R. S. Sengar S/o Shri R. B. S. Sengar v. State of Chhattisgarh
2022-11-11
NARENDRA KUMAR VYAS
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The petitioner who is substantially holding the post of Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat, Surajpur has been directed to perform duties as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Manendragarh District Koriya and in his place, the respondent No. 5, who was holding the substantive post of Dy. Collector has been posted as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Surajpur till the next date of hearing vide its order dated 22.04.2022, thereafter, the Respondent No. 1 has issued order dated 28.04.2022, by which one R.D. Sahu, Chief Executive Officer Baikunthpur has been posted as Chief Executive Officer, Janpand Panchyat Manendragarh District Koriya. Subsequently, Respondent No. 4 Collector Surajpur, District Surajapur has issued order dated 11.05.2022 by which the respondent No. 5 has been directed to be posted as Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Surajpur. The petitioner has challenged the legality and propriety of the orders dated 11.05.2022, 22.04.2022 and 28.04.2022 before this Court. 2. The brief facts as reflected from the records are that the petitioner who was working as Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Sonhat, District Koriya has been transferred as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Surajpur. In pursuance of the transfer order, he joined the duties on his transferred post. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 Commissioner Ambikapur has directed the petitioner to work as Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Manendragarh District Koriya vide order dated 22.04.2022 (Annexure P/2). Thereafter, Collector Surajpur vide its order dated 11.05.2022 has posted respondent No. 5 as Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Surajpur and vide order dated 28.04.2022, one R.D. Sahu has been posted as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Manendragarh as such there was no place of posting for the petitioner. 3. The petitioner has moved an application on 11.05.2022 for cancellation of attachment order before the Commissioner, Surguja and on 12.05.2022 before the Collector, Surajpur, but no action has been taken on his representation, therefore, he has filed the present writ petition and prayed for following reliefs which are as under:- (i) To kindly quash the impugned transfer order dated 18.05.2022 and dated 22.04.2022 issued by the respondent No.3 and to also quash the subsequent order dated 11.05.2022 issued by respondent No. 4 without authority and jurisdiction whereby the respondent No. 5 had been posted in place of the petitioner. (ii) To kindly issue writ to quo warranto thereby restraining the respondent No. 5 to work as Chief Executive Officer.
(ii) To kindly issue writ to quo warranto thereby restraining the respondent No. 5 to work as Chief Executive Officer. (iii) Any other order that may be deemed fit and just may also kindly be made including cost of the petition. 4. The State has filed their return contending that the Vice President of Surguja Area Tribal Development Authority has recommended the case of the petitioner for posting at Janpad Panchayat, Manendragarh on 24.03.2022 (Annexure R/1) and in pursuance of the recommendation made by the Vice President of Surguja Area Tribal Development Authority, the Commissioner has sought opinion from the Collector Surajpur regarding posting of the petitioner at Janpad Panchayat Manendragarh vide its memo dated 31.03.2022. In pursuance of the opinion given by the Collector, the Commissioner has passed the impugned order on 22.04.2022, the petitioner was relieved and he has given the charge on 11.05.2022 vide Annexure R/4 to respondent No. 5. It has also been contended that the State Government has posted so many Dy. Collectors who are on probation on the various Janpad Panchat as CEO, thus, it cannot be said that respondent No.5 was not competent to hold the post of Chief Executive Officer, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. The respondent No. 5 has also filed the return reiterating the stand taken by the State and further submitted that the writ of quo warranto cannot be issued unless it is specifically pleaded and substantially proved that the person holding any public post is holding such post in direct violation of any statutory provision. No such legislative mandate has been brought on record by the petitioner to question the competency of the respondent No. 5 to hold the post of Chief Executive Officer, therefore, the writ petition for issuance of quo warranto is not maintainable. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo and ors (2014) 1 SCC 161 . It has also been contended that qua the challenge to the order dated 22.04.2022, it is relevant to mention here that the petitioner has voluntarily relinquished the charge of Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Surajpur vide order dated 11.05.2022 (Annexure R/5), therefore, the petitioner cannot claim to be remained posted in that post.
It has also been contended that qua the challenge to the order dated 22.04.2022, it is relevant to mention here that the petitioner has voluntarily relinquished the charge of Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Surajpur vide order dated 11.05.2022 (Annexure R/5), therefore, the petitioner cannot claim to be remained posted in that post. He would further submit that the petitioner has not challenged the legality and validity of the order dated 22.04.2022 when the same order was passed and has already been executed the same by taking the charge of Chief Executive Janpad Panchayat Manendragarh, thus at this juncture executive order may not be opened for judicial review and would refer to the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this High Court in Writ Appeal No. 248 of 2015 in the case of Tarun Kanungo vs. State of Chhattisgarh on 15.05.2015 and would pray that the petition may kindly be dismissed. 6. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The issue to be determined by this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, writ of quo warranto against the respondent No. 5 is maintainable or not. 8. From the facts and material on record, it is quite vivid, that the Dy. Collector are being posted as Chief Executive Officer in various Janapad Panchayats. The petitioner is unable to point out any impediment regarding posting of Dy. Collectors as Chief Executive Officer, therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner that the respondent No. 5 is not eligible to be appointed cannot be considered and accordingly it is rejected. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo and ors (2014) 1 SCC 161 has held as under:- 21. From the aforesaid exposition of law it is clear as noon day that the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a writ of quo warranto is a limited one and can only be issued when the person holding the public office lacks the eligibility criteria or when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible.
That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible. The basic purpose of a writ of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on the constitutional courts to see that a public office is not held by usurper without any legal authority. While dealing with the writ of quo warranto another aspect has to be kept in view. Sometimes a contention is raised pertaining to doctrine of delay and laches in filing a writ of quo warranto. There is a difference pertaining to personal interest or individual interest on one hand and an interest by a citizen as a relator to the court on the other. The principle of doctrine of delay and laches should not be allowed any play because the person holds the public office as a usurper and such continuance is to be prevented by the court. The Court is required to see that the larger public interest and the basic concept pertaining to good governance are not thrown to the winds. 10. In view of above stated legal position and considering the facts of the case, the petition so far as relates to issuance of quo warranto against the respondent no. 5 deserves to be dismissed. 11. Now, so far as with regard to transfer of the petitioner is concerned, it is well settled legal position of law that the transfer is an incidence of service and no employee can claim to be remained posted at particular place and the law regarding interference by the court in transfer and posting of the employee has been well settled and it has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.O.I and Ors. vs. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 , Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors vs. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 532 , State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11SCC 402, State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
vs. S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 , Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors vs. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 532 , State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11SCC 402, State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. S. S. Kourav & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1056 , M. Sankaranarayanan, IAS vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 763 , N. K. Singh v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 423 and Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey 2009 (8) SCC 337 , and the conclusion may be summarised as under:- 1. Transfer is a condition of service. 2. It does not adversely affect the status or emoluments or seniority of the employee. 3. The employee has no vested right to get a posting at a particular place or choose to serve at a particular place for a particular time. 4. It is within the exclusive domain of the employer to determine as to at what place and for how long the services of a particular employee are required. 5. Transfer order should be passed in public interest or administrative exigency, and not arbitrarily or for extraneous consideration or for victimization of the employee nor it should be passed under political pressure. 6. There is a very little scope of judicial review by Courts/Tribunals against the transfer order and the same is restricted only if the transfer order is found to be in contravention of the statutory Rules or malafides are established. 7. In case of malafides, the employee has to make specific averments and should prove the same by adducing impeccable evidence. 8. The person against whom allegations of malafide is made should be impleaded as a party by name. 9. Transfer policy or guidelines issued by the State or employer does not have any statutory force as it merely provides for guidelines for the understanding of the Department personnel. 10. The Court does not have the power to annul the transfer order only on the ground that it will cause personal inconvenience to the employee, his family members and children, as consideration of these views fall within the exclusive domain of the employer. 11. If the transfer order is made in mid-academic session of the children of the employee, the Court/Tribunal cannot interfere. It is for the employer to consider such a personal grievance. 12.
11. If the transfer order is made in mid-academic session of the children of the employee, the Court/Tribunal cannot interfere. It is for the employer to consider such a personal grievance. 12. Adverting to the facts of the case, it is quite vivid, that the petitioner has been posted by the State Government on 07.08.2021 as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Surajpur, District Surajpur. In pursuance of the order, he has joined the place on 19.08.2021 thereafter he has been directed to work as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Manendragarh, District Koriya on 11.04.2022. Before he joined the place, the State Government has posted one R.D. Sahu as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Baikunthpur and no place of posting was given to the petitioner. The respondent/State has compelled the petitioner to run from pillar to post to discharge the duties. Earlier transfer order was passed by the State Government on 07.08.2021 and on the recommendation of MLA, who was the Vice President of Surguja Area Tribal Development Authority, the petitioner was transferred. This Court has to see to what extent the transfer on recommendation of Member of Legislative Assembly is permissible. 13. In the present case, the State has filed the return without any document to demonstrate any independent decision taken by the administrative head, while transferring the petitioner rather there was no scope left for the said purpose. Even from perusal of Annexure R/2 by which the Commissioner has proposed and sought opinion from the Collector Surajpur, no opinion has been placed on record. Even what are the material for transferring the petitioner that has not been placed on record, therefore, this Court is drawing adverse inference against the respondent/State, that no consultation with the department head has been done before transferring the petitioner vide order dated 22.04.2022. As such the decision has been rendered vulnerable as being influenced by the proposal and recommendations made by the local MLA, who was the Vice President of Surguja Area Tribal Development Authority. It is well settled that the member of the Legislative Assembly or the Minister concerned has right to make a recommendation, but these recommendations cannot be taken to be the final word. The underline principle for transfer is public interest or administrative exigency, which is conspicuously absent from the present case.
It is well settled that the member of the Legislative Assembly or the Minister concerned has right to make a recommendation, but these recommendations cannot be taken to be the final word. The underline principle for transfer is public interest or administrative exigency, which is conspicuously absent from the present case. In this case, even the State has not filed any document along with the return to whisper about the administrative exigency which has necessitated the petitioner to transfer. It is also well settled legal position of law that the elected representatives under the constitution are to work in the legislature and not as administrators. They cannot start interfering in the administration or the working of the Executive (Administrative head). It is they who are the best judges to decide how the department has to be administered and which employee should be transferred to which place. The politicians cannot be done the role of administrators. It is also well settled legal position of law that cannot have a right to claim that a particular employee should be posted at a particular station. This choice has to be made by the administrative head, i.e. the Executive and not by the legislators. Where an employee is to be posted must be decided by the administration. It is for the officers to show their independence by ensuring that they do not order transfer merely on the asking of an MLA or Minister. They can always send back a proposal showing why the same cannot be accepted. It is also well settled legal position of law that whenever any transfer is ordered not by the departments, but on the recommendation of a Minster or MLA, then before ordering the transfer, views of the administrative department must be ascertained. Only after ascertaining the views of the administrative department, the transfer may be ordered if approved by the administrative department, meaning thereby the views of the administrative department have essentially to be sought in the matters of transfer. What follows is that the views of the administrative department must reflect subjective satisfaction and conscious application of mind that the transfer is essential on account of administrative exigency and/or public interest or that the transfer of employee is necessary for the effective utilization of his/her services.
What follows is that the views of the administrative department must reflect subjective satisfaction and conscious application of mind that the transfer is essential on account of administrative exigency and/or public interest or that the transfer of employee is necessary for the effective utilization of his/her services. There is no such material placed on record by the State and the record does not reveal that the transfer has been effective utilization of the services of the petitioner and he has been transferred mainly on the basis of the recommendation made by the political executives. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the respondents cannot be countenanced and sustained. 14. Hon’ble High Court of Himanchal Pradesh in Ram Krishan Vs. District Education Officer, Indian Law Reports (Himachal Series) (1979) 8 HIM, 481 has held as under:- “x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x We hereby record our strong disapproval of such type of interference from outsiders in day-to-day administration of the State. If such interference is to be allowed, it would only mean that the government servants should run after those who are taking part in public life and in politics for getting better terms of service and a better place for their postings, and should do everything to please them and not to please the department by their ability, honesty and integrity. It need not be emphasised that such interference of outsiders in day-to-day administration of the State is highly detrimental to the public interest as it would result in nepotism and corruption wherein only those who can wield influence and purse, can succeed. Therefore, we want by this judgment to bring it to the notice of all concerned that sooner this type of interference is discouraged and stopped, the better for the administration and the people of this State. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x”. 15. Again the Hon’ble High Court of Himanchal Pradesh in the case of A.K. Vasudeva v. State of H.P. and others, Indian Law Reports (Himachal Series) (1981) 10 HIM, 359, has held as follows:- x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 21.
15. Again the Hon’ble High Court of Himanchal Pradesh in the case of A.K. Vasudeva v. State of H.P. and others, Indian Law Reports (Himachal Series) (1981) 10 HIM, 359, has held as follows:- x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 21. The practice of effecting transfers of teachers at the behest of every M.L.A. and other influential persons seems to be rampant in the department of Education in the State. The record is full of it. Indeed when the transfer proposals are prepared there is a column No.8 which is to show “recommended/proposed by”. I find that a transfer has been made even at the instance of the President Youth Congress (I) Subathu of a teacher Alaxender from Kanda to Subathu. It appears that no transfer is made except at the instance of somebody. Why was Shri Chaman Lal reluctant to admit his role, and why did he depose that he had nothing to do with the posting and transfer of any teacher? I had expected him to come out openly and frankly. He is not only a member of the Legislative Assembly but at the moment owns a responsible position as Chairman of a public corporation. x x x x xx x x x x x x ”. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x. 28. It is unfortunate indeed that despite the aforementioned pronouncement by this Court the malady of the politicians interfering in the administration of the Education Department is as rampant as before, if not worse. Apparently no one is bothered about any discipline in this department and the teachers and others are perhaps encouraged by this method to be beholden to the political persons instead of relying on the honesty and the integrity of the Director of Education and other officers for administering the department and ordering transfers. x x.” 16. The Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court of Himanchal Pradesh in CWP No. 2621 of 2020 decided on 17.08.2020 in case of Lekh Raj vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh and Ors. has held in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 as under:- 30.
x x.” 16. The Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court of Himanchal Pradesh in CWP No. 2621 of 2020 decided on 17.08.2020 in case of Lekh Raj vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh and Ors. has held in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 as under:- 30. It was further held that the elected representatives cannot have a right to claim that a particular employee should be posted at a particular station. The choice has to be made by administrative head i.e. Executive and not by the legislators. Where an employee is to be posted must be decided by the administration. It is for the officers to show their independence by ensuring that they do not order transfers merely on the asking of an MLA or Minister. They can always send back a proposal showing why the same cannot be accepted. 31. Lastly, it is held that whenever any transfer is ordered not by the departments but on the recommendations of a Minister or MLA, then before ordering the transfer, the views of the administrative department must be ascertained and only after ascertaining the views of the administrative department, the transfer may be ordered if approved by the administrative department, meaning thereby the views of the administrative department have essentially to be sought in the matters of transfer. What follows is that the views of the administrative department must reflect subjective satisfaction and conscious application of mind that the transfer is essential on account of administrative exigency and/or public interest or that the transfer of employee is necessary for the effective utilization of his/her services. 32. Adverting to the present case, the order of transfer cannot withstand judicial scrutiny as the same does not show that the petitioner has been transferred on account of administrative exigency and/or public interest. The record further does not reveal that the transfer has been effected for the effective utilization of the services of the petitioner and he has been transferred merely on the basis of the recommendations made by the political executive. 17. In view of above stated factual and legal position and considering the fact that no administrative exigency has been placed on record to transfer the petitioner, order dated 22.04.2022 and 11.05.2022 deserve to be quashed and the order of transfer of respondent No. 5 in place of petitioner is also set aside.
17. In view of above stated factual and legal position and considering the fact that no administrative exigency has been placed on record to transfer the petitioner, order dated 22.04.2022 and 11.05.2022 deserve to be quashed and the order of transfer of respondent No. 5 in place of petitioner is also set aside. The State is at liberty to place the respondent No. 5 anywhere else. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is allowed in part.