitant to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 on the plea addressed of alternative remedy, since the party respondents by their blatant and nefarious activities have ensured that the alternative remedy is not efficacious. We are also not convinced that there is any cause to stay our hands in so far as the grossly delayed application to set aside the ex-parte decree. We are also not convinced that there is any cause to stay our hands in so far as the grossly delayed application to set aside the ex-parte decree. In such circumstances, we direct the Execution Court in E.P. 6 of 2013; if pending, or if closed to restore it suo motu and, depute a Commissioner to supervise the erection of a fence or wall, as desired by the petitioner, in accordance with the decree and the Police to afford necessary protection to carry out the same. It shall also be ensured by the Police that no destruction is caused to the fencing by the respondents and if such an act is carried out the Execution Court shall take such steps, as provided in Order XXI Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code to curb the violation. The Police shall scrupulously comply with the orders of the Civil Court.” 35. After hearing both sides, we are of the view that the facts of the present case are broadly similar to the cases mentioned in Illyas v. State of Kerala’s case supra [ 2014 (4) KLT 362 (DB)] and Baby v. Deputy Superintendent of Police’s case supra [ 2019 (4) KLT 12 (DB)], etc. For that matter, ordinarily facts of two cases cannot be identical, we are only mainly concerned with the broad similarity of the factual issues and the legal principles laid down by this Court in the aforecited decisions. 36. Judging from the abovesaid factual perspective mentioned by us hereinabove, we are of the view that since civil litigative proceedings in terms of Exts.P2 & P3 judgments have been concluded long ago and have attained finality, in favour of the petitioner, and the execution proceedings have also been duly finalised as per Ext.P4, as early as on 30.05.2016 with the delivery proceedings be completed, etc., to again insist that the petitioner, who is more than 78 years old, should file another civil suit, at this very elderly age, would be rather not in accordance with exercise of sound and prudent constitutionally conferred discretion of this Court. The dispute between these adversarial siblings have been going on for a quite long time. We have already dealt with the factual pleas of the appellant and have made a broad assessment of the overall scenario, which is only on the basis of objective facts on record. 37. The dispute between these adversarial siblings have been going on for a quite long time. We have already dealt with the factual pleas of the appellant and have made a broad assessment of the overall scenario, which is only on the basis of objective facts on record. 37. Therefore, we are of the view that, the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge to grant relief of police protection in the manner directed as per the impugned judgment is certainly a reasonable view in the matter. At any rate, we are not in a position to hold that the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge in the abovesaid factual context is, in any manner, grossly illegal, manifestly perverse or unreasonable. 38. The learned Single Judge, had also directed as per the impugned judgment that the respondent-SHO may go to the residence of the petitioner and take a statement from him verifying whether the writ petitioner and the steps for evicting the 4th respondent therein are being taken at his instance and with his proper knowledge, and if so, the respondent-SHO was directed to provide adequate police protection to the petitioner to carry out the directions contained in Exts.P2 and P3 judgments, and this has to be done within the time limit stipulated therein, etc. Earlier, when the respondent-SHO had contacted the petitioner, he had informed that he was then in Thrissur and that he would directly come over to the Police Station, so that his statement can be recorded. Further we are told that the writ petitioner had appeared in person before the respondent-SHO in the central Police Station, Ernakulam and his statement was recorded by the respondent-SHO. The plea has been taken by the appellant that the said recording of the statement by the petitioner may not have been voluntary inasmuch as the petitioner was also escorted by his sister Smt.Vimala Naik, sister’s son and daughter and that they have instigated and persuaded the petitioner to give all statement before the Police, etc. 39. The plea has been taken by the appellant that the said recording of the statement by the petitioner may not have been voluntary inasmuch as the petitioner was also escorted by his sister Smt.Vimala Naik, sister’s son and daughter and that they have instigated and persuaded the petitioner to give all statement before the Police, etc. 39. Sri.Raju Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent herein submits that his party did not want the Police to come over to his residential building at Ernakulam where the appellant is on unlawful occupation, in order to avoid any bitter scene and that therefore, he had voluntarily come all the way from Thrissur and in view of his old age and health, he found it necessary to be accompanied by his sister and children and that his sister Vimala Naik and children had accompanied him only based on his request. That, the petitioner has voluntarily given his statement before the Police and the fact that he had voluntarily gone to the Police Station and given the statement instead of requesting the Police to come over to his residence and take the statement would also show his bona fides to ensure the proper compliance of the directions in the impugned judgment, etc. We need not get into those aspects regarding the petitioner being accompanied by his sister, when he had gone to the Police Station. 40. We do not find any valid grounds to interfere with the views rendered by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the discretion in terms of the impugned judgment. 41. Further, it is ordered that the time limit stipulated in the impugned judgment will start to run from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The intra court appellate challenge fails, and accordingly the Writ Appeal stands dismissed.