JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Mohan Pandey. J.) 1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. has been filed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.12.2012 passed in Sessions Trial No. 29/2012 by the learned Sessions Judge, Kabirdham, District Kabirdham (C.G.) whereby the learned trial court has convicted the appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, further rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on the intervening night of 26-27.04.2012 the appellant committed murder of his wife Gotimbai, with the use of axe. 3. Further case of the prosecution, in brief, is that Santan (P.W. 1), who is the father of the deceased, lodged the FIR (Ex.P/1) at Police Station - Pipariya on 27.04.2012 at about 6:15 AM to the effect that the appellant herein had come to his house along with the deceased and their three children to attend the marriage. Further, Santan (P.W. 1) had advanced Rs. 2 lakhs for selection of his son Manoj (P.W. 7) as Police officer, however, his son could not get selected, and therefore he demanded the money back. In night of 26.04.2012, the deceased also asked the appellant herein to refund the said amount, due to which quarrel took place between them. On 27.04.2012, in morning hours, the wife of Santan (P.W. 1) apprised him that the deceased is lying dead. Santan (P.W. 1) also went to the spot and saw the deceased dead lying face up on the earth and the blood stained axe (tangiya) was also kept near her dead body. The appellant was missing from the house; therefore, Santan (P.W. 1) on the basis of strong suspicion lodged the FIR (Ex.P/1) against the appellant herein. 4. On the basis of FIR (Ex.P/1), Merg Intimation (Ex.P/2) was registered and the investigation begun to run. ASI, Vishnu Prasad Sharma (P.W. 11) prepared the Inquest vide Ex.P/9. Thereafter, the body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to District Hospital, Kawardha. Spot map was prepared vide Ex./P15. Blood stained soil, plain soil, and iron axe (tangiya) were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/11. Vide postmortem report Ex.P/13, Dr. ASI, Vishnu Prasad Sharma (P.W. 11) prepared the Inquest vide Ex.P/9. Thereafter, the body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to District Hospital, Kawardha. Spot map was prepared vide Ex./P15. Blood stained soil, plain soil, and iron axe (tangiya) were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/11. Vide postmortem report Ex.P/13, Dr. P.C. Prabhakar (P.W. 10) had opined that the deceased died due to excessive bleeding, which was result of chopping off of her cervical and artery bone. On 27.04.2012 the clothes worn by deceased were seized vide Ex.P/16, the appellant herein was arrested, his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex. P/3, and pursuant thereto lungi worn by him was recovered from his possession vide Ex.P/5. Also, one gold locket and gold nose pin (fulli) was recovered from the conscious possession of the appellant vide Ex.P/4. The seized articles were sent for F.S.L. and identification of gold locket and nose pin was conducted by Nayab Tahsildar, P.R. Bhaskar (P.W. 5), wherein Santan (P.W. 1) and his son Manoj (P.W. 7) identified those articles as belonging to the deceased. After due investigation, charge sheet was filed for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC against the appellant/accused before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kawardha, which was committed to the Court of Session, Kabirdham, District Kabirdham, C.G. for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. The learned trial court framed charge under Section 302 of IPC against the appellant/accused. The appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defence. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and brought 20 documents into record. Statement of the appellant/accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the guilt, and got exhibited 05 documents D/1 to D/5. 6. Learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, finding the following circumstances established :- (i) That, five years back amount of Rs. 6. Learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted the appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, finding the following circumstances established :- (i) That, five years back amount of Rs. 2 lakh was advanced by the parents of deceased to the appellant for providing job to Manoj (P.W. 7), who is brother of deceased, (ii) That, there arose dispute, one night prior to the incident, firstly, at about 7-8 PM, and secondly, at about 1-1:30 AM, between the appellant herein and the deceased with regard to refund of amount so advanced, (iii) That, dead body of the deceased was found in field of Narayan, situated at back side of the house on 27.04.2012 at about 5 AM, (iv) That, appellant and deceased were sleeping in different rooms, however, soon after the incident, the appellant went missing as he was neither present at place of occurrence nor in the house, and for the very same, no explanation has been offered by him, (v) That, the gold locket and nose pin worn by deceased and lungi worn by the appellant and also the axe were seized only on the basis of his memorandum statement (Ex.P/3), (vi) That, further, the said locket and pin were identified by Santan (P.W. 1) and Manoj (P.W. 7), (vii) And that, as per the FSL report, the seized lungi contained blood on it. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that there is no direct evidence against the appellant herein and the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence. She would further submit that the chain of the circumstances is not complete and mere seizure of axe (tangiya) and some jewellery on the instance of the appellant are not sufficient to record the order of conviction. It is also submitted that the memorandum and seizure witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution, thus she would pray for the acquittal of the appellant. 8. Per Contra, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent/State, would submit that the learned trial court after appreciating the entire evidence on record, has convicted the appellant. There was seizure of axe and jewellery from the conscious possession of the appellant. The doctor (P.W. 10) has proved the cause of death of the deceased as homicidal in nature and further, the chain of the circumstances is complete. There was seizure of axe and jewellery from the conscious possession of the appellant. The doctor (P.W. 10) has proved the cause of death of the deceased as homicidal in nature and further, the chain of the circumstances is complete. He would further submit that in the FSL report (Ex.P/20) blood is found on axe, lungi of the appellant and Saree and blouse of the deceased. Thus, he would support the judgment passed by the learned trial court. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and went through the records carefully. 10. At the very outset, it is pertinent to mention here that this case is based upon circumstantial evidence and in a case of circumstantial evidence, the entire chain of evidence must be complete and the conclusions which are arrived at after examining the chain of evidence must point towards culpability of the accused. A few extracts of the law that emerges in a case based upon circumstantial evidence from the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Munikrishna alias Krishna v. State by Ulsoor P.S. reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1449 is quoted herein below :- 15. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused. In other words, a very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt. As early as in 1952, this Court in its seminal judgment of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, had laid down the parameters under which the case of circumstantial evidence is to be evaluated. It states:— “… It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused…” 16. Hanumant (supra) has been consistently followed by this Court. To name a few, Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra. 17. In Musheer Khan @ Badshah Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, dated 28.01.2010, this Court while discussing the nature of circumstantial evidence and the burden of proof of prosecution stated as under:— “39. In a case of circumstantial evidence, one must look for complete chain of circumstances and not on snapped and scattered links which do not make a complete sequence. This Court finds that this case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a cautious approach as circumstantial evidence is “inferential evidence” and proof in such a case is derivable by inference from circumstances. 40. Chief Justice Fletcher Moulton once observed that “proof does not mean rigid mathematical formula” since “that is impossible”. However, proof must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a definite conclusion. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, has been compared by Lord Coleridge “like a gossamer thread, light and as unsubstantial as the air itself and may vanish with the merest of touches”. The learned Judge also observed that such evidence may be strong in parts but it may also leave great gaps and rents through which the accused may escape. Therefore, certain rules have been judicially evolved for appreciation of circumstantial evidence. 41. To my mind, the first rule is that the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference from circumstantial evidence must be clearly proved beyond any reasonable doubt. If conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, it must create a network from which there is no escape for the accused. 41. To my mind, the first rule is that the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference from circumstantial evidence must be clearly proved beyond any reasonable doubt. If conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, it must create a network from which there is no escape for the accused. The facts evolving out of such circumstantial evidence must be such as not to admit of any inference except that of guilt of the accused. (See Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1963 SC 74 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 70]). 42. The second principle is that all the links in the chain of evidence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and they must exclude the evidence of guilt of any other person than the accused. (See State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal [ (1992) 3 SCC 300 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 642 : 1992 Cri LJ 3693], SCC p. 309, para 20.) 43. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, we must remember the principle laid down in Ashraf Ali v. King Emperor [(1916-17) 21 CWN 1152 : 43 IC 241] (IC at para 14) that when in a criminal case there is conflict between presumption of innocence and any other presumption, the former must prevail. 44. The next principle is that in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and are incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis except his guilt. 45. When a murder charge is to be proved solely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, presumption of innocence of the accused must have a dominant role. In Nibaran Chandra Roy v. King Emperor [(1906-07) 11 CWN 1085] it was held that the fact that an accused person was found with a gun in his hand immediately after a gun was fired and a man was killed on the spot from which the gun was fired may be strong circumstantial evidence against the accused, but it is an error of law to hold that the burden of proving innocence lies upon the accused under such circumstances. It seems, therefore, to follow that whatever force a presumption arising under Section 106 of the Evidence Act may have in civil or in less serious criminal cases, in a trial for murder it is extremely weak in comparison with the dominant presumption of innocence. 46. The same principles have been followed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Govinda Reddy v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1960 SC 29 :1960 Cri LJ 137] where the learned Judges quoted the principles laid down in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. [ AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] The ratio in Govind [ AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] quoted in AIR para 5, p. 30 of the Report in Govinda Reddy [ AIR 1960 SC 29 : 1960 Cri LJ 137] are: “5. … ‘10. … in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances [which lead to the conclusion of guilt should be in the first instance] fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be [shown] that within all human probability the act must have been [committed] by the accused.’ [As observed in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 at pp. 345-46, para 10.]” The same principle has also been followed by this Court in Mohan Lal Pangasa v. State of U.P. [ (1974) 4 SCC 607 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 643 : AIR 1974 SC 1144 ]” 11. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of deceased Gotimbai was homicidal in nature? Learned trial court recorded an affirmative finding with regard to this question on the basis of postmortem report (Ex.P/13) wherein, Dr. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of deceased Gotimbai was homicidal in nature? Learned trial court recorded an affirmative finding with regard to this question on the basis of postmortem report (Ex.P/13) wherein, Dr. P.C. Prabhakar (P.W. 10), who conducted the postmortem, has clearly stated that the cause of death is excessive bleeding owing to chopping off of cervical and artery bone and the nature of death is said to be homicidal and further, nothing contrary has come in his cross-examination. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the postmortem report (Ex. P/13) as well as the evidence of Dr. P.C. Prabhakar (P.W. 10), we are satisfied that learned trial Court has rightly held the death of Gotimbai to be homicidal in nature. We hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court. 12. The next question for consideration would be whether the trial Court is justified in holding that appellant is the person who committed murder of the deceased and, thereby, convicting him for offence under Section 302 of IPC? 13. Now we would scrutinize each and every chain of circumstance one by one. 14. As noticed above, in order to base the conviction of the appellant, learned trial court has considered circumstances as mentioned above in order to connect the appellant with the offence in question. The circumstance No. (i) and (ii) - 15. The circumstance regarding motive as relied by the learned trial court is that, five years back the appellant had taken amount of Rs. 2 lakhs from the brother of the deceased for providing job, and when the deceased compelled the appellant herein to refund the money, dispute arose one night prior to date of the incident, and on the very next day at about 5 AM, dead body of deceased Gotimbai was found in the field of Narayan which is situated behind the house of Santan (P.W. 1). It is undisputed that on the date of incident, many persons were staying in the house of father of the deceased i.e Santan (P.W. 1). It is undisputed that on the date of incident, many persons were staying in the house of father of the deceased i.e Santan (P.W. 1). In para 8 of the cross-examination, Santan (P.W. 1) has stated that there were 2-3 marriages going on in his house, and many relatives were present and 10-15 persons were sleeping along with the appellant, therefore, it can’t be held that the appellant herein alone had an opportunity to commit murder of his wife i.e. deceased. Further, Radha Bai (P.W. 2) in para 6 of her cross- examination admitted that the alleged amount was not taken by the appellant herein, but by his brother, Ghanshyam. Therefore, it makes suspicious that amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was given to the appellant, and also, the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt by adducing any cogent and clinching evidence that the alleged amount was actually given to appellant herein. Even if, for an instance, it is assumed that the amount of Rs. 2 lakh was given to the appellant or his brother and that too 5 years ago, then mere its demand by deceased is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the aforesaid. The circumstance No. (iii) and (iv) - 16. The dead body of deceased was found on 27.4.2012 in the field of Narayan just behind the house of Santan (P.W. 1) and appellant was missing from house. Santan (P.W. 1) himself has admitted that on account of marriage there were many relatives staying in his house. The male members and female members were sleeping in different rooms and no one has seen the appellant in company of the deceased therefore, on mere suspicion, it would not be safe to hold the appellant guilty for offence of murder of his wife. 17. Next is the failure of the appellant herein to offer explanation regarding his absence from the house soon after the incident. Though, the appellant hasn’t offered any explanation where was he just after the incident, however in Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharasthtra reported in 2021 (5) SCC 626 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that failure of the appellant to give any explanation cannot be used as a link to complete the chain. It was held therein as under :– 25. It was held therein as under :– 25. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that the appellant failed to give any explanation in his statement under Section 313 CrPC. By now it is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain. Reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487] The circumstance No. (v) - As to Recovery of Gold Locket, Nose Pin, and Lungi - 18. In the case in hand, pursuant to memorandum statement (Ex.P/3) of the appellant recorded on 27.04.2012 at about 1 PM, gold locket and nose pin worn by deceased, were recovered from his possession vide seizure memo (Ex.P/4) on 27.04.2012 at about 1:20 PM and lungi worn by him was recovered from the field of Kartik vide seizure memo (Ex.P/5) on 27.04.2012 at about 2 PM. Witnesses to seizure of gold locket, nose pin and lungi, Vinod (P.W. 3) and Panchu (P.W. 4) turned hostile and even when leading questions were asked by the Prosecutor, they have not stated anything regarding above stated articles. 19. Further, one axe was seized from the spot vide seizure memo (Ex.P/11) on 27.04.2012 itself at about 8:15 AM. Witness to such seizure, namely Bhagwat- Village Kotwar (PW 8); has supported the case of the prosecution and his evidence couldn’t be demolished even in cross examination, whereas, other witness Santan (P.W. 1), has not stated anything about it. Perusal of seizure memo (Ex.P/11) and memorandum statement (Ex.P/3) makes it amply clear that the axe was seized from the spot, whereas, memorandum statement of the appellant herein has been recorded subsequently, therefore, the same would not tantamount to discovery for the purposes of Section 27 of Evidence Act. 20. In Mani v. State of T.N. reported in AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 1021 their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that “the discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and conviction in such a serious matter cannot be based upon the discovery. 20. In Mani v. State of T.N. reported in AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 1021 their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that “the discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and conviction in such a serious matter cannot be based upon the discovery. Once the discovery fails, there would be literally nothing which would support the prosecution case.” Apart from the seizure of the gold locket and nose pin and also the lungi worn by the appellant, we will have to scrutinize other incriminating material available on record against the appellant. The circumstance No. (vi) - Identification of articles - 21. Coming to the next ground taken by the learned court below i.e. identification of gold locket and one nose pin. The gold locket as well as the nose pin were seized from the pocket of the appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P/3) vide seizure memo (Ex.P/4) on 27.04.2012. As discussed earlier, the seizure witnesses of the aforesaid articles turned hostile and thus the prosecution couldn’t be benefitted from their evidence. Identification of the above articles was conducted on 08.05.2012 at about 2:10 PM. P. R. Bhaskar, Nayab Tahsildar (P.W. 5) has proved the identification of articles vide identification memo (Ex.P/8) but in cross-examination he has admitted that the police officials brought Santan (P.W. 1) and Manoj (P.W. 7) along with the articles and thus, the identification of the articles got vitiated. Further, the testimony of Santan (P.W. 1) and Manoj (P.W. 7) is not congruent with the identification memo (ExP/8) as to date of said identification as well as number of articles kept for the said purpose, as Santan (PW 1) has stated that he was called after 4 days of the incident for identification, on the other hand, Manoj (P.W. 7) states that he was called 10-15 days after the incident. This contradiction creates serious doubt on the case of the prosecution. The circumstance No. (vii) - F.S.L. report - 22. Next circumstance is the FSL report (Ex.P/20) in which the blood found on the articles is blood but it is not proved that it was of human origin. This contradiction creates serious doubt on the case of the prosecution. The circumstance No. (vii) - F.S.L. report - 22. Next circumstance is the FSL report (Ex.P/20) in which the blood found on the articles is blood but it is not proved that it was of human origin. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 3714 while dealing with the issue as to effect of failure of the prosecution to establish the blood as being of human origin or its blood group, has observed as under :- 8.The prosecution also relies upon the evidence relating to recovery of sticks and tabbal which were blood-stained. Such evidence may not be helpful to the prosecution in this case inasmuch as there is no evidence to show that these articles were stained with human blood, and more particularly with blood of the same blood group as that of the deceased. As per the Forensic Science Laboratory Report, the blood stains were disintegrated, and their origin could not be determined. In Sattatiya v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210 : ( AIR 2008 SC 1184 ), one of the crucial factors that had led this Court to reverse the conviction was that the bloodstains on the items seized in the recovery could not be linked with the blood of the deceased. This factor was treated as a serious lacuna in the case of the prosecution. Similarly, in Shantabai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 354 : ( AIR 2008 SC 1571 ), the blood-stains on some of the clothes seized from the accused in recovery belonged to a different blood group from that of the blood group of blood-stains found on the clothes of the deceased and on the sample of soil, axe, stones etc. which were taken from the spot by the investigating officer. As a result of this mismatch, it was held that this circumstance was not proved against the accused. It is also important to note the following observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 74 : "21. In this connection, reference may also be made to circumstances 9 and 10, relating to the recovery of the blood-stained earth from the house. It is also important to note the following observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 74 : "21. In this connection, reference may also be made to circumstances 9 and 10, relating to the recovery of the blood-stained earth from the house. The blood-stained earth has not been proved to be stained with human blood. Again, we are of opinion that it would be farfetched to conclude from the mere presence of bloodstained earth that earth was stained with human blood and that the human blood was of Kamla and Madhusudhan. These circumstances have, therefore, no evidentiary value." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, the five judge bench had ruled that in that case the prosecution needed to prove that the blood-stains found on the earth or the weapons were of a human origin and were of the same blood group as that of the deceased. 9. We are also conscious of the fact that, at times, it may be very difficult for the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to the disintegration of the serum, or insufficiency of bloodstains, or haematological changes etc. In such situations, the Court, using its judicious mind, may deny the benefit of doubt to the accused, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, if other evidence of the prosecution is credible and if reasonable doubt does not arise in the mind of the Court about the investigation. Thus, in the case of R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266 : ( AIR 2013 SC 651 , Para 17), this Court had observed: "31. A failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe could not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is insufficient in itself, or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation, that a serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood in question. However, in such a case, unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind may entertain with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in this regard. However, in such a case, unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind may entertain with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in this regard. Once the recovery is made in pursuance of a disclosure statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching of blood group(s) loses significance." Similar observations were made by this Court in the case of Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : ( AIR 2001 SC 330 ), wherein it was observed that it was not possible to accept the submission made on behalf of the accused that in the absence of the report regarding the origin of the blood, the accused could not have been convicted, inasmuch as it was only because of the lapse of time that blood could not be classified successfully. In the case of Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2600 ), this Court had ruled that as the recovery was made pursuant to a disclosure statement made by the accused, and the serological report had found that the blood was of human origin, the non determination of the blood group had lost its significance. In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 507 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1776 ), the Court had observed that the failure of the serologist to detect the origin of the blood, due to disintegration of the serum, did not mean that the blood stuck on the weapon could not have been human blood at all. In this context, it was noted that it could not be said that in all cases where there was a failure in detecting the origin of blood, the circumstance arising from recovery of the weapon would stand relegated to disutility. It was thus observed that unless the doubt was of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind entertained with some objectivity, no benefit could be claimed by the accused. 10. It was thus observed that unless the doubt was of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind entertained with some objectivity, no benefit could be claimed by the accused. 10. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused would be in a disadvantageous position in case if the aforementioned dictum laid down by this Court in the cases of R. Shaji ( AIR 2013 SC 651 ) (supra), Gura Singh ( AIR 2001 SC 330 ) (supra), Jagroop Singh ( AIR 2012 SC 2600 ) (supra) and Teja Ram ( AIR 1999 SC 1776 ) (supra) relating to the bloodstains is applied in each and every case. Non-confirmation of bloodgroup or origin of the blood may assume importance in cases where the accused pleads a defence or alleges mala fides on the part of the prosecution, or accuses the prosecution of fabricating the evidence to wrongly implicate him in the commission of the crime. 11. In the case of John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129 : (AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 531), this Court, on facts, observed that the evidence of recovery of weapons was credible. The Forensic Science Report (FSL) report had disclosed that the blood was of human origin. The Court proceeded to conclude that since the evidence of recovery of weapon was proved to the satisfaction of the Court, it was sufficient that the prosecution had proved that the blood-stains were of human origin, even though the blood group could not be ascertained. 12. The cases discussed above highlight the burden that the prosecution would ordinarily have to discharge, depending on the other facts and circumstances of the case, for the evidence relating to recovery to be considered against the accused. At the same time, as mentioned above, we are conscious of the fact that it may not always be possible to inextricably link the bloodstains on the items seized in recovery to the blood of the deceased, due to the possibility of disintegration of bloodstains on account of the time-lapse in carrying out the recovery. At the same time, as mentioned above, we are conscious of the fact that it may not always be possible to inextricably link the bloodstains on the items seized in recovery to the blood of the deceased, due to the possibility of disintegration of bloodstains on account of the time-lapse in carrying out the recovery. For this reason, in Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127 : ( AIR 2018 SC 3199 ), where one of us (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar J.) had the occasion to author the judgment, this Court, relying on Teja Ram ( AIR 1999 SC 1776 ) (supra), had held that the failure to determine the blood group of the blood-stains collected from the scene of offence would not prove fatal to the case of the prosecution. In Prabhu Dayal case ( AIR 2018 SC 3199 ) (supra), although the FSL report could not determine the blood group of the blood-stains on account of disintegration, the report clearly disclosed that the blood-stains were of human origin, and the chain of circumstantial evidence was completed by the testimonies of the other witnesses as well as the reports submitted by the Ballistic Expert and the Forensic Science Laboratory regarding the weapon used to commit murder. 13. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if the recovery of blood-stained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. The Court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match. Since the prosecution has utterly failed to link the bloodstains found on the lungi with the blood of the deceased, we are of the considered view that prosecution couldn’t establish the complete chain of evidences so as to hold the appellant guilty for the aforestated. 23. “One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the general burden never shifts. 23. “One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the general burden never shifts. There can be no conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal proof. The onus of the prosecution cannot be discharged by referring to very strong suspicion and existence of highly suspicious factors to inculpate the accused nor falsity of defence could take the place of proof which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed, though a false plea by the defence at best, be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances unfailingly point to the guilt.” (See. Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 4 SCC 522 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 300 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 316 at page 527). 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that firstly, the motive of the appellant for killing his own wife i.e. the deceased, could not be established by the prosecution. Secondly, failure of appellant to explain his absence from the house after the incident, would have supplied an additional circumstance, as discussed above, however, same cannot be used as a link to complete the chain. Thirdly, alleged recovery of gold locket and nose pin from the possession of the appellant and its identification is not free from suspicion and even if they are accepted as gospel truth on the sole testimony of ASI, Vishnu Sharma (P.W. 11), then also in totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellant as aforesaid cannot be sustained, and lastly, the FSL report does not establish that blood stains found on lungi worn by appellant was blood of human origin. The conviction has to be based upon sound judicial principles and not mere on conjectures. The prosecution ought to have established entire chain of evidence in order to bring home the charge of Section 302 of IPC against the appellant, which is certainly missing from the present matter. 25. As such, we are of the considered opinion that prosecution has miserably failed in establishing the complete chain of circumstances so as to hold the appellant herein criminally liable for murder of his wife i.e. the deceased. 25. As such, we are of the considered opinion that prosecution has miserably failed in establishing the complete chain of circumstances so as to hold the appellant herein criminally liable for murder of his wife i.e. the deceased. In that view of the matter, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgment recording conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and awarding life sentence. The appellant is acquitted of the charge punishable under Section 302 of IPC and he be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 26. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed.