ORDER : By way of instant petition, petitioner has prayed for the following substantive reliefs:- “a) That the order dated 07.10.2017 i.e. Annexure A-5 whereby the respondent refused to count the service of the applicant from 16.04.1967 to 22.02.1978 rendered in Panchayat Samiti for pension and other benefits may kindly be quashed and set aside. (b) That the respondents may kindly be directed to consider the case of the applicant from 16.04.1967 to 22.02.1978 for pension and other benefits on the analogy of the judgment passed in CWP No. 1802 of 2002 Annexure A3.” 2. The case as pleaded by the petitioner is that he was initially appointed as Panchayat Secretary in the Panchayati Raj Department on 16.4.1967. Thereafter he was appointed as Gram Sewak on 20.2.1978 in the Department of Rural Development. He subsequently was appointed as Horticulture Extension Officer in Horticulture Department on 20.10.1989 and retired from the said post on 30.11.2004. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that though he was granted all service benefits w.e.f. 20.10.1989 till his retirement as continuity in service but was denied the benefit of service, which he had rendered as Panchayat Secretary from 16.4.1967 to February, 1978. He has, thus, sought benefit in light of judgment passed in CWP No 1802 of 2002, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & others vs. Basheshar Lal. He preferred representation dated 20.11.2013, however, his representation was finally rejected on 7.10.2017 vide Annexure A-6, forcing him to file the instant petition. 4. Petitioner has assailed the impugned order dated 7.10.2017 on the grounds that his case has not been considered in light of the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 1802 of 2002, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & others vs. Basheshar Lal. It has further been contended that the petitioner has been discriminated and denial of service benefits to him for the service rendered from 16.4.1967 to 22.9.1978 is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. As per petitioner, though he served the Panchayat Samiti as Panchayat Secretary w.e.f. 16.4.1967 to 22.9.1978, his services were later absorbed in Rural Development Department, therefore, he was entitled for benefit of continuity of service since the very first day of his employment as Panchayat Secretary i.e. 16.4.1967. 5. As per petitioner, though he served the Panchayat Samiti as Panchayat Secretary w.e.f. 16.4.1967 to 22.9.1978, his services were later absorbed in Rural Development Department, therefore, he was entitled for benefit of continuity of service since the very first day of his employment as Panchayat Secretary i.e. 16.4.1967. 5. In reply, respondents No. 2 and 3 have submitted that the petitioner had joined as Panchayat Secretary in Gram Panchayat, Munish under Panchayat Samiti, Rampur, District Shimla, H.P. on 16.4.1967 and continue to work in such capacity till 22.2.1978. Vide office order dated 2.2.1978, the petitioner was offered fresh appointment as regular Gram Sewak in Rural Development Department. The petitioner accepted the appointment on the basis of offer made to him vide letter dated 2.2.1978, which clearly contained the stipulation that the previous service of Panchayat Secretary would not be taken into account for any purpose. As per the respondents, the case of petitioner was distinguishable from the case of Basheshar Lal, respondent in CWP No. 1802 of 2002, as the services of said Basheshar Lal were taken over by the department vide order dated 1.6.1984, while he was working as Panchayat Secretary in the Panchayat Samiti. The benefit of the judgment of Basheshar Lal was available only to those Panchayat Secretaries, whose services had been taken over by the department w.e.f. 1.6.1984. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 7. The office order dated 2.2.1978 by virtue of which, the petitioner was appointed as Gram Sewak in Rural Development Department is on record as Annexure R-1. Para-2 (vi) of the said letter stipulated that previous service as Panchayat Secretaries would not be taken into account for any purpose. It is not denied that petitioner had accepted the appointment as Gram Sewak in pursuance to the office order dated 2.2.1978, Annexure R-1. Thus, he was fully aware that his past service as Panchayat Secretary would not be taken into account for any purpose, still he accepted the offer and continued to work as Gram Sewak from 20.2.1978 till his appointment as Horticulture Extension Officer in Department of Horticulture on 20.10.1989. He served as Horticulture Extension Officer till 30.4.2004, when he got superannuated. Thus, he was fully aware that his past service as Panchayat Secretary would not be taken into account for any purpose, still he accepted the offer and continued to work as Gram Sewak from 20.2.1978 till his appointment as Horticulture Extension Officer in Department of Horticulture on 20.10.1989. He served as Horticulture Extension Officer till 30.4.2004, when he got superannuated. Noticeably, till the date of his retirement, petitioner did not either raise any objection to the terms and conditions of his appointment nor raised any claim for counting his past service as Panchayat Secretary. 8. Petitioner for the first time raised the issue vide his representation dated 20.11.2013. There is no explanation as to why the petitioner remained silent during his entire service career as also for the period of about nine years after his retirement. In these circumstances, the petition filed by the petitioner before the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal in the year 2017 was clearly time barred. The representation made by the petitioner in 2013 for cause of action that had arisen in favour of petitioner on 2.2.1978 would not have created or revived the cause of action for him. It is more then settled that the limitation once expired cannot be revived by a subsequent representation. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2018 (16) SCC 721 titled as D.C.S. Negi vs. Union of India & others, has held as under: - “12. Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to note that for quite some time, the Administrative Tribunals established under the Act have been entertaining and deciding the applications filed under Section 19 of the Act in complete disregard of the mandate of Section 21, which reads as under :- “21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,— (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where— (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of subsection (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period”. 13. A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21 (1) or Section 21 (2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21 (1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period of sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21 (3). 14. In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impresses. 14. In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impresses. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non-applicant is not at all relevant.” 10. Thus, the petition of the petitioner before the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal was clearly time barred. Merely because now due to abolition of the erstwhile Tribunal, the matter has been transferred to this Court, the point of limitation cannot be ignored. The petition of the petitioner is clearly barred by principle of delay and laches. 11. Even on merit, the petitioner has not been able to make out a case. His appointment letter had a specific stipulation as noticed above and petitioner joined as Gram Sewak by accepting such condition. The case of petitioner cannot be equated with the case of Sh. Basheshar Lal, respondent in CWP No. 1802 of 2002 on account of distinction in fact situation. The services of said Basheshar Lal along with other Panchayat Secretaries were taken over by the State Government w.e.f. 1.6.1984 and they were absorbed in the Panchayati Raj Department, whereas the case of petitioner was different. He was offered fresh appointment as Gram Sewak in different department and he accepted the same without any reservation to specific stipulation, as noticed above. 12. In view of the observations made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.