JUDGMENT Vinod S. Bhardwaj. J. - The present appeal has been filed raising a challenge to the judgment and order dated 05.07.2019 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Tarn Taran whereby the accused-respondent has been acquitted from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. FACTS: 2. Before proceeding further in the matter certain facts as pleaded by appellant and as are necessary for just and proper appreciation of the Appeal are referred to hereinbelow:- i) That the appellant/complainant claimed that the accused-respondent was having family relations with him and that she had borrowed a sum of Rs.2,40,000/- from the appellant on 13th June, 2016, in the presence of one Priya Kapoor and Vinod Kumar. The loan in question was advanced for a period of one year to enable her to repair her house and the respondent is stated to have promised to return the said amount on or before August 2017. ii) An agreement is also stated to be executed in this regard, whereby, the accused-respondent admitted to having received the loan of Rs.2,40,000/- as aforesaid. iii) When the appellant-complainant approached respondent-accused for repayment of the same, the respondent issued cheque No.150422 dated 05.08.2017 from her bank account with Allahabad Bank. The said cheque was however returned by the bank with memo dated 09.08.2017 with remarks 'insufficient funds'. iv) The appellant, thereafter, sent a legal notice raising a demand for the amount, however, upon failure on the part of the respondent to pay the amount despite demand, the complaint was instituted under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. v) The appellant appeared as CW-1 and did not lead any further evidence. No evidence was also led by the accused-respondent apart from cross-examination of the appellant. vi) Upon consideration of the same, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran held that the complainant has failed to prove any legal debt or liability against the respondent and hence in absence of any legally enforceable debt, there was no occasion for respondent to execute any instrument towards discharge of the same. It was accordingly held that the version of the appellant/complainant was improbable and hence acquitted the respondent/accused of the charges framed. Arguments of the Petitioner: 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued that the judgment of the Trial Court suffers from infirmity and perversity. It was accordingly held that the version of the appellant/complainant was improbable and hence acquitted the respondent/accused of the charges framed. Arguments of the Petitioner: 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued that the judgment of the Trial Court suffers from infirmity and perversity. There has been non-application of judicious mind towards appreciation of evidence adduced by the appellant. It was contended that there is no denial of the signature on the cheque and as such there was a presumption against the accused. The burden could not have been shifted by the Court upon the appellant/complainant to establish that any amount was due once the signatures on the cheque was not in dispute. It is also contended by the appellant that as per the case pleaded by respondent- accused, she had handed over the cheque in question to one Priya Kapoor, hence the burden lies upon the accused to examine Priya Kapoor in her defence and that inability on her part to lead such evidence should be read against her. The fact that she has chosen not to examine Priya Kapoor, an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the accused-respondent. It is vehemently argued that the respondent is a signatory to the cheque and that the said cheque was dishonored for want of 'sufficient funds'. The respondent has chosen not to offer any valid explanation to the circumstances under which the cheque in question had been issued and also choose not to respond to the legal notice sent by the appellant to the respondent. It is contended that the presumption as envisaged under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been mis-interpreted and that there was no further obligation to cast upon the appellant/complainant. In support of his contention learned counsel has made reference to the judgment of this Court in the matter of Sukhjinder Singh Vs. Buta Singh, 2019(4) RCR (Criminal) 245, to contend that merely because body of the cheque was not filled by the drawee of the cheque is immaterial. The relevant extract of the said judgement is reproduced as under:- As mentioned above, the fact that body of the cheque was filled up in handwriting other than that of the drawer of the cheque; is not any proof of the fact that the consent of the drawer; in drawing such a cheque; was missing. The relevant extract of the said judgement is reproduced as under:- As mentioned above, the fact that body of the cheque was filled up in handwriting other than that of the drawer of the cheque; is not any proof of the fact that the consent of the drawer; in drawing such a cheque; was missing. If this is permitted then the drawer of the cheque can frustrate the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act in; virtually; every case. He can get the cheque prepared as per his choice from some other person and can subsequently start pleading that he had not filled up the body of the cheque or that he had not consented to the filling of the body of the cheque. In such a situation, the payee or the holder in due course would have no means to prove his consent. Otherwise also, since the cheque is not a document which is required to be attested by witnesses for being a valid document, therefore, the complainant is under no legal obligation to examine a witness to prove the due execution of the same. On the contrary, if the drawer of the cheque takes a plea that his consent qua drawing of the cheque was missing, then it is, exclusively; for the drawer to prove the fact that he had not consented to the filling of the body of the cheque. 4. Reliance was further placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, 2019 (2) RCR (Criminal) 1, the relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:- 40. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. 42. In the absence of any finding that the cheque in question was not signed by the respondent-accused or not voluntarily made over to the payee and in the absence of any evidence with regard to the circumstances in which a blank signed cheque had been given to the appellant-complainant, it may reasonably be presumed that the cheque was filled in by the appellant-complainant being the payee in the presence of the respondent-accused being the drawer, at his request and/or with his acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change in the amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the payee. The High Court ought not to have acquitted the respondent-accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have gone through the documents appended along with the instant appeal. ANALYSIS: 6. From perusal of the same, it is evident that as per the case set up by the appellant/complainant that the appellant claims that the amount in question was advanced in cash in the presence of two witnesses Vinod Kumar and Priya Kapoor, after withdrawing the amount from the bank i.e. Punjab and Sind Bank, Tarn Taran. It is also claimed that an agreement in this regard was also executed on 28th June 2016, when the respondent and her husband Sukhchain Singh wherein, the respondent admitted that she had taken a loan of Rs.2,40,000/-. It is also alleged that the complainant had approached for the repayment along with Vinod Kumar and Priya Kapoor in the month of August 2017, when the cheque in question was handed over to her. Further, in her statement recorded by respondent- accused she had taken the following plea:- 'Q: Do you want to say anything in your defense against the contents of notice of accusation? Ans: I did not issue any cheque to the complainant. I had given a cheque to one Priya as a payment to the saving scheme called committee. I did not borrow any money from the complainant present in the Court nor did I issued any cheque to the complainant present in the Court. I had not monitory transaction with the complainant. I have no legally enforceable debt towards the complainant. The complaint is false and based upon false facts' 7. The relevant extract of the cross-examination of the respondent/complainant reads thus:- xxxxxxxxx. It was 28,06.2016 when the agreement he accused to Priya Kapoor after signing the same and it was a blank cheque. Xxxxxxxxxxx. It is correct that I withdrawn the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- on 13.06.2016, Rs, 1,30,000/- on 14,06.2016 and Rs.1,30,000/- on 15.06.2016 and Rs.2,00,000/- on 24.06.2016 from my savings account. It was 28,06.2016 when the agreement he accused to Priya Kapoor after signing the same and it was a blank cheque. Xxxxxxxxxxx. It is correct that I withdrawn the amount of Rs.2,50,000/- on 13.06.2016, Rs, 1,30,000/- on 14,06.2016 and Rs.1,30,000/- on 15.06.2016 and Rs.2,00,000/- on 24.06.2016 from my savings account. It is wrong to suggest that accused was having committee with Priya Kapoor and accused had handed over blank security cheque for the same to Priya Kapoor, which has been misused by me, in connivance with said Priya Kapoor. It is wrong to suggest that no amount was taken by the accused form me nor she is liable to pay any amount to me. Xxxxxxxxxxx. 8. It is also pertinent to refer to the specific application filed by the respondent/accused under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, wherein it was stated as under:- 2. That the accused/applicant is not in visiting terms with the complainant and is not known to the complainant. The accused/applicant has neither taken any loan from complainant nor had issued any cheque in the name of the complainant. A false complaint on concocted story had been filed by the complained with an intention to grab his hard earned money under threat. And the complaint had deposed against the accused/applicant and the accused/applicant wants to cross examine the complainant, through his counsel to arrive at the truth. 9. A perusal of the judgment shows that the Trial Court ruled against the appellant and in favour of the respondent/accused after noticing the following discrepancies/contradictions. 9. From the entire cross-examination of the complainant, it is crystallized that the complainant has failed to proved his case account against the accused beyond reasonable doubts for the following reasons: 1. The complainant has nowhere mentioned in the complaint about the date when the accused raised demand of loan from the complainant. No doubt the date of advancement of loan is mentioned in the complaint but not the date when the accused raised demand of loan from the complainant. 2. The photocopy of the passbook of the account of the complainant placed on record Ex.C5 shows that the amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- was withdrawn from the account of the complainant through cheque. Had the amount was actually given by the complainant to the accused on 13.06.2016, he could have issued the same cheque in favorite of the accused. 2. The photocopy of the passbook of the account of the complainant placed on record Ex.C5 shows that the amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- was withdrawn from the account of the complainant through cheque. Had the amount was actually given by the complainant to the accused on 13.06.2016, he could have issued the same cheque in favorite of the accused. Moreover, it is not the only amount, which was withdrawn on 13,06.2016 but large sum of amount has been withdrawn on dated 14.06.2016, 15.06.2016 and 24.06.2016 through cheques. Since the complainant is admittedly a businessman, therefore, it can be securely presume from the transactions that the same are business transactions. 3. The complainant has not examined the alleged Vinod Kumar and Priya Kapoor, in whose presence the loan amount Was given by him to the accused. Since the names of those persons are mentioned in the complaint, therefore, they were necessary to be examined by the complainant to fasten the ability of the accused. 4. The complainant has also referred to an agreement in his complaint and has placed the same on record as Ex.C6 during preliminary examination but did not prove the same in accordance with law by summoning the attesting witnesses thereof. Since the document Ex.C6 is not proved in accordance with law, therefore, the same provides o help to the complainant 5. The complainant claims to have family relationship with the accused and claimed in his cross-examination that the accused is doing the government job in Government Senior Secondary School (Boys), Tarn Taran. However, on the Service record being summoned by the accused from the said school, it was reported by the school authorities that no such person, namely, Raj Kaur wife of Sukchain Singh, has worked with the School, Even the complainant, who has claimed in the complaint to have close family relations with the accused, has failed to divulge the details of the children of the accused. 6. The complainant has not brought on record his income tax return for the concerned period, even when he has specifically mentioned himself to be businessman and must have filed income tax returns. 7. Last but not the least, it is admitted that the complainant is a businessman and the accused is a laborer and yet the complainant had not taken any receipt on the day when the alleged amount was advanced by the complainant to the accused. 7. Last but not the least, it is admitted that the complainant is a businessman and the accused is a laborer and yet the complainant had not taken any receipt on the day when the alleged amount was advanced by the complainant to the accused. The alleged agreement Ex.C6 is of dated 28.06.2016 and has also not been proved on record in accordance with law. 8. The cheque Ex.C1 further goes to show that the cheque in question has been filled in blue ink pen. The signatures of the accused are in black ink pen. Had the cheque in question been issued by the accused in favor of the accused on 05.08.2017, then it must have been in one flow and in same ink pen, especially when it is not the case of the complainant that the cheque in question was issued postdated. 10. After recording the aforesaid discrepancies, the respondent-accused was discharged. Legal Position Regarding Presumption under Negotiable Instruments Act: 11. The presumption enshrined under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is not absolute and is rather rebuttable presumption. The accused would be discharged of the presumption, the moment an accused raises reasonable suspicion with respect to the due execution of the cheque. It is not incumbent upon an accused to lead evidence and even subjecting the complainant to cross- examination on such aspects can be taken as sufficient grounds to shift the burden upon the complainant to establish that the debt in question was duly advanced to the drawer of the cheque. Once such suspicion is created by an accused, the burden of proof would thereafter shift upon the complainant to prove that the cheque had been executed in discharge of a pre-existing liability/legally enforceable debt. Existence of legally enforceable debt is a pre-requisite for issuance of a cheque. 12. It is a settled proposition of law that presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact, such a presumption is a rebuttable presumption and the drawer of the cheque may dispel the same. The aforesaid position in law stands settled in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC 16 . The aforesaid position in law stands settled in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC 16 . While dealing with the aspect of presumption in terms of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- '21.The appellant's submission that the cheques were not drawn for the 'discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability' is answered by the third presumption available to the Bank under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This section provides that "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability". The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the appellant of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. 22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court "shall presume" the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 , it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. "It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused" (ibid). Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court "may presume" a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. 23. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. 23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exists, no discretion is left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists". Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'. 24. Judicial statements have differed as to the quantum of rebutting evidence required. In Kundan Lal Rallaram vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316 , this Court held that the presumption of law under Section 118of Negotiable Instruments Act could be rebutted, in certain circumstances, by a presumption of fact raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The decision must be limited to the facts of that case. The more authoritative view has been laid down in the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 575 , where this Court reiterated the principle enunciated in State of Madras vs Vaidyanath Iyer (Supra) and clarified that the distinction between the two kinds of presumption lay not only in the mandate to the Court, but also in the nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the case of a discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is consistent with the innocence" of the accused. In the case of a discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is consistent with the innocence" of the accused. On the other hand in the case of a mandatory presumption "the burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised under S.114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted......" [See also V.D. Jhingan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1762 ; Sailendranath Bose vs. The State of Bihar AIR 1968 SC 1292 and Ram Krishna Bedu Rane vs. State of Maharashtra 1973 (1) SCC 366 .] (Emphasis supplied) 13. It was, thus, held that the obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumption of law or fact, unless, the accused adduces evidence showing reasonable possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact. Thus, to say that if the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, there is no discretion left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but the same does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. The rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'. 14. The rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'. 14. Reference is also necessary to be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513 . The relevant extract of the same is as under:- '13. In a significant departure from the general rule applicable to contracts, Section 118 of the Act provides certain presumptions to be raised. This Section lays down some special rules of evidence relating to presumptions. The reason for these presumptions is that, negotiable instrument passes from hand to hand on endorsement and it would make trading very difficult and negotiability of the instrument impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. The presumption, therefore, is a matter of principle to facilitate negotiability as well as trade. Section 118 of the Act provides presumptions to be raised until the contrary is proved (i) as to consideration, (ii) as to date of instrument, (iii) as to time of acceptance,(iv) as to time of transfer, (v) as to order of indorsements,(vi) as to appropriate stamp and (vii) as to holder being a holder in due course. 14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Indian Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) "may presume" (rebuttable), (2) "shall presume" (rebuttable) and (3) "conclusive presumptions" (irrebuttable). The term 'presumption' is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence a fact, conveniently called the "presumed fact" drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. The term 'presumption' is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence a fact, conveniently called the "presumed fact" drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumption literally means "taking as true without examination or proof". 16. Section 4 of the Evidence Act inter-alia defines the words 'may presume' and 'shall presume as follows: - "(a) 'may presume' - Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. (b) 'shall presume' - Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved." In the former case the Court has an option to raise the presumption or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the presumption. If in a case the Court has an option to raise the presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed, unless and until it is disproved. 17. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability. 18. Applying the definition of the word 'proved' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. 19. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. 20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. 21. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue.' (Emphasis supplied) 15. The law is thus well settled that in order to rebut the statutory presumption, an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. The Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non- existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt would not serve the purpose of the accused. To disprove the presumption, an accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or that their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man, would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. 16. In the mater of Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed on the matter of presumption cast under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and held as under:- '26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. 27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. 28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.' 17. In the matter of John K. Abraham Vs. Simon C. Abraham And Another (2014) 2 SCC 236 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in order to draw presumption under Section 118 read with Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, burden lies on the complainant to show (i) that he had the requisite funds for advancing the sum of money/loan in question to the accused (ii) that the issuance of cheque by accused in support of repayment of money advanced was true and (iii) that the accused was bound to make payment as had been agreed while issuing cheque in favour of the complainant. Taking note of the fact that the complainant was not aware of the date when the substantial amount was advanced by him to the accused and his failure to produce relevant documents in support of the alleged source for advancing money to an accused, the judgment convicting the accused was set aside by holding the same to be perverse. The relevant facts noticed from the aforesaid judgment are extracted as under:- '6. When we examine the case of the respondent-complainant as projected before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the material evidence placed before the trial Court, we find that the trial Court had noted certain vital defects in the case of the respondent-complainant. Such defects noted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate were as under: a) Though the respondent as PW-1 deposed that the accused received the money at his house also stated that he did not remember the date when the said sum of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid to him. b) As regards the source for advancing the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-, the respondent claimed that the same was from and out of the sale consideration of his share in the family property, apart from a sum of Rs.50,000/-, which he availed by way of loan from the co-operative society of the college where he was employed. Though the respondent stated before the Court below that he would be in a position to produce the documents in support of the said stand, it was noted that no documents were placed before the Court below. c) In the course of cross-examination, the respondent stated that the cheque was signed on the date when the payment was made, nevertheless he stated that he was not aware of the date when he paid the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-. d) According to the respondent, the cheque was in the handwriting of the accused himself and the very next moment he made a contradictory statement that the cheque was not in the handwriting of the appellant and that he (complainant) wrote the same. e) The respondent also stated that the amount in words was written by him. f) The trial Court has also noted that it was not the case of the respondent that the writing in the cheque and filling up of the figures were with the consent of the accused appellant. 9. e) The respondent also stated that the amount in words was written by him. f) The trial Court has also noted that it was not the case of the respondent that the writing in the cheque and filling up of the figures were with the consent of the accused appellant. 9. It has to be stated that in order to draw the presumption under Section 118 read along with 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the burden was heavily upon the complainant to have shown that he had required funds for having advanced the money to the accused; that the issuance of the cheque in support of the said payment advanced was true and that the accused was bound to make the payment as had been agreed while issuing the cheque in favour of the complainant. 10. Keeping the said statutory requirements in mind, when we examine the facts as admitted by the respondent-complainant, as rightly concluded by the learned trial Judge, the respondent was not even aware of the date when substantial amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was advanced by him to the appellant, that he was not sure as to who wrote the cheque, that he was not even aware when exactly and where exactly the transaction took place for which the cheque came to be issued by the appellant. Apart from the said serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, he further admitted as PW.1 by stating once in the course of the cross- examination that the cheque was in the handwriting of the accused and the very next moment taking a diametrically opposite stand that it is not in the handwriting of the accused and that it was written by the complainant himself, by further reiterating that the amount in words was written by him. 11. We find that the various defects in the evidence of respondent, as noted by the trial Court, which we have set out in paragraph 7 of the judgment, were simply brushed aside by the High Court without assigning any valid reason. Such a serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, which strikes at the root of a complaint under Section 138, having been noted by the learned trial Judge, which factor was failed to be examined by the High Court while reversing the judgment of the trial Court, in our considered opinion would vitiate the ultimate conclusion reached by it. Such a serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, which strikes at the root of a complaint under Section 138, having been noted by the learned trial Judge, which factor was failed to be examined by the High Court while reversing the judgment of the trial Court, in our considered opinion would vitiate the ultimate conclusion reached by it. In effect, the conclusion of the learned Judge of the High Court would amount to a perverse one and, therefore, the said judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.' (Emphasis supplied) 18. In the matter of Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 , while dealing with the standard of proof and the presumption drawn under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- '14. Justice S.B. Sinha in M.S. Narayana Menon Alias Mani Vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 had considered Sections 118(a),138 and139 of the Act, 1881. It was held that presumptions both under Sections 118(a) and 139 are rebuttable in nature. Explaining the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" referring to an earlier judgment, following was held in paragraph No.28:- "28. What would be the effect of the expressions "may presume", 'shall presume"and "conclusive proof" has been considered by this Court in Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1, in the following terms: (SCC pp. 30-31, para 52) "It is true that the legislature used two different phraseologies 'shall be presumed' and 'may be presumed' in Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and furthermore although provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as regards the right to mines and minerals said to be vested in the Government vis-?-vis the absence thereof in relation to the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words 'shall presume' would be conclusive. The meaning of the expressions 'may presume' and 'shall presume' have been explained in Section 4of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression 'shall presume' cannot be held to be synonymous with 'conclusive proof'." 15. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression 'shall presume' cannot be held to be synonymous with 'conclusive proof'." 15. It was noted that the expression "shall presume" cannot be held to be synonymous with conclusive proof. Referring to definition of words "proved" and "disproved" under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, following was laid down in paragraph No.30: "30. Applying the said definitions of "proved" or "disproved" to the principle behind Section 118(a)of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration does not exist. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied upon." 16. This Court held that what is needed is to raise a probable defence, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence and even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon. Dealing with standard of proof, following was observed in paragraph No.32:- "32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies." 17. In Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 , this Court held that an accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. Following was laid down in Paragraph No.32:- "32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different." 18. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different." 18. This Court again reiterated that whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is "preponderance of probabilities". In paragraph No.34, following was laid down:- "34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is "preponderance of probabilities". Inference of preponderanc of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies." 25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:- (i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. (ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. (iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. (iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. 26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. 26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of the PW1, when the specific question was put that cheque was issued in relation to loan of Rs.25,000/- taken by the accused, the PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received monetary benefit of Rs. 8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000/- being admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs.50,000/- with regard to which complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was also filed as Ex.D2, there was burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the year 2010-2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs.18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts.' (Emphasis supplied) 19. A perusal of the same shows that the failure of the complainant to display his financial capacity to advance the amount alleged to have been lent would shift the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity to lend the money as well as the other circumstances to establish existence of consideration for issuance of cheque. After noticing that there was no evidence led before the Court to indicate the financial capacity of the complainant to lend the money in question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the judgment of conviction suffered perversity and was thus liable to be set aside. After noticing that there was no evidence led before the Court to indicate the financial capacity of the complainant to lend the money in question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the judgment of conviction suffered perversity and was thus liable to be set aside. It was observed that the accused had raised a probable defence and that the complainant failed to prove his financial capacity on the basis of evidence led by him and thus ordered acquittal of the accused. LEGAL POSITION IN APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL 20. The same now leads to the scope of interference by the Court while hearing appeal against acquittal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of M. G. Aggarwal versus State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 , the relevant part is extracted as under: "(16) Section 423(1) prescribes the powers of the appellate Court in disposing of appeals preferred before it and clauses (a) and (b) deal with appeals against acquittals and appeals against convictions respectively. There is no doubt that the power conferred by clause (a) which deals with an appeal against an order of acquittal is as wide as the power conferred by clause (b) which deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, and so, it is obvious that the High Court's powers in dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the appeal in question is one against acquittal or against conviction. That is one aspect of the question. The other aspect of the question centres round the approach which the High Court adopts in dealing with appeals against orders of acquittal. In dealing with such appeals, the High Court ;naturally bears in mind the presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact that the said presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court and so, the fact that the accused person is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt will always be present in the mind of the High Court when it deals with the merits of the case. As an appellate Court the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. Thus, though the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those which it has in dealing with an appeal against conviction, in-dealing with the former class of appeals, its approach is governed by the overriding consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence. Sometimes, the width- of the power is emphasized, while on other occasions, the necessity to adopt a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals is emphasised, and the emphasis is expressed in different words or phrases used from time to time. But the true legal position is that however circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused. this position has been clarified by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. The King Emperor and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151 . (17) Some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasizing the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, "the findings of the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons": vide Surajpal Singh V. The State Similarly in Ajmer Singh V. State of Punjab, it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are "very substantial and compelling reasons to do so.') In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for "good and sufficiently cogent reasons" or for "strong reasons". In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should not be read to have intended- to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423 (1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasise is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused "is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial." Therefore, the test suggested by the expression "substantial and compelling reasons" should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab; and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse. Therefore, the question which we have to ask ourselves in the present appeals is whether on the material produced by the prosecution, the High Court was justified in reaching the conclusion that the prosecution case against the appellants had been proved beyond a reason-able doubt, and that the contrary view taken by the trial Court was, erroneous. In answering this question, we would, no doubt, consider the salient and broad features of the evidence in order to appreciate the grievance made by the appellants against the conclusions of the High Court. But under Article 136 we would ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the High Court particularly where the said findings are based on appreciation of oral evidence. 21. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of Nagbhushan vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 212, as under: "7.2 Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required to be considered. 7.2.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 , this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama v. S.Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) " the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused." 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) "(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanpal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference." (emphasis supplied) 7.2.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: "20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v.State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. (2009) 10 SCC 636 )." (emphasis supplied) 7.2.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 7.3 In the case of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope o Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: "31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) "10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) "10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case." 31.1 In Sambasivan v. State of Karala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)" 8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babula Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well- considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case." 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Karala (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10) "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.PC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well- established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions. 31.4. In K.Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule." (emphasis supplied) 22. Thus, the position which emerges from a perusal of the law as settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court through its catena of judgments in matters pertaining to appeals against acquittal can be summarized as under:- a) Powers of High Court in dealing with criminal appeals are equally wide whether the appeals are against conviction or acquittal. b) In dealing with appeal against acquittal, the High Court bears in mind that the presumption of innocence is strengthened. c) As an appellate Court, the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. d) That the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are "very substantial and compelling reasons to do so". e) The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, even though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. f) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. e) The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, even though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. f) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal, than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. g) The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. CONCLUSION: 23. It is evident from a perusal of the facts and the position in law noticed above that the respondent-accused had taken a specific plea that there was no transaction ever amongst the complainant and the accused and that the cheque in question had been handed over by her to Priya Kapoor towards a chit fund committee and the same was not in discharge of any liability. The same was rather in the nature of an investment. The said cheque has been misused by Priya Kapoor in connivance with the appellant. To the contrary, the stand taken by the complainant/appellant is to the effect that not only was the amount advanced in the presence of Priya Kapoor, but also the agreement as well as the cheque in question had been issued in the presence of Priya Kapoor as well as Vinod Kumar. It was thus incumbent upon the complainant to examine the said witness in support of his contention. A negative burden can not be cast upon the respondent to prove his innocence. Besides, the complainant has not produced his books of accounts and relevant material to show that the amount in question was ever advanced to the respondent-accused. It was thus incumbent upon the complainant to examine the said witness in support of his contention. A negative burden can not be cast upon the respondent to prove his innocence. Besides, the complainant has not produced his books of accounts and relevant material to show that the amount in question was ever advanced to the respondent-accused. Financial capacity of a person to pay would not necessarily mean that the amount in question had been advanced to an accused. The obligation is upon the complainant to establish, when a question is raised about the ability and the fact of having advanced a loan, that not only did the complainant have the financial capacity to advance the amount claimed to have been advanced but also that such an amount was actually advanced. The complainant failed to establish the same by any cogent and convincing evidence. All the material facts already stand examined by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Tarn Taran. It cannot be said that the finding so recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran is perverse or suffers from legal infirmity or impropriety or that the conclusion so drawn by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran is not tenable upon reading of such evidence. The Appellate Court would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal merely for the reasons that another opinion is also possible in the facts of a case unless the Appellate Court comes to a conclusion that the order under challenge suffers from vice of perversity, impropriety or mis-interpretation of the evidence adduced on record. Finding no merit in the instant appeal, the same is dismissed. JUDGMENT Vinod S. Bhardwaj, J. - The question which arises for consideration in the instant batch of petitions relates to striking a balance between the Constitutional right to life as enshrined under Article 21 as well as statutory obligation cast under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, in a case where a minor claims to have abandoned her guardian and approaches the Court through a self- proclaimed next friend/guardian. 2. The instant batch of petitions deals with such issues where this Court has been approached by invoking its writ jurisdiction to seek protection of life and liberty apprehending threat to the same and where it is alleged that the natural guardians are wanting to impose their own will over the will of the minor. 3. 2. The instant batch of petitions deals with such issues where this Court has been approached by invoking its writ jurisdiction to seek protection of life and liberty apprehending threat to the same and where it is alleged that the natural guardians are wanting to impose their own will over the will of the minor. 3. Before adverting to the merits of the controversy, the facts of each case are being referred to in brief: CRWP-2139-2022, P..... Minor Through Vikram Vs. State of Haryana & Ors: 3.1 The petitioner, who is aged 16 years and 5 months, has filed the above said writ petition through one Vikram aged 28 years, seeking a writ in the nature of Mandamus to protect her life and liberty as also that of her friend Vikram, wherein, it has been categorically pleaded that the minor is staying with her friend namely Vikram and that even though she wishes to stay further, however, parents of the minor want to marry her with an older boy without her consent. It is alleged that her friend Vikram was also given beatings by her family members and that she is in a live-in-relationship with her next friend Vikram. Protection has been claimed by the petitioners invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of India CRWP-2140-2022 Satvir Singh & Anr Vs. State of Haryana & Ors: 3.2 The instant petition has been filed by Satvir Singh, who is a major aged 21 years and one minor L..... Kaur aged 17 years through Satvir Singh. The petitioners have prayed for issuance of directions to protect their lives and liberties, which is alleged to be in danger at the hands of respondent Nos. 4 to 9, as the petitioners want to marry with each other, despite stiff opposition from the family members of the minor. It is alleged that the intimacy between the petitioners was not appreciated and was to the dislike of the parents of the minor and they had started making efforts to marry her elsewhere in a hasty manner, with a person of their own choice, who is much older in age than the minor. As the minor has not attained the marriageable age, she claims to have come to live with petitioner No.1 and thus claim to be in a hiding to save their lives. CRWP-2250-2022, P.... Kaur Vs. As the minor has not attained the marriageable age, she claims to have come to live with petitioner No.1 and thus claim to be in a hiding to save their lives. CRWP-2250-2022, P.... Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors: 3.3 The instant petition had been filed by minor through her friend Reeta for seeking protection as she claims to be residing with Reeta, who is mother of Robin Masih and that the minor claims to have a liking for Robin Masih, the son of Reeta, the self-proclaimed guardian. Eventually, the parents of the minor got registered a case bearing FIR No.55 dated 06.05.2021 under Section 366 IPC registered at Police Station Sadar Gurdaspur against Robin Masih. Prayer was thus made for seeking protection of life and liberty of the petitioner as also that of her guardian invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. Respondent-State(s) had already been served with an advance copy of the petition(s). Hence, it was averred by the counsel(s) representing the State that the factual aspects not being controvertible and the issue being legal, no formal notice is required and hence advanced arguments. ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS: 5. While reiterating the averments contained in the petitions, counsel appearing on behalf of respective petitioners submitted that solemnization of marriage is not a pre-requisite for seeking protection of life and liberty once such an apprehension exists, a person would be entitled to claim protection of her rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The said right cannot be confined or denied on the touchstone of Hindu Marriage Act or the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 6. Reliance was placed upon certain orders/judgements of this Court passed in CRWP-2238-2021 titled as Priyanka & Another Vs. State of Haryana & Ors decided on 05.03.2021, wherein the minor who was in a live-in-relationship was extended an indulgence; a similar order had been passed in CRWP-6660-2020 titled as Jyoti Vs. State of Haryana & Ors decided on 01.09.2020; CRWP-3990- 2020 titled as Roopa Vs. State of Haryana & Ors decided on 22.06.2020; CRWP- 1525-2020 titled as Sarabjeet Kaur & Another Vs. State of Punjab & Ors decided on 12.02.2020; CRWP-29048-2019 titled as Navpreet Kaur & Another Vs. State of Punjab & Ors decided on 04.10.2019. State of Haryana & Ors decided on 01.09.2020; CRWP-3990- 2020 titled as Roopa Vs. State of Haryana & Ors decided on 22.06.2020; CRWP- 1525-2020 titled as Sarabjeet Kaur & Another Vs. State of Punjab & Ors decided on 12.02.2020; CRWP-29048-2019 titled as Navpreet Kaur & Another Vs. State of Punjab & Ors decided on 04.10.2019. A reference was also made to the judgement of this Court reported as 2019(4) RCR (Civil) 183 titled as Jashanpreet Kaur & Another Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 7. The gist of the aforesaid orders/judgements was to the effect that merely because the petitioners are not of marriageable age, it would not deprive them of their fundamental right to seek protection of their lives and liberties. The Court examined the issue in the context of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and held that merely because the petitioners are not of the marriageable age and the marriage performed, if any, would be hit by Section 5(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the same being only a civil consequence qua the validity of the marriage, their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied as they stand on a much higher pedestal. Life and liberty of the persons is sacrosanct being integral to their being, it ought to be protected regardless of solemnization of invalid or void marriage or even in the absence of any marriage amongst the parties. In all the said matters, the respective SSPs/SPs were directed to verify the threat perception and to take necessary steps to provide protection to the life and liberty of the petitioners, if deemed fit and necessary. 8. Per contra, counsel appearing on behalf of the State have submitted that there is no dispute to the proposition that Article 21 of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and it is imperative upon the State to take adequate measures to protect the life and liberty of each person, however, there are statutory safeguards required under the statutory scheme to protect the interest of a minor and that once such a fact comes to the notice of the Court, it becomes incumbent upon the Court in its capacity as parens patriae to examine what is in the best interest of the minor. It is contended that a minor is not perceived in law to be able to comprehend consequences of his/her acts what is in his/her best interest and it is for the said reason that a minor is to be re-presented through guardian, who is recognized by the statute or by the Court. Such a choice or right is not conferred upon the minor to self-proclaim a guardian/next friend and in the present circumstances, the possibility of the petition having been instituted under the influence of such guardian (given the nature of relationship of the minor with the next friend) cannot be ruled out. As such, adequate measures under the statutory scheme ought to be taken by the Court to determine as to what would be in the best interest of the minor. 9. I have had learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the documents appended by them with the respective petitions and the judgements referred to by the respective counsel in support of their arguments. The documents are in the nature of documents related to date of birth and a representation submitted to the concerned SSP/SP. DISCUSSION: 10. Law recognizes the guardians of following types:- (a) Natural guardian; (b) Testamentary Guardian; (c) Guardians appointed/declared by the Court; (d) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any Court of Wards. 11. However, in the pre-1956 Hindu law, there also existed a guardian by affinity, who happened to be the guardian of a minor widow. As per the position in law as it existed, then the husband's relation, if there existed any, within the degree of sapinda were the guardians of a minor widow in preference to her father and his relations. There is yet another concept of de-facto Guardian, who happens to be a person who take continuous interest in the welfare of a minor's person or in the management of administration of his property without any authority of law. Hindu jurisprudence has all along recognized the above principle even though such term is not mentioned in any of the texts. However, such a situation always came with a caveat, where the person acting as de-facto Guardian had to display continuous interest in the welfare of a minor's person or in the management and administration of his property. A mere intermeddler is not a de-facto Guardian. However, such a situation always came with a caveat, where the person acting as de-facto Guardian had to display continuous interest in the welfare of a minor's person or in the management and administration of his property. A mere intermeddler is not a de-facto Guardian. An isolated act of a person with regard to child's property also does not make him a guardian. There must be continuous course of contact. However, with the enunciation of legislation, the codified law assumes significance and co-exists with un-codified law. 12. Before proceeding further in the matter, it is essential to submit that the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, deals with law relating to minority and guardianship amongst Hindus. As the parties in the instant batch of petitions are Hindus as per the law, the aforesaid Act relating to minority and guardianship is applicable. The relevant provisions of this Act are reproduced hereinafter below:- Section 4. Definitions.-In this Act,- (a) "minor" means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years; (b) "guardian" means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his person and property, and includes- (i) a natural guardian, (ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor's father or mother, (iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and (iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any Court of wards. ( c) "natural guardian" means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6. Section 6. ( c) "natural guardian" means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6. Section 6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor- The natural guardians of a Hindu minor; in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are- (a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl--the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl--the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl the husband: Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section- if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or (b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi). Explanation.--In this section, the expressions "father" and "mother" do not include a step-father and a step-mother. Section 13. Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration- (1) In the appointment of declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration. (2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor. 13. Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 prohibits a de-facto guardian from dealing with the property of a minor. The said Section thus, by inference, acknowledges existence of a de-facto guardian and imposes a restriction upon such guardian to dispose off or deal with the property of a Hindu minor. 14. Apart from the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, The Guardians and Wards Act 1890 deal with the law of guardian and wards and procedure relating to appointment of a guardian and defines the rights, duties and obligation of the guardian as well as a ward. Certain essential provisions of the said Act are extracted as under:- Section 4. 14. Apart from the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, The Guardians and Wards Act 1890 deal with the law of guardian and wards and procedure relating to appointment of a guardian and defines the rights, duties and obligation of the guardian as well as a ward. Certain essential provisions of the said Act are extracted as under:- Section 4. Definitions--In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,-- (1) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, (9 of 1875) is to be deemed not to have attained his majority: (2) "guardian" means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property, or of both is person and property: (3) "ward" means a minor for whose person or property, or both, there is a guardian: (4) "District Court" has the meaning assigned to that expression in the 1 Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882), and includes a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction: [(5) "the Court" means- (a) the District Court having jurisdiction to entertain an application under this Act for an order appointing or declaring a person to be a guardian; or (b) where a guardian has been appointed or declared in pursuance of any such application-- (i) the Court which, or the Court of the officer who, appointed or declared the guardian or is under this Act deemed to have appointed or declared the guardian; or (ii) in any matter relating to the person of the ward the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the ward for the time being ordinarily resides; or (c) in respect of any proceeding transferred under section 4A, the Court of the officer to whom such proceeding has been transferred:] (6) "Collector" means the chief officer in charge of the revenue administration of a district, and includes any officer whom the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, may, by name or in virtue of his office, appoint to be a Collector in any local area, or with respect to any class of persons, for all or any of the purposes of this Act: (8) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made by the High Court under this Act. Section 7. Power of the Court to make order as to guardianship. Section 7. Power of the Court to make order as to guardianship. (1) where the Court is satisfied that it is for the welfare of a minor that an order should be made-- (a) appointing a guardian of his person or property, or both, or (b) declaring a person to be such a guardian, the Court may make an order accordingly. (2) An order under this section shall imply the removal of any guardian who has not been appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by the Court. (3) Where a guardian has been appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by the Court, an order under this section appointing or declaring another person to be guardian in his stead shall not be made until the powers of the guardian appointed or declared as aforesaid have ceased under the provisions of this Act. Section 8. Persons entitled to apply for order- An order shall not be made under the last foregoing section except on the application of- (a) the person desirous of being, or claiming to be, the guardian of the minor, or (b) any relative or friend of the minor, or (c) the Collector of the district or other local area within which the minor ordinarily resides or in which he has property, or (d) the Collector having authority with respect to the class to which the minor belongs. 15. Further, Section 3(1) of the Indian Majority Act 1875 provides that every person domiciled in India shall attain the age of majority on completing the age of 18 years and not before. Further, Section 2(a) of the Indian Majority Act 1875 provides that nothing in the said Act shall affect the capacity of any person to act in the matters namely marriage, dower, divorce and adoption hence, by a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions a girl below age of 18 years is treated as minor under the Indian Majority Act for all purposes except for marriage, dower, divorce and adoption. 16. In addition to the from above legislations dealing with minor, it would also be pertinent to refer to the relevant provision under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 16. In addition to the from above legislations dealing with minor, it would also be pertinent to refer to the relevant provision under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The aforesaid Act had been promulgated to consolidate the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and/or in need of care and protection by catering to their basic needs through proper care, protection, development, treatment and social reintegration in the adjudication and disposal of matters, in the best interest of children. 17. Section 2(14)(vii)(xii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 are reproduced hereinbelow:- Section 2(14)--"child in need of care and protection" means a child- (vii) who is missing or run away child, or whose parents cannot be found after making reasonable inquiry in such manner as may be prescribed; or (xii) who is at imminent risk of marriage before attaining the age of marriage and whose parents, family members, guardian and any other persons are likely to be responsible for solemnisation of such marriage; 18. The Parliament also enacted the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 with an object to secure children from the sexual assault/sexual harassment or pornography, which defines child under Section 2(d) to mean any person below the age of 18 years. 19. The Court is thus required to ensure protection of a minor/child as per the different statutes while also ensuring the safety and security of such person. The aim and object of the provisions enshrined under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 and Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 is intended to protect the person of a minor from being subjected to any such act, which is deemed penal by law. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,1956 declares the guardian of a minor Hindu and their duties, obligations viz-a-viz the minor. The provisions of Guardians and Wards Act stipulates the procedure for appointment of a guardian in the case of a ward (minor). 20. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,1956 declares the guardian of a minor Hindu and their duties, obligations viz-a-viz the minor. The provisions of Guardians and Wards Act stipulates the procedure for appointment of a guardian in the case of a ward (minor). 20. The provisions relating to the effect of minority on the validity of the marriage does not apply to the facts of the instant case as the petitioners have no where claimed themselves to have any solemnized any marriage and have rather set up a case that they are living with the person through whom the petitions have been filed claiming such person as their guardian. 21. It is also not disputed that the persons through whom the present petitions have been filed do not fall in any of the categories of the guardians recognized under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 or having been appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890. There is nothing on record even to infer that the persons can be termed as de-facto guardians as there is no long-standing relationship on the basis whereof the person, through whom the minor approaches the Court, may be termed as a de-facto guardian. Continuity of interest is an essential pre-requisite to be satisfied before a person can be deemed or be termed as a de-facto guardian. 22. The common thread which runs through all these petitions is that minors intend to live with the petitioner and eventually to solemnize marriage on her attaining the age of majority. The relationship in question is portrayed as live- in-relationship in the nature of marriage. 23. In the matter of Ravneet Kaur & Another Vs. State of Punjab & Ors,2021(4) RCR (Criminal) 140, this Court has held as under:- 62. In Indra Sarma Vs. V.K.V. Sarma : (2013) 15 SCC 755 Hon'ble Supreme Court culled out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression "live-in-relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the PWDV Act as under:- "55. We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationships. We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationships. (1) Duration of period of relationship Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression "at any point of time", which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation. (2) Shared household The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, need no further elaboration. (3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long standing relationship, may be a guiding factor. (4) Domestic Arrangements Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. (5) Sexual Relationship Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc. (6) Children Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication. (7) Socialization in Public Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage. (8) Intention and conduct of the parties Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship." 63. (8) Intention and conduct of the parties Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship." 63. Since sexual relationship forms an essential part of live- inrelationship in the nature of marriage and there cannot be any sexual relationship with a girl child less than 18 years of age by any person even with her consent, a girl child less than 18 years of age will not be entitled to live in live-in- relationship in the nature of marriage with a person of her choice. 64. It follows from the above discussion a minor girl aged above 15 years who has not attained marriageable age of 18 years may solemnize marriage with a person of her choice but such marriage cannot be legally enforced to allow consummation thereof and entrustment of her custody to her husband; that a minor girl is not entitled to reside with a person of her choice in live-in-relationship in the nature of marriage; that a minor girl cannot give consent to any person of her choice for her removal from lawful guardianship and sexual relationship with her for consummation of marriage or live-inrelationship in the nature of marriage and her consent is immaterial, if she was enticed or taken away out of lawful guardianship and that any such person of her choice with whom she wants to live in live-inrelationship cannot purport to act as her guardian and claim her custody without seeking order from Guardian Judge/Family Court under the GW Act or the HMG Act as the case may be. 65. The question which next arises is whether the fundamental right to protection of life and liberty extends to protection of the minor girl for residing with her husband or person of her choice in live-inrelationship in the nature of marriage? 67. In Pardeep Kumar Singh Vs. 65. The question which next arises is whether the fundamental right to protection of life and liberty extends to protection of the minor girl for residing with her husband or person of her choice in live-inrelationship in the nature of marriage? 67. In Pardeep Kumar Singh Vs. State of Haryana : 2008(3) RCR (Criminal) 376 a Single Bench of this Court issued the following directions:- "(i) Whenever any intimation is received by the SSP/SP of concerned District regarding the marriage of a young couple with a threat and an apprehension of infringement of the right of life and liberty by the police at the instance of the family members of one of the spouses, the SSP/SP concerned will consider the representation and will himself/herself look into the matter and issue necessary directions to maintain a record of the said intimation under Chapter 21 of the Punjab Police Rules. (ii) On receipt of above said intimation of marriage by any police officer, necessary directions will be issued to the concerned Police Station to take necessary steps in accordance with law to enquire into the matter by contracting the parents of both boy and girl. The matter regarding age, consent of the girl and grievance of her family will be determined. In the eventuality of any complaint of kidnapping or abduction having been received from any of the family members of the girl generally the boy (husband) will not be arrested unless and until the prejudicial statement is given by the girl (wife). Arrest should generally be deferred or avoided on the immediate receipt of a complaint by the parents or family members of the girl taking into consideration the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar's case (supra); (iii) If the girl is major (above 18 years), she should not forcibly be taken away by police to be handed over to her parents against her consent. Criminal force against the boy should also be avoided. Criminal force against the boy should also be avoided. (iv) So far as the threat to the young couple of the criminal force and assault at the hands of the private persons is concerned, it would always be open to the police to initiate action if any substantive offence is found to have been committed against the couple; (v) In case of any threat to the breach of peace at the hands of the family members of the couple it will always be open to the State authorities to take up the security proceedings in accordance with law; (vi) It will not be open to the "run away couple" to take law in their hands pursuant to the indulgence shown by the police on the basis of their representation sent to the SSP/SP of the concerned District; (vii) If despite the intimation having been sent to the SSP/SP there is an apprehension or threat of violation of right of personal life and liberty or free movement, the remedy of approaching the High court should be the last resort; (viii) In case there is an authority constituted for issuance of marriage certificate as per the law laid down by Supreme Court in Seema's case (supra) in the concerned districts, the couple of so called 'run away marriage' should get the marriage registered in compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court and a copy of the same should also be forwarded to the police along with the representations or any time subsequent thereto. (ix) Nothing said here-in-above will prevent the immediate arrest of a person who fraudulently entices a girl with false promises and exploits her sexually as per the statement of the girl." 71. In the very nature of things, these directions for protection of rights of couples will apply in case of marriage by a man or woman who is major with a man or woman who is also major and will not, therefore, apply to cases of child marriages in which the question of protection to the minor girl child will be governed by the provisions of the JJ Act. 72. 72. Section 2(14)(xii) of the JJ Act defines a child "who is at imminent risk of marriage before attaining the age of marriage and whose parents, family members, guardian and any other persons are likely to be responsible for solemnization of such marriage" as a child in need of care and protection. A girl child below 18 years of age who is sought to be married by her parents/guardian being a child in need of care and protection is required to be produced before a Child Welfare Committee constituted under Section 27 of the JJ Act so that she could be cared for, protected and appropriately rehabilitated or restored to society. 73. In Independent Thought's Case (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :- "176..........By now it is well settled by a catena of judgments of this Court that the "right to life" envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not merely a right to live an animal existence. This Court has repeatedly held that right to life means a right to live with human dignity. Life should be meaningful and worth living. Life has many shades. Good health is the raison d'etre of a good life. Without good health there cannot be a good life. In the case of a minor girl child good health would mean her right to develop as a healthy woman. This not only requires good physical health but also good mental health. The girl child must be encouraged to bloom into a healthy woman. The girl child must not be deprived of her right of choice. The girl child must not be deprived of her right to study further. When the girl child is deprived of her right to study further, she is actually deprived of her right to develop into a mature woman, who can earn independently and live as a self sufficient independent woman. In the modern age, when we talk of gender equality, the girl child must be given equal opportunity to develop like a male child. In fact, in my view, because of the patriarchal nature of our society, some extra benefit must be showered upon the girl child to ensure that she is not deprived of her right to life, which would include her right to grow and develop physically, mentally and economically as an independent self sufficient female adult." 74. In fact, in my view, because of the patriarchal nature of our society, some extra benefit must be showered upon the girl child to ensure that she is not deprived of her right to life, which would include her right to grow and develop physically, mentally and economically as an independent self sufficient female adult." 74. In Independent Thought Case (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed as under :- "95. A cursory reading of the JJ Act gives a clear indication that a girl child who is in imminent risk of marriage before attaining the age of 18 years of age is a child in need of care and protection (Section 2 (14) (xii) of the JJ Act). In our opinion, it cannot be said with any degree of rationality that such a girl child loses her status as a child in need of care and protection soon after she gets married. The JJ Act provides that efforts must be made to ensure the care, protection, appropriate rehabilitation or restoration of a girl child who is at imminent risk of marriage and therefore a child in need of care and protection. If this provision is ignored or given a go by, it would put the girl child in a worse off situation because after marriage she could be subjected to aggravated penetrative sexual assault for which she might not be physically, mentally or psychologically ready. The intention of the JJ Act is to benefit a child rather than place her in difficult circumstances. A contrary view would not only destroy the purpose and spirit of the JJ Act but would also take away the importance of Article 15(3) of the Constitution. Surely, such an interpretation and understanding cannot be given to the provisions of the JJ Act." (emphasis added) 75. In Independent Thought's Case (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised the need of eradicating the social evil of child marriages as under :- "Merely because child marriages have been performed in different parts of the country as a part of a tradition or custom does not necessarily mean that the tradition is an acceptable one nor should it be sanctified as such. Times change and what was acceptable the few decades ago may not necessarily be acceptable today." 76. In Independent Thought's Case (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed as under :- "104. Times change and what was acceptable the few decades ago may not necessarily be acceptable today." 76. In Independent Thought's Case (Supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed as under :- "104. The Preamble to our Constitution brings out our commitment to social justice, but unfortunately, this petition clearly brings out that social justice laws are not implemented in the spirit in which they are enacted by Parliament. Young girls are married in thousands in the country, and as Section 13 of the PCMA indicates, there is an auspicious day - Akshaya Trutiya - when mass child marriages are performed. Such young girls are subjected to sexual intercourse regardless of their health, their ability to bear children and other adverse social, economic and psychological consequences. Civil society can do just so much for preventing such child marriages but eventually it is for the Government of India and the State Governments to take proactive steps to prevent child marriages so that young girls in our country can aspire to a better and healthier life. We hope the State realizes and appreciates this." 80. It is now well settled that girl child in need of care and protection under Section 2 (14) (xii) of the JJ Act cannot be kept in a Nari Niketan/Special/Observation Home meant for juveniles in conflict with law established under the JJ Act. For judicial precedents reference may be made to Neetu Singh v. State (Delhi) : 1999(1) P.L.R. 47; Rukshana Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (Delhi) : 2007(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 542; Balwinder Singh @ Binder Vs. State of Punjab (P&H) : 2008(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 1 and CRWP-4725-2021 titled as 'Seema Kaur and another Vs. State of Punjab and others' decided on 03.06.2021. 24. The enunciation of statutory framework in the nature of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 and Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act does not run contrary to the provisions enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Protection of life and liberty guaranteed to a citizen necessarily ensures that the Court of law, when approached, would step into the shoes as a guardian of such minor and take all such steps as are essential to protect the life and liberty of such a minor. Protection of life and liberty guaranteed to a citizen necessarily ensures that the Court of law, when approached, would step into the shoes as a guardian of such minor and take all such steps as are essential to protect the life and liberty of such a minor. It would be incomprehensible to contend or to suggest that the protective scheme and procedure formulated under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 is not in furtherance of protection enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The said Acts are intended to ensure advancement of Article 21. The Court of law, while issuing any directions to follow the procedure provided for under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, does so with an object to ensure safety and protection of a minor, who the law does not recognise as having acquired the wisdom and knowledge to take best decisions for himself/herself. The decision so taken by the competent authority with respect to the minor as per the procedure prescribed in law, cannot be deemed as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India with on a ground that such a decision will not be in conformity with the interest which such a minor conceives to be in his/her best interest. The Court cannot be oblivious to the duty cast upon it as a repository of the best interest of the minor and there can be no presumption that once a minor conveys his/her desire to stay with any person and that such person claims to be the next friend/de facto guardian, the same would actually and in reality be in furtherance of the best interest of the minor. Determination of what would be in the best interest of the minor has to be done by the Court as per the procedure known to law. 25. The Court, thus, has to take upon itself the responsibility to ensure that the fundamental right of such a minor to claim protection of his/her life and liberty is made available and also to ensure that in the said process, the protection of the statute is not violated. CONCLUSION: 26. 25. The Court, thus, has to take upon itself the responsibility to ensure that the fundamental right of such a minor to claim protection of his/her life and liberty is made available and also to ensure that in the said process, the protection of the statute is not violated. CONCLUSION: 26. In view of the above, the petitions are partly allowed with directions as under:- I. The minor in all these cases happen to fall within the definition of child in need of care and protection as provided under section 2(14)(vii)(xii) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Senior Superintendent of Police/Superintendent of Police of the respective districts shall depute a Child Welfare Police Officer to produce the minor/child before the Committee constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015. II. The respective Committee shall conduct enquiry contemplated under Section 36 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 and pass an appropriate order under section 37 of the said Act, by associating all the stakeholder, and to ensure that the objects of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 are well served. III. The Child Welfare Committee shall take appropriate decisions with respect to the boarding and lodging of the minor and also to conduct enquiry on all issues relating to and affecting safety and well-being of the child/minor. IV. During the pendency of such adjudication and passing of orders as contemplated under Section 37 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, the committee shall also take appropriate interim/decisions as regards placement of a child/custody of the child in need of care and protection. V. The concerned SSPs/SPs shall also take appropriate steps as warranted by law against the threat perception to the minor as well as to their next friend, through whom the minors have approved this Court and to ensure that the respective petitioners are protected from any physical harm at the instance of the respondents in respective cases. VI. The petitioners are directed to appear in the office of SSP/SP of the respective Districts within a period of 03 days from today, failing which the concerned SSP/SP shall depute a Child Welfare Police Officer to produce the minor before the Child Welfare Committee within a period of 01 week thereafter. VII. VI. The petitioners are directed to appear in the office of SSP/SP of the respective Districts within a period of 03 days from today, failing which the concerned SSP/SP shall depute a Child Welfare Police Officer to produce the minor before the Child Welfare Committee within a period of 01 week thereafter. VII. The Child Welfare Committee constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, shall send a compliance report to this Court. Petitions are party allowed in terms as aforesaid. Registry is directed to send a copy of the order along with petition(s) and annexures to the concerned Senior Superintendent of Police/Superintendent of Police for necessary compliance.