JUDGMENT : P. SAM KOSHY, J. 1. The instant writ petition has been filed seeking for the following reliefs: (A) A writ and/or an order in the nature of writ of appropriate nature do issue commanding and directing the respondents to produce before this Hon’ble Court all the relevant records pertaining to the case of the petitioners for its kind perusal. (B) A writ and/or an order in the nature of the writ of appropriate nature do quashing the e-auction notice dated 15.10.2022 published in Hari Bhumi city edition and Central Chronical (CG) edition (ANP-1 colly) at serial no. 1 which relates to the property of the petitioner. (C) A writ and/or an order in the nature of writ of appropriate nature do issue directing the respondent no. Sub Divisional Officer to decide the appeal itself No. 20210111000421/A-6-year 2020-21 between Smt. Sanyogita Sharma vs. M/s Travelwala India Pvt. Ltd. and Others within the period prescribed and till then the auction proceed settled to be held on 24.11.2022 (as per Annexure P-1) be kept in abeyance in facts and circumstance of case. 2. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the document Annexure P-1 which is a paper publication showing notice of sale of immovable properties attached with the respondent no. 3/bank by the private respondents. The notice for sale of the immovable properties has been published by the respondent no. 3 Bank under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 read with proviso to Rule 6(2) and 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002. 3. The challenge to the said notice of sale is primarily on the ground that the petitioner herein is the owner of the mortgaged property and that she is totally unassociated with the entire transaction carried out by the private respondents with the respondent no. 3 bank. 4. It is the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the petitioner had come in physical possession of the said property by virtue of a Will that was executed by her father Shri Jagmohan Sharma. It was the further contention of petitioner that the entire transaction made by the private respondents with the respondent no. 3 Bank is without taking the petitioner in confidence nor was she aware of any such transaction at any point of time. It was the further contention of petitioner that the entire transaction made by the private respondents with the respondent no. 3 Bank is without taking the petitioner in confidence nor was she aware of any such transaction at any point of time. That it is only when the impugned notice of sale has been published in the newspaper on 15th October, 2022, she has learnt about the said transactions. Therefore, she has approached this Court for an appropriate direction protecting her interest. 5. It is the contention of petitioner that in spite of there being a specific Will in her favour the private respondents who are her own family members have fraudulently got the property mutated in their name vide order dated 01.05.2015. This fact when it came to the notice of petitioner, she preferred an appeal before the office of the Sub Divisional Officer, Raipur where the case has been registered as Revenue Appeal No. 20210111000421/A-6/year 2020-21 between Smt. Sanyogita Sharma vs. M/s Travelwala India Pvt. Ltd. and Others. 6. It is further contended by learned counsel for petitioner that there the petitioner has also an order of status quo in her favour in respect of subject land. That in spite of the said specific order of status quo by the SDO, the respondent no. 3 Bank has proceeded for sale of the said properties by auction for which the impugned notice has been published for holding the auction on 24.11.2022 at 2 p.m. i.e. (today afternoon). The prayer of the petitioner is that pending the appeal before the SDO, the auction proceedings may be directed to be deferred and if required, the auction be initiated only after the outcome of the Revenue Appeal pending before the SDO and an interim protection to that effect may be passed while disposing of the writ petition. 7. At the outset, this Court is of the opinion that under the given factual circumstances of the case, where admittedly the auction sale has been initiated invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 read with proviso to Rule 6(2) and 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002, it would not be fit for the High Court at this juncture to invoke the writ jurisdiction and interfere with the proceedings drawn under SARFAESI Act. It would all the more not be justified for this Court to entertain the writ petition for the reason that the petitioner had an opportunity of approaching the concerned Debts Recovery Tribunal in respect of her grievance under Section 17. 8. The law in this regard is by now well settled by a series of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The landmark of which being that of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 where in very categorical terms the Supreme Court in paragraphs 40 to 45 has held as under: “40. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned cases, it must be held that the High Court completely misdirected itself in assuming that the appellant could not have initiated action against respondent No. 1 without making efforts for recovery of its dues from the borrower-respondent No. 2. 41. The facts of the present case show that even after receipt of notices under Section 13(2) and (4) and order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, respondent Nos.1 and 2 did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. Only a paltry amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid by respondent No. 1 on 29.10.2007. She did give an undertaking to pay the balance amount in installments but did not honour her commitment. Therefore, the action taken by the appellant for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) and by filing an application under Section 14 cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground and, in our view, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the writ petition of respondent No. 1. 42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 9. This judgment has further been reiterated on numerous occasions and the latest decision in this regard is the one that was pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Phoenix ARC Private Limited vs. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir and Others, (2022) 5 SCC 345 reiterating the principles laid down in the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment in paragraph-21 has held as under: “21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Mathew K.C. (supra) to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the Court. The writ petitions have been filed against the proposed action to be taken under Section 13(4). As observed hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 13.08.2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. Even the impugned orders passed by the High Court directing to maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the secured properties on payment of Rs.1 crore only (in all Rs.3 crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are to the extent of approximately Rs.117 crores. The ad-interim relief has been continued since 2015 and the secured creditor is deprived of proceeding further with the action under the SARFAESI Act. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of Court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex-parte ad-interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of Court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex-parte ad-interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of the secured creditor/assignor. Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings before the High Court deserve to be dismissed.” 10. Needless to mention that though the petitioner may not be borrower, nonetheless in view of the specific provision mentioned in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act which permits any person to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, the petitioner could have also availed the said remedy available to her rather than invoking the writ jurisdiction. It appears that the so called private respondents who are the borrowers are in collusion with the petitioner and have tried their luck before the writ Court invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. This Court in the given factual backdrop and the authoritative decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court particularly the two decisions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs is not inclined to entertain the writ petition holding it to be not maintainable. 12. The writ petition accordingly stands rejected as not maintainable. However, the right of the petitioner stands reserved to avail such other remedies as are available under law.