ORDER : This civil revision petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is filed aggrieved of the order, dated 22.11.2017, passed in O.S.No.36 of 2011 on the file of the Court of X Additional District & Sessions Judge, Krishna, at Machilipatnam. 2. Heard Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarty, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/plaintiff and Sri M. Radha Krishna, learned counsel the respondents/defendants. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of registered non-possessory agreement of sale-cum-general power of attorney, dated 10.12.2019, executed by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of 3rd defendant alleging fraud and collusion. The plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.52 of 2009 on the file of the Court of Principal District Judge, Machilipatnam, against the 1st defendant for recovery of amount due under the promissory note, dated 30.06.2008, executed by the 1st defendant. As the 1st defendant failed to discharge the same, the plaintiff filed I.A.No.342 of 2009 in O.S.No.52 of 2009 seeking attachment of the schedule property before judgment. In spite of giving an undertaking not to alienate the schedule property, the 1st defendant filed counter stating that the schedule property was mortgaged to State Bank of Hyderabad, Machilipatnam, towards security and the 1st defendant already alienated the schedule property and has no salable interest over the same. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the property hypothecated to the State Bank of Hyderabad and the schedule property in I.A.No.342 of 2009 in O.S.No.52 of 2009 are one and the same and the registered non-possessory agreement-cum-general power of attorney is created with a view to defeat and delay the suit claim of the plaintiff. Hence, the suit was filed. 4. The defendants 1 and 2 filed separate written statements and in respect of the document in question, they stated that the 3rd defendant is a bona fide purchaser of the schedule property, purchased the same for valuable consideration of Rs.41,81,000/-from defendants 1 & 2 and paid a sum of Rs.36,00,000/-and also paid the balance of Rs.5,80,000/-to the defendants 1 & 2 on 18.12.2009. The 3rd defendant filed separate written statement and further contended that he obtained receipt from defendants 1 and 2 and thereafter, he sold away the property to the 4th defendant long prior to the filing of the suit. The 3rd defendant filed separate written statement and further contended that he obtained receipt from defendants 1 and 2 and thereafter, he sold away the property to the 4th defendant long prior to the filing of the suit. On receipt of suit summons, he came to know about the previous transaction and the suit filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.52 of 2009 and about filing of petition in I.A.No.342 of 2009 for attachment before judgment in the suit. During trial, when the 3rd defendant was intending to mark the money voucher issued for Rs.5,80,000/-by the defendants 1 and 2 on 18.12.2009, counsel for the plaintiff raised an objection for marking the same as exhibit on the ground that it is neither a mere money voucher nor a receipt, but possession was delivered after receiving Rs.5,80,000/-and as such, it is a deed of conveyance and is liable to be registered and necessary stamp duty and penalty are to be collected and therefore, the said document cannot be admitted in evidence. 5. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court held that the document which is styled as money voucher, requires registration as possession is delivered by virtue of that document and it cannot be admitted in evidence unless stamp duty and penalty are paid by the 3rd defendant. 6. Hence, this revision by the plaintiff. 7. The revision petitioner is mainly aggrieved by the direction of the trial Court permitting the 3rd defendant to take steps for payment of stamp duty and penalty for use of the document for collateral purpose of proving possession of the property. It is argued that a document which requires registration but not registered cannot be looked into as evidence and in this regard, the following decisions have been cited: (i) Ponnapola Seetha Ramaiah v. Snagala Sreenivasulu, 2012 (6) ALT 549 (ii) Golla Dharmanna v. Sakari Poshetty and others, 2013 (6) ALT 205 (iii) Yashchandra (D) by L.Rs v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 4572 (i) In Ponnapola Seetha Ramaiah (1 supra) (decided on 27.09.2012), where the agreement of sale without possession followed by delivery of property on payment vide endorsements on the back of agreement, it is held that such document requires registration and for want of registration, the same is to be excluded for evidence. In the said case, Section 49 of the Registration Act has been considered. In the said case, Section 49 of the Registration Act has been considered. It is pertinent to refer contrary view expressed by the same Judge in the case of K.Ramamoorthi (infra). (ii) In Golla Dharmanna v. Sakari Poshetty and others (2nd supra) the suit is one for declaration of tile and perpetual injunction. A document transferring right, title and interest in the immovable property worth exceeding Rs.100/-is regarded as sale deed and held it requires registration as per Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and thus merely because the requisite stamp duty and penalty has been paid in view of Section 35(a) of the Indian Stamp act, 1899, it cannot be said that such document is admissible in evidence as objection as to requirement of registration is different from objection as to requirement of stamp duty and compliance of stamp duty does not automatically make it admissible in evidence, if as per law, the said document is also required to be registered. No point regarding admissibility of such document for purposes mentioned in Section 49 of the Registration Act was considered. (iii) In Yashchandra (D) by L.Rs v. State of Madhya Pradesh (3rd supra) a document receipt of amount and permission to enclose land and cultivate 1/3rd of his land and after payment of the full amount, payee is entitled to cultivate the land for 10 years. Since this document was held to be antedated, it was held that the said document cannot be looked into for deciding whether this document creates any right, title or interest in the appellant. Further, on the contention that it can be used for collateral purpose of possession is raised, no express finding is given nor was Section 49 of the Registration Act was considered. 8. Further, on the contention that it can be used for collateral purpose of possession is raised, no express finding is given nor was Section 49 of the Registration Act was considered. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that when a document which requires registration has not been registered, the same can be received in evidence for collateral purpose by virtue of proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and as such, the trial Court has rightly given liberty to the 3rd defendant to pay necessary stamp duty and penalty for collateral purpose of proving possession and in this regard, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) E.Padma Rao @ Vadla Padma Rao & others Kumar v. Vijay Kumar, (2013) 1 ALD 581 (ii) K.Ramamoorthi v. C.Surendranatha Reddy, (2012) 6 ALD 163 (iii) V.Dharma Reddy v. S.Hari Ram, (2004) 5 ALD 600 (i) In E.Padma Rao @ Vadla Padma Rao & others v. Vijay Kumar (4 supra), in a suit for specific performance, the existence of the agreement was not in dispute, but its admissibility in evidence is objected on the ground it was not stamped as required under law. The proviso to Explanation 1 to Article 47-A of Schedule 1 A of the Stamp Act reads as below: “Explanation 1:-An agreement to sell followed by or evidencing delivery of possession of the property agreed to be sold shall be chargeable as a “sale” under this article: Provided that, where subsequently, a sale deed is executed in pursuance of agreement of sale as aforesaid or in pursuance of an agreement referred to in clause (B) of article 6, the stamp duty, if any, already paid or recovered on the agreement of sale shall be adjusted towards the towards the total duty leviable on the sale deed”. After excerpting proviso to Explanation 1 to Article 47-A of Schedule 1 A of the Stamp Act, it is observed that what becomes important and pivotal in this regard is the factum of delivery of possession, whether it is at the time of execution of agreement or subsequent thereto. Therefore, it is held that the agreement by which possession of land was given to lay it into plots, lay roads thereon and develop the land was held to have fallen within the explanation and requires stamp duty under Article 47A. Therefore, it is held that the agreement by which possession of land was given to lay it into plots, lay roads thereon and develop the land was held to have fallen within the explanation and requires stamp duty under Article 47A. It is a peculiar case, where ¾ of the property was already sold; a converse situation arose where the stamp duty paid on sale deeds to be considered to examine whether the agreement to sell was found not adequately stamped and such situation is not contemplated in the proviso to Explanation 1. Then the High Court observed at paragraphs 14 to 17 as follows: “14. The situation in fail, triggers a discussion about certain basic aspects. Though logic and morality, as such, do not constitute the basis for claiming any relief, there is no taboo as regards their application in the process of adjudication. This very case provides an occasion to address the issue. 15. The petitioners do not dispute the existence of an agreement between them and the respondents. As a matter of fact, they have respected it to the extent of 3/4th of the property covered by it. Till the matter reached the Court, they did not doubt the veracity of the agreement or its enforceability. It is only when a suit is filed as regards the balance, they plead that the agreement is such a prohibited substance, that it cannot have entry into the Court at all. It is on account of such a stance, that people are gaining courage to say or do something in a Court, which they do not feel it appropriate, to do outside. This is how an idiom, that a person who is otherwise truthful outside, would gain courage to speak falsehood, once he enters the witness box in a Court. 16. The procedures in law are formulated only to help the parties and the Court, to get the root and truth of the matter and the Courts cannot remain mute spectators to braze in attempts to subvert the truth. If proper attention is not paid in this regard, a situation may develop where Courts would become places where acts of immorality are committed with impunity. 17. Logic is not a prohibited phenomenon, in law. If proper attention is not paid in this regard, a situation may develop where Courts would become places where acts of immorality are committed with impunity. 17. Logic is not a prohibited phenomenon, in law. Benjamin Cardozo, in his treatise "Judicial Process" has observed (Page 32): Logical consistency does not cease to be a good because it is not the supreme good. Holmes has told us in a sentence which is now classic that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." But Holmes did not tell us that logic is to be ignored when experience is silent. I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and artificial exceptions unless for some sufficient reason, which will commonly be some consideration of history or custom or policy or justice. Lacking such a reason, I must be logical, just as I must be impartial, and upon like grounds. 18. The observation made by the learned Jurist becomes relevant in cases of this nature. A person, who acts under an agreement, and derives benefit under it, cannot turn around and treat it as untouchable, as regards the balance.” (ii) In K.Ramamoorthi v. C.Surendranatha Reddy (decided on 27.07.2012), unregistered sale deed is held to be admissible in evidence for collateral purpose of proving possession as consistently held by Court. After narrating all such cases, the following conclusions were drawn and illustrations for collateral purposes were given. “22. On a compendious reference of the case law discussed above, the followings conclusions emerge: i) A document, which is compulsorily registrable, but not registered, cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power. The phrase "affecting the immovable property" needs to be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 17(b) of the Registration Act, which would mean that any instrument which creates, declares, assigns, limits or extinguishes a right to immovable property, affects the immovable property. ii) The restriction imposed under Section 49 of the Registration Act is confined to the use of the document to affect the immovable property and to use the document as evidence of a transaction affecting the immovable property. iii) If the object in putting the document in evidence does not fall within the two purposes mentioned in (ii) supra, the document cannot be excluded from evidence altogether. iii) If the object in putting the document in evidence does not fall within the two purposes mentioned in (ii) supra, the document cannot be excluded from evidence altogether. iv) A collateral transaction must be independent of or divisible from a transaction to affect the property i.e., a transaction creating any right, title or interest in the immovable property of the value of rupees hundred and upwards. v) The phrase "collateral purpose" is with reference to the transaction and not to the relief claimed in the suit. vi) The proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act does not speak of collateral purpose but of collateral transaction i.e., one collateral to the transaction affecting immovable property by reason of which registration is necessary, rather than one collateral to the document. vii) Whether a transaction is collateral or not needs to be decided on the nature, purpose and recitals of the document. Having culled out the legal propositions, the discussion on this issue will be incomplete if a few illustrations as to what constitutes collateral transaction are not enumerated as given out in Radhomal Alumal (supra) and other Judgments. They are as under: a) If a lessor sues his lessee for rent on an unregistered lease which has expired at the date of the suit, he cannot succeed for two reasons, namely, that the lease which is registrable is unregistered and that the period of lease has expired on the date of filing of the suit. However, such a lease deed can be relied upon by the plaintiff in a suit for possession filed after expiry of the lease to prove the nature of the defendant's possession. b) An unregistered mortgage deed requiring registration may be received as evidence to prove the money debt, provided, the mortgage deed contains a personal covenant by the mortgagor to pay (See: Queen-Empress v Rama Tevan('92) 15 Mad. 253, P.V. M.Kunhu Moidu v T. Madhava Menon('09) 32 Mad. 410 and Vani v Bani ('96) 20 Bom. 553). c) In an unregistered agreement dealing with the right to share in certain lands and also to a share in a cash allowance, the party is entitled to sue on the document in respect of movable property (Hanmantapparao v Ramabai Hanmant.[AIR 1919 Bom. 38: 21 Bom. L.R.716). 410 and Vani v Bani ('96) 20 Bom. 553). c) In an unregistered agreement dealing with the right to share in certain lands and also to a share in a cash allowance, the party is entitled to sue on the document in respect of movable property (Hanmantapparao v Ramabai Hanmant.[AIR 1919 Bom. 38: 21 Bom. L.R.716). d) An unregistered deed of gift requiring registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act is admissible in evidence not to prove the gift, but to explain by reference to it the character of the possession of the person who held the land and who claimed it, not by virtue of deed of gift but by setting up the plea of adverse possession (Varada Pillai (supra)). (e) A sale deed of immovable property requiring registration but not registered can be used to show nature of possession (Radhomal Alumal (2-supra), Bondar Singh (15supra) and A. Kishore (16-supra). 23. The above instances are only illustrative and not exhaustive. There may be many more situations where a transaction can be collateral to the transaction which affects the immovable property. The Courts will have to carefully decide on a case to case basis in the light of the legal principles contained in the above discussed and various other judgments holding the field.” (iii) In V. Dharma Reddy v. S. Hari Ram (supra), it was held that where an agreement of sale culminates into a sale deed, it loses its character as instrument within the definition of Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act as held in paragraphs Nos.7 and 8. “7. Agreement of sale, undoubtedly, creates rights and liabilities between the parties concerned. However, where it results in a sale-deed, the purpose underlying the agreement cannot be said to be still subsisting even thereafter. Therefore, once a sale-deed is executed, the agreement of sale preceding it cannot be treated as an instrument for the purpose of the Stamp Act. 8. There is another way of examining the matter. Whenever stamp duty is collected on an agreement of sale, the same is taken into account at the time of levying stamp duty on the sale deed. The effort is to ensure that the stamp duty on the entire transaction does not exceed the prescribed limit. 8. There is another way of examining the matter. Whenever stamp duty is collected on an agreement of sale, the same is taken into account at the time of levying stamp duty on the sale deed. The effort is to ensure that the stamp duty on the entire transaction does not exceed the prescribed limit. Where, however, the entire stamp duty is collected on the sale deed, levy of stamp duty on an agreement of sale, which preceded the sale-deed, under any pretext, would result in subjecting the transaction for stamp duty, over and above what is prescribed under law. Such a course of action is impermissible.” 9. Insofar as the observation of the trial Court that the disputed document requires registration, the same is not under challenge. It is also rightly held by the trial Court that the said document requires registration. The effect of non-registration is dealt with in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, and the same prohibits such a document to be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, however, the proviso to Section 49 gives leverage to receive such document in evidence under three circumstances, viz., (i) to receive such document as evidence of contract in a suit for specific performance; (ii) as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purpose of Section 53(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or (iii) as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instruments. 10. In the present case, the purpose of producing the document in evidence is not covered by the points (i) & (ii). Obviously, the document can be permitted to be received in evidence for collateral purpose. The trial Court has spelt out what is the collateral purpose in the present case for which this document can be received in evidence by stating that it may be for the purpose of proving possession of the property. 11. A document can be objected to be received in evidence mainly on two grounds; such as want of registration and want of payment of proper stamp duty. Since both these aspects are governed by two separate enactments, mere compliance of provisions of one of such Acts is not enough. To make a document fit for receipt in evidence, the provisions of the Stamp Act are also to be complied with. Since both these aspects are governed by two separate enactments, mere compliance of provisions of one of such Acts is not enough. To make a document fit for receipt in evidence, the provisions of the Stamp Act are also to be complied with. As such, since in the present case, the document requires stamp duty and penalty with reference to Article 49 A of Schedule 1A of the Stamp Act, as it was held to be a document of agreement of sale with possession by subsequent act in continuation of the earlier agreement of sale without possession, unless such condition of payment of proper stamp duty with penalty is complied with, the document cannot be received in evidence. On such payment, the document cannot be objected to be received in evidence for collateral purpose, which is already indicated supra. Therefore, the contention of the revision petitioner that the document cannot be received in evidence for any purpose just because it is defective for want of registration and such defect is incurable unlike in the case of stamp duty, is not tenable. The decisions relied on by the revision petitioner have no application to the present case as distinguished above. On the other hand, the decision in K.Ramamoorthi squarely covers the present on the point in support of it. 12. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this civil revision petition shall stand closed.