JUDGMENT : NAVNEET KUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the Judgment of Conviction dated 28.04.2006 and order of sentence dated 29.04.2006 passed by the learned 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Latehar whereby the accused appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 384, 353, 504 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years under Section 384 of the Indian Penal code, further imprisonment for two years under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code and further he was directed to undergo imprisonment for two years under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for three years under Section 3(i)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and a fine of Rs. 5000/- (Rupees five thousand) and in its default of payment of fine the appellant was further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. It has further been directed that 50 per cent of the fine amount so paid by the accused shall go to the complainant/informant. 2. The prosecution case arose in the wake of written report dated 05.06.2003 of the informant Siddhi Paswan (PW-3), the then Junior Engineer Rural Engineering Committee Chandwa, District, Latehar which is as under: On 03.06.2003 the accused appellant Pramod Kumar Sahu stepped inside the government quarters of the informant situated in the residential colony at Chandwa and demanded Rs. 20,000/- from him and threatened if his demand were not met with, the informant and his family would be taken to task and ruined. As per the allegations, upon refusal of paying extortion demand, the accused hurled various abuses upon the informant and calling him names and stated “TUM HARIJAN DURJAN KO MAARTE MAARTE YAHAN SE BHAGA DOONGA YADI CHAIN SE REHNA HAI TO RANGDARI TAX MERE YAHAN PAHUNCHA DO.” The informant has further stated that in the past also the accused had misbehaved with him threatening him of dire consequences and resulting in seeping of fear psychosis in the mind of the informant and hence, he was constrained to take the lawful recourse of registering a case under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 3. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid written report instituted by the informant at Ranchi SC/ST Police Station on 07.06.2003 a formal F.I.R. was lodged by SC/ST P.S. Case No. 18 of 2003 dated 07.06.2003 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 198 of 2003 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 384, 353, 504 of the Indian Penal Code and 3(i) (X) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and the investigation of the case commenced. After the completion of the investigation the charge sheet no. 15 of 2004 dated 28.02.2004 was submitted for the offence punishable under Sections 384, 353, 504 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(x) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 in the court of C.J.M. Latehar against the accused facing the trial on 04.03.2004 and thereafter the learned C.J.M. Latehar finding the case prima facie true took the cognizance of the aforesaid offences on 09.03.2004 and the case was then made over to the Court of S.D.J.M. Latehar for disposal. Subsequently the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on 06.07.2004. After conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court passed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence which is under challenge in this appeal. 4. Heard Mr. Jitendra S. Singh and Randhir Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 5. Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the learned defence counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned trial court failed to appreciate the testimony of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution in totality and came to a wrong finding inasmuch as vital contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses and also the improvement in the case by the informant himself has vitiated the entire prosecution case. Further it has been pointed out that the alleged occurrence admittedly has not taken place in a full public view and the learned trial court has erred in finding the public view as the place of occurrence which is admittedly a government colony and therefore it is not a public place within the public view. Further it has been pointed out that the alleged occurrence admittedly has not taken place in a full public view and the learned trial court has erred in finding the public view as the place of occurrence which is admittedly a government colony and therefore it is not a public place within the public view. Further it has been pointed out that none of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution as eye witness and there are major discrepancies in the statements of witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution and therefore it is urged on behalf of the appellant that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is bad in law and fit to be set aside. 6. On the other hand learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State opposed the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and submitted that the learned trial court has rightly appreciated the depositions of the witnesses and there is no legal point to interfere in the impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence and for this, this appeal is fit to be dismissed being devoid of merit. Appraisals and Findings 7. Having heard the parties perused the record of this case including the lower court record. 8. It is found that in order to substantiate the case of the prosecution altogether six witnesses have been examined as under: PW-1 Suresh Paswan, PW-2 Rukmani Devi, PW-3 Siddhi Paswan (informant of the case), PW-4 Krishna Kumar, PW-5 Amarjit Balihar (initial investigating officer of the case) and PW-6 Madhusudan (subsequent investigating officer of the case). Apart from the oral evidences some of the documentary evidences have also been brought on record. Exhibit 1 is the written report of the informant dated 05.06.2003. 9. Neither the formal FIR nor the written report of the informant dated 05.06.2003 has been proved by the I.O. although the two I.O. have been examined in this case. 10. PW-1 Suresh Paswan is said to be the Assistant Engineer in Irrigation Department posted at Latehar where the informant alleged that the said occurrence took place. PW-1 in his deposition stated that this incident has been told by informant to him that the appellant had demanded Rangdari/Extortion from the informant PW-3, to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and also insulted him by calling Harijan. PW-1 in his deposition stated that this incident has been told by informant to him that the appellant had demanded Rangdari/Extortion from the informant PW-3, to a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and also insulted him by calling Harijan. He categorically stated in the cross examination that the occurrence did not take place in his presence and he had merely deposed on the basis of hearsay story. 11. PW-2, Rukmani Devi examined on behalf of the prosecution is the wife of the informant PW-3. She has totally falsified the case of the prosecution particularly with respect to the alleged place and also the acquisition made by the informant PW-3. In view of the her testimony vide Para-1 where she stated that appellant had come to the her resident at Ranchi at 6 O’clock in evening and threatened and demanded extortion of Rs. 20,000/- failing which he threatened to kill them. She further stated categorically in unequivocal words that at that time her husband was not present in the house and she was all alone in the house along with the children. This version of the informant wife (PW-2) has totally demolished the case of the prosecution that the alleged occurrence has taken place in the Government Quarter in Chandwa in the district of Latehar. Further the case of the prosecution with respect to the allegation of causing torture, teasing and insulting to the victim under SC/ST Act is also falsified because this witness PW-2 (wife of the victim PW-3) did not utter a single word about the acquisition of teasing, torture or causing atrocities upon him. The version of this witness also appears to be very natural trustworthy in view of the fact that the allegation narrated by PW-3 in the F.I.R. is at Latehar but the case was instituted admittedly at Ranchi and therefore the entire charges levelled against the appellant is not substantiated as set out by the informant in the F.I.R. 12. PW-3, Siddhi Paswan who is said to be the victim of the occurrence is also not very much confident about his version in view of the fact that the occurrence is said to have taken place on 03.06.2003 at Chandwa in his government residential house and the FIR was lodged by him on 05.06.2003 which was formally registered on 07.06.2003. PW-3, Siddhi Paswan who is said to be the victim of the occurrence is also not very much confident about his version in view of the fact that the occurrence is said to have taken place on 03.06.2003 at Chandwa in his government residential house and the FIR was lodged by him on 05.06.2003 which was formally registered on 07.06.2003. This witness did not give explanation in his written report of the FIR about the delay in instituting this case but in the deposition he stated that due to the official work and pressure he could not make an application earlier. He has further stated that the appellant had been threatening him continuously even after the date of occurrence i.e. 03.06.2003 on the subsequent date but ironically neither this victim/informant made a complaint neither in Chandwa nor in Ranchi about the alleged subsequent incident of threatening. The witness has further stated in Para 12 of the cross examination that after the date of occurrence i.e. on 03.06.2003 he had been receiving threat and this was informed to the Dy. S.P. but the Dy. S.P. has been examined as PW-6, Madhusudan who categorically stated in Para 8 of his cross-examination that he has not received any complainant from the informant between 03.06.2003 to 07.06.2003 about the subsequent threatening given by the appellant and thus the testimony of the informant PW-3 gets totally falsified not by his wife only but by his own exaggerated statement against this appellant. Further there is an improvement in the statement of this witness from the F.I.R. vide Para 15 where PW-3 stated that the ‘appellant had entered into his room and stayed for 15 minutes alongwith his three associates’ but this fact was not narrated in the F.I.R. by him and further in Para 16 he stated that the appellant had come along with three associates was not informed either in the written report nor in the subsequent restatement recorded by the I.O. and as such in order to exaggerate the charges he had made such statement. In view of such glaring contradictions, inconsistencies and anomalies in the statement the version of this witness PW-3 in his examination-in-chief that the appellant had come to his residence on 03.06.2003 at Chandwa Sarkari Residential Government Quarter and demanded extortion for Rs. In view of such glaring contradictions, inconsistencies and anomalies in the statement the version of this witness PW-3 in his examination-in-chief that the appellant had come to his residence on 03.06.2003 at Chandwa Sarkari Residential Government Quarter and demanded extortion for Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) and in case of non-fulfilment of demand of said extortion amount he was threatened by abusing him Harijan, Durjan while asking Rangdari, failing which to face with the dire consequences and also used abusing languages. 13. PW-4, Krishna Kumar is junior Engineer in Sarva Siksha Abhiyan and he was posted in Chandwa and what he has stated he came to know from his brother PW-3 (informant). Although he has supported the case of the prosecution that there was a demand of Rangdari tax but did not utter a single word about the offence invoking Section 3 (i) (x) of the SC/ST Act in his examination-in-chief and thus the case of the prosecution has also not been supported by this witness. 14. PW-5 is the first I.O. who had simply recorded the restatement of the informant (PW-3) on 07.06.2003 and he stated that in restatement the informant stated that there was a demand of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) by the appellant from the informant and thus, the entire case of the prosecution is totally falsified by restatement of the informant himself. 15. PW-6 is another I.O. who after completing the investigation submitted the charge sheet. The attention of this witness was drawn by the defence in Para 8 of the cross-examination in order to show the contradictions in the statement of informant that in the statement of the informant PW-3 with respect to the fact that even after the date of occurrence i.e. on 03.06.2003 he had been receiving the threat from the appellant, and he had informed this fact to the Dy. S.P. but it had been totally negated by the I.O. this witness PW-6, in Para 8 which has already been discussed in detail in the forgoing paragraphs. Further the delay in the institution of this case has also not been explained either in the written report or in the subsequent report although first time it was explained in the deposition before the Court which is evident from the depositions of the PW-3. 16. Further the delay in the institution of this case has also not been explained either in the written report or in the subsequent report although first time it was explained in the deposition before the Court which is evident from the depositions of the PW-3. 16. Having taken into consideration the aforesaid testimonies of all these witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution it is well founded that the charges levelled against the accused appellant has not been substantiated beyond a reasonable doubt and the learned trail court has committed error in holding the guilt of the accused persons despite the fact that the version of the victim PW-3 has been totally falsified by his wife and further a number of contradictions, inconsistencies and anomalies as discussed above have been found in the statement of the victim PW-3 himself. 17. The learned defence counsel has also stated that even if the version of the informant is taken into consideration that he was abused and treated badly by accusing him Harijan and threatening within the meaning of Section 3(i) (x) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act 1989, it is said that the occurrence has taken place in the room of the informant where nobody was present although later on it has been included in the version of informant by stating that the accused appellant has come along with the three persons and in support of his contentions the learned defence counsel has relied upon the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another, (2020) 10 SCC 710 . From this ruling Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed under the circumstances of the case as under: 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view.” What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh and Others vs. State. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view.” It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic). The Court held as under (SCC pp. 443-444, Para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place.” A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State and not by private persons or private bodies.” 18. In view of the aforesaid observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court the case of the prosecution gets failed and it is well founded that the prosecution has not been able to prove at all the charges levelled against the appellant and therefore the appellant deserves to be acquitted from the charges levelled against him by setting aside the Judgment of Conviction dated 28.04.2006 and order of sentence dated 29.04.2006 passed by the learned 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Latehar in SC/ST No. 81 of 2004 in connection with Ranchi SC/ST P.S. Case No. 18/2003, against him. 19. 19. In the result the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted from the charges levelled against him. 20. Since the appellant is on bail he is discharged from the liability of bail bond. 21. Let the LCR be sent back to the concerned court along with a copy of this judgment.