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2022 DIGILAW 5 (JK)

Zahid Snober v. State of J&K

2022-01-28

PANKAJ MITHAL, SANJAY DHAR

body2022
JUDGMENT Sanjay Dhar, J. 1. By this common judgment and order, we propose to dispose of the following cases: (i) Intra-Court appeals bearing LPASW Nos. 199/2017 & 200/2017 against the judgment and order dated 19.09.2017 passed by the Writ Court in SWP Nos. 2218/2016, 66/2017 & 1147/2017 of Srinagar wing of the Court, (ii) Intra-Court appeals bearing LPA Nos. 176/2018, 166/2018, 169/2018 & 171/2018 against the judgment and order dated 18.08.2018 passed by the Writ Court in SWP No. 360/2017 of Jammu Wing of the Court, and (iii) Writ petitions bearing SWP Nos. 2680/2015, 577/2016, 1103/2017, 1993/2017, 1876/2018, 1980/2018, 2669/2018 & APSWP No. 19/2016 of Jammu Wing of the Court. (A) Background facts: 2. The J&K Service Selection Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’) issued three separate Advertisement Notices on 16.04.2002, 04.05.2005 & 26.05.2008 inviting applications for a total of 111 posts of Naib-Tehsildars. The selection process culminated in making recommendation by the Board in favour of selected candidates, who were appointed to the posts of Naib-Tehsildars. The process came to be completed in the year 2009-10. 3. Initially, two sets of writ petitions came to be filed by some of the candidates who had responded to the aforesaid Advertisement Notices. In the first set of writ petition bearing SWP No. 487/2009 titled Hamidullah Dar and ors vs. Mohd Afzal Bhat and ors, a contention was raised by the petitioners therein that a good number of questions in the question-booklet, the candidates were required to answer either wrong/vague questions with more than one correct options or incorrect answers. The petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition immediately, after conduct of the written test when the selection process was yet to be finalized, filed the said writ petition challenging the written test and the selection process itself. An alternative prayer seeking a direction upon the Board to add marks for questions identified by the petitioners therein to their score and to conduct their interview was also sought. During the pendency of the said writ petition, a provisional select list was issued by the Board which was also challenged by the petitioners after making appropriate amendment to their writ petition. The Writ Court, after impleading the selected candidates as respondents to the writ petition, kept their appointments subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 4. During the pendency of the said writ petition, a provisional select list was issued by the Board which was also challenged by the petitioners after making appropriate amendment to their writ petition. The Writ Court, after impleading the selected candidates as respondents to the writ petition, kept their appointments subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 4. During pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, an Experts Committee comprising of Professors/Heads of Departments of Political Science, Geography, Economics, Environmental Science and History was constituted by the Court to examine the questions identified by the petitioners in the writ petition, which according to them, were wrong/vague. The Experts Committee declared that 23 questions, out of 25 questions referred to the Committee, were vague/wrong with multiple correct answers or the answers given in the key were not the correct answers. The question-booklet comprised of 120 questions, out of which 23 questions were declared as wrong/vague. After taking note of the findings of the Experts Committee, the Writ Court passed the following directions: “For the reasons discussed, the writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: (i) The respondent Board shall delete 23 questions i.e questions 3, 9, 31, 32, 35, 42, 47, 52, 64, 72, 71, 72, 80, 83, 84, 95, 105, 107, 109, 111, 133 & 115 from the question paper and thereafter assess and evaluate performance of petitioners in SWP No. 487/2009 and the selected (now appointed) candidates-respondents 4 to 110, as if the question paper comprised of 97 questions only. The respondent Board thereafter shall prepare category wise merit list, redraw the select list and recommend the candidates on the basis of merit for appointment as Naib-Tehsildars accordingly. The exercise shall be completed within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. (ii). The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 acting on the recommendations so received shall consider appointment of candidates recommended, thereafter, in accordance with rules within four weeks. (iii). The selection list dated September 8th, 2009 and the appointment orders issued on the basis of the selection list to the extent of such of the selectees/appointees who do not find place in the redrawn select list shall stand quashed. (iv). (iii). The selection list dated September 8th, 2009 and the appointment orders issued on the basis of the selection list to the extent of such of the selectees/appointees who do not find place in the redrawn select list shall stand quashed. (iv). The seniority of such of selectees/appointees (respondents 4 to 110) who find place in the redrawn selection list shall remain unaffected by the exercise to be undertaken by the respondents 1 to 3 in compliance of this judgment”. 5. It is pertinent to mention here that besides passing the aforesaid directions, the Writ Court also made certain observations in paras 25 and 32, which would be relevant to the disposal of these cases and the same are reproduced as under: “25. The Board can be asked to delete 23 questions from the Test Booklet, identified in the writ petition and declared as wrong/vague, with more than one correct answers or the correct answers not tallying with the Answer key, evaluate merit of the selected candidates and petitioners in the present petition or such of the petitioners who questioned the written test, without participating any further in the selection process and before the provisional select list was issued on 08.09.2009 on the basis of their performance, taking the written test to comprise of 97 questions i.e 120 questions less by 23 questions, held by the Experts Committee to be wrong/vague with more than one correct answers or correct answer not tallying with the answer key. Such of the candidates who participated in the selection process after the written test was conducted on 22.02.2009 and questioned the written test thereafter or did not question the written examination are to be ignored as they after their failure to question the written examination before participating any further in the selection process or waiting for selection process to get finalized, cannot be allowed to turn around and question the written examination or selection process. This would be in tune with law laid down in Ramesh Chandra Shah and ors v. Anil Joshi and ors, reported in Civil Appeal Nos. 2802-2804 of 2013 decided on 03.04.2013. It would be advantageous to extract Paras 18 and 21 of the judgment. 18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn around and question the method of selection and its outcome. 21. 2802-2804 of 2013 decided on 03.04.2013. It would be advantageous to extract Paras 18 and 21 of the judgment. 18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn around and question the method of selection and its outcome. 21. In Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla (1986) Supp. SCC 285, a three-Judge Bench ruled that when the petitioner appeared in the examination without protest, he was not entitled to challenge the result of the examination. The same view was reiterated in Madan Lal v. State of J & K (1995) 3 SCC 486 in the following words: “The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner.” xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx “32. In said backdrop, it may not be appropriate to issue a writ of Mandamus commanding respondents to appoint the petitioners without evaluating their merit as also that all the selected candidates on the basis of their response to 97 admittedly correct questions. The performance of the petitioners as also selected candidates remains to be known. Therefore, the only direction that would be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case is one set out in preceding para (para 25). The performance of the petitioners as also selected candidates remains to be known. Therefore, the only direction that would be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case is one set out in preceding para (para 25). However, in case, it is impossible for respondents 1 to 3 for any valid reasons, or reasons beyond their control to embark on such exercise, they would be free to appoint the petitioners against available vacancies of Naib-Tehsildars in direct recruitment Quota in accordance with the rules as the petitioners cannot be deprived of fruits of litigation because of failure on the part of the respondents 1 to 3 to comply with the directions”. 6. Another bunch of writ petitions bearing SWP No. 1941/2009 titled Inam-Ul-Haq Hajam vs. State and ors and clubbed petitions also came to be filed in Srinagar Wing of the Court. These writ petitions related to the same selection process. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners felt aggrieved of the selection and appointments of private respondents to these writ petitions on the ground that they were not eligible in terms of the Recruitment Rules, inasmuch as, they had not passed Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects. During pendency of the said writ petitions, the Writ Court directed reservation of 23 posts of Naib-Tehsildars for the petitioners till disposal of the said writ petitions. The said writ petitions came to be disposed of vide judgment and order dated 19/08/2015. The operative portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: “38. For the above stated reasons this writ petition along with connected CMP(s) is disposed of in the following manner: - The official respondents are directed to consider and appoint the petitioners on the posts of Naib Tehsildars against the vacancies which stand already reserved in terms of the Court Orders in these writ petitions. The appointment orders in this behalf be issued within four weeks from the date copy of this order is served. In case of those of the petitioners who might have crossed the upper age limit for entering into Government services, it shall be deemed that relaxation is granted in the upper age limit. The petitioners in this fact situation shall be given all the service benefits including the seniority from the date the private respondents have been appointed on the posts of Naib Tehsildars. The petitioners in this fact situation shall be given all the service benefits including the seniority from the date the private respondents have been appointed on the posts of Naib Tehsildars. The petitioners, however, will not be entitled to any monitory benefit for the period between appointment of private respondents and till the date of their appointments. Besides this the petitioners in SWP. Nos 1941/2009, 1820/2009 and 1709/2009 shall also be extended the benefit of Judgment dated 31st December, 2014 passed in SWP. No. 487/2009”. 7. The aforesaid two judgments of Srinagar Wing of the Court have attained finality as the same have not been challenged. In fact, both these judgments came to be implemented by the respondent-State. While the directions passed in SWP No. 487/2009 were implemented in terms of Government Order No. 164-Rev of 2016 dated 10.11.2016, the directions dated 19.08.2015 passed in SWP No. 1941/2009 and clubbed matters came to be implemented vide Government Order No. 84-Rev of 2016 dated 30.06.2016. While implementing the judgment of the Writ Court passed in SWP No. 487/2009, the Government appointed seven petitioners, who had filed the aforesaid writ petition, without actually redrawing the merit list of the petitioners and the selected candidates, after deleting 23 wrong questions. Instead, the Government, based on the observations of the Writ Court made in para 32 of the judgment, the petitioners came to be appointed as Naib Tehsildars vide Government Order dated 10.11.2016. While implementing judgment dated 19.08.2015 of the Writ Court passed in SWP No. 1941/2009 and clubbed matters, the Government issued appointment orders in favour of 20 writ petitioners. The other three writ petitioners showed their disinclination to take up the appointments. 8. Four more candidates filed a writ petition bearing SWP No.1299/2009 before Jammu wing of the High Court whereby they challenged the Advertisement Notices which are subject matter of this case. During pendency of the said writ petition, the Board issued the select list on 08.09.2009. The writ petitioners did not find their names in the select list, consequently they withdrew the writ petition and filed another writ petition bearing SWP No. 1809/2009 challenging the select list. In the meanwhile, SWP No. 1941/2009 and clubbed matters that were pending before the Srinagar wing of the Court came to be decided in terms of judgment dated 19.08.2015. The writ petitioners did not find their names in the select list, consequently they withdrew the writ petition and filed another writ petition bearing SWP No. 1809/2009 challenging the select list. In the meanwhile, SWP No. 1941/2009 and clubbed matters that were pending before the Srinagar wing of the Court came to be decided in terms of judgment dated 19.08.2015. On 11.04.2016, the writ petition bearing SWP No. 1809/2009 of Jammu wing of the Court came to be disposed of in terms of the directions contained in aforesaid judgment dated 19.08.2015. However, the Government vide Order No. 158-Rev of 2016 dated 09.11.2016 rejected the claim of writ petitioners on the ground that their cases are not similarly situated to that of writ petitioners in SWP No. 1941/2009 and clubbed matters. The said order came to be challenged by the writ petitioners by way of a fresh writ petition bearing SWP No. 360/2017 before the Jammu wing of the Court. The said writ petition has been allowed by the Writ Court in terms of the impugned judgment and order dated 18.08.2018, operative portion whereof is reproduced herein-below: “Therefore, in view of what has been discussed above, I deem it proper to allow the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to consider and issue appointment orders in favour of petitioners selecting/appointing them as Naib Tehsildars and shall be given all the service benefits including seniority from the date other similarly situated candidates have been selected and appointed as Naib Tehsildars. In case of those of the petitioners who might have crossed the upper age limit for entering into Government services, it shall be deemed that relaxation is granted in the upper age limit. It is further directed that in the seniority list the petitioners herein be placed over and above the 29 selected ineligible candidates, who were appointed by relaxation of rules that too after the end of selection process. However, it is made clear that although the petitioners herein shall be entitled to all consequential benefits including seniority etc however, they will not be entitled to any monetary benefit for the period between appointment of selected candidates pursuant to the notifications in question and till the date of appointments of petitioners herein. If as on today there are no posts of Naib Tehsildars available, respondents are directed to create supernumerary posts for the petitioners. If as on today there are no posts of Naib Tehsildars available, respondents are directed to create supernumerary posts for the petitioners. Let the relevant orders be issued within a period of eight weeks from today. It is made clear that if the respondents fail to appoint the petitioners against the post of Naib Tehsildars within a period of eight weeks from today, the selection of 29 ineligible candidates shall stand quashed forthwith and thereafter they shall not be disbursed with their salaries etc”. 9. The aforesaid judgment has been challenged by the Government as well as by the selected candidates who, as per the Writ Court were ineligible, by filing separate intra-Court appeals before Jammu wing of the Court. 10. Another set of Intra-Court appeals arises out of judgment and order dated 19.09.2017 of Srinagar wing of the Court passed in SWP No.2218/2016 connected with SWP Nos. 66/2017 and 1147/2017. Vide the aforesaid order, the Writ Court has dismissed the aforesaid three writ petitions whereby the writ petitioners had challenged order dated 06.12.2016 passed by the Government in terms of which their claim for appointment to the posts of Naib-Tehsildar has been rejected on the ground that their cases are not similarly circumstanced with the case of the petitioners in SWP No. 487/2009, as the writ petitioners had waited till the conclusion of the selection process. The writ Court has, after relying upon the observations quoted in para (25) of the judgment passed in SWP No. 487/2009, repelled the challenge of the writ petitioners. This order of the Writ Court is also under challenge by way of intra-Court appeals filed before the Srinagar wing of the Court. 11. Besides the above, the writ petition bearing SWP No. 2608/2015 has been filed by Sameer Ahmed and another in Jammu wing of this Court whereby they have sought extension of benefit of judgment dated 19.08.2015 passed in SWP No.1941/2009 titled Inam-ul-Haq Hajam vs. State and ors. Rakesh Gupta and others have filed SWP No. 1876/2018 in Jammu wing of the Court and claimed relief in terms of judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed by Srinagar wing of the Court in SWP No. 487/2009. Bittu Ram and ors have filed SWP No. 2069/2018 in Jammu wing of the Court basing their relief on the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009. Bittu Ram and ors have filed SWP No. 2069/2018 in Jammu wing of the Court basing their relief on the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009. Mohd Rafiq and others have filed SWP No. 1993/2017 claiming benefit in terms of judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009. Similar relief has been claimed by Rakesh Kumar Sharma and others in SWP No. 1103/2017. In SWP No.1998/2018, filed by Parvez Ahmad and others, a challenge has been thrown to order dated 16.06.2017 passed by the Government whereby their claim with regard to appointment to the posts of Naib-Tehsildars which are subject matter of these petitions, has been rejected. AP(SWP) No. 19/2016 c/w SWP No. 577/2016 has been filed by one Ram Kumar claiming relief on the analogy of judgment dated 19.08.2015 passed in SWP No. 1941/2009 & clubbed matters. (B). Contentions: 12. The writ petitioners, who have challenged judgment and order dated 19.09.2017 passed in SWP No. 2218/2016 and connected matters by the Srinagar wing of the Court, contend that their cases are squarely covered by the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009, inasmuch as, they did not participate in the selection process after declaration of result of the written test and, as such, the Writ Court was not justified in observing that because they had participated in the selection process, as such, they are debarred from challenging the selection. It is the contention of the writ petitioners that their merit is higher than the merit of the candidates who were selected pursuant to the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009. It is contended that one of the selected writ petitioner, namely Rayees Ahmed Parray had received zero marks in the written test. This, however, has been disputed by the respondents and it is averred that the said candidate has secured 48 marks, but due to inadvertent mistake, his marks have been shown as zero. It is also contended by the appellants/ writ petitioners that some of the selected candidates were not holding the requisite qualification, inasmuch as they had not passed the Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects which was a mandatory condition of eligibility. It is also contended by the appellants/ writ petitioners that some of the selected candidates were not holding the requisite qualification, inasmuch as they had not passed the Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects which was a mandatory condition of eligibility. It has also been contended that the respondent-Board was required to redraw the entire merit list as per the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009 and the Board without undertaking the said exercise could not appoint the writ petitioners of the aforesaid writ petition. 13. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir in its appeal filed against the judgment dated 18.08.2018 passed in SWP No. 360/2017 by Jammu Wing of the Court has contended that the Writ Court, while virtually quashing the appointment of 29 selected candidates, has failed to take into consideration the fact that the selection process was held in respect of three Advertisement Notifications i.e., Notifications No. 1/2002 dated 26.04.2002, 9/2005 dated 14.12.2005 and 4/2008 dated 26.05.2008. It is contended that the eligibility for the post of Naib-Tehsildar prior to amendment effected to the Recruitment Rules vide SRO 178 dated 03.06.2003 was Graduation only which came to be amended vide aforesaid SRO, as Graduation and Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects. Thus, for the purpose of Notification No. 1/2002, even simple graduates were eligible to apply, whereas in respect of Notifications No. 9/2005 and 4/2008, the eligibility was Graduation and Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects. It is averred that vide SRO 74 of 2009 dated 31.03.2009, the eligibility for the post of Naib-Tehsildar has again been amended to make it Graduation with knowledge of Urdu. It is contended that the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been taken into account by the Writ Court. According to the appellant-State, keeping in view the aforesaid developments and the fact that a common selection process was undertaken in respect of the posts advertised vide the aforesaid three Notifications, it was decided to permit even the Graduate candidates to participate in the selection process. The appellant-State contends that, in any case, in the cases of these 29 selected candidates, requisite relaxation has been granted in terms of letter dated 02.03.2010. 14. The appellant-State contends that, in any case, in the cases of these 29 selected candidates, requisite relaxation has been granted in terms of letter dated 02.03.2010. 14. In the intra-Court appeals filed by the selected candidates who, as per the impugned judgment of the Writ Court dated 18.08.2018, were ineligible to participate in the selection process, it has been contended that they were not parties to the writ petition and, as such, it was not open to the Writ Court to make observations and remarks against their eligibility and to virtually quash their appointments. It has also been contended by these appellants that as per the relevant Recruitment Rules, the eligibility condition for the post of Naib-Tehsildar was Graduation and the requirement of Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects is applicable only to the other posts in the category of “Executive Posts” mentioned in the Schedule to the Jammu and Kashmir Revenue (Subordinate) Service Recruitment Rules, 1973. 15. As already noticed, the writ petitioners of other writ petitions, which are subject matter of this judgment, claim parity with the writ petitioners of SWP Nos. 487/2009 and 1941/2009 along with clubbed matters, which stand decided vide judgments dated 31.12.2014 and 19.08.2015 respectively. (C) Discussion: (i) Regarding Intra Court Appeals bearing LPA Nos. 199/2017 and 200/2017 against the judgment dt.19.09.2017 passed in SWP Nos.2218/2016,66/2017 and 1147/2017 of Srinagar wing of the Court and Writ petitions bearing SWP Nos. 1876/18, 2669/18, 1993/17, 1103/2017, 2680/2015, 577/2016, 1980/2018 and APSWP No. 19/2016 of Jammu Wing of the Court: 16. A common ground which has been urged by the appellants/writ petitioners in aforenoted cases is that they are entitled to the benefit flowing from the directions contained in judgment and order dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009. They claim that if the merit of the candidates, who participated in the selection process pursuant to three advertisement notices mentioned hereinbefore, is redrawn in accordance with the directions of the aforesaid judgment, they would make the select list as they are having better merit than those who have been selected pursuant to the aforesaid judgment of the Writ Court. The challenge to the judgment of the Writ Court dated 19.09.2017 in the intra-Court appeals bearing LPA Nos. The challenge to the judgment of the Writ Court dated 19.09.2017 in the intra-Court appeals bearing LPA Nos. 199/2017 & 200/2017 is further based upon the contention that these writ petitioners never participated in the selection process beyond their appearance in the written test and, as such, the observations of the writ Court in para (25) of the judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009 are not attracted to their cases. The writ petitioners in SWP No. 2608/2015 and APSWP No. 19/2016 c/w SWP No. 577/2016 further contend that besides holding qualification of Matric with Urdu as one of the subjects, they also hold better merit as compared to the writ petitioners in SWP No. 1941/2009 and clubbed matters and, as such, they are entitled to be appointed as Naib-Tehsildars. 17. If we have a look at the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the aforesaid writ petitions and the intra-Court appeals, there is a common thread running through all these cases. The writ petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court only after the selection process was finalized. All of them may not have actually participated in the selection process after the written test, inasmuch as, they may not have been called for the interview because of their inferior merit, but the fact of the matter remains that they sat on the fence and woke up from the deep slumber only after the Writ Court delivered its judgment in SWP No.487/2009 on 31.12.2014, highlighting the fact that some questions were having wrong answers or that the answers were vague. 18. It is correct that the writ petitioners have resorted to several rounds of litigation challenging the selection process, the consideration orders passed by the Government on their claims flowing out of judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009, but all these rounds of litigation have been initiated by them only after the pronouncement of judgment dated 31.12.2014. Thus it appears that the aforesaid writ petitioners had acquiesced in rejection of their candidature and reconciled to their fate until one fine morning they came to know about the judgment in Hamidullah Dar’s case 19. Thus it appears that the aforesaid writ petitioners had acquiesced in rejection of their candidature and reconciled to their fate until one fine morning they came to know about the judgment in Hamidullah Dar’s case 19. The Supreme Court has, in the case of State of U.P and ors vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and ors, (2015) 1 SCC 347 , while discussing the issue as to in which cases the principles of delay and laches would be applicable, laid down the following guidelines: “22.The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: 22.1. Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time-to-time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India(supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence”. 20. From the foregoing enunciation of law on the subject, it is clear that if a judgment does not touch upon the policy matters, it is a judgment in personam. The intention as to whether a judgment is in personam, can be gathered from its language. The judgment in Hamidullah Dar’s case is a clear example of a judgment in personam as it does not touch upon any policy matter. This is clear from the fact that in para (32) of the aforesaid judgment, the direction for appointment is confined only to the petitioners. Further the direction for redrawing of merit is confined to the petitioners and selected candidates only. It does not extend to whole of the merit list. Same is the nature of the judgment passed in Inamul Haq Hajjam’s case which explicitly grants relief to only the petitioners therein. Thus principles of delay and laches would be applicable with full force to the cases of the aforesaid petitioners/appellants. 21. It is not in dispute that the selections were made in the year 2009-10. Some candidates feeling aggrieved by the selections filed writ petitions immediately thereafter, like the writ petitioners in SWPs No. 487/2009 and 1941/2009 and clubbed matters. The writ petitioners in LPA Nos. 199/2017, 200/2017, SWP No. 2608/2015, APSW No. 19/2016 c/w SWP Nos. 21. It is not in dispute that the selections were made in the year 2009-10. Some candidates feeling aggrieved by the selections filed writ petitions immediately thereafter, like the writ petitioners in SWPs No. 487/2009 and 1941/2009 and clubbed matters. The writ petitioners in LPA Nos. 199/2017, 200/2017, SWP No. 2608/2015, APSW No. 19/2016 c/w SWP Nos. 577/2016, 1103/2017, 1993/2017, 1876/2018, 1980/2018 & 2609/2018 never felt aggrieved against the rejection of their candidature. They only filed the writ petitions after the judgments were passed in SWP Nos. 487/2009 and 1941/2009. It is on this count that the State, after considering their claims, rejected the same. 22. As already noted the judgments in Hamidullah Dar’s case and Inamul Haq Hajjam’s case are judgments in personam, as such, it is not open to those candidates who were not parties to the aforesaid two cases to claim parity with the candidates who had approached the Court at the appropriate stage. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam and another vs. Jaswant Singh and another, (2006) 11 SCC 464 . In the said case the Supreme Court, while considering the cases of some of the employees who already stood retired and claimed benefit of a judgment passed in a writ petition whereby certain employees were held entitled to attain the age of superannuation at the age of 60 years instead of 58 years, opined that the persons, who approach the Court at the belated stage, placing reliance upon an order passed in some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary relief on account of delay and laches. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as under: “5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that has been settled by this Court. Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of this Court in Harwindra Kumar V. Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether they are entitled to same relief or not? But the only question is grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of this Court in Harwindra Kumar V. Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a serious question that arises for consideration is whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same, collected their post retirement benefits, can such persons be given the relief in the light of the subsequent decision delivered by this Court? 6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 & 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if similar relief is to be given to the persons who have not approached the Court that will unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment to these persons in terms of two years' salary and increased benefit of pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the Court after their retirement. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the Court after their retirement. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others”. 23. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio, the Supreme Court, in the case of A.P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala and ors, (2007) 2 SCC 725 , observed that the benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to a case automatically. It was further observed that the Court has to take into consideration the fact as to whether the writ petitioner has chosen to sit over the matter and then woken up after the decision of the Court. 24. The mere fact that the aforesaid writ petitioners had filed the writ petitions on an earlier occasion also wherein the respondent-State was directed to consider their claim by treating their writ petitions as representations, does not entitle them to grant of any relief, particularly because all these earlier writ petitions were filed by them after passing of the judgments in Hamidullah Dar’s case and Inam-Ul-Haq Hajam’s case (supra). 25. The Supreme Court has, in the case of State of Uttaranchal and another vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 , while dealing with a similar issue, observed as under: “16. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do so for six years and the junior employee held the promotional post for six years till regular promotion took place. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that they had given representations at the relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting to note that when the regular selection took place, they accepted the position solely because the seniority was maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. 17. It is clear as noon day that the cause of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. 17. In C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another, (2008) 10 SCC 115 , a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the concept of representations and the directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the representations and the challenge to the said rejection thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus: - “Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.” 26. In State of Tamil Nadu vs. Seshachalam (2007) 10 SCC 137 , the Supreme Court observed as under: “….filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a Court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” 27. Again in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, 2014 (4) SCC 108 , the Supreme Court has observed as under: “13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others, AIR 1969, the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others, AIR 1969, the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221, which is as follows: - “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” 14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 , while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person?s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct. 15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc., AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter „Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold. 28. In Ghulam Rasool Lone vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and another (2009) 15 SCC 321 , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary one. It was further observed that for sufficient and cogent reasons, the Court may, in a given case, refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, delay and laches being one of them. The Court, while observing that the writ petitioner in the said case was sitting on the fence, while another person was granted the promotion on the basis of order passed in his writ petition, held that such a petitioner cannot be granted indulgence by the Court and he has to thank himself for his plight. 29. The Court, while observing that the writ petitioner in the said case was sitting on the fence, while another person was granted the promotion on the basis of order passed in his writ petition, held that such a petitioner cannot be granted indulgence by the Court and he has to thank himself for his plight. 29. Considering the cases of the petitioners, who approached the Court only after culmination of selection process and pronouncement of judgments in Hamidullah Dar’s case and Inamul-Haq’s case (supra), in the light of the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in foregoing judgments, it can safely be stated that the claim of these petitioners seeking appointments in respect of selections made in the year 2009-10, by filing writ petitions in the years 2015 onwards, is certainly belated. 30. It has been vehemently contended by the writ petitioners in the afore-noted cases that delay and laches would not come in the way of granting relief in their favour as the said contention has not been raised by the official respondents as well as the selected candidates at the time of admission of the writ petitions. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the judgments of this Court in Gh. Nabi Parray vs. State, 2010 (2) JKJ, 66 Bashir Ahmad Bhat vs. State of J&K & ors, 2004 (3) JKJ 189 and, Abdul Ghani vs. Union of India, 2013 (2) JKJ 140 . In all these judgments, it has been held that question of delay and laches should be raised and addressed at the time of admission of a writ petition. The ratio laid down in these cases is not applicable to the facts of the present cases for the reason that in all the writ petitions where pleadings have been filed by the official respondents, plea of delay and acquiescence has been clearly raised. In fact in the rejection orders passed by the Government, which are under challenge in the writ petitions/intra court appeals, a distinction has been drawn between the cases of writ petitioners and the appointees pursuant to Court orders on the ground of delay and acquiescence. Thus, at no point of time, the official respondents have waived the contention of delay and laches. 31. Thus, at no point of time, the official respondents have waived the contention of delay and laches. 31. The aforestated writ petitioners/appellants have also relied upon the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of C. Channabasavaiah vs State of Mysore & others, AIR 1965 SC 1293 and Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & ors vs The State of Maharashtra & ors, (1974) 1 SCC 317 , to contend that delay and laches would not come in their way to claim the relief in their favour because their fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution is at stake. 32. So far as the cases relied upon by the writ petitioners/appellants are concerned, the same are distinguishable on facts. In C. Channabasavaiah’s case (supra), the petitioners were claiming appointment alleging violation of Articles 14, 15 & 16 of the Constitution, on the ground that persons with lesser merit were appointed by the Government. In that case, the persons with lesser merit came to be appointed on the basis of an undertaking given by the Government before the Writ Court. It is in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that delay would not defeat the claim of the petitioners. In the instant case, the candidates, who had filed the earlier writ petitions, were given appointments on the basis of Court directions that had acquired finality. Their appointments are not a result of concession made by the Government, but the same are a result of Court judgment which operated in personam. 33. Similarly, in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar’s case (supra), challenge was laid by the petitioner to the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collectors. It is in those circumstances that the Supreme Court held that because procedure is not a thing of the past, but is still being followed by the State Government, therefore, it is but desirable that its constitutionality should be adjudged when the question has come before the Court. In the instant case, neither any rule, nor any procedure is subject matter of challenge in the aforesaid writ petitions. Thus, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is not applicable to the facts of these cases. 34. In the instant case, neither any rule, nor any procedure is subject matter of challenge in the aforesaid writ petitions. Thus, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is not applicable to the facts of these cases. 34. Next, it has been contended that if the respondent-Board would have implemented the directions passed in Hamidullah Dar’s case and redrawn the merit list of the candidates, the writ petitioners would have secured higher merit than the merit secured by those who have been appointed pursuant to the aforesaid judgment. The contention is misconceived inasmuch as the direction for fresh evaluation of merit is with respect to the petitioners in Hamidullah Dar’s case and the selected candidates only and not regarding all the candidates who had participated in the selection process. Besides this, in para (32) of the judgment in aforesaid case, an option was given to the official respondents to appoint the petitioners therein against available vacancies of Naib-Tehsildars if it was impossible to undertake an exercise of redrawing the merit. 35. It seems that vide order dated 02.08.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in a Contempt Petition bearing No. 733/2015 arising out of judgment dated 31.12.2014 passed in SWP No. 487/2009, it was observed that the respondent-Board by sitting over the directions of the Writ Court, had waived the option of redrawing of the merit of the petitioners and the selected candidates and a clear cut direction was issued to the Government to appoint the writ petitioners. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction dated 02.08.2016 passed in Contempt Petition bearing No.733/2015, the writ petitioners of SWP No. 487/2009 came to be appointed. The aforesaid order passed in the contempt proceedings on 02.08.2016 has been implemented, as a consequence whereof, the writ petitioners in SWP No. 487/2009 stand appointed in terms of Govt. order dated 10.11.2016. 36. Now the writ petitioners of SWP No. 487/2009 have been working as Naib-Tehsildars for the last more than five years. If the selection and appointment of the candidates, who have been appointed pursuant to the judgment passed by the Writ Court in Hamidullah Dar’s case, is disturbed at this stage at the instance of those writ petitioners who have all along been fence sitters, it would work very harshly against them. If the selection and appointment of the candidates, who have been appointed pursuant to the judgment passed by the Writ Court in Hamidullah Dar’s case, is disturbed at this stage at the instance of those writ petitioners who have all along been fence sitters, it would work very harshly against them. The judgment of the Writ Court as well as the order passed in the Contempt petition, on the basis of which these candidates have been appointed, have acquired finality as the same have not been challenged before any higher forum. Thus, equity weighs heavily in favour of such candidates. Even otherwise, redrawing of merit of selected candidates at this belated stage would give rise to practical problems as it would not only disturb the candidates, some of whom have been serving in the Department for the last more than twelve years and may have even earned promotions during this period. Even the third party claims may also arise if the previous appointments made under the aforesaid three Advertisement Notices are disturbed at this stage. 37. The Supreme Court in Miss Shainda Hassan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 1381 , which was a case, where the petitioner was appointed as a Principal in a Girls College though she had not the requisite experience in terms of the advertisement notice, allowed her to continue to work as Principal keeping in view the fact that she had served the institution for over 16 years. The Court held that it would be unjust to make her leave the post. 38. In Dr. (Mrs.) Meera Messey v. Dr. S. R. Mehrota and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1153 , the Supreme Court in a case where Himachal Pradesh University had promoted Research Associates as Lecturers for which only direct recruitment was provided for, refused to set aside their appointments on the ground that they had been working for more than 11 years. 39. Similarly, in Roshni Devi, Shravan Kumar etc. vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 3268 , the Supreme Court, while noticing that the recruitment to the posts of Clerks in the State of Haryana had not been made in accordance with the law but because the equity was in favour of those persons who had already been appointed and served for more than 9 years, refused to annul their appointments. 40. 40. Thus, it has been the consistent view of the Supreme Court that even if there is some minor irregularity in selection of a candidate but if such a candidate has put in a number of years of service, it may not be advisable to disturb his appointment. 41. Apart from the above the Writ Court in para (25) of its judgment dated 31.12.201 passed in Hamidullah Dar’s case, as has been quoted hereinbefore, has made it abundantly clear that such of the candidates who participated in the selection after the written test was conducted on 22.02.2009 and questioned the written test thereafter or did not question the written examination, are to be ignored as they, after their failure to question the written test before participating any further in the selection process or waiting for selection process to get finalized, cannot be allowed to turn around and question the written examination or the selection process. The writ petitioners in the instant case may not have participated in any process after the written examination, but they have certainly allowed the selection process to get finalized, whereafter, they have turned around and challenged the written examination and selection process which they cannot be permitted to do in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Shah and ors vs. Anil Joshi and ors, (2013) 11 SCC 309 , that has been relied upon by the Writ Court in its judgment dated 31.12.2014. 42. In the light of what has been discussed above and keeping in view the fact that the aforesaid writ petitioners have simply acquiesced in and accepted the fate of their rejection and allowed the selected candidates to steal march over them, they cannot be heard to complain and raise a grouse at this stage. (ii) Regarding Intra-Court Appeals bearing LPA Nos. 176/2018, 166/2018, 169/2018 & 171/2018 against the judgment and order dated 18.08.2018 passed by the Writ Court in SWP No. 360/2017 of Jammu Wing of the Court: 43. That takes us to the legality and validity of the judgment dated 18.08.2018 of the Writ Court passed in SWP No. 360/2017 in Jammu wing of the Court. 176/2018, 166/2018, 169/2018 & 171/2018 against the judgment and order dated 18.08.2018 passed by the Writ Court in SWP No. 360/2017 of Jammu Wing of the Court: 43. That takes us to the legality and validity of the judgment dated 18.08.2018 of the Writ Court passed in SWP No. 360/2017 in Jammu wing of the Court. At the very outset, we would like to note the assertion of the writ petitioners of the aforesaid writ petition that in case direction of the Writ Court regarding their appointments is upheld, they will have no grouse with regard to appointment of 29 candidates regarding whose eligibility certain remarks and directions have been made by the Writ Court. These selected candidates in their separate appeals have contended that as per the Recruitment Rules, prescribed qualification is Graduation for Naib-Tehsildars, whereas, for other Executive Posts, it is Graduate and Matric with Urdu as one of the subjects. It is also contended by these candidates as also by the State in their intra-Court appeals that these 29 candidates regarding whose selection and appointment, the Writ Court has made certain observations pertaining to their eligibility, were not parties to the writ petition and, therefore, it was not open to the Writ Court to pass directions against these candidates and to make observations regarding their eligibility. 44. So far as the contention of the appellants/selected candidates regarding their eligibility is concerned, merit of the same can be appreciated by having a look at the relevant Recruitment Rules. Vide SRO 178 dated 03.06.2003, an amendment was affected to the Rules governing the field viz. J&K Revenue (Subordinate) Service Recruitment Rules, 1973. The relevant excerpts read as under: SRO-178. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Section 124 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir, the Governor hereby directs that in Schedule appended to the Jammu and Kashmir Revenue (Subordinate) Service Recruitment Rules, 1973 the following amendments shall be made, namely: (1) For the entry appearing against Class ‘(I)’, the following shall be substituted, namely: 6500-10500 1. Naib-Tehsildar 2. Instructor (Naib-Tehsildar) 3. Asstt. Revenue Attorney 4. Reader to Financial Commr. 5. Reader to Divisional Commr. 6. P.A to Deputy Commr. Graduation in case of Naib-Tehsildars. Graduate having passed Matric in Urdu as one of the subjects I. 50% by direct recruitment. II. Naib-Tehsildar 2. Instructor (Naib-Tehsildar) 3. Asstt. Revenue Attorney 4. Reader to Financial Commr. 5. Reader to Divisional Commr. 6. P.A to Deputy Commr. Graduation in case of Naib-Tehsildars. Graduate having passed Matric in Urdu as one of the subjects I. 50% by direct recruitment. II. 45% by promotion from class II amongst person having not less than 5 years service in the said class and having qualified the prescribed departmental examination in order of seniority including those having worked in settlement. III. 5% by promotion from remaining Girdawars promoted in Class II above on the basis of seniority amongst those who have worked satisfactorily in survey teams of settlement for at least 5 years subject to qualifying the departmental examination. 45. A bare perusal of above entry shows that it specifically mentions that in the case of Naib-Tehsildars, the minimum prescribed qualification shall be Graduate having passed Matric in Urdu as one of the subjects. The learned counsels, appearing for the selected candidates/appellants while interpreting the aforesaid SRO, it appears to us, are misreading the same. In our opinion, there is no ambiguity in the language of the aforequoted rule. Our aforesaid opinion gets strengthened from the fact that in the cases of these selected candidates/ appellants relaxation in their qualification has been granted by the Government, which clearly shows that they were not eligible as per the Rules in vogue, as they did not possess the requisite qualification i.e., Graduate having passed Matric in Urdu as one of the subjects. 46. There is, however, merit in the submission of the appellants that it was not open to the Writ Court to issue directions against the selected candidates as regards their seniority and status of their appointments without impleading them as parties to the writ petition. It is a cardinal principle of natural justice that no one should be condemned unheard. In the instant case, the learned Writ Court while passing the impugned judgment has observed these principles in breach, inasmuch as, none of the selected candidates was a party to the proceedings before the Court. 47. Apart from the above, these selected candidates (the appellants herein), upon grant of relaxation in qualification by the Government, have been working as Naib-Tehsildars since the year 2010. 47. Apart from the above, these selected candidates (the appellants herein), upon grant of relaxation in qualification by the Government, have been working as Naib-Tehsildars since the year 2010. Thus, equity tilts heavily in their favour and in view of the discussions made in preceding paras, it would neither be appropriate nor in the interest of justice to disturb their appointments at this belated stage when they may have earned a number of increments and even promotions by now. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 18.08.2018 to the extent it has directed that seniority of the writ petitioners be fixed over and above the 29 selected candidates (appellants herein) and that in case writ petitioners are not appointed within eight weeks, appointments of these 29 candidates (appellants herein) shall stand quashed with a consequential direction of stopping their salaries etc. is not sustainable in law, inasmuch as, these directions have been passed without hearing the affected parties. 48. Coming to the challenge to the aforesaid judgment dated 18.08.2018 of the Writ Court laid by the Government vide its intra Court Appeal bearing LPASW No. 176, it has not urged even a single ground justifying the rejection of cases of the writ petitioners vide Government Order dated 09.11.2016 (supra) passed by the Revenue Department of the Government, whereby claim of the writ petitioners has been rejected on the ground that their cases were not similarly situated with the cases of the petitioners in Inaam-Ul Haq’s case (supra). As already noted, in Inaam-Ul Haq’s case, the Writ Court, after holding that Matriculation with Urdu as one of the subjects, was an essential qualification for selection to the post of Naib-Tehsildar in terms of Notifications issued in the years 2005 and 2008, came to the conclusion that the writ petitioners in the said writ petitions being eligible could not have been ignored from selection at the altar of the candidates who were not holding the basic eligibility condition. Accordingly, a direction was issued to the respondents to consider and appoint the writ petitioners against the vacancies which stood reserved in terms of the Court order. The judgment was implemented by the Government in terms of its order dated 30.06.2016 (supra) and 20 writ petitioners came to be appointed on the posts reserved in terms of the Court orders. 49. The judgment was implemented by the Government in terms of its order dated 30.06.2016 (supra) and 20 writ petitioners came to be appointed on the posts reserved in terms of the Court orders. 49. The writ petitioners in SWP No. 360/2017, who are four in number, had, on an earlier occasion, filed writ petition bearing SWP Nos.1809/2009 and 1299/2009 challenging the select list as well as the selection process. It was during the pendency of writ petition 1809/2009 that Inaam-Ul Haq’s case came to be decided and the aforesaid writ petition came to be disposed on 11.04.2016 directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners in terms of the directions passed in Inaam-Ul Haq’s case. The respondent-State accorded consideration to the case of aforesaid four writ petitioners and rejected the same primarily on the grounds that the writ petitioners had challenged the selection of all the candidates and that there was no post reserved in the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners, as such, their case is different from the cases of the petitioners in Inaam-Ul Haq’s case. 50. The reasoning given in the rejection order passed by the Government is specious, inasmuch, as merely because the petitioners had challenged the whole selection and not confined their challenge to the selection of ineligible candidates, does not make their case different from the cases of the petitioners in Inaam-Ul Haq’s case. Similarly, the mere fact that no post was reserved during the pendency of the writ petition, does not make the case of aforesaid four writ petitioners different from the cases of writ petitioners that were decided in terms of the judgment dated 19.08.2015 passed in Inamul-Haq’s case. The rejection order made by the Government is, in our opinion, is arbitrary and without any basis. The same is not sustainable in law and deserves to be quashed. To this extent, we do not find any illegality in the findings of the Writ Court. 51. Apart from the above, the writ petitioners of this particular case are not guilty of any delay and laches. It is not a case where the writ petitioners sat back and approached the Court after knowing the outcome of the litigation initiated by other candidates. 51. Apart from the above, the writ petitioners of this particular case are not guilty of any delay and laches. It is not a case where the writ petitioners sat back and approached the Court after knowing the outcome of the litigation initiated by other candidates. It is a case where the writ petitioners have at the earliest in the year 2009 itself, when the selection process was yet to be finalized, approached the writ Court challenging the whole selection. The only difference is that the writ petitioners chose to file the writ petition in Jammu wing of the Court, whereas the writ petitioners, whose cases were decided in terms of the judgment in Inamul-Haq’s case (supra) had filed the writ petition in Srinagar Wing of the Court. In our opinion that does not make any difference. The writ petitioners have been vigilant and alive to their rights, and they have not allowed their claims to go stale. Therefore, their cases cannot be equated with the cases of other writ petitioners who chose to approach the Court only after knowing the result of the cases of Hamidullah Dar and Inamul Haq Hajjam. The judgment of the Writ Court, therefore, to the extent it quashes the Govt. order dated 09.11.2016 and the directs the appointment of the petitioners by according them similar benefits as has been accorded to the writ petitioners in Inamul-Haq’s case (supra) deserves to be upheld. (D) Conclusion: 52. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the aforesaid Intra-Court Appeals, and the Writ Petitions are disposed of by issuing the following directions: - (i) LPASWs No. 199/2017 and 200/2017 filed before Srinagar Wing of the Court as well as APSWP No.19/2016, SWP Nos. 2608/2015, 577/2016, 1103/2017, 1993/2017, 1876/2018,1980/2018 & SWP No. 2069/2018 filed before Jammu Wing of the Court shall stand dismissed. (ii) LPASW Nos. 176/2018, 161/2018, 169/2018 & 171/2018 filed before Jammu Wing of the Court are partly allowed. 2608/2015, 577/2016, 1103/2017, 1993/2017, 1876/2018,1980/2018 & SWP No. 2069/2018 filed before Jammu Wing of the Court shall stand dismissed. (ii) LPASW Nos. 176/2018, 161/2018, 169/2018 & 171/2018 filed before Jammu Wing of the Court are partly allowed. Consequently the judgment of the Writ Court dated 18.08.2018 passed in SWP No. 360/2017 to the extent it quashes the Government Order No. 158-Rev of 2016 dated 09.11.2016 and directs the official respondents to consider the appointment of the petitioners therein against the posts of Naib Tehsildars including grant of relaxation in upper age limit and to grant to them similar benefits as have been granted to the petitioners in Inamul Haq Hajjam’s case (supra), is upheld, whereas the directions made by the writ Court to the extent of placing the writ petitioners over and above 29 selected candidates (appellants herein) in the seniority list as well as the directions regarding quashment of their appointments and consequent stoppage of their salaries etc., are set aside. (iii) The appointment of the writ petitioners of SWP No.360/2017 shall be made on any available vacancies in the cadre of Naib Tehsildars (direct quota). 53. Disposed of in the above terms.