Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 522 (JHR)

Jagannath Prasad Sah v. State of Jharkhand

2022-04-28

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

body2022
JUDGMENT : Civil Review No. 21 of 2021 1. Heard Mr. Rishu Ranjan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel for the opposite parties. 2. This review petition has been filed by the respondents in W.P.(S) No.4331 of 2009 for reviewing the order dated 30.07.2019 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4331 of 2009. 3. Mr. Rishu Ranjan, learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners submits that in order of suspension and in appellate order, there is no admission that writ petitioner was waiting for posting in the headquarter. By way of referring suspension order dated 10.02.1994 he submits that there is no admission of that fact. He further submits that in the appellate order there is no fact noted about his presence in the headquarter. On these grounds, he submits that order passed by this Court is required to be reviewed to the tune of the fact that the writ petitioner is not entitled for consequential benefit. He relied on judgment in the case of “Kamlesh Verma V. Mayawati & Others” reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 . 4. On the other hand, Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-opposite party submits that there is no error on record in the order which has been sought to be reviewed by the learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners. He draws the attention of the Court to certain paragraphs of the order dated 30.07.2019 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4331 of 2009 and submits that these two documents have been dealt with by this Court thereafter order has been passed. 5. The Court has again gone through the suspension order and finds that there is admission that petitioner was waiting for posting in headquarters. Transfer order dated 21.12.1984 has also been considered by the appellate authority in the appellate order dated 06.07.2009. Looking to these documents the Court while disposing of the writ petition has dealt with these documents thereafter order has been passed. It is well settled that if any apparent error is on record then review is required. 6. On the strength of those documents on which learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners sought to review the order, has already been considered by this Court while disposing of W.P.(S) No. 4331 of 2009 vide order dated 30.07.2019. It is well settled that if any apparent error is on record then review is required. 6. On the strength of those documents on which learned counsel for the respondents-petitioners sought to review the order, has already been considered by this Court while disposing of W.P.(S) No. 4331 of 2009 vide order dated 30.07.2019. Reference may be made to the case of “Lily Thomas V. Union of India & Ors.” reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 wherein para 52 and 54 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “52. The dictionary meaning of the word “review” is “the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement”. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka held: (SCC pp. 619-20, para 19) “19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: ‘… nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in…. The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.’ Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: ‘It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.’ Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength. 54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: “1. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: “1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.” Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter.” 7. In view of the aforesaid facts and considering that there is no apparent error on record whiling disposing of the writ petition, the review petition is not fit to be allowed. Accordingly, this review petition is dismissed. 8. Let Contempt Case (Civil) No. 609 of 2020 be detached from Civil Review No. 21 of 2021 and be listed on the assigned day.