JUDGMENT : ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI, J. 1. The Petitioners/Original Defendants have preferred the present Petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order passed by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No.5, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Chamber Judge”) below Exh. 10 in Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 dated 8.9.2021, whereby the learned Chamber Judge has allowed the Application Exh.10 preferred by the Respondent/Original Plaintiff. The order reads as under: “The Application Exh.10 is hereby allowed. The Commissioner is hereby appointed to draw the panchnama and map about the articles lying in the suit premises after informing the parties and open the lock by the keys lying with both the parties. The plaintiff has to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only) as to remuneration before the Nazir of this Court.” 2. The facts leading rise to the present Petition in nutshell are that the Petitioner No.1/Original Defendant No.1 is the owner and occupant of Shop No. 527/AQ/2/FF/25/A and TenAment No. 0119-79-0486-0001-1, situated at Panjara Pole Ward, Murtimant Complex, Relief Road, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as “the Suit Property”). The Respondent/Original Plaintiff has filed Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 before the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad for specific performance, possession and permanent injunction. The Respondent/Original Plaintiff was in possession of the suit property Since the year 2011 and was doing the business of mobile in the name of “Shree Sidhi Mobile. That on 1.1.2011, the Defendant No.1 agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff and for the said purpose the plaintiff has given Rs.80,00,000/- to the defendant no.2, who is son of defendant no.1 by way of cash payment in installments and lastly he paid an amount of Rs.50,000 on 12.8.2021. The defendants are not ready and willing to execute the sale deed after accepting the remaining amount of Rs.20,00,000/-. That on 24.8.2021, the defendants have illegally locked the suit property and took the possession of the suit property, however, the plaintiff’s goods are lying inside the suit property, and therefore, plaintiff is unable to continue his business. The plaintiff has also filed an application for interim injunction and inter alia prayed for opening of the lock of the suit premises and hand over the possession of the lock of the suit property. The plaintiff has also filed an application for interim injunction and inter alia prayed for opening of the lock of the suit premises and hand over the possession of the lock of the suit property. The plaintiff has also filed an application vide Exh.10 for appointment of Court Commissioner under Order 28 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to file report regarding the present status of the suit property. That on 2.9.2021, the defendants have filed written statement and reply to injunction application vide Exh.16 in Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 inter alia contending in paragraph 8 and 9 that the defendant no.1 is the owner of the suit property and there is no oral or written agreement to sell the suit property between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1, the plaintiff has not paid any amount to the defendants as alleged and documents produced are forged and required to be send to the FSL. That the defendant no.1 went to the office of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and deleted the name of the Plaintiff from the record and for the said purpose the plaintiff has also given declaration. That during the year 2019-2020 and 2020-21, 2012-13 and 2013-14 the name of defendant no.1 was shown as the owner and occupant of the suit property. The defendants have filed reply vide Exh.19 to the Application at Exh.10 – appointment for Commissioner and contended that the plaintiff has not stated any reason for appointment of Commissioner and there is no requirement of appointment of Commissioner in the present matter. On the suit premises, there are locks of the plaintiff and defendants, and therefore, there is no question of appointment of Court Commissioner and has requested to reject the said application. That the learned Chamber Judge vide order impugned, without considering the submission made by the defendants, allowed the application appointing the Court Commissioner to draw the panchnama and map about the articles lying in the suit premises. The defendants have moved application immediately to stay the impugned order passed below Exh.10 in Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 and the learned Chamber Judge was pleased to stay the order for 7 days. 3. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah for the Petitioners and learned Advocate Mr. M.T.M.Hakim for the Respondent. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. The defendants have moved application immediately to stay the impugned order passed below Exh.10 in Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 and the learned Chamber Judge was pleased to stay the order for 7 days. 3. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah for the Petitioners and learned Advocate Mr. M.T.M.Hakim for the Respondent. 4. Learned Advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah for the Petitioner has heavily contended that in the present case the learned Chamber Judge has failed to appreciate that the Court cannot appoint Court Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC to ascertain as to how the property is being used and what are the articles lying inside the suit premises as it amounts to collecting evidence. It is also contended that the learned Chamber Judge has failed to appreciate that the interim injunction application filed by the Respondent/Original Plaintiff is yet to be decided and the Respondent/Original Plaintiff has moved the said Application for appointment of Court Commissioner only with an intention to collect the evidence. It is further contended that the learned Chamber Judge has failed to appreciate the reliefs prayed in the interim injunction filed by the Respondent/Original Plaintiff, wherein it was prayed for opening the lock of the suit property and hand over the possession of the suit property. It is further contended that the learned Chamber Judge has failed to appreciate that by passing the impugned order, without deciding the issue as to whether it is required to open the lock of the suit property and hand over the possession of the suit property to plaintiff, directed the Court Commissioner to open the lock and make a report regarding the articles lying in the suit property. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner has further contended that the learned Chamber Judge has failed to appreciate that the Court cannot appoint a Court Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC for the purpose of deciding application for grant of temporary injunction for collecting the evidence for ascertaining as to which of the parties is in possession of the suit property and what are the articles lying in the suit premises, such order would be beyond the scope of Order 26 Rule 9 of CPC. It is further contended that the learned Chamber Judge has failed to appreciate that where both the parties are claiming possession, the question of possession cannot be ascertained by the appoint of the Court Commissioner. It is for the parties to lead necessary evidence to establish possession. It is also contended that the learned Chamber Judge has erred in appointing the Court Commissioner as it would amount to helping the plaintiff in creating evidence. 5. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. M.T.M.Hakim for the Respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Rasulkhan Aliyarkha Block & Anr. In Special Civil Application No. 10186 of 2012, wherein, it was held by this Court that in absence of jurisdictional error, this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, would not interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court. Further, it is held that the Trial Court has properly exercised the jurisdiction and no interference is required under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Learned Advocate Mr. Hakim has contended that the learned Trial Court has not committed any error in arriving at the conclusion to allow the Application for appointment of Court Commissioner since the learned Trial Court has rightly held that considering the facts and circumstances and disputes between the parties, there are two locks put on the suit premises and the goods are lying therein. Therefore, for deciding the disputes by and between the parties, the Court Commissioner is required to be appointed. 6. Having heard the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates for the respective parties, before exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, at the outset, the Court finds it apt to mention here that this writ petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Apex Court has considered in detail the scope of interference by this Court to hold and observe that, Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court Suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power would be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power would be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The observations of the Apex Court read as under: “57. Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. As noted above, prior to the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could issue prerogative writs in exercise of their original jurisdiction. [See 1986 (suppl.) SCC 401 at page 469)]. 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P . and others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Mahara j - AIR 1963 SC 946 , page 951]. 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. 60. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others - [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to It. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to It. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L.Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L.Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 7. In yet another judgment in the case of Puri Investments v. Young Friends and Co. and Ors. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 7. In yet another judgment in the case of Puri Investments v. Young Friends and Co. and Ors. - MANU/SC0290/2022 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “There was no perversity in the order of the Appellant Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 8. Thus, exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be with a view to keep the Tribunals/Courts within the bounds of their authority, to ensure that law is followed by the Tribunals/Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and/or when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. In exercise of its power of superintendence, High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 9. Revisiting the facts of the case, on 8.9.2021, the Application Exh.10, for appointment of Court Commissioner was preferred by the Respondent/Original Plaintiff and was allowed by the learned Trial Court. Against the same, the Petitioners/Original Defendants have preferred the present Petition challenging the said order of appointment of Court Commissioner. That on 1.11.2021, the Respondent/Original Plaintiff has filed Application Exh.32 for recovering the goods of the Respondent/Original Plaintiff, which are lying idle in the suit premises since the filing of the Suit as the Petitioners/Original Defendants have put a lock on the suit premises and not allowing the Respondent/Original Plaintiff to access the same. That on 1.11.2021, the Respondent/Original Plaintiff has filed Application Exh.32 for recovering the goods of the Respondent/Original Plaintiff, which are lying idle in the suit premises since the filing of the Suit as the Petitioners/Original Defendants have put a lock on the suit premises and not allowing the Respondent/Original Plaintiff to access the same. The Petitioners/Original Defendants have also filed Affidavit to the effect that the Petitioners/Original Defendant on the strength of ex-parte ad interim order passed by this Court on 8.9.2021 has stalled the entire suit proceedings, particularly the application of the Respondent/Original Plaintiff for recovery of goods i.e. mobile phones and other accessories which are lying idle in the suit premises since the Petitioners/Original Defendant illegaly put his lock upon the suit premises and has thereby denied access to the Respondent/Original Plaintiff. 10. Pursuant to the impugned order passed by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No.5, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad on 8.9.2021, it appears that the learned Chamber Judge has rightly observed considering the facts and circumstances and the dispute between the parties, there are two locks put up in the suit premises and the goods are lying therein. Therefore, for deciding the disputes by and between the parties, the Court Commissioner is required to be appointed. The learned Chamber Judge has also referred to judgment in the case of Shanti Life Space Pvt. Ltd. v. Umang Satishbhai Chokhawala 2020 (4) GLR 2594 and has observed that this citation is not applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, as such, there is neither any jurisdictional error nor any factual error and hence the Respondent/Original Plaintiff has rightly contended that this is not a fit case to exercise the discretion under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and thereby not required to interfere in the same to the discretionary order passed by the learned Chamber Judge and the discretion is properly exercised. This Court is therefore, of the opinion that the discretion is properly exercised by the learned Chamber Judge and there is no scope to interfere in the same. Hence, the Petition is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed with no order as to costs. The order passed by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No.5, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad below Exh. 10 in Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 dated 8.9.2021 be executed accordingly. Notice is discharged. Hence, the Petition is devoid of merits and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed with no order as to costs. The order passed by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No.5, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad below Exh. 10 in Civil Suit No. 1001 of 2021 dated 8.9.2021 be executed accordingly. Notice is discharged. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. Further order: Learned counsel Shri Viral K. Shah for the petitioner has urged after pronouncement of this order that let the interim relief granted earlier be extended for few weeks to enable him to approach higher forum. Pursuant to facts and circumstances and as discussed in order, request is not acceded to.