ORDER 1. This appeal is directed against order dated 18.01.2018 passed by Learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No.1577/2017 whereby the petition against cancellation of lease has been partly allowed only to the extent that while maintaining the order of cancellation of lease, order of recovery of Rs.19,50,000/- has been set aside. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the controversy involved in the appeal necessary for adjudication are that the appellant was holding a mining lease on certain terms and conditions. While he was undertaking mining operation, certain allegations were made that the appellant had unauthorisedly sublet the lease in favour of third person which had unauthorisedly led to issuance of a show cause notice on 15.04.2010. The appellant filed reply to the show cause notice denying allegation of subletting and offering an explanation that the engagement of other persons was for limited purposes of collection of Ravannas and depositing the amount apart from the documents. The appellant also brought to the notice of the authorities that the subsisting agreement/ power of attorney has been immediately cancelled. Affidavits of Tek Chand Garg and Mohd. Rafiq which are allowed to be sublet also submitted with agreement of cancellation on 15.04.2010 itself. 3. It however appears that the matter was not closed and later on another notice came to be issued on 05.05.2015 requiring the appellant to deposit the amount of Rs.19,50,000/- failing which appropriate action would be initiated under the Rules of 1986. 4. The appellant again filed reply to the same. Finally impugned order dated 12.06.2015 came to be passed by which the mining lesae of the appellant was cancelled by the Mining Engineer Bharatpur. Another notice thereafter came to be issued on 16.06.2015 reminding the appellant that he is liable to pay Rs.19,50,000/-, which if not paid appears to be of land revenue. 5. The appellant preferred a writ petition which was also disposed off on 17.10.2016 directing the appellant to approach the revisional authority to decide the review petition. Finally the revisional authority also dismissed the appeal on 19.12.2016 giving rise to writ petition filed by the appellant wherein the order passed is impugned in this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argued that the impugned order by which lease has been cancelled suffers from several defects which render the order unsustainable in law. Finally the revisional authority also dismissed the appeal on 19.12.2016 giving rise to writ petition filed by the appellant wherein the order passed is impugned in this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argued that the impugned order by which lease has been cancelled suffers from several defects which render the order unsustainable in law. The first submission is that the show cause notice which was initially issued to the petitioner on 15.04.2010 and subsequent notice again issued on 15.05.2015 did not propose cancellation of lease deed. It is argued that the notices only required the petitioner to additional an amount of Rs.19,50,000/- which says that the party even after having held the appellant guilty of breach authority exercised its discretion behind only to impose fine and not to cancel the lease. Second submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the order of cancellation otherwise is in excess of jurisdiction and authority conferred on the authority under the provisions contained in Rule 18 (21) of the Rules of 1986. Elaborating his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the authority to take action is arrived at only in case of failure of the lease holder to remedy the breach in respect of which notices have been issued. It is the case of the appellant that as soon as notice was issued the subsisting power of attorney in favour of one Rafiq was instantly cancelled on 15th of April itself and this document was also placed before the concerned authority. The agreement with the other person namely Tek Chand had lived out its life as it attained natural demise way back on 31.12.2008. Therefore, the breach having being remedied, there was no action required to be taken against the appellant. The third submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the competent authority having considered the reply of the appellant had formed an opinion by accepting the explanation which was reflected in its comment forwarded to the Accountant General wherein he clearly stated that the explanation was accepted. Having formed such an opinion, the authority could not have again changed its view to pass the impugned order. 7. Having formed such an opinion, the authority could not have again changed its view to pass the impugned order. 7. Last but not the least, it is submitted that the impugned order shows that the authority has not applied its mind to material on record with regard to alleged breach much less considering the same in view of the provisions contained in Rule 18 (21) but it has acted mechanically on the basis of the observations made by the Accountant General. The order is completely non speaking and does not assign any reason or an opinion as to how the authority arrived at such a conclusion that the appellant committed breach of the rules rendering his lease liable to be cancelled. In support of his submissions learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill & anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 , Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad & Ors. reported in 2012(4) SCC 407 , Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji reported in 1952(1) SCR 135, Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR2008, SC 1771, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors. reported in 2005(7) SCC 627 , M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others reported in 2010(9) SCC 496. 8. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General, supporting the order passed by learned Single Judge would submit that in the present case, a notice was issued to the appellant on the allegation of having unauthorisedly sublet the mining lease in favour of a third person which was not disputed by the appellant. He would submit that the appellant rather came up with the explanation that later on, he had cancelled the agreement with third party which means that the appellant had admitted breach committed by him. Therefore, it is contended that the appellant was liable for appropriate action. 9. Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the appellant having offered the lease area in favour of one Tek Chand earlier, had already committed serious breach and therefore appropriate action was taken against him. Therefore, it is contended that the appellant was liable for appropriate action. 9. Learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that the appellant having offered the lease area in favour of one Tek Chand earlier, had already committed serious breach and therefore appropriate action was taken against him. He would submit that though in the first notice dated 15.04.2010 penalty was proposed being ten times the amount of penalty, in the second notice which was given to the petitioner on 05.05.2015, it was clearly stated that if the amount of penalty is not paid appropriate action would be taken against him. As admittedly the appellant failed to pay Rs.19,50,000/- despite repeated notices, the authority was left with no option but to cancel the lease which is permissible under the law. On other two submissions of learned counsel for the appellant, learned Additional Advocate General would reply by submitting that the comments offered to the Accountant General did not take away the power of the competent authority to decide whether a case of cancellation of lease is made or not. Lastly it is submitted that the order is speaking one and though it may not contain detailed reasons, reasons in brief are found in the order therefore it cannot be said that the order is non speaking or does not contain any reason. 10. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the impugned order of cancellation of lease vide order dated 12.06.2015 is unsustainable in law. 11. The source of authority to take action by the mining engineer under the provisions of Rule 18(21) of the Rules of 1986 was wrongly invoked. It is reproduced hereinbelow: '18 (21) (a) In case of any breach on the part of the lessee of any covenant or condition contained in the lease, the competent authority may determine the lease and take possession of the said premises and forfeit the security money or in the alternative may impose payment of a penalty not exceeding twice the amount of annual dead rent of the lease. Such action shall not be taken unless the lessee has failed to remedy the breach after serving of 15 days notice; (b) The Government may also at any time after serving the aforesaid notice enter upon the said premises and distain all or any of the minerals or movable property may carry away, distain or order the sale of the property so distained or so much of it as will suffice for the satisfaction of the rent or royalty due and all cost the expenses occasioned by the non-payment thereof.' A fair and logical interpretation of the rule would be that even in a case if there is a breach found, the authority could take action only when the lessee has failed to remove the breach after expiry of 15 days notice. That means, in a case where breach has occurred and it has been brought to the notice of the lease holder by giving 15 days notice and if the lease holder admits the breach but remedies the breach within the stipulated period of 15 days, the authority will have no power to initiate any action either to determine the lease or to impose any penalty or to take any other adverse action against the lease holder on the ground of breach of terms and conditions of lease or the regulatory provisions. 12. When the notice dated 15.04.2010 was served upon the appellant, the appellant immediately cancelled the subsisting agreement with Mohd. Rafiq on 15.04.2010 itself. 13. The statements of Tek Chand and Mohd. Rafiq both were also placed before the competent authority in response to the show cause notice. On this aspect, there is nothing on record to show that either breach was not remedied within the stipulated period of 15 days or that thereafter, again the breach was committed which was not remedied. If that be so, it is clear that the breach in the form of allowing a third person to operate on the mining lease was removed as contemplated under the law. Therefore, there was no occasion for the authority to take further action against the appellant. 14. Precisely for this reason, when an occasion arose to submit a comment before the Accountant General, the mining engineer gave report as below: 15. Therefore, there was no occasion for the authority to take further action against the appellant. 14. Precisely for this reason, when an occasion arose to submit a comment before the Accountant General, the mining engineer gave report as below: 15. A perusal of the comment submitted by Mining Engineer clearly shows that the Mining Engineer himself was satisfied with the affidavit submitted before it along with the reply and the explanation that the lease property was neither sold nor given on lease or rent to anyone else. The authority already clearly referred to the cancellation of power of attorney and lastly opined that the observation is required to be annulled. 16. This is clear indication of the view which was taken by the Mining Engineer after receipt of the reply filed by the appellant before it. 17. We also find that in any case, none of the notices which were issued to the appellant, preceding passing of impugned order dated 12.06.2015, ever proposed cancellation of the lease of the appellant. In the first notice dated 15.04.2010, he was directed to pay penalty. 18. In the second notice dated 05.05.2015 also he was asked to deposit Rs.19,50,000/- which if not paid, appropriate action would be taken. That only meant that if that amount is not deposited, it might give rise to proceedings towards cancellation of lease. There is nothing on record to show that any show cause notice, proposing cancellation of lease was issued against the appellant. This is an additional reason why the impugned order is not sustainable in law. 19. Last but not the least, after going through the impugned order dated 12.06.2015 we find that the competent authority has not applied its mind. Except referring to an objection made by the Accountant General in the entire order, what has been mentioned is the chronology which led to issuance of the impugned order without any application of mind to reply which was submitted by the appellant. 20. In the impugned order it has been stated that when notice dated 05.05.2015 was given, reply filed on 25.05.2015 was not found satisfactory. It was clearly against the opinion which was already formed by the competent authority which is reflected from the note submitted for consideration before the Accountant General. 21. It appears that the authority proceeded to cancel the lease on the basis that amount of Rs.19,50,000/- was not deposited. It was clearly against the opinion which was already formed by the competent authority which is reflected from the note submitted for consideration before the Accountant General. 21. It appears that the authority proceeded to cancel the lease on the basis that amount of Rs.19,50,000/- was not deposited. In our opinion, neither the appellant was liable to pay Rs.19,50,000/-, nor lease could be cancelled without giving any show cause notice on that ground. Once we hold that the appellant having remedied the breach within the stipulated period of 15 days there is no occasion to initiate any proceedings as contemplated under Rule 18(21) of the rules of 1986, even order for payment of Rs.19,50,000/- from the appellant was not justified in law. 22. We do not consider it necessary to further dwell into the matter insofar as order being non speaking is concerned. The decisions which have been cited at the bar makes it a settled legal position that an order is required to be speaking in nature and must contained reasons. An order which is not speaking and does not contain reasons, apart from being in violation on the statutory mandate, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even though, an attempt has been made to support the order on various reasons, we are not inclined to take cognizance of the same in view of authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in his case Mohinder Singh Gill & anr. (Supra) that the legality and validity of a statutory order is to be judged from the contents of the order and could not be justified by supplanting reasons which are not in the order itself. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the order of cancellation of lease suffered from patent illegality and is unsustainable in law. Therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge has to set aside by which the petition was dismissed. The writ petition stands allowed and the impugned order cancelling lease is also held illegal and set aside and of no consequence in law. Appeal is accordingly allowed.