ORDER : 1. This petition is filed by legal heirs of defendant No.15 challenging herein the legality and propriety of the order dated 22.01.2020, passed in Civil Suit No. 76- A/13 by IInd Civil Judge Class-II, Ambikapur, Surguja, whereby application filed by the petitioners under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with section 151 of the CPC for taking written statement on record, has been dismissed. 2. The case in nutshell is that, original plaintiff namely Ramdev filed a Civil Suit for declaration of title, partition and permanent injunction. The plaintiff and defendants are legal heirs of late Ishwar and Raghuwar Sahu. The plaintiff pleaded that the property detailed in Schedule-A annexed with the plaint situated at Village Batwahi, Tahsil- Lundra, District- Sarguja (CG) was recorded in name of Raghuvir Sahu and late Ishwar Sahu during Sarguja State Settlement and later on, it was partitioned between them. Revenue records were also corrected. It is also pleaded that late Ishwar Sahu during his lifetime, partitioned his share mentioned in Schedule-B & C appended with the plaint amongst his sons. The plaintiff further pleaded that the land bearing Survey No. 542/2, 1438/2, 1438/5 fell in his share. The defendant Nos.1, 14 and 16 by playing fraud, had executed the sale deed in favour of defendant Nos. 22, 23 and 24 on 19.09.2008 and they were interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff, therefore, he filed suit for 1/4th share of the property described in Scheduled-C, and, declaration was also sought to the effect that the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant No. 22, 23 and 24 is null and void up to the share of the plaintiff but defendant No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18, 20 and 21 filed their written statements and denied the averments made in the plaint. Counter claim was also filed by them seeking therein 1/4th share of the property described in Schedule- C, 1/4th share of the property described in Schedule- B, declaration of the sale deed dated 10.09.2008 as null and void, and, sale deeds executed pertaining to plot numbers 1438/2, 1438/3 and 1438/5 are null and void up to their share and for permanent injunction. 3. During the pendency of Civil Suit, the defendant No. 15 namely Mohan died on 16.11.2015 and his legal heirs i.e. the petitioners herein were brought on record. 3. During the pendency of Civil Suit, the defendant No. 15 namely Mohan died on 16.11.2015 and his legal heirs i.e. the petitioners herein were brought on record. They were proceeded ex-parte on 26.10.2016 and thereafter an application under Order 9 Rule 7 of the CPC was moved and the same was allowed by the learned trial court vide order dated 20.12.2019. 4. The petitioners/legal heirs of defendant No.15 filed their written statements along with an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Section 151 of the CPC for taking written statement on record on behalf of the legal heirs of the defendant No. 15. Oral objection was raised by the plaintiff on application moved by the petitioners. The learned trial court vide order dated 22.01.2020 rejected the said application on the ground that the legal heirs of the defendant No.15 have pleaded contrary to the pleading made by the original defendant which is not permissible. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order passed by the learned trial court is erroneous and contrary to law. He further submits that the learned trial court ought to have appreciated the fact that not taking of the written statement on record would cause great loss to the petitioners herein as no written statement was filed by the original defendant No.15. He also submits that the time limit prescribed under Order 8 Rule 1 of the CPC is directory and not mandatory and thus the Court may in its discretion allow the party to file the written statement beyond the period of 90 days, if sufficient reason is assigned. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) Vs. Union of India reported in 2005 (6) SCC 344 and Abdul Razak (dead) through Lrs. and Others Vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and Others, 2010 (2) SCC 432 . 6. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that written statement was filed by the deceased defendant No.15 and his signature is available on the written statement and counter claim. He further submits that the petitioners/defendants have taken new stand in written statement by filing an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) of the CPC. 6. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that written statement was filed by the deceased defendant No.15 and his signature is available on the written statement and counter claim. He further submits that the petitioners/defendants have taken new stand in written statement by filing an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) of the CPC. He submits that the petitioners are claiming right over the property by virtue of will deed dated 17th January, 1978, executed by Smt. Maheshwa wd/o. Raghunath, Shital Prasad S/o Ishwar Sao and plaintiff Ramdev S/o Ishwar Sao in favour of Vijay Prasad Gupta, Mohan Prasad Gupta, Arjun Prasad Gupta, Kamlesh Prasad Gupta of the agricultural land ad-measuring 20 acres situated at village- Batwahi, whereas, no such claim was made by the original defendant No. 15 in the written statement filed on 19th February, 2010. 7. Mr. Prasad submits that the learned trial court rightly rejected the application moved by the legal hairs of the defendant No.15. It is well settled that the legal hairs of deceased defendant have right to file written statement after death of the original defendant but if they deviate from the pleading made by the original defendant, then they will have to move an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC to take such additional stand. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 9. It would be advantageous to go through the provision of Order 22 Rule 4 (2) of the CPC which is given as under:- “4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant.- (2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.” 10. In the matter of Vidyavati Vs. Man Mohan and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 431 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scope of Order 22 Rule 4 (2) of the CPC, the relevant para Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 are reproduced herein below:- “3. It is seen that the petitioner’s claim of right, title and interest entirely rests on the will said to have been executed by Champawati in favour of the first defendant and herself. It is now admitted across the Bar that the first defendant had life interest created under the will executed by Champawati. It is seen that the petitioner’s claim of right, title and interest entirely rests on the will said to have been executed by Champawati in favour of the first defendant and herself. It is now admitted across the Bar that the first defendant had life interest created under the will executed by Champawati. Therefore, the said interest is co-terminous with his demise. Whether the petitioner has independent right, title and interest dehors the claim of the first defendant is a matter to be gone into at a later proceeding. It is true that when the petitioner was impleaded as a party-defendant, all rights under Order 22, Rule 4(2), and defences available to the deceased defendant became available to her. In addition, if the petitioner had any independent right, title or interest in the property then she had to get herself impleaded in the suit as a party defendant in which event she could set up her own independent right, title and interest, to resist the claim made by the plaintiff or challenge the decree that may be passed in the suit. This is the view the court below has taken rightly. 4. This Court in Bal Kishan V. Om Parkash (1986) 4 SCC 155 : AIR 1986 SC 1952 has said thus: The sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 22 authorises the legal representative of a deceased defendant to file an additional written statement or statement of objections raising all pleas which the deceased-defendant had or could have raised except those which were personal to the deceased-defendant or respondent. 5. The same view was exressed in Jagdish Chander Chhatterjee V. Sri Kishan (1972)2 SCC 461 : (1973)1 SCR 850 wherein this Court said: (SCC pp. 464-65, para 10) ... Legal representative of the deceased respondent was entitled to make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased respondent. In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased. Indeed this does not prevent the legal representatives from setting up also their own independent title, in which case there could be no objection to the court impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a separate suit for a decision on the independent title. 6. Indeed this does not prevent the legal representatives from setting up also their own independent title, in which case there could be no objection to the court impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a separate suit for a decision on the independent title. 6. This being the position in law, the view of the court below is perfectly legal. It is open to the petitioner to implead herself in her independent capacity under Order 1, Rule 10 or retain the right to file independent suit asserting her own right. We do not find any error of jurisdiction or material irregularit committed in the exercise of jurisdiction by the court below warranting our intereference. The SLP is, accordingly, dismissed.” In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if a person has independent right, title and interest other than the claim of the first defendant, is a matter to be gone into at a later proceeding. It is true that when the person was impleaded as a party-defendant, all rights under Order 22, Rule 4 (2) of the CPC, and defences available to the deceased defendant became available to him. In addition, if the person had any independent right, title or interest in the property then he has to get himself impleaded in the suit as a party defendant in which event he could set up his own independent right, title and interest, to resist the claim made by the plaintiff. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-6 permitted the petitioner therein to get impleaded in independent capacity under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC or to retain the right to file independent suit asserting own right. 11. In the matter of Jagdish Chander Chatterjee Vs. Sri Kishan, (1972) 2 SCC 461 : (1973)1 SCR 850 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 10 has held as under: “10.Under sub-clause (ii) of Rule 4 of Order XXII, Civil Procedure Code any person so made a party as a legal representative of the deceased, respondent was entitled to make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased respondent was entitled to make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased-respondent. In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased. Indeed this does not prevent the legal representatives from setting up also their own independent title, in which case there could be no objection to the court impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a separate suit for a decision on the independent title.” 12. In the case of Bal Kishan Vs. Om Parkash, (1986) 4 SCC 155 : AIR 1986 SC 1952 in para 4 has held as under: “4. But in the instant case the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the above decision for two reasons. First, the appellant hand not been brought on record as a respondent in the eviction petition in his personal capacity but had been brought on record only as the legal representative of Musadi Lal. Secondly, in the circumstances of this case, even if a prayer had been made to bring the appellant on record in his personal capacity, the Rent Controller could not have allowed the application and permitted him to raise the plea of independent title because such a plea would oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to try the case itself. The observations made in the Jagdish Chander Chatterjee case have to be confined to only those cases where the court hearing the case has jurisdiction to try the issues relating to independent title also. The Rent Controller, who had no jurisdiction to pass the decree for possession against a trespasser could not have, therefore, impleaded the appellant as a respondent to the petition for eviction in his independent capacity. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the above plea of the appellant. Further the plea of the appellant that he was hoding the property as a trespasser is also not tenable because the possession of Musadi Lal being permissive, the possession of the appellant who had succeeded to the estate of Musadi lal as his heir could not be that of a trespasser in the circumstance of the case. He could not, therefore, resist the passing of the decree for eviction on proof of the ground in Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act. 13. He could not, therefore, resist the passing of the decree for eviction on proof of the ground in Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Razak (dead) through LRs and Others Vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and Others, 2010 (2) SCC 432 has distinguished the Bal Kishan and Vidyawati case as under :- “33. The judgments of Bal Kishan case and Vidyawati case are clearly distinguishable. In the first case, the earlier judgment in Jagdish Chander Chatterjee case, which substantially supports the appellants was distinguished on the ground that the plea raised by the impleaded legal representative of the tenant was inconsistent with his defence and if accepted, the same would result in ouster of the jurisdiction of the Rent Cotroller. In the second case also, the Court found that the plea raised by the appellant, who was impleaded as legal representative of the defendant that she had independent title under the will executed by Champawati was not in consoanance with the plea taken by the original defendant. However, as discussed in the earlier part of the judgment, the claim made by the appellants is in no way inconsistent with or derogatory to the defence set up by Abdul Razak. In any case, once the additional written statement filed by the appellants was taken on record without any objection by Respondents 1 and 2, who also led their evidence keeping in view the pleadings of the additional written statement, the High Court was not at all justified in allowing the application filed for striking off the additional written statement and that too without even adverting to Order 6 Rule 16 CPC and considering whether Respondents 1 and 2 were able to make out a case for exercise of power by the court under that provision.” 14. In the case in hand also, the legal heirs of the defendant No.15 have taken a new plea of right over the property by virtue of the will deed which was not taken by the original defendant in the written statement and the present case is also distinguishable from the judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner as the written statement as well as counter claim was filed by the original defendant No.15 but his legal heirs have denied the signatures, whereas, civil suit was filed on 08.04.2019 and written statement along with the counter claim was filed on 23.02.2010. It is also pertinent to note here that the original defendant No.15 died on 16.11.2015 and till that date no objection was raised by him and further, no plea was taken in this regard. 15. In the case of Kalawati Gupta Vs. Krishan Kumar And Ors., passed in Civil Revision No. 2712 of 1998 decided on 07.02.2001 by this Court where it was held that : “It is trite that when a person is brought on record in his/her capacity as a legal representative, then he/she is bound by the pleadings already raised by the deceased, he/she cannot raise pleadings or defence which were otherwise not available to the original party,” 16. Now coming to the facts of the present case. In light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this High Court, it is apparent that earlier, written statement as well as the counter claim was filed by the original defendant No.15 and for long five years no objection was raised to the effect that no written statement has been filed by him, but after his death his legal representatives filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) of the CPC along with additional written statement taking a different stand, which is not permissible under the law. 17. Considering the provisions of Order 22, Rule 4(2) of the CPC and law laid down in this regard, I am of the view that the learned Court below has rightly rejected the application moved by the petitioners under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with section 151 of the CPC. 18. In the result, the petition is dismissed; however, there shall be no order as to cost(s).