JUDGMENT : Jay Sengupta, J.: 1. This is an application seeking transfer of Special Case No. 31/2021 under Sections 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act from the learned Special Court under the POCSO Act, Mayabunder, North and Middle Andamans to the learned Special Court, POCSO Act at Port Blair under the same Sessions Division. By an order dated 20.01.2022 the learned Sessions Judge Andaman & Nicober Islands at Port Blair was pleased to reject the petitioner’s prayer for transfer of the case under Section 408 of the Code. 2. The contentions of the petitioner, as presented before this Court by his learned counsel Mr. D.C. Kabir, are as follows. The petitioner was an Additional Public Prosecutor and a Special Public Prosecutor for a case under the POCSO Act in which the present de facto complainant was the victim. In that case both the accused and the victim were juveniles. First, there was a dispute between the Presiding Officer of the learned Special Court at Mayabunder and the present petitioner regarding deployment of security personnel in the Court compound. On a date fixed for evidence in the said case, the petitioner asked the victim to come to his chamber to refresh the facts. She came. But, she raised objections regarding some of the questions asked by the petitioner. She was also agitated with the fact that she had to wait for the Juvenile Court to sit. The Court actually did not sit on that date. This led to further altercations with the petitioner. Afterwards, the victim went to the learned Presiding Officer of the Special Court and gave a complaint to him alleging that the petitioner had committed offences under the POCSO Act when she had been to his chamber. Surprisingly, as would be evident from a copy of the FIR, there is no indication whether this was sent to the police station by the learned Judicial Officer himself. From a copy of the purported order dated 30.12.2021 supplied by the Administration, a copy of which was not supplied to the petitioner although a certified copy of the entire order sheet had been applied for, it appeared that the learned Special Court claimed to have passed a direction under Section 156 (3) of the Code for registration of the instant FIR. However, there was no case number for filing of such application. However, there was no case number for filing of such application. In fact, the learned Special Court was also not sitting in Court while taking up such matter. Nor did the letter of complaint which was treated as an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code contained the relevant averments as required to be made in terms of Section 154 (3) and 156 (1) of the Code, as per the ratio of Hon’ble Apex Court given in the case of Priyanka Shrivastava, (2015) 6 SCC 287 . Thus, it was only an attempt made subsequently by the learned Presiding Officer to make up for the illegality committed by him in directly referring the matter to the Police Station. In fact, the learned Judicial Officer recorded that the victim had lodged the complaint “confidentially” before this Special Court. It was not proper on the part of the learned Judge to have dealt with the personal letter of the de facto complainant without any endorsement or receipt or official entry of any short for forwarding the same to the police station in order to register an FIR. This only amounts to an overreach by a judicial authority. After all these, the learned Judge could not have gone on to take up the same matter himself. When the petitioner wanted to move an application before the learned Sessions Judge, the prosecution objected and the matter was sent back to the learned Special Court at Mayabander. By relying on a purported judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court without citing any reference, the learned Judge recorded that the victim needed to be heard in an application for anticipatory bail involving the POCSO Act. On 07.01.2022 the victim appeared, the matter was heard and the petitioner’s application for anticipatory bail was turned down. These, among other things, gave rise to a serious apprehension that the petitioner would not get justice before the said learned Court. During investigation, the prosecution prayed for preservation of the CCTV footage concerning the allegations levelled. The petitioner then joined the issue claiming that the CCTV footage for the Court premises should be unrestricted i.e., it should also include Judges’ chamber. However, no order was passed on this issue. All these show a clear bias in the mind of the learned Judge. The petitioner then joined the issue claiming that the CCTV footage for the Court premises should be unrestricted i.e., it should also include Judges’ chamber. However, no order was passed on this issue. All these show a clear bias in the mind of the learned Judge. Reliance is placed, regarding the principles of transfer and on A.U. Kureshi (2009) 11 SCC 84 , on the question of acting in judicial capacity, on Kanak Lata 2015 6 SCC 617 , on the question of transfer in a case of bias. 3. The case of the Administration, as placed by Ms. Zinu, are as follows. No case for transfer has been made out in the present case. The direction to lodge a First Information Report was passed by the learned Special Court in his judicial capacity. As such there is no bar on him to hear the matter at a subsequent stage. No judicial officer would be falsely implicating a Public Prosecutor simply because there was some disagreement with him regarding deployment of security personnel. The application for transfer is based on surmises. There is no actual bias that can be made out from the actions of the learned Presiding Officer. Moreover, welfare of the minor victim girl should be of paramount consideration. She hailed from Diglipur. Other witnesses were also from there. The victim girl should not be made to travel all way to Port Blair for deposing in the case. Reliance was placed on Nahar Singh Yadav & Another Versus Union of India & Others (SCC 307)/2010 (Vol.II) Supreme 729; Usmangani Adambhai Vahora Versus State of Gujrat (2016) 1 Crimes (SC) 20; K.P. Tiwari Versus State of M.P. 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540. In fact, CCTV footage for the entire Court premises was available with the investigating agency. The victim girl had already been examined under Section 164 of the Code and her medical examination had also been done. 4. Mr. Siddique, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the minor victim girl submitted as follows. This was not a case where the order directing registration of FIR under Section 156 (3) of the Code was being challenged. In any event, the learned Special Court had special powers including the power to direct investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code. Mr. Siddique, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the minor victim girl submitted as follows. This was not a case where the order directing registration of FIR under Section 156 (3) of the Code was being challenged. In any event, the learned Special Court had special powers including the power to direct investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code. The present application was premature inasmuch as Section 407 of the Code could only be invoked in a case where either an inquiry or a trial has commenced. Reliance was placed on the case of Ganesh Singh, 2009 PLJR on the alternative argument that in the event it was found that the case should be transferred to another Court even at the stage of investigation, the same ought to be done with utmost caution. The learned Special Court had rightly asked the victim to appear as per the Hon’ble Delhi High Court’s judgment. Only after giving a proper hearing to the accused, his prayer for anticipatory bail was rejected. The victim was a student staying at Diglipur which was about 80 kilometers away from Mayabunder, but was about 303 kilometers from Port Blair. It took nearly 9 hours to travel to Port Blair from Diglipur. The victim girl should not be unnecessarily put to such difficulty. It was further pertinent to mention that the victim girl actually never went inside the chamber of the learned Presiding Officer. 5. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted the following. The judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Ganesh Singh (supra) was not at all relevant in the present case as it had dealt with an administrative order issued in Delhi regarding dealing of cases by Trial Courts. The fact in K.P. Tewari (supra) was also distinguished on facts inasmuch as it dealt with the comments made by the Hon’ble High Court on the working of judiciary. The facts were completely distinguishable even in the case of Nahar Singh (supra). There the case was investigated by the CBI. It had numerous witnesses and the Court was found to be overburdened with cases. In Osman Gani Case (supra), the Hon’ble High Court had sought for an explanation of the learned Trial Court, which was not given and the High Court treated this as an adverse circumstance. The said ratio was also not relevant in the present facts. It had numerous witnesses and the Court was found to be overburdened with cases. In Osman Gani Case (supra), the Hon’ble High Court had sought for an explanation of the learned Trial Court, which was not given and the High Court treated this as an adverse circumstance. The said ratio was also not relevant in the present facts. Moreover, the difficulty for a day’s travel that the victim girl might face in travelling to the learned Court at Port Blair on a single occasion and cannot jeopardise the right of the accused to a fair trial. 6. At this stage, this Court requested the learned counsels for the parties to address the issue of whether a case pending at the stage of investigation can be transferred in exercise of powers under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rhea Chakraborty, 2020 SCC Online SC 654, an earlier decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar & Anr. Versus State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (1978) 2 SCC 35 as also a decision of this Court in State (CBI) vs. Klichine Aleksandre & Ors., (1996) 2 Cal LT 61 (HC). 7. At this Mr. Kabir, learned counsel for the petitioner, further submitted as follows. Referring to Section 2 (h) and Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rules 142, 143, 370, 375 and 412 of the Criminal Rules and Orders, it was submitted that the moment an FIR got registered, records were created for that case in the respective registers. A serial number was allotted to a case for the year. That was how general record (GR, for short) was created. Thus, it was not in doubt that even before a final report was filed that was to say, at the stage of investigation, a case did come into existence. Therefore, the term “case and appeal” as used in Section 407 as well as in Section 406 of the Code would obviously include such a case which was pending at the stage of investigation. What was barred by the decisions in Rhea Chakraborty (supra) and Ram Chander Singh Sagar (supra) was that in exercise of powers under Section 406 of the Code, the investigation of a case could not be transferred. What was barred by the decisions in Rhea Chakraborty (supra) and Ram Chander Singh Sagar (supra) was that in exercise of powers under Section 406 of the Code, the investigation of a case could not be transferred. However, it was trite law that an investigation could be transferred in exercise of powers under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Thus, there was a distinct difference between transfer of investigation and transfer of a case pending at the stage of investigation. In fact, there is no harm, if by exercise of powers under Section 406 of the Code, a case at the stage of investigation was transferred from Calcutta to Bombay although the investigation remains with the Calcutta Police. The decision of the Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court in Klichine Aleksandre (supra) had rightly distinguished the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar’s Case (supra) and held that it was possible to transfer a case pending at the stage of investigation in exercise of powers under Section 407 of the Code. In fact, the power to transfer a case as contained in Section 407 of the Code available to this Court was more expansive than the power of transfer of a case available under Section 406 of the Code. Reliance was also placed on a decision of a Single Bench of this Court in Madan Gopal Mitra’s Case, 2015 SCC Online Cal 910 whereby a bail application was transferred from a Sessions Court to another at the investigation stage. Fair trial and speedy trial were deeply ingrained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If an accused had such a right to a fair trial there had to be a corresponding remedy. This was quite obvious as per the doctrine ubi jus ibi remedium. 8. Ms. Zinu representing the State further submitted that no judicial proceeding was pending at this stage, but only an investigation was. Therefore, the same cannot be transferred in exercising of powers under Section 407 of the Code. 9. Mr. Siddique, learned counsel for the private opposite party, further submitted that a case commenced only after submission of charge-sheet. At this stage Section 407 of the Code could not be invoked to transfer such a proceeding. 10. Therefore, the same cannot be transferred in exercising of powers under Section 407 of the Code. 9. Mr. Siddique, learned counsel for the private opposite party, further submitted that a case commenced only after submission of charge-sheet. At this stage Section 407 of the Code could not be invoked to transfer such a proceeding. 10. I heard the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the revision petition and the written notes of submissions of the respective parties. 11. Before dealing with the issue of whether the present proceeding could be transferred on the ground of bias, it is of utmost importance to find out whether a criminal proceeding which is pending at the stage of investigation can be transferred to another Court in exercise of powers under Section 407 of the Code. 12. For a proper exposition of the points of law, it is required to quote Sections 406 and 407 of the Code as under. “S. 406. Power of Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals. – (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the Supreme Court that an order under this section is expedient for the ends of justice, it may direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred from one High Court to another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. (2) The Supreme Court may act under this Section only on the application of the Attorney-General of India or of a party interested, and every such application shall be made by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the State, be supported by affidavit or affirmation. (3) Where any application for the exercise of the powers conferred by this section is dismissed, the Supreme Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has opposed the application such sum not exceeding one thousand rupees as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of the case.” “S. 407. Power of High Court to transfer cases and appeals-(1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court- (a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto, or (b) that some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise, or (c) that an order under this section is required by any provision of this Code, or will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or is expedient for the ends of justice, it may order- (i) that any offence be inquired into or tried by any Court not qualified under sections 177 to 185 (both inclusive), but in other respects competent to inquire into or try such offence; (ii) that any particular case or appeal, or class of cases or appeals, be transferred from a Criminal Court subordinate to its authority to any other such Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction; (iii) that any particular case be committed for trial to a Court of Session; or (iv) that any particular case or appeal be transferred to and tried before itself. (2) The High Court may act either on the report of the lower Court, or on the application of a party interested, or on its own initiative: Provided that no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in the same sessions division, unless an application for such transfer has been made to the Sessions Judge and rejected by him. (3) Every application for an order under sub-section (1) shall be made by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the Advocate-General of the State, be supported by affidavit or affirmation. (4) When such application is made by an accused person, the High Court may direct him to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for the payment of any compensation which the High Court may award under sub-section (7). (5) Every accused person making such application shall give to the Public Prosecutor notice in writing of the application, together with copy of the grounds on which it is made; and no order shall be made on of the merits of the application unless at least twenty-four hours have elapsed between the giving of such notice and the hearing of the application. (6) Where the application is for the transfer of a case or appeal from any subordinate Court, the High Court may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice, order that, pending the disposal of the application, the proceedings in the subordinate Court shall be stayed, on such terms as the High Court may think fit to impose: Provided that such stay shall not affect the subordinate Court' s power of remand under section 309. (7) Where an application for an order under sub-section (1) is dismissed, the High Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has opposed the application such sum not exceeding one thousand rupees as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case. (8) When the High Court orders under sub-section (1) that a case be transferred from any Court for trial before itself, it shall observe in such trial the same procedure which that Court would have observed if the case had not been so transferred. (9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any order of Government under section 197.” 13. In Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar’s Case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:- “TRANSFER POWER UNDER SECTION 406 CRPC The Code of Criminal Procedure clothes this Court with power under Section 406 to transfer a case or appeal from one High Court or a Court subordinate to one High Court to another High Court or to a Court subordinate thereto. But, it does not clothe this Court with the power to transfer investigations from one police station to another in the country simply because the first information or a remand report is forwarded to a Court. The application before us stems from a misconception about the scope of Section 406. There is as yet no case pending before any Court as has been made clear in the counter affidavit of the State of Tamil Nadu. In the light of this counter affidavit, nothing can be done except to dismiss this petition.” 14. The application before us stems from a misconception about the scope of Section 406. There is as yet no case pending before any Court as has been made clear in the counter affidavit of the State of Tamil Nadu. In the light of this counter affidavit, nothing can be done except to dismiss this petition.” 14. In Rhea Chakraborty’s Case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court was categorical in holding as follows-“Having considered the contour of the power under Section 406 CrPC, it must be concluded that only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred. The ratio in Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar (supra) in my view, is clearly applicable in the present matter.” 15. However, in Klichine Aleksandre’s Case (supra), a Single Bench of this Court, after considering the above ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar’s Case (supra), held that a case pending at the investigation stage can be transferred as per Section 407 of the Code. 16. Another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had transferred a bail application in exercise of powers under Section 407 of the Code. In the case of Madan Gopal Mitra (supra). 17. Quite like in Section 406 of the Code, the expression “cases and appeals” have also been used in Section 407 of the Code. To that extent, the provisions are quite in pari materia. 18. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Rhea Chakraborty (supra) and Ram Chander Singh Sagar (supra) would also determine the powers of transfer as available to a High Court under Section 407 of the Code. 19. It is germane to mention that in Rhea Chakraborty’s Case (supra), a transfer was sought of an FIR lodged in Bihar and all consequential proceedings to Maharashtra. CBI had already taken over the matter in Bihar. Mumbai police had been inquiring into the death in question in terms of Section 174 of the Code. It was in this context that the issue of transfer of investigation under Section 406 of the Code came up. Finally, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the CBI to investigate both the cases. Thus, there it was more a question of transfer of investigation, which could not have been done by invoking Section 406 of the Code. Finally, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the CBI to investigate both the cases. Thus, there it was more a question of transfer of investigation, which could not have been done by invoking Section 406 of the Code. This is clearly reflected from the ratio laid down therein, as discussed earlier. 20. The ratio laid down in Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar’s Case (supra) is factually more relevant in the present case. It was categorically held there that merely because an FIR or remand report was forwarded to a Magistrate, one cannot say that a ‘case’ has come into existence or that consequently, a transfer can be effected by involving section 406 of the Code. 21. Therefore, although as regards the provisions of Criminal Rules and Orders, as referred to earlier, it may be assumed, at least loosely speaking, that a case does come into existence after registration of an FIR, it is not so at least for the purpose of Section 406 or, for that matter, Section 407 of the Code. 22. However, Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar’s Case (supra) was also decided on the ground that the aggrieved did not pursue a relief at the place where the investigation was pending. 23. In view of the ratio laid down in the above referred decision, it may not be possible to chart the course as laid down by this Court in Klichine Aleksandre’s Case (supra) and transfer a proceeding pending at the stage of investigation to another Court by exercising powers under Section 407 of the Code. 24. In the instant case, it is purely a question of transfer of a criminal proceeding to another Court at the stage of investigation. Here, the investigating agency remains the same. Perhaps, one may not gain much by trying to distinguish between a transfer of investigation and a transfer of a proceeding at the stage of investigation. For all practical purposes, a transfer of a proceeding to another Court at the stage of investigation would most often overlap with a transfer of investigation. If these two are two statistical sets, then there surely exists an intersecting sub-set. For all practical purposes, a transfer of a proceeding to another Court at the stage of investigation would most often overlap with a transfer of investigation. If these two are two statistical sets, then there surely exists an intersecting sub-set. If transfer has to be undertaken in respect of one such set (i.e., transfer of investigation) would it not be effected simply because it also involves a part of the other set (i.e. transfer of a proceeding to another Court at the time of investigation)? At some point, the difference between the two gets blurred. 25. Although the expression is not statutorily defined, a more acceptable proposition would be that a ‘transfer of investigation’ as referred to in Rhea Chakraborty’s Case (supra) or in Dr. Ram Chander Singh Sagar’s Case (supra) envisages not only a transfer of the investigating agency (at the stage of investigation), but also transfer of a proceeding to another Court at the stage of investigation. 26. It, therefore, becomes necessary to find out whether Section 482 of the Code may be invoked by this Court, in an appropriate situation, to effectuate such transfer in order to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 of the Code is quoted as under – “482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 27. In State (CBI) vs. K.V. Rajendran & Ors., (2008) & Section 673, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under – “......It is needless to mention that it would be open for the respondents to make independent application under Section 482 of the Code if they find that subsequent events having taken place, the investigation must be transferred from State police authorities to CBI......” 28. In State of Punjab vs. CBI & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 182 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the caution that is required to be exercised by a High Court in exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in directing investigation by CBI would equally apply to the cases where such power is exercised under Section 482 of the Code. 29. Therefore, it can fairly by concluded that in exceptional circumstances and upon exercise of due caution, an investigation can be transferred by the High Court not only by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, but also by exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code. As a natural corollary, this would include a power to transfer a proceeding to another Court at the stage of investigation. 30. Now, coming back to the question of transfer of a case on the ground of bias, it is quite elementary that it is not always necessary that there should exist an actual bias in the mind of a learned Judicial Officer. However, if the circumstances are such that an accused entertains a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he would not get justice before a learned Judicial Officer, then this could be sufficient for effecting a transfer a case from that particular Court. Indeed, perceptions are often more important than reality. On this reliance may be placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satish Jaggi (supra). 31. On merits, the petitioner has alleged the following facts as being indicative of bias- (i) The petitioner, in his capacity as a Public Prosecutor, was having disagreements with the learned Judge regarding deployment of security personnel. (ii) The defacto complainant submitted a complaint addressed to the learned Judge at his chamber. (iii) The learned Judge admitted that the complaint was given confidentially. (iv) The complaint was not officially received by the Court. (v) Instead of forwarding the complaint to the police, the learned Judge, decided to pass a direction under Section 156 (3) of the Code. (vi) The complaint did not satisfy the requirements of an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code. (vii) This was an act of judicial overreach. (viii) At last, the learned Judge ought to have recused himself from the case as he had played an instrumental role in having the FIR lodged. (vi) The complaint did not satisfy the requirements of an application under Section 156 (3) of the Code. (vii) This was an act of judicial overreach. (viii) At last, the learned Judge ought to have recused himself from the case as he had played an instrumental role in having the FIR lodged. (ix) On the contrary, the learned Judge went the extra mile in having an audience for the alleged victim even at the hearing of the petitioner’s prayer for anticipatory bail. 32. It is not necessary to go into the minute details of the petitioner’s allegations of bias or strictly require a party to prove bias. However, after taking into account some of the circumstances alleged as mentioned in clauses (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) above, one can fairly conclude that the petitioner might have entertained a reasonable apprehension in his mind that he would not get justice before the learned trial Judge. It is reiterated that this conclusion does not necessarily postulate that there exists a bias in the mind of the learned Judge. This is only about the reasonable apprehension that the petitioner might have entertained. 33. Considering the facts of the instant case, I find this to be an exceptional case where the inherent powers of this Court should be exercised to transfer the present proceeding to another Court. 34. However, the right of an accused to a fair trial has to be balanced with the right of a victim to the same. Just as the possible difficulties that the victim would face in travelling to a distant trial Court for a day or two cannot outweigh the right of an accused to a fair trial, all efforts should be made to ameliorate the difficulties that could be faced by the victim in undertaking such travel. 35. In view of the above and in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, the impugned proceeding is transferred to the learned Special Court, POCSO Act at Port Blair with immediate effect. 36. In the event trial commences and the victim is summoned to depose in it, the Administration shall make necessary and appropriate arrangements for her travel between her residence and the learned Trial Court at Port Blair, to and fro, being accompanied by a relative, at its own cost. 36. In the event trial commences and the victim is summoned to depose in it, the Administration shall make necessary and appropriate arrangements for her travel between her residence and the learned Trial Court at Port Blair, to and fro, being accompanied by a relative, at its own cost. If necessary, the Administration shall also make appropriate arrangements for their stay at Port Blair for a day and night on each such occasion. 37. With these observations, the revisional application is disposed of. 38. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment may be delivered to the learned Advocates for the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all formalities.