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2022 DIGILAW 527 (GAU)

Laichhingi D/o Bunglavunga v. Northeast Frontier Railway

2022-05-20

MARLI VANKUNG, MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA

body2022
JUDGMENT : MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, J. 1. Heard Mr. Lalchhanliana Khiangte, learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and Mrs. H. Lalmalsawmi, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondent No. 6. 2. The appellants are aggrieved with the Judgment AND Order dated 08.04.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP (C) No. 121 of 2021, wherein the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were directed to pay interest for the period between 23.04.2019 to 13.03.2021. The appellants prayer is that interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be paid to them, which should be over and above the interest paid to them under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. The appellants case is that the appellants lands, which were covered by Periodic Pattas were acquired vide Award No. 1 of 2021 (Part-B Kawnpui), with compensation being paid only for the value of their crops. Being aggrieved, the appellants submitted a reference application under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, 1894, praying that compensation should also be paid for the value of their lands along with interest under Sections 28 AND 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as the “L.A Act, 1894.” The same was registered as L.A. Case No. 30/2013 before the Court of the Addl. District and Sessions Judge-II, Aizawl (Reference Court). L.A Case No. 30/2013 was disposed of by the learned Reference Court vide Order dated 05.12.2013, by awarding solatium and interest for the crops in terms of Section 23 of L.A. Act, 1894, without any compensation being awarded for the value of their lands. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Review Petition No. 25/2014, which was dismissed vide order dated 06.05.2016. 4. The appellants thereafter approached this Court by filing Civil Revision Petition No. 4/2017, which was dismissed on the ground of there being an alternative remedy by way of an appeal. Accordingly, the appellants filed RFA No. 10/2017 before this Court. The same was disposed of vide order dated 10.10.2017, remanding the case back to the learned Reference Court, who was directed to consider whether the appellants were entitled to be compensated for the value of their lands. Accordingly, the appellants filed RFA No. 10/2017 before this Court. The same was disposed of vide order dated 10.10.2017, remanding the case back to the learned Reference Court, who was directed to consider whether the appellants were entitled to be compensated for the value of their lands. Consequent to the order dated 10.10.2017 passed in RFA No. 10/2017, the learned Reference Court disposed of L.A. Case No. 30/2013 vide Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 by directing the respondents to pay compensation for the appellants acquired lands @ Rs. 38/- per sq. ft. The operative portion of the Judgment and Award at paragraph No. 12 is as follows: “12. During the course of hearing the ld. Counsels for the parties agreed that this case is squarely covered by the Judgment and Order dated 1.3.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 36 of 2013 (V.L. Peka and Others vs. District Collector, Kolasib and Another) and the case can be disposed in line with the said Judgment amd Order dated. 1.3.2018 in L.A. Case No. 36 of 2013 by awarding compensation to be determined at the rate of Rs. 38 per square feet along with other statutory benefits without proceeding further with the case. In view of the submissions made by the ld. counsels of both sides, the instant case is disposed of by passing the Award in the following terms: (i) The Petitioners shall be paid compensation for the market value of the acquired area of their respective lands at the rate of Rs. 38 per square feet along with 30% solatium and 12% interest as per Section 23(1A) and 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which shall be assessed and calculated by the District Collector, Kolasib within a period of one month from the date of this order. (ii) The Petitioners shall also be paid interest both under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be calculated separately on the total amount so assessed at the rate of 9% p.a. for one year from the date of taking possession i.e. 24.1.2014 till 24.1.2015 and 15% p.a. for every subsequent years i.e. 25.1.2015 to the date making of assessment by the District Collector. (iii) The total amount of compensation so assessed shall be paid by the N.F. Railway by depositing the same to this Court within two months from the date of making of assessment by the District Collector.” 5. (iii) The total amount of compensation so assessed shall be paid by the N.F. Railway by depositing the same to this Court within two months from the date of making of assessment by the District Collector.” 5. Since no assessment was being made by the respondents for payment of compensation for the lands, the appellants filed Execution Case No. 4/2018. The District Collector then assessed the compensation amounting to Rs. 11,90,43,661/- which was inclusive of the interest @ 9% from the date of possession for a period of one year and thereafter @ 15% per year till the date of assessment of the compensation. 6. In the year 2020, the respondent No. 1 filed an appeal in this Court challenging the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed by the learned Reference Court in LA Case No. 30/2013, which was registered as RFA No. 15/2020. The same was dismissed by this Court vide Order dated 30.10.2020. 7. The respondents thereafter apparently deposited the compensation amount for the appellants lands in the District Collector’s Office on 13.03.2021. 8. The appellants subsequently submitted representations to the respondents praying for payment of interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894. As the representations were not considered by the respondents, the petitioners filed WP (C) No. 121/2021 claiming they were entitled to payment of interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894. 9. WP (C) No. 121/2021 was disposed of by the Single Judge vide Judgment and Order dated 08.04.2022, holding that though no compensation was awarded for the appellants’ lands initially, compensation was assessed for the land value pursuant to the order passed by the learned Reference Court. The awarded compensation for the land included interest @ 9% per annum for the first year, beginning from the date of possession and thereafter interest @ 15% per annum till the date of assessment, i.e. on 23.04.2019. The learned Single Judge also held that the appellants claim for payment of interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 had no basis. The learned Single Judge however held that as per Sections 28 and 34 of the LA Act, 1894, interest had to be paid till the awarded amount was paid. The learned Single Judge also held that the appellants claim for payment of interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 had no basis. The learned Single Judge however held that as per Sections 28 and 34 of the LA Act, 1894, interest had to be paid till the awarded amount was paid. As no interest had been paid on the land compensation amount for the period between the date of assessment and date of deposit in the District Collector’s office only on 13.03.2021, the respondents were directed to pay the appellants interest between the period 23.04.2019 to 13.03.2021 on the compensation amount assessed for the land. 10. The appellants being aggrieved with the Judgment and Order dated 08.04.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP (C) No. 121/2021 have prayed for setting aside the impugned Order dated 08.04.2021 passed in WP (C) No. 121/2021. They also prayed that a direction be issued to the respondents to pay interest in terms of Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894, as payment of interest under Section 34 can be given over and above the interest payable under Section 28 of the LA Act, 1894. 11. The appellants’ counsel submits that the components of Section 28 and Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 are distinct and separate and as there was a delay in the payment of the compensation amount, Section 34 was attracted. 12. The appellants’ counsel further submits that the word “both” reflected in paragraph No. 12 (ii) of the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 30/2013 indicates that interest is to be calculated as per Sections 28 and section 34 of the L.A. Act, 1894. However, due to an inadvertent mistake committed in the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed by the learned Reference Court in L.A. Case No. 30/2013, the words/numbers “Section 34” has been left out from the said paragraph No. 12 (ii). 13. The learned CGC appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 on the other hand submits that no compensation was initially awarded by the District Collector, for the lands of the appellants and only compensation for crops was given. 13. The learned CGC appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 on the other hand submits that no compensation was initially awarded by the District Collector, for the lands of the appellants and only compensation for crops was given. However, on the basis of the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed in LA Case No. 30/2013, assessment of the compensation to be paid to the appellants for acquisition of their lands was made and compensation was given alongwith interest under Section 28 of the LA Act, 1894. The learned CGC also submits that the question of paying interest under two provisions of the LA Act, 1894, i.e. Sections 28 and 34 does not arise. The CGC further submits that the interest rate under Sections 28 and 34 of the LA Act, 1894 is the same and interest had already been paid under Section 28 of the LA Act, 1894. She further submits that the Apex Court in the case of Maj. General Kapil Mehra and Others vs. Union of India and Another, Civil Appeal No. 2545-2546 of 2012 has held that the LA Act, 1894 provides for payment of interest to the claimants either under Section 34 or Section 28 of the LA Act, 1894. As such, the appellants cannot claim interest under both the provisions of LA Act, 1894. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 submits that she has got no comments to make in the present case. 15. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 16. A perusal of the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed by the learned Reference Court in L.A. Case No. 30/2013 clearly shows that the order has been passed by way of consent of the parties. As the consent Order dated 03.08.2018 shows that interest was to be paid under Section 28 of the LA Act, 1894, the question arises as to whether the appellants can now claim interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 and whether a mistake had been committed by the learned Reference Court in it’s Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed in LA Case No. 30/2013. The Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 clearly states that the learned counsels for the parties agreed that LA Case No. 30/2013 is squarely covered by the Judgment and Order dated 1.3.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 36 of 2013 (V.L. Peka and Others vs. District Collector, Kolasib and Another) and that the case can be disposed of in line with the Judgment and Order dated 1.3.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 36/2013. 17. Copy of the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 passed in LA Case No. 36/2013 (Sh. V.L. Peka and Others vs. District Collector, Kolasib and Another) has been called for and the same shows that the said Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 had been made by way of the consent of the parties therein and the Judgment and Order also states that the provision of Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894 would not apply. Paragraph 12 of the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 passed in LA Case No. 36/2013 is reproduced below: “12. During the course of hearing the ld. Counsels for the petitioners and respondent no. 2 (NF Railway) agreed that the rate of compensation may be determined at Rs. 38 per square feet along with other statutory benefits except the provision of section 34 of Land Acquisition Act 1894, without further proceeding of the case. In view of the submissions made by the ld. Counsels for the parties, the instant case is disposed of by passing Award in the following terms: Award: (i) The Petitioners shall be paid compensation for the market value of the acquired area of their respective lands at the rate of Rs. 38 per square feet along with 30% solatium and 12 % interest as per Section 23(1A) and 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which shall be assessed and calculated by the District Collector, Kolasib within a period of two months from the date of this order. (ii) The Petitioners shall also be paid interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be calculated separately on the total amount so assessed. (iii) The total amount of compensation so assessed and interest calculated shall be satisfied by the N.F. Railway by depositing the same to this court within a period of two months from the date of making this order, thereafter disburse the amount of compensation to the petitioners. (iii) The total amount of compensation so assessed and interest calculated shall be satisfied by the N.F. Railway by depositing the same to this court within a period of two months from the date of making this order, thereafter disburse the amount of compensation to the petitioners. Pronounced in an open court and given under my hand and seal on this 1stday of March, 2018.” 18. As the appellant’s reference case before the learned Reference Court, i.e. LA Case No. 30/2013 was disposed of in terms of the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 passed in LA Case No. 36/2013, it is crystal clear that the appellants had abandoned their claim for payment of interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894. 19. The above being said, the appellants have not made any challenge to the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed by the learned Reference Court in LA Case No. 30/2013. The appellants have also not taken any stand in the writ petition to the effect that they had withdrawn their consent to the Consent Order dated 03.08.2018 passed in LA Case No. 30/2013. In fact, the appellants have kept quiet about the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 passed in LA Case No. 36/2013, wherein the learned Reference Court states in paragraph 12 of the Judgment and Order as follows: “12. During the course of hearing the ld. Counsels for the petitioners and respondent no. 2 (NF Railway) agreed that the rate of compensation may be determined at Rs. 38 per square feet along with other statutory benefits except the provision of section 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, without further proceeding of the case.” 20. We find that the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that an inadvertent mistake had been committed by the learned Reference Court in the Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 30/2013 is incorrect as the same had been made in line with the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 36/2013, wherein, it is specifically provided that Section 34 of the L.A. Act, 1894 would not be made applicable to the case. Further, the appellants’ counsel herein was also the counsel, not only in L.A. Case No. 30/2013, but also in L.A. Case No. 36/2013 and he very well knew about the terms of the consent order passed by the learned Reference Court in L.A. Case No. 30/2013 and L.A. Case No. 36/2013. 21. Despite the above facts, the appellants and their counsel have not made a clean breast of things. They have also not annexed the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 36/2013, nor brought it to the notice of the learned Single Judge. The appellants, by resorting to jugglery and clever maneuvering have sought for payment of interest under Section 34 of the L.A. Act, 1894, though they had abandoned the claim by way of a consent order, i.e. vide i.e. Judgment and Award dated 03.08.2018 passed in L.A. Case No. 30/2013. 22. In the case of Satyan vs. Commissioner, (2020) 14 SCC 210 , the Apex Court has held that in prerogative writs, whether under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution, a litigant cannot be permitted to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose, and to suppress or not to disclose other facts. 23. In the case of K.D. Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Apex Court has held that the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. It further held that if an applicant does not disclose all material facts fairly and truly, but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent the abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court. The relevant portion of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.D. Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and Others (Supra) is abstracted herein-below: “38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play ‘hide and seek’ or to ‘pick and choose’ the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, the Court knows law but not facts. 39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commissioners is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the Court with “soiled hands.” Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.” 24. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.” 24. Though the appellants’ counsel has now prayed that he may be allowed to withdraw the writ appeal, we are not inclined to allow the said prayer, as the appellants have tried to mislead the Court by cleverly maneuvering the facts of the case and the order passed by the learned Reference Court, though knowing fully well that they are not entitled to payment of interest under Section 34 of the LA Act, 1894. They have not only wasted the Court’s time but also Tax Payer’s money. Accordingly, we are of the view that cost should be imposed upon the appellants. 25. In view of the above reasons, we do not find any ground to allow the writ appeal. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. As the appellants and their counsel have tried to mislead this Court and as they have tried to play ‘hide and seek’ with facts, we are of the view that cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) should be imposed upon them. 26. Accordingly, the appellants are directed to pay cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) only in the Registry of this Court within a period of two weeks from today. The counsel for the appellants shall file a compliance affidavit within two weeks. 27. The Registry is directed to thereafter transfer the said cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority, Aizawl.