JUDGMENT : 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed that the impugned order dated 07.08.2015 of termination of his services be quashed and set aside and thereby, the Respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with full back-wages and with continuity of service. 2. Heard, learned Advocate, Mr. Jit Patel, for the petitioner and learned Advocate, Mr. Maulik Nanavati, for the Respondents. 3. Learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Sanitary Inspector vide order dated 24.08.2011. 3.1 As per the terms of the service, his services were continuous and the same were to be regularized on completion of five years. 3.2 It appears that in August, 2015, an FIR being First Information Report No. 11 of 2015, came to be registered against the present petitioner with ACB Police Station, Vadodara, for the alleged commission of the offence punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in brief, ‘Act of 1988’). 3.2.1 The petitioner came to be arrested in connection with the said FIR and on that ground, the Respondents terminated the services of the petitioner vide order dated 07.08.2015. 4. Learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, appearing for the petitioner mainly contended that without conducting any departmental inquiry against the petitioner, his services came to be terminated and therefore, the impugned order be quashed and set aside. 4.1 It was, further, submitted that the order passed by the Respondents in stigmatic in nature and therefore, the Respondents ought to have conducted a departmental inquiry before terminating the services of the petitioner. 4.2 In support of his submissions, learned Advocates, Mr. Patel, placed reliance on the decision of this Court, Dated: 16.02.2022, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 8547 of 2021 and submitted that the issue involved in this petition is covered by the aforesaid decision. 4.3 Learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, next placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, Dated: 20.02.2018, rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 189 of 2018. 4.4 Learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, also relied on the decision of this Court, Dated: 06.04.2022, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 7255 of 2015 as well as another decision dated 07.04.2022, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 12610 of 2015. 4.4 Learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, also relied on the decision of this Court, Dated: 06.04.2022, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 7255 of 2015 as well as another decision dated 07.04.2022, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 12610 of 2015. 4.5 Relying on the aforesaid decisions, it was submitted that in similar type of cases, this Court quashed and set aside the order of termination of services and thereby, directed the concerned Respondents to reinstate the petitioner in the concerned matter. 4.6 It was, therefore, prayed that this petition be allowed and the Respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner. 5. On the other hand, learned Advocate, Mr. Nanavati, appearing for the Respondents strongly opposed this petition and referring to the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply, submitted that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Sanitary Inspector for the period of five years. 5.1 It was, further, submitted that as per the terms and conditions of appointment, a person shall remain on the period of probation for five years and on successful completion of, initial, services of two years, the appointment of such person was to be continued for further three years and only on successful completion of such period, the person so appointed was to be absorbed in the main stream of the Respondents. 5.2 It was submitted that, as per the terms and conditions of the appointment order, the services of the concerned employee could be terminated either by giving one month’s notice or one month’s fix pay in lieu of such notice period. 5.3 It was also pointed out that the services of an employee can be ended immediately, without issuance of any notice, if, the work performance of an employee is either found to be unsatisfactory or he / she is found to be involved in any kind of misconduct during the contract period. 5.4 Learned Advocate, Mr. Nanavati, submitted that FIR No. 11 of 2015 is registered against the present petitioner with ACB Police Station, Vadodara, under the provisions of the Act of 1988, wherein, it is alleged that the present petitioner was caught red-handed by the ACB officials on 04.08.2015, while accepting the bribe of Rs.2500/- from one of his subordinate employees. Thus, as per the terms and conditions of his appointment, services of the petitioner came to be terminated. Thus, as per the terms and conditions of his appointment, services of the petitioner came to be terminated. 5.5 It was submitted that the departmental inquiry is not required to be conducted against the present petitioner, as he is not a permanent employee of the Respondents. 5.6 It was, therefore, prayed that this petition be dismissed. 6. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and having perused the material on record, it emerges that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Sanitary Inspector for the period of five years. A copy of the appointment order of the petitioner is produced at Page-29 of the compilation, whereas, the terms and conditions of his appointment are produced at Page-31 of the compilation. 6.1 It, further, emerges from the record that services of the petitioner came to be terminated by the Respondents vide impugned order dated 07.08.2015. A copy of the impugned order dated 07.08.2015 is produced at Page-12 of the compilation. 6.2 If, the impugned order is carefully examined, it is clear that the services of the petitioner came to be terminated only on the ground that an FIR, under the provisions of the Act of 1988, is lodged against the present petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order of termination is stigmatic in nature and therefore, before terminating the services of the petitioner, the Respondents were required to conduct a departmental inquiry. 6.3 At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of this Court, Dated: 06.04.2022, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 7255 of 2015. 6.3.1 In the said matter, this Court considered the similar issue and thereafter, by relying on the decision of this Court dated 26.02.2019, rendered in Special Civil Application No. 12071 of 2018, allowed the same and appropriate directions were issued to the concerned Respondents. 6.3.2 The relevant observations made by this Court in the order dated 06.04.2022, reads thus: “ 10. 6.3.2 The relevant observations made by this Court in the order dated 06.04.2022, reads thus: “ 10. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material placed on record, it would emerge that pursuant to the advertisement issued by the respondent – board for the post of Panchayat Sahayak, the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 25.02.2008 on a fixed pay of Rs.2500/- p.m. for a period of five years, however, the services of the petitioner were not regularized on the ground that the petitioner has failed to pass CCC examination. It is further required to be noted at this stage that the petitioner has not challenged the aforesaid action of the respondent authority that the services were not regularized on a particular date on the aforesaid ground. It is further revealed from the record that immediately thereafter, FIR being C.R. No.8/2014 came to be filed against the petitioner for the alleged commission of offence punishable under the provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The concerned respondent authority has, therefore, terminated the services of the petitioner on the ground that FIR is registered against the petitioner. This Court has gone through the impugned order passed by the concerned respondent authority. From the impugned order, it is clear that the services of the petitioner were terminated only on the ground of registration of the FIR under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thus, it is not in dispute that before passing the impugned order, which is stigmatic order, show cause notice was not issued to the petitioner. Thus without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the impugned order came to be passed. The respondent authority has also not conducted departmental inquiry against the petitioner under the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1997. In a decision in case of Sandip Ajitsinh Vaghela (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court has considered almost similar type of case, wherein the concerned petitioner was appointed as Clerk on a fixed pay for a period of five years and against him, an FIR came to be registered with Anti Corruption Bureau, District : Vadodara with allegation that the concerned petitioner had demanded illegal gratification and based on registration of FIR against the said petitioner, his services were terminated. This Court, after considering various decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has observed in Paragraph Nos.5.1 to 5.8 and 6 as under, “(5.) The position of law in relation to effecting termination of service of an employee, even if on the fixed pay, by passing a stigmatic order without following principles of natural justice came to be delineated and discussed by this Court in Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No.17872 of 2017 decided on 30th November, 2017. In that case, petitioner was appointed as Beat Guard. The allegations were raised against him inter alia that he had stolen two passbooks, that he mentioned wrong information in the Register to allow trucks to pass-by illegally. It was stated in the order leading to his termination of service that he used the pass-book for illegal purpose for which it was stolen and due to the act of negligence, caused damage to the forest's properties to a large extent. It was mentioned in the order that if the petitioner was to continue in service, it would entail greater loss and that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service since the petitioner was found to be negligent and careless in discharge of his duties. 5.1 The law on the aspect was discussed with reference to the decisions of the Apex Court. In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 5 SCC 152 ], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: "Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry." (para 29) (emphasis supplied) 5.2 The above statement of law that if the order is punitive and stigmatic in nature, even if the employee concerned is a temporary employee or holding the post as on probation, his dismissal or removal would warrant a regular inquiry and fullfledged compliance of natural justice, emanaged from the early decision of the Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India [ (1984) 2 SCC 369 ]. In that case, the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the Court to go behind the formal order of discharge so as to find out the real cause of action. In that case, the appellant was an IPS Officer, undergoing training as a probationer, arrived late by about 22 minutes at the place, even though prior intimation was sent about the time on which, the candidates were required to reach the venue. The incident of delayed reporting was considered to be one by the authorities calling for an inquiry and an explanation was sought for from the petitioner and all other probationer trainees who had arrived late. On the basis of explanation, the Director recommended the Government for discharge of the appellant from service. The Government passed order of discharge on the basis of recommendation of the Director with whom, the only ground prevailing was that the appellant did not show any sign of repentance. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits. 5.3 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits. 5.3 The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. In such circumstances, the Apex Court stated, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged, to go beyond the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court held, "If .... .... .... the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground where the aggrieved officer is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2). It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2)." (Paras 11 and 13) 5.4 It is the foundation of the order which really matters. The Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal (supra) stated that if from the record and the attendant circumstances of the present case it becomes clear that the real foundation for the order of discharge of the appellant-probationer was the alleged act of misconduct, the impugned order would amount to termination of service by way of punishment and in absence of any enquiry held in accordance with Article 311(2), it was liable to be struck down. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all. 5.5 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [ (1980) 2 SCC 593 ] stated and observed thus, "53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological coverups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological coverups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." (Emphasis supplied) (Para 9) 5.5.1 Having delineated the aforesaid principles, the Apex Court held that the order in the case before it could not be treated as a simple order of retrenchment and that it was an order passed by way of punishment. It was held that such order of dismissal which was passed without holding a regular departmental inquiry cannot be allowed to be sustained. 5.6 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.7 In Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi (supra), it was thereafter observed and held, "6. When the impugned order is assessed, evaluated and considered in light of the aforesaid principles, it is even not necessary to adopt the process of lifting of veil. It is not necessary to remove the facade even, for, the order in these very recitals could be manifestly said to be based on allegations of misconduct. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, even though the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, even though the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a fullfledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. Even if the temporary, ad-hoc or probationer employee is driven out of service on the ground of misconduct without holding inquiry and stigma is caste on his career by the punitive order, it is also a facet of behaving with hire and fire attitude by the employer." 5.8 Also stand to support the petitioner another decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No.1095 of 2016 decided on 21st September, 2016 in which, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that the order ex facie indicated that the basis of the order of termination was criminal complaint lodged against the petitioner. As the order was passed without compliance of natural justice, it was required indulgence of the Court, stated the Court, after discussing the position of law in that regard. (6.) In light of the aforesaid principles and the position of law on the aspect, if the facts of the present petitioner are revisited, the petitioner was appointed on 28th September, 2012 as Junior Clerk for a fixed period of five years. His tenure was to come to an end as per appointment order on 28th September, 2017. Pursuant to F.I.R. being C.R. No.I09 of 2016 registered on 19th December, 2016, the petitioner was supplied to the impugned order of termination is dated 21st August, 2017. 6.1 Looking at the contents and the recitals in the impugned order mentions about filing of F.I.R. against the petitioner at Vadodara (Rural) Anti Corruption Bureau Police Station, Vadodara. It was stated that the petitioner was a Clerk appointed. The complainant stated that he received a phone call from the petitioner to meet him in connection with the work of getting the land of the complainant converted into non-agriculture, that the petitioner asked the gratification of Rs.60,000/- which was ultimately agreed for Rs.50,000/- and Rs.30,000/- was given to the petitioner. The impugned order thereafter narrated the details of the charges applied against the petitioner under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the factum of his suspension and the extension of suspension from time-to-time. The impugned order thereafter narrated the details of the charges applied against the petitioner under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the factum of his suspension and the extension of suspension from time-to-time. It was thereafter stated that since the offence was registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act and since the petitioner had committed a misconduct of asking illegal gratification, his services were liable to be terminated. Thus, it was clear from the bare reading of the recitals in the impugned order that the foundation in the impugned order was alleged misconduct of taking bribe for which F.I.R. was registered. By very nature of the contents of the order, the order could be treated as stigmatic. The order was passed without compliance of principles of natural justice. Since the allegation of misconduct was foundation for the penal action taken against the petitioner, above discussed position of law would operate to grant relief to the petitioner. 6.2 While the impugned order will be liable to be quashed and petitioner will be liable to be reinstated, it is clarified that his reinstatement would be for the period which would make up the total period of the fixed period for which he was appointed.” 11. At this stage, this Court would like to refer to the orders passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in similar type of cases. In a decision delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No.6062/2019 on 02.09.2021, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has considered similar facts, where the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground of alleged demand of illegal gratification. In the said case also, the order of termination was passed without holding any departmental inquiry and since the order of termination was stigmatic, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has quashed and set aside the order and directed the concerned respondent to reinstate the concerned petitioner on his original post. The Coordinate Bench of this Court has observed in Paragraph Nos.6 as under, “6. Under the circumstances and in light of the aforesaid undisputed fact, the impugned order 31.01.2019 passed by the respondent authority is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on his original post. It is clarified that the reinstatement is only for the purpose of holding the departmental inquiry. Under the circumstances and in light of the aforesaid undisputed fact, the impugned order 31.01.2019 passed by the respondent authority is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on his original post. It is clarified that the reinstatement is only for the purpose of holding the departmental inquiry. The grant of consequential benefits would depend on the ultimate outcome of the departmental proceedings.” 12. The decision in case of Dineshbhai Dhudabhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat delivered in Special Civil Application No.11518/2020 on 07.02.2022, recently the Coordinate Bench of this Court has considered the similar matter, where the order of termination was passed against the concerned petitioner, who was working as Junior Clerk engaged in a five years’ contract basis. In the said case also, FIR came to be registered against the concerned petitioner for the alleged offences punishable under the provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The concerned authority terminated the services of the petitioner concerned without holding departmental inquiry and in the said case also, the Coordinate Bench has quashed and set aside the order of termination and has observed in Paragraph No.7 as under, “7. Accordingly the order dated 14.09.2020 is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated on his original post. The petitioner shall continue to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of his reinstatement. The order of reinstatement shall be without consequential benefits. Notional pay may be fixed as if the petitioner was continued in service and as if the initial order dated 29.07.2015 and also the order dated 14.09.2020 was also not pressed. However, it is clarified that in the event the respondents contemplating terminating services of the petitioner, the same shall be done only in accordance with law after holding an appropriate inquiry.” 13. Recently, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has passed another order dated 15.02.2022 in Special Civil Application No.7035/2021 and, thereafter, has observed in Paragraph No.9 as under, “9. In view of the above, the petition is allowed. Considering the fact that the impugned order of termination is dated 02.02.2019 and the petitioner's term was for a period of five years i.e. from 07.09.2015, the order of termination is set aside. In view of the above, the petition is allowed. Considering the fact that the impugned order of termination is dated 02.02.2019 and the petitioner's term was for a period of five years i.e. from 07.09.2015, the order of termination is set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of 10 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order on the original post with similar service conditions to make up a total five years period as per the original appointment period. Thus, reinstatement of the petitioner shall be upto making up a total original period of five years of the petitioner’s appointment. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any monetary benefits or salary for the intervening period. Respondents are not precluded from proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with law.” 14. Thus keeping in view the aforesaid orders/decisions rendered in similar type of cases by this Court, if the facts of the present case as discussed hereinabove, are carefully examined, it is revealed that in the present case also, the concerned respondent authority has passed impugned order without holding departmental inquiry only on the ground that FIR under the provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been registered against the petitioner. Thus in the facts of the present case, the impugned order passed by the respondent authority is required to be quashed and set aside.” 6.4 Keeping in view the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision, if, the facts of the present case, as discussed herein above, are carefully examined, then, it becomes clear that this petition is squarely covered by the order of this Court dated 06.04.2022. Therefore, the impugned order dated 07.08.2015 passed by the Respondents deserve to be quashed and set aside. 7. Resultantly, this petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 07.08.2015 is quashed and set aside. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service on his original post with continuity of service. However, the petitioner shall not be entitled for any monteary benefits for the interregnum period. 7.1 The Respondents are, however, not precluded from proceeding against the present petitioner in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.