JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mrs. Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Present petition arises out of judgment and order dated 27.09.2021 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Mathura in Rent Control Appeal No. 05 of 2017. 3. Facts, in nutshell, are that plaintiff respondent filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the Prescribed Authority which was registered as P.A. No. 53 of 2011 for releasing residential premises situated at Chatta Bazar, Holi wali Gali, Mathura from the defendant petitioner on the ground that the landlord being a follower of Vaishnav Sampradaya and a highly devoted person was not getting well alongwith his sons and daughter-in-laws, who were following the western culture and their eating habits was not matching to that of landlord, who is a purely vegetarian man. Further, it was also stated that the current residence at Krishna Nagar was far away causing inconvenience to the landlord respondent to discharge his religious obligations. 4. The release application was contested by the tenant petitioner on the ground that the need of the landlord was illusory and he had multiple properties at his disposal from where he can conveniently settle his needs. Moreover, the landlord was 71 years of age and being ill did not needed the accommodation in question. It was also stated that the accommodation was with the tenant petitioner since 1940 and landlord respondent was having three residential properties at Krishna Nagar, Mathura. Further, one of the son of the landlord was carrying on the business of utensils from the ground floor of the residential accommodation in question. On the first floor the tenant was in accommodation of one part which consisted of two rooms, kitchen and latrine bathroom while the landlord was having the other portion in which he can easily shift. It was also stated that the distance of river Yamuna from Krishna Nagar is only 3.5 Kilometers and not 7 Kilometers, as stated by the landlord. 5. After the exchange of pleadings and evidences filed by the parties the Prescribed Authority vide judgment and order dated 03.03.2017 rejected the release application filed by the landlord. It was also stated that the distance of river Yamuna from Krishna Nagar is only 3.5 Kilometers and not 7 Kilometers, as stated by the landlord. 5. After the exchange of pleadings and evidences filed by the parties the Prescribed Authority vide judgment and order dated 03.03.2017 rejected the release application filed by the landlord. Against the said order, Rent Control Appeal No. 05 of 2017 was filed before the District Judge, Mathura who vide judgment and order dated 27.09.2021 while setting aside the order of Prescribed Authority had allowed the release application of the landlord holding it to be bonafide and genuine. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. Mrs. Rama Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the tenant petitioner, raised three fold objections and submitted that the Appellate Court had not considered the provisions of Rule 16 (2) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Rules of 1972’) and while setting aside the order of Prescribed Authority, the Appellate Court failed to take note of the fact that the length of tenancy would greatly diminish a direction to vacate the tenanted premises since the tenant was in occupation of the building since the year 1940. 7. She secondly submitted that there was no bonafide and genuine need of the landlord as several evidences were pressed in by the tenant to establish that the landlord was in possession of several vacant accommodation which has not been denied and the distance of river Yamuna was not 7 Kilometers from Krishna Nagar as claimed by the landlord. Further, according to her, the release application was to be considered as a whole and no pleadings or grounds made therein had ever been withdrawn by the landlord and, thus, landlord cannot be given relaxation to the situation which goes totally against him. She next contended that the premises in dispute is situated at the first floor and staircase is only 1.5 feet wide and landlord being an old man with failing health cannot live in such congested area, thus, the need raised is not bonafide. According to her, the landlord is having three houses at Krishna Nagar being House No. 216/675, 216/77 and 216/76. Landlord is having one more accommodation as House No. 240/251 at Pratap Nagar, Mathura. 8. According to her, the landlord is having three houses at Krishna Nagar being House No. 216/675, 216/77 and 216/76. Landlord is having one more accommodation as House No. 240/251 at Pratap Nagar, Mathura. 8. Reliance has been placed upon decision of Apex Court in case of T. Sivasubramaniam and others Vs. Kasinath Pujari and others, AIR 1999 SC 3190 and Sudha Agrawal Vs. Xth Additional District Judge and others, 1999 (7) Supreme Today 214. 9. As far as the question of comparative hardship she contended that it lies in favour of tenant petitioner as the landlord at the time of making application was 71 years of age and now is more than 81 years of age and suffering from paralysis. According to her, as the tenant petitioner is earning his livelihood from the book shop which is situated adjacent to the premises in question, thus, the comparative hardship tilted in favour of tenant petitioner. Apart from these three arguments no other argument has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. Replying to the argument of the petitioner’s counsel Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel appearing for the landlord respondent, submitted that Rule 16 (2) (a) of Rules of 1972 is not applicable in the present case as from reading of the same it is clear that it is applicable only to the premises let out for any business and has no application for residential premises. 11. Reliance has been placed upon decision of Apex Court in case of Rishi Kumar Govil Vs. Maqsoodan and others, 2007 (2) ARC 1, relevant paragraph nos. 17 and 18 are extracted here as under; “17. Rule 16 on which reliance has been placed by both the sides reads as follows: "16. 11. Reliance has been placed upon decision of Apex Court in case of Rishi Kumar Govil Vs. Maqsoodan and others, 2007 (2) ARC 1, relevant paragraph nos. 17 and 18 are extracted here as under; “17. Rule 16 on which reliance has been placed by both the sides reads as follows: "16. Application for release on the ground of personal requirement: In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the prescribed authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the following- (a) where the landlord already has adequate and reasonably suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirements shall be construed strictly; (b) where a residential building was let out at a time when the sons of the landlord were minors and subsequently one or more of them has married, the additional requirement of accommodation for the landlord's sons shall be given due consideration; (c) where the tenant has, apart from the building under tenancy other adequate accommodation, whether owned by him or held as tenant of any public premises, having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his social status, the landlord's claim for additional requirements shall be construed liberally; (d) where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building; (e) where there are a number of tenants separately occupying a block of tenements and the landlord desires their eviction on ground of his personal need the prescribed authority shall, consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants; (f) where the landlord offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family the landlord's claim for release of the building under tenancy shall be construed liberally; (g) where the landlord was engaged in any employment in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building is situate and was in occupation of other accommodation by reason of such employment or where the landlord is the wife or minor son or unmarried daughter of a person who was engaged in any profession, trade, calling or employment away from the city, municipality, notified area or town area within which the building is situate and was living with such person, and by reason of the cessation of such engagement, the landlord needs the building for occupation by himself for residential purposes, such need shall ordinarily be deemed sufficient. (2) While considering an application for release under (a) of subsection (1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the prescribed authority shall also have regard to such facts as the following: (a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite party is, has been carrying on his business in that building, the less the justification for allowing the application; (b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application; (c) the greater the existing business of the landlord's own, apart from the business proposed to be set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application, and even if an application is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority may on the application of the tenant impose the condition where the landlord has available with him other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or not) which is not suitable for his own proposed business but may serve the purpose of the tenant, that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed authority; (d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self-employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration. (3) Where the tenant being servant of Government or of any local authority or any public sector corporation does not contest the application, then a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the District Magistrate, who shall have the right to oppose the application." 18. The parameters relating to Rule 16 of the Rules have been dealt with by this Court in Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and Ors., [2003] 2 SC 28. In the said judgment it was inter-alia noted as follows: "10. The parameters relating to Rule 16 of the Rules have been dealt with by this Court in Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda and Ors., [2003] 2 SC 28. In the said judgment it was inter-alia noted as follows: "10. A bare perusal of Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 makes it clear that the Rule only prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for business use. Clause (a) of sub-rule (2) provides, greater the period of tenancy less the justification for allowing the application; whereas according to clause (b) in case the tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift his business, greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind Sub-clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very long period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant. 11. In the case in hand we find that even though the period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but availability of another shop to him where he can very well shift his business as found by the Prescribed Authority, neutralises the factor of length of tenancy in the accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. We further find that the landlady has no other shop where she can establish her son who is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the business of father of Prem Prakash is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to attract application of Clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As observed earlier it is clear that length of period of tenancy as provided under Clause (a) of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules, 1972 is only one of the factors to be taken into account in context with other facts and circumstance of the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed son of the landlady whose need is certainly bonafide and has also been so accepted by the respondent before us." 12. He next contended that the other available accommodations were at Krishna Nagar, which was 7 Kilometers away from the river Yamuna, while the premises in dispute situated at Chhata Bazar was near to the river Yamuna and as he was the follower of Vaishnav Sampradaya, landlord in his last phase of life wanted to pursue his religious commitments and was daily visiting the temples and taking bath in holy river Yamuna, the present accommodation was needed by him. According to him most of the temples of interest of the landlord where he performs sewa puja are closed to the accommodation in dispute. Moreover, from the ground floor of the premises in dispute the landlord was carrying out his business and if the first floor was vacated it would become very easy for him to live there and carry out his business. 13. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Shanker Lal Agarwal Vs. District Judge, Aligarh and others, 2013 (2) ARC 422, wherein the Court held that the landlord cannot be deprived of beneficial enjoyment of his property. Relevant paragraph no. 14 is extracted here as under; “14. In the words of the Apex Court, as said in Prativa Devi (supra) such gratuitous advice of the Court is wholly uncalled for. District Judge, Aligarh and others, 2013 (2) ARC 422, wherein the Court held that the landlord cannot be deprived of beneficial enjoyment of his property. Relevant paragraph no. 14 is extracted here as under; “14. In the words of the Apex Court, as said in Prativa Devi (supra) such gratuitous advice of the Court is wholly uncalled for. Law cannot be construed in a manner so as to deprive the landlord beneficial enjoyment of his property. The Appellate court ought not to have endeavoured as to how else landlord should have adjusted himself while deciding the question of bona fide requirement. This was wholly unnecessary, as said by the Apex Court in R.C. Tamrakar (supra). I am clearly of the view that above observation fully apply in this case rendering the appellate order bad in law.” 14. Reliance has also been placed upon another decision of coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Suresh Chand Sharma Vs. Nand Kumar Kamal, 2013 (97) ALR 817, wherein the Court held that Section 21 confers right upon the landlord to get his building released on the ground specified therein. Further, the Court found that a landlord cannot be compelled to live in a particular manner either by tenant or by any other agency. Even the Court of Law must not dictate such terms to a landlord to live in a particular manner and adjust his needs accordingly. Relevant paragraph nos. 21 to 25 are extracted here as under; “21. Section 21 of Act, 1972 confers a right on landlord to get a building, which is under occupation of a tenant, released on the ground specified therein and this includes bona fide requirement of building by himself or members of his family for whose benefit he held it. The right of landlord to judge his requirement and live according to his own wisdom and discretion cannot be controlled by third person, like tenant, or, even the Court. The right of landlord to judge his requirement and live according to his own wisdom and discretion cannot be controlled by third person, like tenant, or, even the Court. The purpose of the Court is to protect the tenant from unjustified eviction or abrupt increase of rent etc., but, simultaneously, if the landlord has come with the case of his own personal need, it has to be judged disparately, fairly and independently, so that a landlord, coming with a bona fide case, must be able to use his own premises for the purpose he has disclosed before the Court, if it is found bona fide and genuine. The issue of hardship between the two is an integral part of looking into the bona fide and genuity of personal need set up by landlord. 22. It cannot be disputed that it is the privilege of landlord to determine his way of living and accommodate himself and his family according to his status, requirement etc. He cannot be compelled to live in a particular manner either by tenant or any other agency. Even the Court of law must not dictate such terms to a landlord to live in a particular manner and adjust his needs accordingly. 23. In Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the Apex Court said that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. Therein the Court considered the age of landlord and doubted his need on the ground that in such advanced age, he would be requiring somebody to take care and therefore should live with other family members instead of alone. The Apex Court observed that High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of High Court and observed: "We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property." 24. Similarly, in R.C. Tamrakar Vs. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of High Court and observed: "We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property." 24. Similarly, in R.C. Tamrakar Vs. Nidi Lekha, AIR 2001 SC 3806 the Court in para 10 and 11 said: "10. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bonafide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else landlord could have adjusted himself. 11. Though the son of the landlady is a doctor and has constructed his own house, the landlady wants to stay in the suit premises. It is not the case of the tenant that landlady has any other suitable accommodation. Therefore, the High Court rightly set aside the finding of the First Appellate Court holding that landlady could not be compelled to reside with her son as her case was that she wanted to stay by herself in the suit premises because of her health condition and the climatic condition of that place suit her." 25. The above referred authorities though, were in the context of residential accommodation, but the principle that the landlord is the master of arranging his own affairs applies not only in respect to his residential accommodation but also the manner and method etc. of earning his livelihood for maintaining himself and family.” 15. Similarly, reliance has been placed upon another decision of coordinate Bench of this Court in case of Praveen Kumar Jain Vs. Kamal Gupta, 2019 (133) ALR 505. Relevant paragraph no. 13 is extracted here as under; “13. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents and after having gone through the written submissions, I find that the landlords need could have been fulfilled by the two shops, namely, shop no. 73 and 74 P.L. Sharma Road, Meerut City. The landlord was the sole person who could have taken a decision as to which shop would fulfil his needs and the needs of his family. 73 and 74 P.L. Sharma Road, Meerut City. The landlord was the sole person who could have taken a decision as to which shop would fulfil his needs and the needs of his family. Definitely, the tenant or for that matter even the Court could not guide the landlord as to which accommodation he should use to fulfil his needs and which accommodation he should not use. The son of the landlord was a qualified Charted Accountant. If he required the two shops to practice and they were good enough for setting up the practice of the Chartered Accountancy then it did not lie of the mouth of the tenant to suggest that the landlord should settle his son in some other shop. I, therefore, find that the shop in question was bonafidely required by the landlord. The finding arrived at by the Court below regarding comparative hardship also cannot be interfered with.” 16. Lastly, reliance has been placed upon decision of this Court in case of Mohd. Aslam Vs. IVth Additional District Judge, Barabanki, 2011 (85) ALR 795. Relevant paragraph nos. 19 to 21 are extracted here as under; “(19) Keeping in view the said fact and finding recorded by appellate authority while rejecting release application that he has passed high-school examination in the year 1969 thereafter he left his studies not made any effort to search any job and from the statement given by him he has not so far decided as to which business he intends to do so, also not learnt art of conducting any business so at his behest release application moved in the year 1981 is not maintainable as his need is not genuine and bona fide in comparison to the need of tenant is totally incorrect, wrong and perverse findings because it is settled proposition of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter tenant cannot dictate to the landlord how he should adjust without getting possession of the tenanted premises and the same cannot be rejected on the ground of delay so the findings given by appellate Court in this regard is liable to be set aside in view of the law as stated herein in below. (20) In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. (20) In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100 , the Supreme Court observed : ".........When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by the Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself" (21) The Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar v. Firms Prem Machinery and Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 , also observed: "........It is settled proposition of law that the land lord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter." 17. Sri Sahai next submitted that an affidavit was filed by one Dinesh Kumar Anand to establish that the accommodation adjacent to the tenant petitioner was in fact a godown and did not have kitchen and toilet, thus, the claim of tenant cannot be accepted. According to him, the said affidavit remain unrebutted, thus, the plea taken by the tenant has no relevance. 18. Replying the argument as to comparative hardship, Sri Sahai submitted that the tenant petitioner had been taking contradictory stand in his writ petition as to the age of landlord respondent as 81 years and 85 years. According to him, the controversy as in regard to the age of the landlord and his need is concerned stands settled by the Apex Court and this Court. He further submitted that it is an admitted case that tenant petitioner was in possession of the premises in question since the year 1940 and no attempt was made to search an alternative accommodation even during the pendency of the release application as well as appeal which lasted for ten years. 19. He further submitted that it is an admitted case that tenant petitioner was in possession of the premises in question since the year 1940 and no attempt was made to search an alternative accommodation even during the pendency of the release application as well as appeal which lasted for ten years. 19. According to him the Appellate Court in its judgment has taken note of the fact that affidavit of one Girdhari Lal who had offered the tenant petitioner residential portion on the ground floor of House No. 221 Arya Nagar Wankey Antapada, Mathura. Thus, the tenant petitioner had not tried to search any alternative accommodation and the comparative hardship tilts in favour of the landlord respondent. 20. Having heard rival submissions and from perusal of the record, this Court finds that it is not disputed to both the parties that the tenant petitioner is in possession of the disputed accommodation, which is a residential premises since the year 1940. The release application filed at the behest of landlord respondent in the year 2011 on the ground that as he was residing with his sons and daughter-in-laws, differences having been arisen with the daughter-in-laws due to the modern lifestyle and eating habits and landlord being a person of 71 years of age and follower of Vaishnav Sampradaya and being a totally vegetarian person was finding difficult to live with them. 21. The release application having been contested by the tenant petitioner on the ground that the landlord was having three alternate accommodation with him at Krishna Nagar and, thus, there was no bonafide and genuine need for getting the premises released as he could easily shift in those premises. Moreover, the comparative hardship tilted in favour of the tenant as he was running business of books from nearby shop and would face great difficulty if the release application was allowed. 22. The Prescribed Authority rejected the release application of the landlord holding that the need was not genuine and bonafide and the comparative hardship tilted in favour of the tenant petitioner. 23. 22. The Prescribed Authority rejected the release application of the landlord holding that the need was not genuine and bonafide and the comparative hardship tilted in favour of the tenant petitioner. 23. The first argument of the petitioner’s counsel to the effect that Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules of 1972 has not been considered by the Appellate Court while deciding the appeal has no force as the matter stands already concluded by the Apex Court in case of Rishi Kumar Govil (Supra) wherein the Apex Court held that Rule 16 (2) (a) of the Rules of 1972 was applicable for the case of eviction from an accommodation for business use and not for residential premises, relying upon its earlier decision in case of Sushila Vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others, 2003 (2) SCC 28 . 24. Coming to the second argument raised by the petitioner’s counsel as to the bonafide need, it is well settled that the tenant cannot question and compel a landlord to live in a particular manner. Even the Court of Law cannot dictate such terms to landlord to live in a particular manner and adjust to his needs accordingly. 25. The argument that landlord was having three other accommodations at Krishna Nagar and could shift at that place and not in the premises in dispute situated at Chhata Bazar cannot be accepted as in Suresh Chand Sharma (Supra) this Court had dealt in extenso the said fact considering the decision of Apex Court in case of Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 , wherein the Apex Court had held that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter and it is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The Apex Court observed that High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of the High Court and observed “We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. That is a lookout of landlord and not of High Court. The Apex Court disapproved the approach of the High Court and observed “We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property.” 26. Moreover, the Court cannot substitute its wisdom and direct a landlord to reside at a particular place, when he has come up with a case that at the fag end of life he wants to pursue his religious commitments and for that he needs a house which is in close proximity of the river Yamuna and the temples nearby. The argument that the bonafide need set-up by the landlord is not genuine is rejected and the decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel in case of T. Sivasubramaniam (Supra) is not applicable as the Apex Court had held that a release application cannot be allowed solely on the ground that landlord is desires of living separately but has to give compelling reasons. 27. In the present case, the landlord has given detailed reasons for him living separately from his sons and daughter-in-laws for pursuing his religious commitments and not being able to gel with the lifestyle of the younger generation. 28. Now coming to the last argument raised by the petitioner’s counsel in regard to the comparative hardship, this Court finds that admittedly the tenant is in possession of the disputed accommodation since the year 1940 and no effort till date has been made by him to get an alternative accommodation. The Appellate Court recorded a categorical finding to the effect that one Girdhari Lal, who had filed his affidavit, had offered an alternative accommodation on the ground floor, which was not rebutted by filing any affidavit by the tenant petitioner. Moreover, the plea of old age of landlord cannot be taken by the tenant petitioner. 29. Considering the facts and circumstances that no effort has been made out by the tenant petitioner to find any other accommodation nor there being any pleading to the said fact, this Court finds that the comparative hardship tilts in favour of the landlord who cannot be denied the beneficial enjoyment of the disputed accommodation during his life time. 29. Considering the facts and circumstances that no effort has been made out by the tenant petitioner to find any other accommodation nor there being any pleading to the said fact, this Court finds that the comparative hardship tilts in favour of the landlord who cannot be denied the beneficial enjoyment of the disputed accommodation during his life time. Thus, this Court after considering the above facts, finds that no interference is required in the finding recorded by the Appellate Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. Writ petition fails and is dismissed, accordingly. Interim order stands discharged. 31. No order as to costs.