JUDGMENT : ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI, J. 1. This petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayers: “(a) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Gandhidham-Kutch in Civil Misc. Application No.20 of 2016; (b) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the impugned order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Gandhidham-Kutch in Civil Misc. Application No.20 of 2016.” 2. The brief facts for the case are that the petitioner is the original-plaintiff, who had preferred a Special Civil Suit No.18 of 2012 before the learned Principal Senior Judge (S.D.), Kutch seeking recovery of sum of Rs.7,81,362/- with interest at the rate of 18%. That, this suit came to be dismissed by the trial court vide judgment and order dated 14.09.2016 mainly on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish its case and the documents produced by the plaintiff were not proved. It is further contended in the petition that the plaintiff filed an appeal before the District Court with 39 days delay and the application for condonation of delay being Civil Misc. Application No.20 of 2016 was preferred. It is also contended in the petition that in the application, the learned District Judge vide order dated 16.01.2017 issued notice and thereafter, on various dates, application could not be heard as notice could not be served upon the respondents- defendants. That, the address of the defendants was the same as stated in the suit and on which summons of the suit were served. That, however, notice issued by the appellate Court could not be served and though the petitioner had paid the process, notice did not come back after service for a long time and various adjournments were given to await service of notice. That, the application was taken up for hearing by learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Gandhidham- Kutch vide an order dated 10.05.2018, dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that for a long time, the respondents have not be served and therefore, dismissed the same presuming that the petitioner has no interest in pursuing the matter. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioner. 3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioner. Though duly served and sufficient time is given to the respondents but none remained present for the respondents. 4. Rule. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioner has urged that in the present case, there is hardly 39 days delay caused in preferring the appeal and the delay is caused due to long absence of the learned advocate for the petitioner. 6. This Court has considered the averments made in the petition and arguments advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner and also considered the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors. vs. Subrata Borah Chowlek and Ors. (12.11.2010 – SC) MANU/SC/1252/2010 has observed as under: “7. Having heard the Learned Counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party. (See: Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and Ors. MANU/SC/0335/1968 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006 ; The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Ors. MANU/SC/0534/1971 : (1972) 1 SCC 366 ; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy MANU/SC/0573/1998 : (1998) 7 SCC 123 ; Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0294/1984 : (1985) 1 SCC 163 ). 8. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. MANU/SC/0042/1961 : (1962) 2 SCR 762 , this Court held that: In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favor of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favor of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decreeholder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan ILR (1890) 13 Mad 269 "Section 5 gives the court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the Appellant. 9. Similarly, in Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao and Ors. MANU/SC/0135/2002 : (2002) 3 SCC 195 , this Court observed that: But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in overjubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lies terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. 10. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan MANU/SC/7946/2008 : (2008) 14 SCC 582 , while observing that although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels, highlighted the following observations of this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. MANU/SC/0250/2005 : (2005) 3 SCC 752 : It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justiceoriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process."(See also: Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma MANU/SC/0694/1996 : (1996) 10 SCC 634 ; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process."(See also: Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma MANU/SC/0694/1996 : (1996) 10 SCC 634 ; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. MANU/SC/0426/1996 : (1996) 3 SCC 132 ) 7. In short as per the settled law, each case is required to be decided on its own merits rather than on technicalities. This court is of the opinion that in the present case there is only 39 days delay and the 39 days delay is hereby condoned. This petition deserves to be allowed and accordingly allowed. The order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Gandhidham-Kutch is here by quashed and set aside. 8. In view of the above discussion, the concerned District Court shall decide the appeal on its own merits without being influenced by the order of this Court. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.