ORDER : 1. By way of instant petition, the petitioner has prayed for following substantive relief: “It is therefore respectfully prayed that keeping view the facts and circumstances of the case & in view of the submissions made here in above the present petition may kindly be allowed and the respondents may please be directed to implement annexure P-6, with a further prayer to direct the respondent No. 3 to rehabilitate the petitioner to some other vacant place where in the land owned and possessed by respondent No. 3 or they may please be directed to consider the case of petitioner for allotment of shop in the complex which has been constructed by respondent No. 3 near Gate-I at Jawalaji, which is lying vacant, with the further prayer to provide electricity and water connection, as has been done in the cases of other similarly situated persons, named above, in order to do justice to the petitioner, so that he can earn his livelihood with dignity and honour and he can provide bread and butter to his family.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No. 3 is the successor of erstwhile Nagar Panchayat, Jawalamukhi. Petitioner was allotted a plot of land on Kangra road at Jawalamukhi by Nagar Panchayat. The rent was fixed at Rs. 150/- per month and petitioner was required to deposit Rs. 5,000/- as security. Petitioner complied with all the terms and conditions of allotment. A formal agreement was executed between the petitioner and executive officer of Nagar Panchayat, Jawalamukhi on 28.10.2005. Petitioner occupied the allotted land and commenced his small business. It was, however, found that the land allotted to petitioner was within the controlled width of National Highway. Petitioner again applied to the Nagar Panchayat to adjust him at alternative place. Resolution dated 19.06.2010 (Annexure P-6) was passed by Nagar Panchayat accepting the request of petitioner to adjust him at alternative place. The reason assigned for such decision was that according to the report of SDO, National Highway, the land allotted to petitioner was in controlled width of the National Highway. 3. Petitioner is still occupying the land allotted to him initially and the resolution of Nagar Panchayat dated 19.06.2010 (Annexure P-6) for adjusting him at alternative place has remained unimplemented. 4. The reason assigned for such decision was that according to the report of SDO, National Highway, the land allotted to petitioner was in controlled width of the National Highway. 3. Petitioner is still occupying the land allotted to him initially and the resolution of Nagar Panchayat dated 19.06.2010 (Annexure P-6) for adjusting him at alternative place has remained unimplemented. 4. Petitioner contends that the livelihood of his entire family is dependent on the small business being conducted by him on the land allotted by the then Nagar Panchayat. Since, the allotted land was found to be in controlled width of National Highway, his entire livelihood was put at stake. He had applied to Nagar Panchayat to be adjusted at alternative place only when objection regarding his occupation on the controlled width of National Highway was raised. Nagar Panchayat had promised to adjust the petitioner by way of resolution dated 19.06.2010. He kept on representing to the Nagar Panchayat and then to respondent No. 3 for implementation of resolution dated 19.06.2010, but to no avail. According to petitioner, he had requested for allotting him a shop lying vacant in the shopping complex of respondent No. 3 near gate No. 1 of Jawalaji temple, but the request of petitioner was not accepted. Petitioner is stated to be under constant fear of being uprooted from the land initially allotted to him. In such event, petitioner is likely to lose his only source of income causing serious peril to the existence of his entire family. 5. Respondent No. 3 has contested the claim of the petitioner. It is not denied by respondent No. 3 that the land initially allotted to petitioner was found to be in controlled width of National Highway. It is also not denied that Nagar Panchayat had passed resolution (Annexure P-6) dated 19.06.2010 to adjust petitioner at alternative place. However, the stand of respondent No. 3 is that the resolution dated 19.06.2010 could not be implemented due to non-availability of vacant space within the jurisdiction of Municipal Council, Jawalamukhi. It is further submitted that entire open space as also the constructed areas of respondent No. 3 already stood allotted to different allottees. As regards, vacant shop in the shopping complex of respondent No. 3, near gate No. 1 of Jawalaji temple, it is stated that respondent No. 3 has been using the said shop as its store. 6. It is further submitted that entire open space as also the constructed areas of respondent No. 3 already stood allotted to different allottees. As regards, vacant shop in the shopping complex of respondent No. 3, near gate No. 1 of Jawalaji temple, it is stated that respondent No. 3 has been using the said shop as its store. 6. During the pendency of petition, respondent No. 3 has issued an auction notice for allotment of two shops, one of these being the same shop which was stated to be used as store by respondent No. 3 and other is situated at old bus stand Jawalamukhi. The reserve price for the shop in the shopping complex near Gate No. 1, Jawalaji temple has been placed at Rs. 4000/- plus 18% GST, whereas reserve price for other shop is Rs. 2000/- plus 18% GST. The date of auction was 12.09.2022. 7. When the matter was heard on 7th September, 2022 and judgment was reserved, respondent No. 3 was directed not to implement the aforesaid auction notice in the meanwhile. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 9. Petitioner has been running his small business on initially allotted land since 2005. Seventeen (17) years have elapsed, petitioner is still occupying the same land, which otherwise is stated to be in controlled width of National Highway. Petitioner had shown his interestedness for adjustment at alternative place. Nagar Panchayat had allowed his request. In the affidavit dated 26.09.2018, sworn by petitioner, his age was mentioned as 41 years. Meaning thereby that petitioner was about 28 years old when he started his business on land allotted to him. Now, he must be about 44-45 years old. In such circumstances, there should not be any doubt that petitioner is at such juncture of his life, where he has a family to support with his sole source of income as noticed above. Though respondent No. 3 has mentioned that father of petitioner is allottee of another shop, but there is no tangible material on record to suggest that petitioner lives with his father in a joint family or is looking after the business of his father. 10. Though respondent No. 3 has mentioned that father of petitioner is allottee of another shop, but there is no tangible material on record to suggest that petitioner lives with his father in a joint family or is looking after the business of his father. 10. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, taking notice of the involvement of government in multifarious activities, acknowledged the validity of grant of government largesses to rehabilitate citizens for purposes of earning their livelihood. This gains significance in the backdrop of scenario where unemployment is one of the biggest issues in the country. 11. As noticed above, petitioner has continued his occupation on initially allotted land and simultaneously has entertained an expectation of being adjusted at alternative place on the representation held out to him by of respondent No. 3. On such promise, petitioner has survived till date and has not made any endeavour to have any alternative source. The reasons again are obvious. The employment despite qualification, is not readily available. Petitioner is stated to be a science graduate with additional degree in Bachelor of Education. 12. In the given circumstances of the case, a right is created in favour of petitioner by promise held out to him by respondent No. 3. In alternative, even if, it is assumed that there was no such promise, the conduct of respondent No. 3 was sufficient for petitioner to entertain legitimate expectation. The concept of legitimate expectations in the context of Indian Law has been articulated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Brahmaputra Metallics Ltd. 2020 (13) SCALE 500 as under: “40. Under Indian Law, there is often a conflation between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. This has been described in Jain and Jain's well known treatise, Principles of Administrative Law: “At times, the expressions ‘legitimate expectation’ and ‘promissory estoppel’ are used interchangeably, but that is not a correct usage because ‘legitimate expectation’ is a concept much broader in scope than ‘promissory estoppel’. ........... A reading of the relevant Indian cases, however, exhibit some confusion of ideas. It seems that the judicial thinking has not as yet crystallised as regards the nature and scope of the doctrine. At times, it has been referred to as merely a procedural doctrine; at times, it has been treated interchangeably as promissory estoppel. ........... A reading of the relevant Indian cases, however, exhibit some confusion of ideas. It seems that the judicial thinking has not as yet crystallised as regards the nature and scope of the doctrine. At times, it has been referred to as merely a procedural doctrine; at times, it has been treated interchangeably as promissory estoppel. However both these ideas are incorrect. As stated above, legitimate expectation is a substantive doctrine as well and has much broader scope than promissory estoppel. ........... In Punjab Communications Ltd. vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation: “the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way Reliance must have been placed on the said representation and the represented must have thereby suffered detriment.” It is suggested that this formulation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is not correct as it makes “legitimate expectation” practically synonymous with promissory estoppel. Legitimate expectation may arise from conduct of the authority; a promise is not always necessary for the purpose.” 41. While this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate consequence of making the law unclear, citizens have been the victims. Representations by public authorities need to be held to scrupulous standards, since citizens continue to live their lives based on the trust they repose in the State. In the commercial world also, certainty and consistency are essential to planning the affairs of business. When public authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the trust reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which it generates. When public authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the trust reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which it generates. Professors Jain and Deshpande characterize the consequences of this doctrinal confusion in the following terms: “Thus, in India, the characterization of legitimate expectations is on a weaker footing, than in jurisdictions like UK where the courts are now willing to recognize the capacity of public law to absorb the moral values underlying the notion of estoppel in the light of the evolution of doctrines like LE [Legitimate Expectations] and abuse of power. If the Supreme Court of India has shown its creativity in transforming the notion of promissory estoppel from the limitations of private law, then it does not stand to reason as to why it should also not articulate and evolve the doctrine of LE for judicial review of resilement of administrative authorities from policies and longstanding practices. If such a notion of LE is adopted, then not only would the Court be able to do away with the artificial hierarchy between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, but, it would also be able to hold the administrative authorities to account on the footing of public law outside the zone of promises on a stronger and principled anvil. Presently, in the absence of a like doctrine to that of promissory estoppel outside the promissory zone, the administrative law adjudication of resilement of policies stands on a shaky public law foundation.” 42. We shall therefore attempt to provide a cogent basis for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is not merely grounded on analogy with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The need for this doctrine to have an independent existence was articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the United State Supreme Court in Vitarelli vs. Seton: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” 43. However, before we do this, it is important to clarify the understanding of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in previous judgments of this Court. In National Buildings Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan, a three Judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that: “18. The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of “legitimate expectation” was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on “legitimate expectation” have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.” (Emphasis supplied) 44. However, it is important to note that this observation was made by this Court while discussing the ambit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation under English Law, as it stood then. As we have discussed earlier, there was a substantial conflation or overlap between the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel even under English Law since the former was often invoked as being analogous to the latter. However, since then and since the judgment of this Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra), the English Law in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation has evolved. More specifically, it has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing. In Regina [Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd. vs. East Sussex County Council] the House of Lords has held thus: “33. In any case, I think that it is unhelpful to introduce private law concepts of estoppel into planning law. More specifically, it has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing. In Regina [Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd. vs. East Sussex County Council] the House of Lords has held thus: “33. In any case, I think that it is unhelpful to introduce private law concepts of estoppel into planning law. As Lord Scarman pointed out in Newbury District Council vs. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1981) A.C. 578, estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would be unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed. But these concepts of private law should not be extended into “the public law of planning control, which binds everyone.” [See also Dyson J. in R vs. Leicester City Council, Ex p Powergen UK Ltd. (2000) JPL 629] 34. There is of course an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power… But it is no more than an analogy because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote. Public law can also take into account the hierarchy of individual rights which exist under the Human Rights Act 1998, so that, for example, the individual's right to a home is accorded a high degree of protection (See Coughlan's case, at pp 254-255) while ordinary property rights are in general far more limited by considerations of public interest [See R (Alconbury Developments) Ltd. vs. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, (2001) 2 WLR 1389]. 35. It is true that in early cases such as the Wells Case (1967) 1 WLR 1000 and Lever Finance Ltd. vs. Westminster (City) London Borough Council, (1971) 1 Q.B. 222 , Lord Denning MR used the language of estoppel in relation to planning law. At that time the public law concepts of abuse of power and legitimate expectation were very undeveloped and no doubt the analogy of estoppel seemed useful......It seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed whatever is useful from the moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet.” (Emphasis supplied) 45. In a concurring opinion in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. vs. Union of India, Justice H.L. Gokhale highlighted the different considerations that underlie the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. The learned judge held that for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, there has to be a promise, based on which the promisee has acted to its prejudice. In contrast, while applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the primary considerations are reasonableness and fairness of the State action. He observed thus: “Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations 289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that basis the party concerned must have acted to its prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used against a statutory provision or notification. 290......In any case, in the absence of any promise, the Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public interest.” (Emphasis supplied) 46. In Union of India vs. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, speaking through Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales vs. Quinn. It then observed: “This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.” 47. Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 48. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food Corporation of India vs. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, speaking through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus: “7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law: A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is ‘fairplay in action’. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. 8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.” (Emphasis supplied) 49. More recently, in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. vs. NOIDA, a two-judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice B.S. Chauhan, elaborated on this relationship in the following terms: “39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination.” The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. ........... 41. Power vested by the State in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons.” It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other...” (Emphasis supplied) 50. As such, we can see that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is one of the ways in which the guarantee of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 finds concrete expression.” 13. Thus, the claims on “legitimate expectation” require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimants in the same way as claims based on ‘promissory estoppel’. There need not be any preexisting right in favour of the petitioner. 14. Adverting again to the facts of the case, the shop in commercial complex near Gate No. 1 of Jawalaji Temple, the allotment of which was earlier denied to petitioner has now been sought to be put to auction. The auction is being justified on the strength of 2001 Rules framed by Government of Himachal Pradesh for leasing out the stalls/shops constructed by Municipalities in Himachal Pradesh. On the basis Rule 5 of the said Rules, it is contented that respondent No. 3 has no option but to adhere to such rules. 15. The 2001 Rules now used as umbrella of protection by respondent No. 3 were in place when initial allotment was made in favour of petitioner. The said rules were again in place when resolution (Annexure P-6) was passed by the erstwhile Nagar Panchayat on 19.06.2010. Respondent No. 3, thus, clearly had held out a promise to petitioner dehors the rules due to unsavory and emergent situation that had arisen on discovering the real status of land allotted to the petitioner. In view of the existing fact situation, respondent No. 3 cannot avoid its obligation to rehabilitate the petitioner, failing which it will be ruining the lives of few innocent citizens for no fault of theirs. 16. In view of the existing fact situation, respondent No. 3 cannot avoid its obligation to rehabilitate the petitioner, failing which it will be ruining the lives of few innocent citizens for no fault of theirs. 16. Another contention has been raised on behalf of respondent No. 3 that petitioner cannot derive any benefit as his initial allotment itself was illegal and it was clearly mentioned by the Nagar Panchayat that petitioner would not be entitled to any alternative place, in case he was uprooted from the allotted land by the National Highway authorities. Such argument needs to be outrightly rejected for the reason that it was the Nagar Panchayat which had allotted the piece of land to petitioner and thus was a party to such illegal transaction. It was the same Nagar Panchayat which subsequently had tried to wipe out its mistake by acceding to the request of petitioner and passed resolution Annexure P-6. 17. Keeping in view the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the petitioner has acquired a right to be allotted an alternative place. The plea as to non-availability of space may not be now available to Respondent No. 3, in view of the fact that said respondent has now proposed to allot two shops by auction and one out of them being the same shop for which petitioner had been requesting. This Court also is not oblivious to the fact that respondent No. 3 is under mandate of 2001 Rules to allot the shops on lease money which should be based on competitive bids. Thus, to maintain the respective rights and equities between the parties the instant petition is disposed of with direction to respondent No. 3 to hold auction of the shops sought to be auctioned vide auction letter Annexure P-11. However, petitioner shall be afforded an opportunity to match the highest offer/bid received by Respondent No. 3 and if petitioner chooses to avail such opportunity, he be allotted the said shop. Petition is disposed of accordingly, so also, the pending applications.