JUDGMENT : – This present appeal is filed under section 32 of the Code of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 against the order dated 16-1-2018 passed by Seventh Additional District Judge, Gwalior in M.A.No. 1/2016, whereby the appeal filed under section 31 of the M.P. Rent Control Act, 1961 arising out of the order dated 24-11-2015 passed by Rent Controlling Authority in case No. 5/2014-15/90-1/Rent, whereby application under section 10 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act for grant of interim maintenance was allowed and the interim maintenance from Rs. 1,100/- per month to Rs. 4,800/- has been awarded. 2. The short facts leading to the present appeal are that the respondent/applicant filed an application before the respondent No. 2/Rent Controlling Authority Lashkar, Gwalior under section 10 (4) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) for increase of the standard rent. The appellant/non-applicant replied to the aforesaid application and denied the allegation made in the application. During pendency of the proceedings, one application under section 11 of the Act has been filed in which prayer to fix the interim rent has been made. The Rent Controlling Authority/respondent No. 2 vide order dated 24-11-2015 allowed the application and directed to make the payment of interim rent to respondent @ Rs. 4,800/- per month. After passing the interim order, the appeal was preferred which was registered as M.A.No. 1/2016 before the Additional District Judge. The same was dismissed by impugned order dated 16-1-2018. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the order impugned passed by learned Additional District Judge is contrary to law and contrary to the provisions of the Act and also otherwise erroneous. He further argued that while passing the impugned order dated 16-1-2018, learned Additional District Judge has failed to determine some material issue of law and there has been substantial error or defect in the procedure to prescribe by this Act, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order impugned is in accordance with law and no interference is warranted in the same and prayed to dismiss the present second appeal. 5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the available record. Section 11 of the Act provides as below : – “Section 11. Fixation of interim rent. 5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the available record. Section 11 of the Act provides as below : – “Section 11. Fixation of interim rent. – If an application for fixing the standard rent or for determining the lawful increase of such rent is made under section 10, the Rent Controlling Authority shall, pending final decision on the application, make, as expeditiously as possible, a provisional order specifying the amount of the interim rent or lawful increase to be paid by the tenant to the landlord and shall appoint the date from which such interim rent or lawful increase so specified shall be deemed to have effect.” 6. It is thus clear from the aforesaid section that interim rent is fixed pending final decision i.e., the Rent Controlling Authority retains seisin over the matter for fixing the final rent. The wording of the section also shows that the interim rent is also fixed for the time being till the final order is passed. The effect of passing of an order of fixation of interim rent during the pendency of the application under section 10 of the Act is liable to be modified theoretically as well as in actuality by the final order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority as held by this Court in the case of Mukesh D. Ramtek vs. Smt. Keshar Singh, 1999(2) M.P.L.J. 206 . In the same case, this Court has also held that the legislature does not intend to include in the words “every order” an interim order as prescribed under section 31 (1) of the Act. 7. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Midnapore Peoples’ Co-op. Bank Ltd. and others vs. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 SCC 399 has held that the interlocutory orders which fall under the following categories are judgments and, therefore, an appeal lies against them : – “(i) Orders which finally decide the question or issue in controversy in the main case; (ii) Orders which finally decide issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case; (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case.” 8. In view of the above principles laid down by the Apex Court, it is apparent that the order passed under section 11 of the Act does not finally decide the question or issue in controversy in the main case or materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case, therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is not acceptable that being a final order, the order impugned is appealable. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant cited the case laws of Kiran Bala Shrivastava vs. Jai Prakash Shrivastava, 2005 (23) LCD 1 and Satpal vs. Sunaina Devi, 2007 (1) Rent LR 518 to buttress his arguments. But the facts and circumstances of above cited cases are totally different from the present case. In the cited cases, the matter was under section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act for grant of interim maintenance, therefore, it does not support the case of the appellant herein. 10. In view of the above, present second appeal being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed.