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2022 DIGILAW 517 (RAJ)

Ram Gopal Yadav, S/o. Shri Ganaga Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan

2022-02-15

AKIL KURESHI, SUDESH BANSAL

body2022
ORDER : 1. This appeal is filed by the original-petitioners to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 04.02.2022. The State Government has initiated land acquisition proceedings for acquiring private lands for the purposes of RIICO industrial area development. Section 6 notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 03.07.2013. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act of 2013') was enacted w.e.f. 01.01.2014. The land acquisition officer passed award on 01.07.2015. The petitioner challenged this award in the writ petition contending that in view of Section 25 of the Act of 2013 the proceedings had lapsed since no award was passed within one year as envisaged in the said Section. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition upon which this appeal has been filed. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants drew out attention to a recent judgment of Division Bench of the Supreme Court in case of The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project v. Mahesh and Ors. in which this very question came up for consideration as can be seen from the question framed by the Supreme Court in its decision:- "Whether the two-year period specified under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('1894 Act', for short) will apply even after the repeal of the 1894 Act, or the twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act will apply for the awards made under clause (a) of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act?" The Supreme Court answered this question in following terms:- "23. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24, and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and anomalies may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the underlying legislative intent behind prescription of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i) to give sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensation payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment to the landowners by reducing the period from two years under Section 11A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012, on application of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in cases where the declarations were issued within twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyond the twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and legal exercise involved in determination of compensation and the need to issue notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awards would be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be deleterious for the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to save such proceedings. We would, therefore, exercise our choice to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislative intent. A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We are conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of a notification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be no notification under Section 19, but declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6 are valid as on 1st January 2014, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing/making of an award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence from 1st January 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force. Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made within twelve months from 1st January 2014. This dictum is subject to the caveat stated in paragraph 16 (supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31st December 2013 would not get revived." 3. We are of strong prima facie view that the legal contentions raised by the petitioners is authoritatively answered by the Supreme Court in above judgment of The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project (supra). The learned Single Judge therefore in our view prima facie committed an error in dismissing the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents however submitted that the lands of the petitioners are situated in the center of the industrial area being developed. The majority of the land owners have already accepted the awards and possession of the land has been taken over. 5. These factual aspects, would not change the legal position. However we will examine what relief can and should be granted to the petitioners in view of the submissions made by the counsel for the respondents. 6. For such purpose, let there be notice for final disposal returnable on 15.03.2021. By way of interim relief both the sides are directed to maintain status quo with respect to the title and possession of the land in question.