ORDER : The petitioner filed a declaration under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short ‘the Act’) in File No.F1/318/76 before the respondent No.2 declaring that she and her husband possessed an extent of 3698.18 sq. meters of land within the urban agglomeration of Hyderabad and New Delhi. Pursuant thereto, the respondent No.2 prepared a draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act on 28.08.1978 determining that the petitioner is holding excess land of 2698.18 sq. meters in Sy.No.20 of Habsiguda Village, Ranga Reddy District (which according to the petitioner is situated within the peripheral area of Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration). The petitioner submitted an exemption application on 07.08.1979 under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent No.3 issued final statement on 14.09.1979 under Section 8(4) of the Act confirming draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act. However, it is stated that the petitioner has not received notice or statement under Section 8(4) or 9 of the Act at any point of time. 2. Section 10(1) notification is said to have been issued published in the Gazette dated 15.05.1980. In such circumstances, the petitioner filed WP.No.5392 of 1980 challenging final statement dated 19.09.1979 and sought a direction to consider the application dated 07.08.1979 for exemption. This Court vide order dated 27.10.1980 in WPMP.No.8060 0f 1980 stayed the publication of Section 10(3) notification in the Gazette. Subsequently, WP.No.5392 of 1980 was allowed by order dated 26.09.1986 following the order passed by this Court in WP.No.5968 of 1983 dated 18.09.1984. 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that final statement under Section 9 of the Act dated 19.09.1979 is quashed in view of WP.No.5392 of 1980 being allowed. 4. It appears that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.5013 Revenue dated 19.12.1980 allotting the excess land of the petitioner to the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA). Subsequently, G.O.Ms.No.492 Revenue dated 27.05.1993 was issued by way of re-allotment in favour of the respondent No.4. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as WP.No.5392 of 1980 was allowed, G.O.Ms.No.5013 dated 19.12.1980 and G.O.Ms.No.492 dated 27.05.1993 are non-est in the eye of law. Subsequently, G.O.Ms.No.492 Revenue dated 27.05.1993 was issued by way of re-allotment in favour of the respondent No.4. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as WP.No.5392 of 1980 was allowed, G.O.Ms.No.5013 dated 19.12.1980 and G.O.Ms.No.492 dated 27.05.1993 are non-est in the eye of law. He further submitted that the respondent No.1 addressed letter dated 03.03.1981 to the respondent No.3 seeking information as to how the excess land was allotted in favour of HUDA when Section 10(3) notification is stayed by this Court and called for a report. However, the respondent No.3 has not submitted any report in that regard. The petitioner has entered into an agreement of sale with one Rajyalakshmi Co-operative Housing Society to alienate the land as per the various guidelines issued by the Central Government as well as by the State Government. The State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.136 dated 28.01.1981 wherein it permitted the excess holder to transfer the excess land in favour of Co-operative Housing Societies with certain conditions. The petitioner filed an exemption application under G.O.Ms.No.136 on 25.04.1981. As the Government was not taking any steps to dispose of the said application, the petitioner filed WP.No.4100 of 1981 seeking for a direction to the respondent No.1 to consider the said application. WP.No.4100 of 1981 was disposed of directing the respondent No.1 to dispose of the exemption application filed under G.O.Ms.No.136 dated 28.01.1981 within a period of eight weeks. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 rejected the exemption application by memo dated 23.09.1981 on the ground that the land of the petitioner was already allotted to HUDA. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner filed WP.No.9168 of 1981 seeking to quash G.O.Ms.No.5013 dated 19.12.1980. The writ petition was disposed of by order dated 22.01.1982 directing the respondent No.1 to consider the exemption application by cancelling the allotment made in favour of HUDA. 7. It is contended by the petitioner that ignoring the directions of this Court, Section 10(3) notification was published in the Gazette on 07.05.1984. By that date, WP.No.5392 of 1980 was pending and there was a stay order not to publish Section 10(3) notification. Thus, Section 10(3) notification is bad in law in view of WP.No.5392 of 1980 being allowed. Section 10(3) notification as well as other proceedings are null and void. By that date, WP.No.5392 of 1980 was pending and there was a stay order not to publish Section 10(3) notification. Thus, Section 10(3) notification is bad in law in view of WP.No.5392 of 1980 being allowed. Section 10(3) notification as well as other proceedings are null and void. The petitioner filed WP.No.9860of 1984 challenging the rejection order of the respondent and obtained interim stay of all further proceedings in WPMP.No.12636 of 1984 dated 25.06.1984. The writ petition was disposed of on 26.11.1984 following the judgment reported in 1984 (2) APLG 158 by directing the respondent No.1 to consider the exemption application as per the observations made by the Division Bench. It is stated that the Division Bench in the batch of cases quashed Section 10(3) and 10(5) notifications and notices as illegal. 8. It is submitted that in the present case, Section 10(3) and 10(5) notification also are deemed to have been quashed without which the respondents could not have proceeded further. That on 22.11.1988, the Government issued a memo stating that exemption applications cannot be considered in view of the pendency of SLP before the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Government has withdrawn SLP and thus, the judgment reported in 1984 (2) APLJ 158 has become final and the respondent No.1 was bound to consider the application of the petitioner for exemption under G.O.Ms.No.136 and ought to have passed orders on merits. In the meanwhile, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.733 Revenue (UC-II) Department dated 31.10.1988 granting exemption up to Ac.5.00 of land situated in the peripheral area excluding the road and open areas. Admittedly, the land of the petitioner is situated in the peripheral area and the same has been admitted by the respondent No.3 in his note file. One M.G. Krishna, who was holding the land in Plot Nos.7 and 8 of Habsiguda Village and who was declared as excess vacant land holder, filed an appeal before the respondent No.2, which was allowed and the matter was remitted back to the respondent No.3 to examine the applicability of exemption application under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988. The respondent No.3 passed revised orders under Section 8(4) of the Act exempting the entire land of M.G. Krishna in terms of G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 and he was declared as non-surplus holder. 9. The respondent No.3 passed revised orders under Section 8(4) of the Act exempting the entire land of M.G. Krishna in terms of G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 and he was declared as non-surplus holder. 9. It is submitted that the case of the petitioner is also similar to M.G. Krishna and as per G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 and subsequent G.Os., the petitioner is also entitled for similar benefit. In the reported judgment of this Court in Nalla Yakoob v. Govt. of AP [ 1992 (2) ALT 473 ] it was held that no exemption application is necessary under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 and it automatically applies, provided that the land is situated in peripheral area and the maximum extent to be excluded in Ac.5.00 excluding road and open area. Thus, the land of the petitioner is automatically exempted under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988. 10. It is contended that instead of passing revised orders under Section 8(4), as per Lr. No.F1/318/76 dated 20.02.1996 of respondent No.3, respondent No.2 kept the matter in cold storage and after the Act was repealed with effect from 27.03.2008, the respondents No.1 to 3 with a malafide intention created the fabricated panchanama dated 16.02.2008, allegedly, taking over possession of the land. It is stated that as per the note file, which has been obtained by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act, the respondent No.3 himself admitted in February 2009 that no panchanama or sketch is available in the file. Apparently, the panchanama dated 16.02.2008, furnished to the petitioner is antedated. Further, Section 10(6) notice was not available in the file and therefore, fresh 10(6) proceedings were prepared for approval and there are no approval proceedings available in the file. The respondent No.3, with a view to defeat the benefit obtained by the petitioner under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 as well as under the ULC Repeal Act, 1999, created the whole proceedings. There was no notice issued to the petitioner under Section 10(5) of the Act. Hence, the action of the respondents is violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. 11. There was no notice issued to the petitioner under Section 10(5) of the Act. Hence, the action of the respondents is violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. 11. The case of the respondent No.3, as stated in the counter affidavit, is that the exemption application of the petitioner was considered and memo No.1479/U.C.II/79-7 dated 23.09.1981 was issued rejecting the case of the petitioner and also in accordance with the judgment of this Court in WP.No.9168 of 1981 dated 22.01.1982, the exemption petition of the declarant was considered and memo No.2502/UC.II/81-4 dated 25.03.1984 was issued rejecting her application. This Court in WP.No.5392 of 1980 passed the following order dated 06.02.1981: “No counter is filed. Interim stay is made absolute in case if the publication was not made prior to October 27, 1980.” 12. It is stated that in the present case, notice under Section 10(1) of the Act was issued on 15.05.1980, which is prior to 27.10.1980. The above facts have been submitted by the Government to this Court through Government Pleader vide memo dated 27.06.1981. This Court, while referring the judgment in (Katya Co-operative Building Society Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1984 2 APLJ 158]) categorically directed the application of the petitioner for exemption under Section 20 shall be considered. However, this court has not set aside the notification and other proceedings under Section 8(1) and 8(4) and notices under Section 10(3) and 10(5) of the act at any point of time. The grievance of the petitioner was examined umpteen times and was rejected. The petitioner has not challenged the rejection orders. Section 10(5) notice was received by the petitioner and challenged notices under Section 10(3) and 10(5) in WP.No.9860 of 1984. The possession was taken over from the petitioner and handed over to the respondent No.4. The writ petition is hit by laches. 13. Mr. B. Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently submitted that stay of publication of 10(3) declaration was granted vide interim order dated 27.10.1980 and later the writ petition was allowed by order dated 26.09.1986. Hence, the question of issuing Section 10(5) notice and Section 10(6) proceedings and taking over possession of the land subsequent thereto does not arise. The entire process is vitiated, it is illegal and void. Hence, the question of issuing Section 10(5) notice and Section 10(6) proceedings and taking over possession of the land subsequent thereto does not arise. The entire process is vitiated, it is illegal and void. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court and also a decision of this Court: SURJIT SINGH v. HARBANS SINGH, (1995) 6 SCC 50 ; SATYABRATA BISWAS v. KALYAN KUMAR KISKU, AIR 1994 SCC 1837; GHANSHYAM SARDA v. SASHIKANTH JHA, 2017 (1) SCC 599 and NALLA YAKOOB v. GOVT. OF AP, 1992 (2) ALT 473 14. The Supreme Court in SURJIT SINGH’s case (1 supra) held as under: “4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes ...” In SATYABRATA BISWAS’s case (2 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: “...Any act done in the teeth of the order of status quo is clearly illegal...” In GHANSHYAM SARDA’s case (3 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: “25. We now come to the crucial question as to the effect of transfer or alienation of Katihar property in violation of the order of 8-5-2014 [Ghanshyam Sarda v. Shiv Shankar Trading Co., (2015) 1 SCC 298 , 316]. The law on the point is well settled in the decision of this Court in DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., [ (1996) 4 SCC 622 ] that legal consequences of what has been done in breach of or in violation of the order of stay or injunction can be undone and the parties could be put back to the same position as they stood immediately prior to such order of stay or injunction. Paras 18 to 21 of the decision in DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. are quite instructive and are: (SCC pp. 636-37) 19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah [ AIR 1975 Mad 270 : 1975 SCC OnLine Mad 73] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, AIR 1986 Cal 220 : 1985 SCC OnLine Cal 146]. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order. 21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by overruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give way. 21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by overruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give way. The court must ensure full justice between the parties before it.” In NALLA YAKOOB’s case (4 supra), this Court held that exemption under G.O. Ms. No.733 dated 31.10.1988 is a general exemption and automatic not contemplating any application, when the land is situated in the peripheral area. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Harender Pershad, learned Special Government Pleader, submitted that exemption application filed under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act was rejected and possession of the land was taken after issuance of Section 10(5) notice and Section 10(6) proceedings. He further submitted that WP.No.5392 of 1980 was allowed by order dated 26.09.1986 following the judgment of this Court in WP.No.5968 of 1983 dated 18.09.1984. That WP.No.5968 of 1983 was allowed by holding that the declaration under Section 10(5) is contrary to the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act and Rule 5 of the Rules and declaration under Section 10(3) and notice under Section 10(5) were quashed and the respondents were directed to dispose of the application of the petitioner therein for exemption in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 20(1) of the Act and guidelines issued in that behalf. He referred to the observations of the learned Division Bench made in para 40 and contended that the only ground on which the writ petition was allowed was that the application for exemption should be decided before preparation of draft statement under Section 8 of the Act. 16. Heard Mr. B. Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Special Government Pleader. Perused the record. 17. WP.No.5392 of 1980 was filed by the petitioner challenging draft-cum-final statement (Section 8(4) order) dated 19.09.1979 in C.C.No.F1/31876and further to direct the respondents to consider the application of the petitioner dated 07.08.1979 for exemption (under Section 20(1)(a) of the ULC Act). In WPMP.No.8060 of 1980 in WP.No.5392 of 1980 the petitioner sought for an interim order directing the respondents not to publish declaration in Gazette under Section 10(3) of the Act. This court passed interim order dated 27.10.1980 staying the publication of Section 10(3) notification. In WPMP.No.8060 of 1980 in WP.No.5392 of 1980 the petitioner sought for an interim order directing the respondents not to publish declaration in Gazette under Section 10(3) of the Act. This court passed interim order dated 27.10.1980 staying the publication of Section 10(3) notification. The interim order dated 27.10.1980 was made absolute by passing the following order on 06.02.1981: “No counter is filed. Interim stay is made absolute in case if the Publication was not made prior to October 27, 1980.” Later, WP.No.5392 of 1980 was allowed by passing the following order dated 26.09.1986: “It is represented that the point raised in this writ petition is already covered by a decision of this Court in W.P.No.5698/83 dt.18-9-84. Therefore for the same reason this petition is allowed. No costs.” 18. The respondents claim to have issued Section 10(3) notification on 26.04.1993. Mr. Harender Pershad, learned Special Government Pleader, submitted that the exemption application of the petitioner was considered as per order dated 22.01.1984 in WP.No.9168 of 1981 and was rejected. He further submitted that interim order was made absolute subject to the condition “if the publication was not made prior to 27.10.1980.” It is argued that publication refers to Section 10(1) notification and the same was published on 15.05.1980 and thus, there was no violation of orders dated 27.10.1980 and 06.02.1981 in WPMP.No.8060 of 1980 in WP.No.5392 of 1982. Such contention is without merit being contrary to the record. 19. The order dated 27.10.1980 was passed staying Section 10(3) notification and further as pointed out above in preceding paragraph relief in WPMP.No.8060 of 1980 was sought only for staying Section 10(3) notification. The reference to “publication” in order dated 06.02.1981 cannot be anything but Section 10(3) publication. The action of the respondents in issuing Section 10(3) notification dated 07.05.1984; Section 10(5) notification dated 28.06.1984 and Section 10(6) order dated 07.01.1985 is in violation and derogation of orders dated 27.10.1980 and 06.02.1981 when the stay of Section 10(3) notification was in operation. Thus, Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) notifications are void. The consequential panchanama dated 16.02.2008 is vitiated and illegal. On this sole ground, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 20. Thus, Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) notifications are void. The consequential panchanama dated 16.02.2008 is vitiated and illegal. On this sole ground, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 20. It also needs to be noted that eventually, WP.No.5392 of 1980 came to be allowed by order dated 26.09.1986 setting aside the draft-cum-final statement dated 19.09.1979 in File No.C.C.F1/318/76 and all consequential proceedings including notifications under Section 10(3), 10(5) and order under Section 10(6) stand nullified. Thus even if exemption applications of the petitioner under Section 20(1)(b) of the Act vide memos dated 23.09.1981, 12.11.1981 and 25.03.1984 were rejected, the same becomes insignificant having no bearing on the relief claimed in this writ petition. 21. Another point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the subject lands are situated in peripheral area and exempted under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988. The subject lands being situated in peripheral area and less than Acs.5.00 is not disputed by the respondents. 22. The ratio in NALLA YAKOOB’s case (Supra 4) was followed in KAUSHALYA S. KEWAL RAMANI v. GOVERNMENT Of ANDHRA PRADESH, (2012) 5 ALD 54 : (2012) 4 ALT 202 . In the said case, Section 8(4) order was passed on 25.02.1980. Section 10(5) notice was issued on 22.12.1996, Section 10(6) order was passed on 13.02.2007 and possession of the land was alleged to have been taken over by the Government on 13.03.2008. Taking note of G.O. Ms. No.733 dated 31.10.1998 and G.O. Ms. No.217 dated 18.04.2000, the following observations were made by the learned single Judge at Paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9: 7. The petitioner's Counsel placing reliance on G.O. Ms. No. 733 Revenue (UC. II) Department dated 31.10.1988 contended that the Government exempted vacant land to the maximum extent of Acs. 5.00 located in peripheral area of Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration in excess of the ceiling limit from the provisions of Chapter-III of the Act. Subsequently, G.O. Ms. No. 217 Revenue (UC.II) Department, dated 18.4.2000 was passed amending G.O. Ms. No. 733 to the effect that exemption in G.O. Ms. No. 733 does not apply where the Government has taken over possession of the surplus land under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act from the declarants as on 31.10.1988. As pointed out earlier, in, this case, till the year 2006, the proceedings under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act were not taken by the authorities concerned. No. 733 does not apply where the Government has taken over possession of the surplus land under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act from the declarants as on 31.10.1988. As pointed out earlier, in, this case, till the year 2006, the proceedings under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act were not taken by the authorities concerned. Therefore, the exemption in G.O. Ms. No. 733 is applicable to the case of the declaration by the 1st petitioner's late husband. 8. This Court in Nalla Yakoob v. Government of A.P. Revenue (UC. II) Department, 1992 (2) ALT 473 , held that there is general exemption granted under G.O. Ms. No. 733 Revenue (UC2) Department, dated 31.10.1988 and it does not contemplate making any application by any individual claiming the said exemption. This Court observed as follows: “The liability to surrender the excess land has to be determined now in the context of GO. Ms. No. 733 Revenue (UC2) Department, dated 31.10.1988 and not otherwise. This G.O. Ms. No. 733, dated 31.10.1988 has been issued by the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 20(1)(a) of the Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 enunciating a policy to grant exception of vacant land in the peripheral area as specified in Column (3) of Schedule-I to the Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 prescribing a maximum of 5 acres of land, that too, after making provision for roads, open spaces, hospitals and school. This is a general exemption granted not contemplating or making any application by any individual. This exemption is automatic, provided, two conditions are complied; namely (1) that the land is in peripheral area; and (2) that the maximum extent is five acres exclusive of the land set apart towards roads, open spaces, school and hospital.” 9. In that view of the matter, the notice dated 22.12.2006 issued under Section 10 (5) of the Act and order passed on 13.2.2007 under Section 10(6) of the Act and the alleged taking over possession of the surplus land on 13.3.2008 are wholly without jurisdiction and ultra virus.” 23. In the present case, possession is alleged to been taken over by the Government on 16.02.2008 i.e., after issuance of G.O. Ms. No.733 dated 31.10.1988. In the present case, possession is alleged to been taken over by the Government on 16.02.2008 i.e., after issuance of G.O. Ms. No.733 dated 31.10.1988. In the light of the law laid down by this Court in NALLA YAKOOB’s case (Supra 4) and KAUSHALYA’s case (Supra 5), exemption of land to an extent of Acs.5.00 in peripheral area is automatic and is a general exemption, the only exception being possession of land should not have been taken prior to 31.10.1988. The same is the fact situation in the instant case as the possession was not taken prior to 31.10.1988 and allegedly taken over on 16.02.2008, which is nonest and illegal. 24. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed setting aside the order under Section 8(4) of the Act, Notifications under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, order under Section 10(6) of the Act and all consequential proceedings in File No.F1/318/76; consequently G.O. Ms. No.492 dated 27.05.1993 is quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous Applications, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed.