State Of Kerala Represented By The Chief Secretary v. K. Mohamed Akbar, S/o. K. Abdu Rahman
2022-07-01
A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, MOHAMMED NIAS C.P.
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J. Under what circumstances can the power of judicial review be exercised in matters of state policy ? That is the question that arises for our consideration in this batch of O.P(KAT)’s. The brief facts necessary for a disposal of these petitions are as follows: Sometime in 2015, the State Government through an executive order brought the government doctors qualified in the Ayurveda/Yoga/Homeo/Unani/Siddha system of medicine under the fold of a separate government department (AYUSH). Resultantly, only the doctors qualified in the Allopathic system of medicine continued in service under the Health Department. The age of retirement of government doctors qualified in the various systems of medicine was uniform at 56 years till 2017. By an executive order dated 28.11.2017, however, the age of retirement of the allopathic doctors in the Health Department of the State was enhanced to 60 years. No such decision was taken in respect of the doctors in the AYUSH department. Some of the members of the latter fraternity, therefore, approached the State Administrative Tribunal alleging discrimination, and seeking a direction to the State government to extend the benefit of enhanced age of retirement to them as well. 2. In two successive rounds of litigation, the Tribunal disposed the pending OA’s before it with a direction to the State government to consider the grievance of the applicants. On both those occasions, the State government passed orders rejecting the requests and representations on the ground that the State government had not yet taken a policy decision in regard to enhancing the age of retirement of the doctors in the AYUSH department. This led the doctors in that department to once again approach the Tribunal impugning the order passed by the State government. This time around, the Tribunal, probably exasperated with the non-compliance by the State government with its directions, allowed the OA’s by placing reliance on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma & Ors. – Judgment dated 03.08.2021 in C.A.No.4578 of 2021, and directed the State government to enhance the retirement age of doctors in the AYUSH department to 60 years as was done in the case of doctors in the Health department.
Ram Naresh Sharma & Ors. – Judgment dated 03.08.2021 in C.A.No.4578 of 2021, and directed the State government to enhance the retirement age of doctors in the AYUSH department to 60 years as was done in the case of doctors in the Health department. The benefit of enhanced retirement age was, however, confined to only those who retired after 03.08.2021 i.e. the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in NDMC (supra). 3. The order of the Tribunal has given rise to three categories of aggrieved persons before us. On the one hand there is the State, which is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal to the extent it directs it to enhance the age of retirement of doctors in the AYUSH department to 60 years and on the other hand, there are the doctors of the AYUSH department who retired on superannuation on attaining the age of 56 years, prior to the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in NDMC (supra). They are aggrieved by the cut-off date fixed by the Tribunal for the benefit of enhanced retirement age. The third category consists of persons who are included in the rank lists prepared by the Kerala Public Service Commission [PSC] for appointment as doctors in the AYUSH department. They have approached this Court by filing O.P (KAT)’s, after obtaining the leave of this Court to do so. Although they do not have any locus standi to challenge the order of the Tribunal since they are not in service as of now and, as persons empanelled in a select list prepared by the PSC they do not have any indefeasible right of appointment to any post either, we permitted the learned counsel appearing for them to advance arguments supporting the stand of the State. 4. The arguments of Sri. Ashok M. Cherian, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State, and Sri. Elvin Peter P.J, Sri.T.R. Rajan, Sri.Harindranath and Sri.B. Ramachandran, the learned counsel appearing for the leave petitioners, are as follows: ? In as much as the State had not taken a policy decision with regard to enhancing the age of retirement of the doctors in the AYUSH department, it was not open to the Tribunal to force a policy decision on them by directing the State to enhance the retirement age of such doctors.
In as much as the State had not taken a policy decision with regard to enhancing the age of retirement of the doctors in the AYUSH department, it was not open to the Tribunal to force a policy decision on them by directing the State to enhance the retirement age of such doctors. It is contended that there are many factors, other than the nature of duties performed by the doctors in the Health department and the AYUSH department, that go into the taking of a policy decision as regards retirement age, and these factors have been ignored by the Tribunal in the impugned order. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the decisions in B. Bharat Kumar and Others v. Osmania University and Others – [ (2007) 11 SCC 58 ]; Mathai M.M. v. Elizabeth Xavier and Others -[ 2011 (2) KHC 387 ]; Jagdish Prasad Sharma and Others v. State of Bihar and Others – [ (2013) 8 SCC 633 ] and Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association v. State of Kerala and Others – [ (2018) 7 SCC 314 ]. ? The reliance placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Supreme Court in NDMC (supra) is wholly misplaced in as much as the facts in the said case are clearly distinguishable. In the said case, although the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and the NMDC had initially excluded the doctors of the AYUSH department from the benefit of enhanced retirement age that was granted to General Duty Medical Officers (GDMO), the Ministry subsequently extended the benefit to the doctors of AYUSH also. While doing so, however, the benefit of enhanced retirement age for doctors in the AYUSH department was made effective from a later date. It was the disparity that arose consequent to the different dates from which the benefit of enhanced retirement age was extended to the doctors that was dealt with by the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the observations in the said judgment as regards the parity in treatment of doctors in both the departments have to be understood in the light of the above crucial facts. 5. Per Contra, the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel, Sri.
It is submitted that the observations in the said judgment as regards the parity in treatment of doctors in both the departments have to be understood in the light of the above crucial facts. 5. Per Contra, the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel, Sri. Raju Joseph, duly instructed by Sri.C. Joseph Antony, Sri.G.P. Shinod, Sri.S. Ramesh, Sri.G. Sudheer, Smt.Asha S.V., Sri.P. Ramakrishnan and Sri.O.D. Sivadas, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents, are as follows: ? The Tribunal was justified in placing reliance on the decision in NMDC (supra) more so when the court had made categorical observations therein to the effect that there was nothing to distinguish between the doctors under the AYUSH department and the Central Health Scheme. These observations, it is contended, prevent the State government from taking a different stand in the instant cases and hence the impugned order of the Tribunal calls for no interference from this Court. ? As regards the cut-off date of 03.08.2021 stipulated by the Tribunal for the benefit of enhanced retirement age for doctors under the AYUSH department, it is contended that there was no basis for the Tribunal to restrict the benefit to only those doctors of the AYUSH department retiring after the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in NMDC (supra). It is argued that once the law was declared by the Supreme Court, that there could not be a differential treatment accorded to the two categories of doctors, the benefit of enhanced retirement age had to be made applicable to the doctors under the AYUSH department from the very same date as that from which the benefit was extended to the doctors under the Health department. 6. We have considered the rival submissions and also perused the pleadings on record. We have also gone through the judgments cited on either side. At the very outset, we deem it apposite to quote the following passage from a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority & Anr. v. B.D. Singhal & Ors. – [2021 SCC OnLine SC 466], wherein while considering a similar issue regarding enhancement of retirement age, the Court observed as under: “Whether the age of superannuation should be enhanced is a matter of policy.
v. B.D. Singhal & Ors. – [2021 SCC OnLine SC 466], wherein while considering a similar issue regarding enhancement of retirement age, the Court observed as under: “Whether the age of superannuation should be enhanced is a matter of policy. If a decision has been taken to enhance the age of superannuation, the date with effect from which the enhancement should be made falls within the realm of policy. The High Court in ordering that the decision of the State government to accept the proposal to enhance the age of superannuation must date back to 29 June 2002 has evidently lost sight of the above factual background, more specifically (i) the rejection of the original proposal on 22 September 2009; and (ii) the judgment of the Division Bench dated 17 January 2012 refusing to set aside the order rejecting the proposal on 22 September 2009 which has attained finality. But there is a more fundamental objection to the basis of the decision of the High Court. The infirmity in the judgment lies in the fact that the High Court has trenched upon the realm of policy-making and has assumed to itself, jurisdiction over a matter, which lies in the domain of the executive. Whether the age of superannuation should be increased and if so, the date from which this should be effected is a matter of policy into which the High Court ought not to have entered.” (emphasis supplied) The above observations assume significance in the cases before us because we find that the Administrative Tribunal, in the order impugned in these petitions, has done precisely what the Supreme Court has exhorted the High Courts not to do. On the facts of the applications that were considered by the Tribunal, it was clear that notwithstanding specific orders passed by it in two rounds of litigation, the State government had not passed orders giving reasons as to why it was of the view that the enhanced retirement age prescribed for doctors in the Health department could not be made applicable to the doctors in the AYUSH department. That being said, we notice that the order that was passed by the State government clearly stated that the State government had not taken a policy decision in the matter.
That being said, we notice that the order that was passed by the State government clearly stated that the State government had not taken a policy decision in the matter. In our view, when confronted with the said stand of the State government, the Tribunal ought to have disposed the OA’s by directing the State government to take a policy decision one way or another, after giving reasons for their decision, if it was one that was against the interests of the applicants in the OA’s. The Tribunal ought to have reminded itself of the fact that, in the absence of a policy decision taken by the State government, it was not within its domain to undertake that exercise by itself and thrust a decision on the State government. 7. No doubt, it is the case of the respondents herein that the Tribunal was justified in holding as it did based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in NMDC (supra). We, however, do not agree. A reading of the said judgment clearly reveals that the factual circumstances obtaining in that case were entirely different, and clearly distinguishable, from the facts in the petitions before us. Firstly, although in that case, the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and the NMDC had initially excluded the doctors of the AYUSH department from the benefit of enhanced retirement age that was granted to General Duty Medical Officers (GDMO), the Ministry had subsequently extended the same benefit to the doctors of AYUSH also, by taking a policy decision to that effect, albeit from a later date. Secondly, it was in the context of the differential dates from which the benefit of enhanced retirement age was extended to the GDMO’s and the doctors of AYUSH that the Court rendered the finding of discrimination between two categories of doctors who were apparently being treated differently for no other reason than that they were practitioners of different systems of medicine. 8. As against the facts in NMDC (supra), the instant is a case where the State government has not taken a policy decision as regards the enhancement of retirement age of doctors in the AYUSH department. There are myriad factors that enter into the making of a decision as regards enhancement of retirement age, and we do not wish to speculate on what they might be.
There are myriad factors that enter into the making of a decision as regards enhancement of retirement age, and we do not wish to speculate on what they might be. It is for the State government to undertake that exercise and come to a decision. For now, we need only direct the State government to take that decision, by considering the representations preferred by the applicants in the OA’s. We feel that such a direction needs to be issued, and the State government compelled to take a decision on merits, since the issue is one that has been urged and pursued by the applicants since 2017. 9. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned order of the Administrative Tribunal and allow O.P (KAT) Nos.138, 139, 142, 146 and 152 of 2022 preferred by the State Government. Consequently, O.P (KAT) Nos.164, 175, 183, 185 and 190 of 2022 preferred by those applicants before the Tribunal, who were aggrieved by the cut-off date stipulated in the impugned order for obtaining the benefit of enhanced retirement age extended to doctors of the AYUSH department, are dismissed. O.P (KAT) Nos.155, 188, 201, 202, 205 and 207 of 2022 preferred by third parties after obtaining the leave of this Court are dismissed as not maintainable, as the said persons do not have any right to appointment to any post in the service under the AYUSH department, and cannot be seen as aggrieved persons for the purpose of maintaining the O.P (KAT)’s. 10. The State government shall consider the representations preferred by the applicants in the OA’s afresh and take a decision on the merits of their claims within an outer time limit of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The order passed by the State government shall contain clear reasons that manifest an application of mind by the State government to the issue of enhancement of retirement age of doctors in the AYUSH department.