ORDER : The petitioner has challenged the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court praying this Court to set aside the judgment and order of conviction dated 09.12.2011 and sentence dated 15.12.2011 passed in C.C.No.1153/2006 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Chikkamagaluru, which is confirmed in Crl.A.No.01/2012 by order dated 27.03.2013 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Chikkamagaluru and consequently acquit the petitioner for the alleged offences. 2. The factual matrix of the case of the prosecution is that on 16.09.2005 at about 7.30 p.m. in SC/ST colony of Dambadahalli Village when P.W.1 and P.W.2 were there in the house, the accused tress-passed the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and abused P.W.1 in a filthy language and assaulted her with a chopper on her left hand thumb and left leg knee and caused grievous injuries, which has resulted in fracture of tibia. The motive for committing the assault is that P.W.1 got married to one Dharmesh, who is the brother-in-law of the accused as against the wishes of the accused. Based on the complaint, the police have registered the case at the first instance for the offence punishable under Sections 448, 504 and 324 of IPC. During the course of investigation, came to know that there was a fracture and hence while filing the charge-sheet, instead of Section 324 of IPC invoked Section 326 of IPC. The accused was secured before the Trial Court and he did not plead guilty and hence the prosecution mainly relied upon the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.7 and documents Exs.P.1 to 7. M.O.1 and M.O.2 are also marked. The Trial Court on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence placed on record, convicted the accused for all the offences and substantive sentence of three years is imposed for the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC and six months for the offence punishable under Sections 448 and 504 of IPC. The Trial Court also ordered to pay the compensation of Rs.20,000/-and in default of payment, to recover the same as per Section 431 of Cr.P.C. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence, an appeal was filed in Crl.A.No.01/2012. The Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, allowed the appeal partly and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court and ordered that the sentence shall run concurrently. The Appellate Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, allowed the appeal partly and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court and ordered that the sentence shall run concurrently. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and sentence and confirmation, the present revision petition is filed. 3. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner had a child by name Sachin aged about 2 years as on the date of the incident and the child used to pass urine sitting in front of his house, which is the backyard portion of P.W.1 house and hence there was frequent quarrel and in view of verbal exchange of words, the incident is said to have occurred. M.O.1 chopper said to be the firewood cutter instrument is admitted by P.W.1 that this kind of chopper used to be in everyone’s house for cutting the firewood. It is emerged in the evidence that there was a ill-will with regard to marriage of P.W.1 with the brother-in-law of the accused and the said marriage was taken place two years back and there was no any frequent quarrel to that effect and it is admitted that she visited her parents house for festival and the motive alleged is totally false. Admittedly, the relationship was strained between the accused and P.W.1 and P.W.2 and they were inimical towards the petitioner. Even though P.W.3 and P.W.4 have turned hostile, who are independent witnesses, both the Courts have relied upon the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and there is no corroboration. The injured also did not disclose the name of the petitioner when the injured was taken to the hospital and the same is not found in the wound certificate Ex.P.6 and the weapon was also not seized at the instance of the petitioner and the same is created. P.W.1 and P.W.2 are interested witnesses and their evidence is inconsistent and the same has not been considered by the Trial Court. The learned counsel would submit that though the prosecution contend that there was fracture, no x-ray was produced and Orthopedic doctor has not been examined. P.W.7 doctor only examined clinically and when the fracture is not proved and the offence is only simple in nature, under such circumstances Section 326 of IPC does not attract. The learned counsel would submit that though the prosecution contend that there was fracture, no x-ray was produced and Orthopedic doctor has not been examined. P.W.7 doctor only examined clinically and when the fracture is not proved and the offence is only simple in nature, under such circumstances Section 326 of IPC does not attract. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the nature of the offence under Section 326 of IPC that it is grievous in nature. Both the Courts failed to take note of the circumstances under which the incident was taken place and sentencing the petitioner for a period of three years is also harsh considering the gravity of the offence. The doctor also admitted that while cutting vegetables with vegetable slicer, P.W.1 slipped accidentally and sustained injury cannot be ruled out and this aspect has not been considered by the Trial Court. The learned counsel would also submit that the incident was taken place almost 17 years ago and both the Courts failed to invoke the Probation of Offenders Act (‘P.O. Act’ for short). 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of STATE v. SHEENAPPA GOWDA AND OTHERS reported in (2011) 4 KCR 2759 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.18 wherein it is discussed with regard to non-production of x-ray before the Court. 5. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of REHMAT v. STATE OF HARYANA reported in (1996) 10 SCC 346 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.10, wherein the Apex Court held that name of the accused were disclosed only at the time when the complaint was recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police after about 5½ hours of the incident and hence conviction is not sustainable. 6. The learned counsel also relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA v. HARIJAN DHARMA AND ANOTHER reported in (1992) 2 Kant.LJ 85 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.12 with regard to invoking of P.O. Act taking the age of the petitioner as 18 years and held that the Act is a reformative measure and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who can be usefully rehabilitated in the society. Its object is to prevent conversion of youthful offenders into abdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. 7. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of COMMANDANT 20 BN ITB POLICE v. SANJAY BINJOA reported in AIR 2001 SC 2058 , wherein the Apex Court in paragraph No.7 discussed that invoking of P.O. Act has been enacted in view of the increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offenders. The Act empowers the Court to release on probation, in all suitable cases, an offender found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for the description mentioned in Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act. 8. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of JAGAT PAL SINGH AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HARYANA reported in AIR 2000 SC 3622 (1), wherein in respect of offence under Section 323 of IPC sentence imposed is of three months imprisonment. Sentence held proper but Courts should have taken note of the provisions of P.O. Act. 9. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of HARIJAN MEGHA JESHA v. STATE OF GUJARAT reported in AIR 1979 SC 1566 , wherein the Apex Court discussed with regard to the very scope of Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and held that circumstance against accused if not put to him in his statement, the prosecution cannot be permitted to rely on that circumstance. 10. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of NAR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA reported in (2015) 1 SCC 496 , wherein the Apex Court discussed with regard to scope and object of Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 11. Per contra, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State would submit that P.W.1 is the victim and P.W.2 is the eye-witness and both of them are daughter and mother and their evidence is consistent. The medical evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Per contra, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State would submit that P.W.1 is the victim and P.W.2 is the eye-witness and both of them are daughter and mother and their evidence is consistent. The medical evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Regarding nature of injury also P.W.7 doctor categorically deposed regarding nature of injury and when she suspected fracture, referred the injured to Orthopedic and x-ray was taken and it confirms that there was a fracture on the tibia and hence the very contention that it does not attract Section 326 of IPC cannot be accepted. Even though x-ray is not marked, but x-ray number is mentioned in the wound certificate. The Trial Court also while considering the material available on record, in paragraph Nos.14 and 19 gave the reasoning. P.W.6 is the Investigating Officer who conducted the spot mahazar, seized the sickle and also blood stained clothes at the spot and the same were also marked as M.O.1 and M.O.2. Though the prosecution has not sent those M.O.s for examination with regard to blood stains is concerned, when the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.7 doctor is clear regarding nature of injuries and when the fracture is proved, the very contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The learned counsel submits that the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Here is a case of tress-passing the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2 by the petitioner and he went with a weapon and inflicted injury which caused grievous injuries and also a fracture and hence it does not attract P.O. Act. Hence, prayed this Court to dismiss the revision petition. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State and also on perusal of the material available on record, the points that arise for the consideration of this Court are: (i) Whether both the Courts have committed an error in convicting and sentencing and confirming the sentence and conviction for the offence punishable under Sections 448, 504 and 326 of IPC? (ii) Whether the petitioner has made out a ground to exercise the revisional jurisdiction? (iii) Whether it is a fit case to invoke the P.O. Act as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner? (iv) What order? (ii) Whether the petitioner has made out a ground to exercise the revisional jurisdiction? (iii) Whether it is a fit case to invoke the P.O. Act as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner? (iv) What order? Point Nos.(i) and (ii): 13. Having perused the material available on record and also the submissions of the respective learned counsel, it is an allegation that this petitioner trespassed the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and inflicted injury with sickle on account of previous enmity. In order to prove the same, both P.W.1 and P.W.2 have been examined and both of them reiterated that the petitioner abused in a filthy language and inflicted injury with sickle. In the cross-examination, no doubt, it is elicited that both are relatives since P.W.1 married the brother-in-law of the accused and the very defence counsel suggested regarding the rivalry on account of P.W.1 marrying the brother-in-law of the accused. The very contention is that the incident took place on account of the child of the petitioner, who is two years old urinated in the backyard of the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2. But the counsel would contend that the marriage was taken two years ago and there was no any frequent quarrel, but the defence itself elicited the motive for the incident. No doubt, it is elicited that after this incident, one more complaint is given by P.W.1, but nothing is elicited with regard to the incident and inflicting injury and a false case has been registered. P.W.2 reiterated the evidence of P.W.1 and she is an eye-witness and no doubt she is the mother of P.W.1, but in the cross-examination, it is elicited that M.O.2 was seized in her house, but she categorically says that the petitioner left the sickle M.O.1 at the spot when she screamed and she categorically says that she has produced the same when the police came and the same was seized. In the cross-examination of P.W.2, it is suggested that there was ill-will with regard to her daughter married the brother-in-law of the accused. With regard to the incident is concerned, nothing is elicited. 14. P.W.3 and P.W.4 have turned hostile. P.W.5 went and recorded the statement of the injured in terms of Ex.P.1. P.W.6 is the Investigating Officer, who conducted the spot mahazar and seized M.O.1 and M.O.2 and investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet. With regard to the incident is concerned, nothing is elicited. 14. P.W.3 and P.W.4 have turned hostile. P.W.5 went and recorded the statement of the injured in terms of Ex.P.1. P.W.6 is the Investigating Officer, who conducted the spot mahazar and seized M.O.1 and M.O.2 and investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet. In the cross-examination, he admits that he did not conduct separate mahazar while seizing M.O.1 and M.O.2. P.W.7 is the doctor who deposed that at around 8.15 p.m., he treated the injured when P.W.2 brought P.W.1 to the hospital and noticed the injuries and categorically deposed that injury No.2 was simple in nature and injury No.1 was grievous in nature and M.O.1 could cause the nature of injuries sustained by P.W.1. But in the cross-examination, defence itself has elicited that when he examined P.W.1, he has sent the injured to the orthopedic and the same was compound fracture and after taking x-ray, continued the treatment but not able to tell the nature of fracture and the same can be stated by the orthopedic. In the cross-examination of P.W.7, nothing is elicited and even not suggested that not referred the injured to the orthopedic for x-ray. The defence itself got elicited that in Ex.P.6 he has mentioned the date as 16.09.2005 and in Ex.P.6 referred x-ray date as 17.09.2005. 15. Having considered the material available on record, first of all, taking x-ray is not disputed and defence itself elicited that x-ray date is mentioned as 17.09.2005. On perusal of Ex.P.6, x-ray number is also mentioned and apart from that, the date is also mentioned and hence the very contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when x-ray is not produced, it cannot be treated as an offence under Section 326 of IPC cannot be accepted. No doubt, the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment in the case of Sheenappa Gowda (supra), has discussed with regard to non-production of x-ray, wherein in paragraph No.18 held that when doctor suspected such fracture, he ought to have referred the injured for taking x-ray to confirm his finding that there is a fracture of middle phalanx. But in the case on hand, when the doctor P.W.7 suspected fracture, he referred the patient to Orthopedic and x-ray was also taken. But in the case on hand, when the doctor P.W.7 suspected fracture, he referred the patient to Orthopedic and x-ray was also taken. I have already pointed out that x-ray number is mentioned in the wound certificate and even not suggested to the witness that not referred to Orthopedic and x-ray was not taken. When such being the factual aspects of the case, the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheenappa Gowda (supra), not comes to the aid of the petitioner. 16. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rehmat (supra) is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding non-disclosure of the name of the assailants when the injured was taken to the hospital. No doubt, in the wound certificate, the name of the assailant is not mentioned. But P.W.7 in his evidence categorically deposed that the injured was brought to the hospital with the history of assault with sickle. But the fact is that both of them are neighbours and even not mentioned the name of the assailant. When the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is consistent that this petitioner tress-passed the house and inflicted the injury, not mentioning the name of the assailant, the same will not go to the root of the case of the prosecution. The Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Rehmat (supra) held that there was a delay of 5½ hours in recording the name of the assailants. But in the case on hand, the incident was taken place at 7.30 p.m. and at around 8.15 p.m. went to the hospital and on information only P.W.5 went to the hospital and recorded the statement of the injured within a span of three hours and hence the said judgment does not come to the aid of the petitioner. 17. Having considered the material available on record and also both oral and documentary evidence placed on record, the Trial Court while considering the material on record taken note of the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.7 and in paragraph No.19 discussed with regard to the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and also considered Exs.P.1 and 2 and also taken note of the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.6 who are the Investigating Officers and also taken note of evidence of P.W.7 doctor which corroborates with the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2. The Trial Court also taken note of M.O.1 sickle, which was used for committing the offence and the same is discussed in paragraph No.23. The Trial Court has given a definite finding with regard to inflicting injury with sickle on P.W.1. 18. The Appellate Court also considering the material on record, on re-appreciation considered the evidence of all the witnesses and particularly in paragraph No.16 taken note of the evidence of P.W.7 doctor and nature of injures and re-appreciated in paragraph Nos.17, 18, and 19 considering the nature of injuries and causing of said injury with sickle M.O.1 and affirmed the finding of the Trial Court and considered the defence of the petitioner in paragraph No.21 regarding causing of such injuries suggesting that she fell on vegetable cutting blade with stock. Hence, I do not find any error committed by the Trial Court and the Apex Court in coming to the said conclusion. 19. Now coming to the aspect of sentence is concerned, admittedly, there was a ill-will with regard to the P.W.1 marrying the brother-in-law of the accused. It is important to note that the incident was taken place in the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2. It emerges in the evidence that in front of the house of the accused, backyard house of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is located and it is the specific evidence of P.W.1 that the accused entered the house from the rear side door of P.W.1 and abused in a filthy language and inflicted injury. It is important to note that he carried sickle while inflicting injury. No doubt, it is contended that the same was seized while conducting mahazar, but P.W.2 categorically says that he had thrown the sickle at the spot when she screamed and hence she has produced the same when the mahazar was conducted. When such being the case and when the injury is a fracture and also when the motive is also elicited from the mouth of P.W.1 and P.W.2 by the defence itself, hence it is clear that there was a prior ill-will. However, both the Courts have imposed sentence of three years. It appears that the same is little harsh taking note of the circumstances under which the incident was taken place and they are neighbours. However, both the Courts have imposed sentence of three years. It appears that the same is little harsh taking note of the circumstances under which the incident was taken place and they are neighbours. The incident was taken place long back as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner and hence this Court can reduce the sentence from three years to one year and enhance the compensation to Rs.75,000/-from Rs.20,000/-. 20. Regarding sentence of six months for the offence punishable under Section 504 of IPC is concerned, it is appropriate to impose the fine as the allegation is that the petitioner abused in a filthy language and hence fine of Rs.1,000/-is imposed instead of substantive sentence. Regarding sentence of six months for the offence punishable under Section 448 of IPC is concerned, the material is clear that the petitioner trespassed the house of P.W.1 and 2 and hence it does not require any interference of this Court. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon two judgments of the Apex Court regarding very scope and ambit of Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and tried to convince this Court contending that the medical evidence has not been put into the mouth of the accused. But on perusal of 313 statement in paragraph No.8, specific evidence of the doctor is also put to the accused and the incriminating evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is also put to the accused in paragraph No.2 in respect of P.W.1 and evidence of P.W.2 in paragraph No.5. Hence, the very judgments referred by the petitioner with regard to Section 313 of Cr.P.C. does not come to the aid of the petitioner. Hence, I answer point Nos.(i) and (ii) as negative. Point No.(iii): 22. The very contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court is that the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court ought to have invoked the P.O. Act and no doubt, this Court and the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra held that the very object in bringing the P.O. Act is to reform and to avoid sending of the youth to serve the sentence along with criminals and also invoked P.O. Act in respect of offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC. But in the case of hand, it has to be noted that he went with weapon and tress-passed the house of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and caused injury of fracture on P.W.1 with sickle and the same caused fracture of tibia. No doubt, the petitioner was aged about 30 years at the time of the incident and not 18 years as observed by the Court in the judgment referred supra and he is also a married person and he was having motive in committing the offence since P.W.1 married his brother-in-law and he went with weapon and caused injury with sickle which is used for cutting the firewood. When such being the case, I am of the opinion that it is not a fit case to invoke the P.O. Act. Hence, I answer point No.(iii) as negative. Point No.(iv): 23. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed in part. (ii) The judgment of conviction for the offence punishable under Sections 326, 448 and 504 of IPC are confirmed. The sentence is reduced to one year instead of three years for the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC and the petitioner is ordered to pay compensation of Rs.75,000/-within six weeks from today. On deposit of the amount, an amount of 70,000/- is payable in favour of P.W.1 and remaining Rs.5,000/-shall vest with the State. (iii) If the petitioner fails to deposit the amount within the period, the petitioner shall undergo the sentence awarded by the Trial Court, which is confirmed by the Appellate Court. (iv) The sentence of six months imposed for the offence under Section 504 of IPC is hereby set aside and fine of Rs.1,000/-is imposed and the same shall vest with the State. (v) The sentence in respect of the offence punishable under Section 448 of IPC is unaltered.