JUDGMENT : KALYAN RAI SURANA, J. 1. Heard Mr. M. Kato, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India (ASGI for short). Also heard Mr. D. Mozumdar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S.K. Deori, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati in O.A. No. 040/00139/2016 as well as order dated 09.08.2018, by which the said learned Tribunal had not entertained review application no. 3/2018, on the ground of delay. It may be mentioned that the respondent herein was the applicant before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal. 3. In brief, the case of the respondent before the learned Tribunal was that on 18.10.1994, he was appointed as Transmission Executive (Dialect and Translation) (hereinafter referred to as “TrEx D&T” for brevity) in the All India Radio (AIR), Dibrugarh on casual/contract basis. It is projected that by a communication dated 14.07.1999, the Station Director, All India Radio (AIR for short) had informed the Director General of AIR that the Staff Selection Commission, Guwahati had given their no objection to make local recruitment and it was further mentioned that as there are a number of TrEx D&T having requisite qualification and working on casual basis for a number of years, their services could have been regularized. The respondent along with seven others had filed a writ petition, which was numbered as W.P. (C) No. 644(AP)/2001, inter-alia, praying for direction upon the petitioners herein to regularize their service. The said writ petition was disposed of by judgment and order dated 14.11.2003, holding that some of the respondents do not have the requisite qualification of Bachelor’s Degree in Hindi, while others were not even graduates, they were not qualified under the recruitment rules. However, it was provided that as the respondents had already put in more than 10 (ten) years of service, it was desirable that the petitioner nos. 1 and 2 herein would consider the case of the respondent and others sympathetically and prepare a scheme for giving some financial consistency and assurance to the respondent and other writ petitioners in the said case and accommodate them in some posts suitable to their qualification and experience. 1 and 2 herein would consider the case of the respondent and others sympathetically and prepare a scheme for giving some financial consistency and assurance to the respondent and other writ petitioners in the said case and accommodate them in some posts suitable to their qualification and experience. By a communication dated 06.01.2006, the respondent and others were informed that there was no scheme in the AIR for regularization of their services and therefore, the directions for framing a scheme as per the hereinbefore referred judgment and order dated 14.11.2003, could not be complied with. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner and other similarly situated persons had filed four writ petitions, being W.P. Nos. (C) 80(AP)/2006, W.P. (C) 81(AP)/2006, W.P. (C) 82(AP)/2006 and W.P. (C) 85(AP)/2006, to assail the communication dated 06.01.2006. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had also preferred a writ appeal against the said judgment and order dated 14.11.2003. The said appeal was initially registered before the Principal Seat and subsequently, the said appeal was transferred to this Bench, where it was re-numbered as WA No. 15(AP)/2006. However, the said appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by observing that prayer for regularization cannot be considered in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . Thereafter, by a communication dated 04.02.2011, the Station Director, AIR informed the Director General of AIR that the respondent and others were engaged as casual worker for short term six day basis and they working in their post without any break against the existing vacancies and that their case deserve to be considered sympathetically as they had rendered service between 15 to 28 years as TrEx D&T without break and adverse remarks. The respondent and others had preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India against the judgment and order, dated 21.11.2006, passed in W.A. No. 15(AP)/2006. The Supreme Court of India in its order dated 25.04.2011, recorded the statement made by the learned senior counsel of the respondent and others that “somehow the writ appeal has been disposed of but the writ petitions have not been disposed of by the High Court so far. In this view of the matter, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition nos. In this view of the matter, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition nos. 80, 81, 82 and 85 of 2006 as expeditiously as possible. As regards the judgment in the writ appeal is concerned, the petitioners would be at liberty to take appropriate steps which are available to them in law.” With the said observations, the Special Leave Petition was disposed of. Thereafter, the respondent had filed a review petition before this Court for reviewing the order dated 20.11.2006, passed in W.A. No. 15(AP)/2006, which was registered as Review Petition No. 14(AP)/2011. This Court by order dated 25.07.2011 made an observation to the effect that the questions raised in the review petition was not raised before the learned Single Judge as well as before the Division Bench on 20.11.2006, and opined that the review petition was not maintainable. However, as the petitioner was seeking permission to withdraw the review petition and to file an appropriate application before the learned Single Judge, the petitioner was granted liberty to do so, in accordance with law, if so advised. Resultantly, the review petition was disposed of. 5. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge heard the said W.P. (C) Nos. 80, 81, 82 and 85(AP) of 2006, along with W.P. (C) No. 157(AP)/2013, W.P. (C) No. 159(AP)/2013, Review Petition No. 21(AP)/2019 and W.A. No. 29(AP)/2008, and by a common order dated 14.08.2015, disposed of all the said matters, by granting liberty to the respondent and others to approach the learned Central Administrative Tribunal for agitating their grievance. The learned Single Judge by taking note of the observations made by the learned counsel for the respondent and others that they were still in service by virtue of interim order of the Court provided that the interim order to continue to operate till the filing of the Original Application before the Tribunal and consideration of interim prayer by the said forum and it was also provided that the previous order of the Court including those passed in writ appeals shall not operate as res-judicata. Thereafter, the respondent filed Original Application before the learned Tribunal, which was registered as O.A. No. 040/00311. The said original application was disposed of by an order dated 03.09.2015, with a direction to file a comprehensive representation before the authorities, to be disposed of by a speaking order. Thereafter, the respondent filed Original Application before the learned Tribunal, which was registered as O.A. No. 040/00311. The said original application was disposed of by an order dated 03.09.2015, with a direction to file a comprehensive representation before the authorities, to be disposed of by a speaking order. Accordingly, the respondent along with six other similarly situated persons, had submitted a joint representation dated 14.09.2015, before the petitioner authorities. The Director General, AIR by a speaking order dated 08.03.2016, held that the request of the respondent and others (i.e. the applicants before the learned Tribunal) cannot be acceded to. Amongst others, reason was assigned to the effect that the engagement of respondent and other similarly situated persons on casual assignment basis was governed strictly by the provisions of the “Talent Booking Scheme” in AIR clearly delinking such engagements from vacancies in any post including the post of TrEx D&T and therefore, it was not permissible at the said stage to even consider introduction of any scheme of regularization of casual assignees including the respondent and other similarly situated applicants before the learned Tribunal. Aggrieved by the said speaking order, dated 08.03.2016, the respondent and other similarly situated six persons, once again approached the learned Central Administrative Tribunal by filing Original Applications which were registered as O.A. Nos. 040/00139/2016, 040/00140/2016, 040/00141/2016, 040/00142/2016, 040/00143/2016, 040/00144/2016 and 040/00145/2016. The said learned Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, took note of non-production of records and held that the speaking order was found wanting details and relying on the power to relax as provided in regulation 6 and 7 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) (Junior Programme Posts) Recruitment Regulations, 2002, had set aside the speaking order dated 08.03.2016, and direction was issued to the petitioners to absorb the respondent and other applicants before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, who were working for a long time with a further observation that by keeping in view such a long service, qualification and experience they had acquired, it cannot be said that they are not of much use to the petitioners and further provided that for regularization of their services, if any relaxation is required, the same may be sought for, as was done in the case of other employees, working in Itanagar as well as in Kohima. 6. 6. The learned ASGI for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal was not sustainable because the power to relax as provided for in the recruitment rules would not permit the petitioners to relax essential qualification. It is submitted that the respondent and other similarly situated persons did not enter into service with the requisite qualification and that the power to relax was the sole prerogative of the Govt. and in this regard, it is submitted that once a recruitment rules provide for certain qualifications for entry level in service, power to relax cannot be exercised for the purpose of relaxing the essential qualification, which did not exist at the time of entry in the service. It is also submitted that after the decision of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Umadevi (supra), there was absolute no scope for preparing the scheme for regularization of the casual workers like the respondent, who were provided with scale of pay pursuant to the orders passed by this Court. 7. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondent has referred to the communication dated 04.02.2011, by the Station Director, AIR, Itanagar to the Director General, AIR, by which comments was made on the memorandum regarding regularization of TrEx D&T and it was submitted that the respondent and other similarly situated persons were rendering service against the existing regular vacancies. Accordingly, it is submitted that as the respondent is rendering service in a regular vacancy, the respondent cannot be denied regularization. It is also submitted that in their detailed representation dated 14.09.2015, the respondent and others had cited examples of several persons, who were appointed on various dates in (i) AIR, Itanagar, (ii) AIR, Aizawl and (iii) AIR, Kohima by way of direct recruitment despite the fact that such persons did not have the requisite essential educational qualification of Graduate Degree in Hindi. It is submitted that in this regard, the petitioners in paragraph 4.15 of this writ petition, had taken a stand that those persons having qualification of BA, MA, or AISSC had been directly recruited. Accordingly, it is submitted that while the petitioners are justifying direct recruitment of other persons lacking in essential qualification, the petitioners are denying regularization of the service of the respondent on the ground that they lack essential qualification. Accordingly, it is submitted that while the petitioners are justifying direct recruitment of other persons lacking in essential qualification, the petitioners are denying regularization of the service of the respondent on the ground that they lack essential qualification. Accordingly, it is submitted that in the establishment of AIR, the competent authorities had already relaxed the essential qualification for serving persons and therefore, the same benefit be extended to the respondents on the ground of parity. In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following cases, viz. (i) U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Pooran Chandra Pandey, (2007) 11 SCC 19 and (ii) Manoranjan Majumder and Others vs. Food Corporation of India and Others, W.P. (C) No. 372/2006, decided by High Court of Tripura on 07.02.2014. 8. Upon hearing both sides, the materials available on record have been perused. 9. In the Original Application filed before the learned Tribunal, the pleaded case of the respondent was that he was appointed as TrEx D&T on 18.10.1994. On the date of appointment, the petitioner had the educational qualification of B.A., as per the certificate issued by the Arunachal University, which is appended to this writ petition. As per the mark-sheet for B.A. (Pass Course), 1993, issued on 09.07.1993, the respondent was not having Hindi as a subject. 10. From the certificate dated 01.03.2010, it appears that the respondent was conferred with the degree of B.A. with major in Hindi by the Indira Gandhi National Open University. Therefore, while entering into the service, the respondent did not have the essential qualification of Bachelor Degree with Hindi and English as a main subject or either of two as medium of examination and the other as a main subject as provided in column-8 (E) of schedule to All India Radio and Doordarshan (Transmission Executive) Recruitment Rules, 1992 as amended vide notification dated 25.02.1994. The respondent has not brought on record the relevant law in force dealing with the situation as to how a TrEx D&T staff would be treated after he/she acquires Bachelor Degree with Hindi as a subject after appointment and during the course of service. 11. It appears that it was not brought to the notice of either this Court or of the learned Central Administrative Tribunal that the respondent had acquired Bachelor Degree with Hindi during the course of his service. 11. It appears that it was not brought to the notice of either this Court or of the learned Central Administrative Tribunal that the respondent had acquired Bachelor Degree with Hindi during the course of his service. An inference to that effect is drawn from the observations made in paragraph 7 of the judgment and order dated 14.11.2003, passed by the Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 644(AP)/2001, to the effect that the respondent had Bachelor’s Degree without Hindi either as main subject or as medium of examination. The aforesaid observation of the High Court has been reiterated in paragraph 5 of the order dated 03.09.2015, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 040/00311 of 2015, wherein the learned Tribunal had recorded that the respondent and others are not even qualified under the recruitment rules. Moreover, even from the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Tribunal, it does not appear that the learned Tribunal was called upon to examine the case of the petitioner in the light of subsequently acquired B.A. Degree with Hindi. It may be mentioned that the learned senior counsel for the respondent had referred to document annexed to the writ petition at Page 37 to project that the Station Director, AIR, Itanagar in his letter dated 14.07.1999, to the Director General, AIR had stated that most of the casual TrExs are having requisite qualification that their service could be regularized. In this regard, as already discussed above, the respondent did not have the requisite qualification as per the recruitment rules. 12. Therefore, this Writ Court, while examining the challenge made to the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Tribunal, matter raised for the first time before this Court cannot be gone into. 13. Thus, the only point required to be decided in this writ petition is whether the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Tribunal is sustainable in so far as it relates to direction issued to the petitioners for regularization/absorption of the respondent, who is working for such a long time, by providing relaxation, as was done in the case of other employees working in Itanagar as well as Kohima. It is in this context that the learned senior counsel for the respondent has referred to the two case citations mentioned hereinbefore. 14. It is in this context that the learned senior counsel for the respondent has referred to the two case citations mentioned hereinbefore. 14. It is seen that the learned Central Administrative Tribunal had taken cognizance of the fact that several appointees at Itanagar and Kohima, in the establishment of AIR, did not have the requisite qualification as required under the Recruitment Rules of 1992, as amended in 1994. Nonetheless, a direction was issued for regularization of the service of the respondent by seeking relaxation by observing that “For regularization of their services, if any relaxation is required, the same may be sought as was done in the case of other employees working in Itanagar as well as in Kohima.” It is seen that in this regard, the petitioners have not denied that several persons were appointed in regular basis as TrEx D&T on regular basis at Itanagar, Kohima and Aizawl without the required qualification. 15. It is no longer res integra that essential educational qualifications as prescribed in the recruitment rules cannot be relaxed. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that if the petitioners had given any relaxation in respect of essential qualification for inducting others in service as TrEx D&T cannot be a ground for this Court to put its seal of approval on the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, inter-alia, directing the petitioners to relax the essential qualifications of the respondent and to regularize his service. It is seen that under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra), took note of benefit of regularization given to a section of employees of the UPSEB, had concluded that the benefit of regularization to be extended to the respondents therein on the ground that they should not be discriminated against and further held that to take a contrary view would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also observed that the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , has to be read in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that it cannot be read in a manner which will make it in conflict with Article 14 and observed that as the respondents therein had put in about 22 years of service, it will surely not be reasonable if their claim for regularization is denied even after such a long period of service and also held that apart from discrimination, Article 14 of the Constitution will also be violated on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness if employees, who have put in such a long service, are denied the benefit of regularization and are made to face the same selection, which fresh recruits have to face. The said ratio was followed by the High Court of Tripura in the case of Manoranjan Majumder (supra). However, in respect of the cited case of Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra), the Court is inclined to observe that subsequently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand and Others, (2008) 10 SCC 1 , had overruled the decision rendered by the two-Judge Bench in the case of Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra) and in paragraph 92 thereof, it was clarified that the comments and observations made by the two-Judge Bench in Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra), should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High Courts, Tribunals and other judicial forum nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench. 16. 16. In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Dayanand (supra), the ratio laid down in the case of Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra), cannot be relied upon by this Court for putting its seal of approval to the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal. 17. The Court is also inclined to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Union of India and Another vs. International Trading Co. and Another, (2003) 5 SCC 437 , wherein it was observed that “What remains now to be considered is the effect of permission granted to the 32 vessels. As highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as 32 vessels are concerned. But it cannot come to the aid of respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case; direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetrating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment from the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution) cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on part.......” 18. Moreover, in the case of State of Orissa vs. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 and Khub Ram vs. Dalbir Singh, (2015) 8 SCC 386, the Supreme Court of India had observed to the effect that when appointment at the initial stage is illegal and contrary to the mandate of the recruitment rules, the illegality cannot be cured or condoned, nor can the illegality be regularized. 19. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Umadevi (supra), the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Tribunal is not found sustainable on facts and in law. 19. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Umadevi (supra), the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Tribunal is not found sustainable on facts and in law. In this regard, the Court finds support from the herein before referred cases of (i) Dayanand (supra), (ii) Mamta Mohanty (supra), (iii) Khub Ram (supra) and (iv) International Trading Co. (supra). Thus, the decision making process of the learned Tribunal is itself vitiated and the resultant directions contained in the impugned order to regularize the service of the petitioner by relaxing the relevant recruitment rules of 1992 is found contradictory to the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Umadevi (supra). It is no longer res integra that essential qualifications prescribed in the Recruitment Rules cannot be relaxed. 20. Hence, the Court has no hesitation to hold that the impugned order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati, in O.A. No. 040/00139/2016, is vitiated by jurisdictional error, by not applying the appropriate principles of law, which amounts to error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, the said impugned judgment and order is hereby set aside and quashed. 21. However, the petitioners shall not disturb the service of the respondent as a fall-out of this order. R. PHUKAN, J. (concurring) 22. I had the benefit of going through the erudite judgment of my learned Brother and I am in complete agreement with the same. However, I thought it fit to supplement the judgment by recording my own view also. 23. The right to equality, as envisage in Article 14, is an integral element of our Constitution. It is the most commonly used mechanism to assess the legality of the legislative as well as executive actions. It encompasses the concept of equality before the law and equal protection of the law. The former concept everyone is equal in the eyes of the law and the latter concept the like should be treated alike and allowed positive discrimination for the benefit of society. The right to equality is, however, not absolute and is subject to exceptions. The state can resort to reasonable classification among the individuals. But, such classification must be based upon intelligible differentia and should have nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 24. The right to equality is, however, not absolute and is subject to exceptions. The state can resort to reasonable classification among the individuals. But, such classification must be based upon intelligible differentia and should have nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 24. There is no concept of negative equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. In case the person has a right, he has to be treated equally, but where right is not available a person cannot claim rights to be treated equally as the right does not exist, negative equality when the right does not exist, cannot be claimed. 25. In Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible.” 26. In Chatman Lal vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 15 SCC 715 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “16. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible.” 26. In Chatman Lal vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 15 SCC 715 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “16. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise, it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 considered this issue and held as under: (SCC p. 85, Para 8) “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible.” 27. In Fuljit Kaur vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2010) 11 SCC 455 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “11. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 P&H 54 , in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 P&H 54 , in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Article 14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would make function of the administration impossible.” 28. In Doiwala Sehkari Shram Samvida Samiti Ltd. vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others, (2007) 11 SCC 641 , Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of negative equality observed thus: “28. This Court in Union of India vs. International Trading Co. has held that two wrongs do not make one right. The appellant cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case, directions should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right but could be perpetuating another wrong and in such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 cannot be pressed into service in such cases. But the concept of equal treatment presupposes existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring wrongs on a par. The affected parties have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative quality. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the above matter, the submission of the appellant has no force. In case, some of the persons have been granted permits wrongly, the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the wrong done by the Government.” 29. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the above matter, the submission of the appellant has no force. In case, some of the persons have been granted permits wrongly, the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the wrong done by the Government.” 29. In Kulwinder Pal Singh and Another vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2016) 6 SCC 532 , Supreme Court while relying upon State of U.P. vs. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 , observed as under: “16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the other candidates were appointed in the post against de reserved category, the same benefit should also be extended to the appellants. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. In State of U.P. vs. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 it was held as under: (SCC p. 337, Para 15) “15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake.” 30. In Arup Das and Others vs. State of Assam and Others, (2012) 5 SCC 559 , this Court observed as under: “19. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in State of U.P. vs. Rajkumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 , this Court once again had to consider the question of filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised. Referring to the various decisions rendered on this issue, this Court held that filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that selectees could not claim appointments as a matter of right. It was reiterated that mere inclusion of candidates in the select list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled. It was reiterated that mere inclusion of candidates in the select list does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled. This Court went on to observe further that even if in some cases appointments had been made by mistake or wrongly, that did not confer any right of appointment to another person, as Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State had committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake.” 31. In State of Orissa and Another vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 , it was observed: “56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on another person to get the same relief.” 32. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the illuminating discourse, is that negative equality is foreign to the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. 33. In the case in hand Mr. Dilip Mazumdar, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, though submits that the authority of All India Radio has appointed Transmission Executive and D&T in some other stations, including Itanagar, Kohima and Aizawl relaxing the requisite educational qualification, yet the learned counsel for the appellant has contested such a submission on the ground that the respondents cannot claim negative equality though inadvertently the AIR authority has appointed some of the Transmission Executive and D&T in some of the stations. While the rival contention is considered in the light of the legal proposition, discussed herein above, we find substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. And we are inclined to record our concurrence to the same. Thus, having examined the impugned order of the learned Tribunal, on the touchstone of the principles discussed herein above we are of the considered view that the same failed withstand the test of correctness. And we are inclined to record our concurrence to the same. Thus, having examined the impugned order of the learned Tribunal, on the touchstone of the principles discussed herein above we are of the considered view that the same failed withstand the test of correctness. The respondents here in cannot claim their regularization on the basis of inadvertent regularization of service of some of candidates in AIR Kohima, Aizwal and Itanagar stations by relaxing their educational qualification as Article 14 does not envisages negative equality. 34. The learned senior counsel for the respondents relying upon the decision of Pooran Chandra Pandey (supra), wherein a two Judge Bench has attempted to distinguish the Constitution Bench judgment in Uma Devi’s case, by suggesting that the said decision cannot be applied to a case where regularization has been sought for in pursuance of Article 14 of the Constitution and that the same is in conflict with the judgment of the seven-Judges Bench in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248 , submits that the ratio laid down in Uma Devi’s case is not applicable here in this case. But, the decision rendered in Pooran Chand Pandey (supra) is overruled subsequently by a larger Bench (three Judge strength) in the case of Dayananda (supra) where in it has been held that Pooran Chand Pandey (supra) should not be read as a binding precedent. It was further held that by virtue of the provision of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the judgment of Uma Devi (supra) rendered by a Constitutional bench is binding on this Bench. Therefore, the submission of learned senior counsel left this court un-impressed. 35. However, we make it clear that we are not holding that the respondents had entered into service through the back door, but initially when they entered in service they had not possessed the requisite educational qualification. In the case of Dayananda (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “69. The menace of illegal and backdoor appointments compelled the courts to rethink and in a large number of subsequent judgments this court declined to entertain the claims of ad-hoc and temporary employee for regularization of service and even reversed the order passed by the High Courts and Administrative Tribunals [Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. vs. Pushpa Srivastava, 1992 (4) SCC 33 , Dr. M.A. Haque and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 1993 (2) SCC 213 , J&K Public Service Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan, 1994 (2) SCC 630 , Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar vs. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 380, Union of India vs. Kishan Gopal Vyas, 1996 (7) SCC 134 , Union of India vs. Moti Lal, 1996 (7) SCC 481 , Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. vs. Dr. P. Sambasiva Rao, 1996 (7) SCC 499 , State of H.P. vs. Suresh Kumar Verma, 1996 (7) SCC 562 , Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal vs. State of J&K, 1996 (9) SCC 619 , E. Ramakrishnan vs. State of Kerala, 1996 (10) SCC 565 , Union of India and Others vs. Bishambar Dutt, 1996 (11) SCC 341 , Union of India vs. Mahender Singh, 1997 (1) SCC 247 , P. Ravindran and Others vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry and Others, 1997 (1) SCC 350 , Ashwani Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1997 (2) SCC 1 , Santosh Kumar Verma and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1997 (2) SCC 713 , State of U.P. and Others vs. Ajay, 1997 (4) SCC 88 , Patna University vs. Dr. Amita Tiwari, 1997 (7) SCC 198 and Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad vs. Anil Kumar Mishra, 2005 (5) SCC 122].” 36. Reference may also be made to another three Judge Bench decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A. Umarani vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, 2004 (7) SCC 112 , wherein it was held that the State cannot invoke Article 162 of the Constitution for regularization of the appointments made in violation of the mandatory statutory provisions. In the case of Uma Devi (supra), the Constitution Bench again considered the question whether the State can frame scheme for regularization of the services of ad-hoc/temporary/daily wager appointed in violation of the doctrine of equality or the one appointed with a clear stipulation that such appointment will not confer any right on the appointee to seek regularization or absorption in the regular cadre and whether the Court can issue mandamus for regularization or absorption of such appointee and answered the same in negative. The Court adverted to the theme of constitutionalism in a system established in rule of law, expanded meaning given to the doctrine of equality in general and equality in the matter of employment in particular, multi-facet problems including the one relating to unwarranted fiscal burden on the public exchequer created on account of the directions given by the High Courts and this Court for regularization of the services of persons appointed on purely temporary or ad hoc basis or engaged on daily wages or as casual labourers. 37. In view of above discussion and finding, the petitioner cannot be expected to comply with the directions issued by the learned Tribunal by regularizing the service of the respondent by resorting to relaxation of essential qualifications. Rather, the court is constrained to observe that the direction issued by the learned Tribunal is neither executable nor compliable, because of the ratio laid down in the case of Uma Devi (supra). 38. Thus, the petitioner has succeeded in establishing a prima-facie case for interference with the order dated 30.11.2017, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati bench in O.A. No. 040/00139/2016, which is impugned in this Writ petition. Accordingly the same is interfered with. The impugned order stands set aside and the writ petition stands allowed. 39. The parties have to bear their own costs.