ORDER : 1. The present petitioners, who are defendant Nos.10, 11 and 12, in O.S.No.978/2014, in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge and J.M.F.C., Magadi, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘trial Court’), have filed this writ petition seeking quashing of the order dated 05.08.2015 passed by the trial Court by allowing the interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff therein under Order III Rule 2 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as ‘CPC’), in permitting the Special Power of Attorney Holder of the plaintiff to proceed further in the suit. 2. Undisputedly and as could be seen from the copy of the plaint, which is produced at Annexure-‘A’, the suit was filed for the relief of partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties by metes and bounds and also for permanent injunction. The present petitioners as defendant Nos.10, 11 and 12 appeared in the matter and filed their statement of objections. It is thereafter, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory application under Order III Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, seeking permission to appoint Special Power of Attorney. The said application came to be allowed through the impugned order. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners in his argument submitted that no opportunity was given to the present petitioners to file their statement of objections to the said application and to address their arguments, on the other hand, on the very same day of filing the IA., the impugned order came to be passed by allowing the application. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contends that, by virtue of the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another –vs- Indusind Bank Ltd., and others, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 217 , the Power of Attorney Holder cannot give evidence on certain aspects which are exclusively to the personal knowledge of the executant of the Power of Attorney. In such an event, the trial Court ought not to have allowed the application. 4. Vide order dated 27.04.2017, notice to respondent Nos.2, 4 to 8 was dispensed with. Respondent Nos.3 and 10 though served, have remained absent. The only contesting respondent is respondent No.1, who is the plaintiff in the trial Court. In such an event, the trial Court ought not to have allowed the application. 4. Vide order dated 27.04.2017, notice to respondent Nos.2, 4 to 8 was dispensed with. Respondent Nos.3 and 10 though served, have remained absent. The only contesting respondent is respondent No.1, who is the plaintiff in the trial Court. Though the said respondent No.1 was being represented by her learned counsel, however, the said learned counsel had remained absent on several dates of hearing, as such, with a reasoned order, this Court on 09.03.2022, appointed an Amicus Curiae for respondent No.1. Accordingly, respondent No.1 is now being represented by learned Amicus Curiae. 5. Learned Amicus Curiae in her arguments submitted that non-giving of an opportunity to the present petitioners to file their objections to the impugned IA. filed under Order III Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC is not violative of principles of natural justice since the same has not caused any prejudice to the interest of the petitioners. In her support, she relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in The Chairman, State Bank of India and others –vs-M.J.James, reported in MANU/SC/1069/2021. She further submitted that, if at all Special Power of Attorney Holder cannot speak about those facts which are exclusively to the personal knowledge of the plaintiff, then, by appointing Special Power of Attorney Holder, the plaintiff attracts the risk in the suit, for which, the defendants should not bother. In case the defendants succeed to show that the Special Power of Attorney Holder had no personal knowledge of certain aspects which are attempted to be brought in the trial Court, then, the risk would be more on the plaintiff since the trial Court in certain circumstances can even draw an adverse inference. 6. A perusal of the order sheet, including the impugned order, which is produced at Annexure-‘D’, would go to show that the application under Order III Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, came to be filed on 05.08.2015 and that on the very same day, the trial Court proceeded to pass its order in few sentence, allowing the said application. A perusal of the said order does not show that the trial Court had given any opportunity to the defendants i.e., the present petitioners, who were only the contesting defendants in the suit, to file their objections, if any, to the said application. A perusal of the said order does not show that the trial Court had given any opportunity to the defendants i.e., the present petitioners, who were only the contesting defendants in the suit, to file their objections, if any, to the said application. It is on this point, learned counsel for the petitioners is contending that it is in violation of natural justice, as such, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 7. Our Hon’ble Apex Court in M.J.James’s case (supra), had an opportunity of analysing several issues on the concept of natural justice and when the alleged violation of natural justice is required to be entertained. In Paragraph-25 of its judgment, it has reiterated the legal position on the point which was enunciated by it previously in the case of State of U.P. –vs- Sudhir Kumar Singh and others, reported in 2020 SCC Online SC 847, in the following terms : “39. An analysis of the aforesaid judgment thus reveals: (1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused. (2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest. (3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. (4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. (4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person. (5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.” A reading of the above legal position, more particularly, Nos.1, 2 and 5, the same would go to show that natural justice cannot be taken as a shield in every matter since it is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary. It is only in the fit cases to remedy injustice, the Court has to consider the natural justice. Where procedural or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Thus, there must be some prejudice caused to the litigant by the non-compliance of principles of natural justice. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. 8. In the instant case, no doubt, the trial Court has not shown that it had given an opportunity to the defendants to file their objections, if any, to the application filed under Order III Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, but, proceeded to allow the said application on the very same day by passing a cryptic order. However, there is nothing on the material to show that by not giving any such opportunity to the defendants therein (the petitioners herein), any prejudice has been caused to the interest of the defendants. However, there is nothing on the material to show that by not giving any such opportunity to the defendants therein (the petitioners herein), any prejudice has been caused to the interest of the defendants. Considering the nature of the suit and the contention of the parties also, which can be ascertained by the copies of the plaint and the written statement filed to it at Annexures-‘A’ and ‘B’, it cannot be inferred that merely by the appointment of Special Power of Attorney Holder by allowing the IA. filed under Order III Rule 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, any prejudice has been caused to the interest of the defendants or there is any likelihood of causing any prejudice to the interest of the defendants. On the contrary, by getting a Special Power of Attorney Holder appointed on her behalf, if at all any inconvenience that may arise for the plaintiff, she herself is agreeable to accept it and to face it. Thus, in the absence of any prejudice or harm to the interest of the defendants being caused or likely to be caused, the alleged violation of non-giving of an opportunity to file their statement of objections to the IA., cannot be considered as a violation of natural justice resulting in any prejudice to the interest of the defendants and thus, warranting any interference in the impugned order. 9. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that, since the Special Power of Attorney Holder is not empowered to give his evidence with respect to those facts which are exclusively to the knowledge of the executant of the Power of Attorney, the trial Court ought not to have allowed the application. In that regard, Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani’s case (supra) has been relied upon by him. A reading of the said judgment, more particularly, Paragraphs-12, 13 and 14, towards which, the attention of this Court was brought, though goes to show that the Hon’ble Apex Court has stated the limitations of a Power of Attorney Holder to lead evidence on behalf of the plaintiff in certain matters, but, it does not expressly bar a Power of Attorney Holder to lead his evidence. However, in such a situation, where a Power of Attorney Holder leads evidence on behalf of the executant of the Power of Attorney, the consequential risks, if any, which would arise from appointment of such a Special Power of Attorney Holder, would be naturally taken by the executant of the Power of Attorney, for which, the other party need not have to unnecessarily worry in the matter. On the other hand, the risk which the executant of the Power of Attorney faces in the suit during the trial may be encashed by the opposite party, however, in accordance with law. Thus, since there is no prohibition for appointing a Power of Attorney, though such a Power of Attorney may face some restrictions being exclusively appointed as a Power of Attorney, that itself cannot be held that a Power of Attorney cannot be appointed in a suit like the one on hand. 10. Further, subsequent to Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani’s case (supra), our Hon’ble Apex Court in Man kaur (Dead) by LRs. –vs- Hartar Singh Sangha, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 512 , was pleased to elaborate the principles about the scope of the Power of Attorney to participate in the legal proceedings in Paragraph-18 of its Judgment and it was observed as below : “18. We may now summarise for convenience, the position as to who should give evidence in regard to matters involving personal knowledge: (a) An attorney-holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit. (b) If the attorney-holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney-holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney-holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved. (c) The attorney-holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge. (c) The attorney-holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge. (d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney-holder, necessarily the attorney-holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorised managers/attorney-holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney-holders. (e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney-holder, the principal has to examine that attorney-holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney-holder. (f) Where different attorney-holders had dealt with the matter at different stages of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all the attorney-holders will have to be examined. (g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his “state of mind” or “conduct”, normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney-holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his “bona fide” need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his “readiness and willingness” fall under this category. There is however a recognised exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or “readiness and willingness”. There is however a recognised exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or “readiness and willingness”. Examples of such attorney-holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad.” Lastly, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the executant of the Power of Attorney i.e., the plaintiff herself could have appeared personally in the matter or could have led her evidence through a Commissioner, as such also, the application should not have been allowed, is also not acceptable, for the reason that, as on the date of the suit, which was in the year 2014, the plaintiff has shown her age as 80 years. Thus, as on date, her age would be 88 years. Furthermore, she is a lady. Thus, a woman aged 88 years, appointing a Special Power of Attorney Holder by expressing her inability to appear in the matter and depose in the suit, cannot be considered as a frivolous reason or with an ulterior motive. Thus, I do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned order. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. In view of disposal of the petition, IA.No.4/2016 filed for extension of interim order does not survive for consideration. The Court while acknowledging the service rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae for respondent No.1 – Smt. Archana K.M., recommends honorarium of a sum of not less than Rs.4,000/- to her payable by the Registry.