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2022 DIGILAW 559 (HP)

Jeevan Khanna, S/o. Late Sh. Badri Nath v. Khem Chand Through His Lrs.

2022-09-15

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2022
ORDER : By way of instant application, filed under S. 151 CPC, prayer has been made on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 4/applicants/ landlords (hereinafter, ‘respondents) to issue directions to the petitioners/non-applicants/ tenants (hereinafter, ‘petitioners’) to pay the use and occupation charges qua the demised premises, which are being occupied by them despite there being eviction order passed by competent court of law. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record, are that the original landlord, late Khem Chand filed an eviction petition under S.14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter, ‘Act’) against the original tenant, late Badri Nath Khanna from the shop situate in building bearing municipal No. 139-140, in the Lower Bazaar, Shimla (hereinafter, ‘demised premises’), on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction. Tenant though opposed the aforesaid prayer made on behalf of the landlord on the ground that the building, wherein the demised premises are situate does not require reconstruction but learned Rent Controller, on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence led on record by the respective parties, dismissed the eviction petition, against which Rent Appeal No. 255/15 of 2005 was filed by the landlord, which was dismissed by the appellate authority vide judgment dated 7.9.2006. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment, landlord filed Revision Petition No. 90 of 2006 before this Court. This court remanded the matter to learned Rent Controller with the direction to record findings on the issue whether Khem Chand could carry on the reconstruction without impleading Smt. Shakuntla as a party or without her permission and without there having been any partition proved to have been effected between the parties. This court further observed that the building in question was composite one and apart from Badri Nath Khanna, there are other tenants in the premises and the roof of the building was common. Though against said order passed by this Court, landlord filed an SLP before Hon'ble Apex Court but the same was also dismissed vide order dated 4.8.2012. 3. Learned Rent Controller, after rehearing the parties, allowed the petition vide order dated 17.1.2009 passed in Rent Case No. 23/2 of 1999/98 by drawing a conclusion that the petition of landlord is bona fide and the tenant is liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction. 3. Learned Rent Controller, after rehearing the parties, allowed the petition vide order dated 17.1.2009 passed in Rent Case No. 23/2 of 1999/98 by drawing a conclusion that the petition of landlord is bona fide and the tenant is liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction. Since the original tenant Badri Nath Khanna died during the proceedings of the case before learned Rent Controller, appeal against order passed by learned Rent Controller came to be filed by his legal heirs, who are petitioners herein. 4. Appellate authority vide judgment dated 11.4.2013 passed in Rent Appeal No. 13-S/13 (b) of 2009, modified the order dated 17.1.2009 to the extent that eviction of the tenant from the demised premises on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction was to be carried out by the executing court only on production of a duly sanctioned plan by the landlord. 5. Aforesaid judgment passed by the Appellate Authority was though laid challenge by way of Civil Revision in this Court by the landlord, but the same was subsequently withdrawn. 6. The landlord filed an execution petition i.e. Case No. 338-10 of 19/11 before the learned Rent Controller, Court No.2, Shimla for execution of order dated 17.1.2009 passed by learned Rent Controller, Court No. 4, Shimla in Rent Case No. 23/2 of 1999/98, wherein the tenants filed objections under S.47 CPC, however, learned Rent Controller, vide order dated 20.7.2021, dismissed the objections and ordered for issuance of warrant of possession qua the demised premises. Against the aforesaid order, the tenants approached this Court by way of this Civil Revision No. 29 of 2021, which is pending adjudication before this Court. 7. Vide order dated 29.7.2021, this Court stayed the operation and execution of order dated 20.7.2021 passed by the learned executing Court. In the present revision petition, present application has been filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4/legal heirs of the landlord Khem Chand, praying therein for issuance of directions to the petitioners to pay use and occupation charges. It has been averred in the application that both learned Courts below have concurrently ordered for eviction of the tenants from the demised premises on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction but yet the tenants/non-applicants are desperate to delay the execution of eviction order with ulterior motive. It has been averred in the application that both learned Courts below have concurrently ordered for eviction of the tenants from the demised premises on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction but yet the tenants/non-applicants are desperate to delay the execution of eviction order with ulterior motive. It has been stated in the application that the landlords are entitled to use and occupation charges at the market rate i.e. the rate at which the landlord could have let out the premises in question, and as such, use and occupation charges qua the demised premises are required to be fixed at the rate of Rs.500/- per square feet, total 220 square feet x Rs.500 = Rs.1,10,000/- per month from the date of eviction order i.e. 17.1.2009 till they continue to occupy the demised premises. With a view to prove the prevailing market rent in the vicinity of the demised premises, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have averred in the application that this court fixed use and occupation charges qua portion of 250 square feet i.e. Shop No. 14, Middle Bazaar, Shimla @ Rs.220/- per square feet. It has been further stated in the application that the shop in Middle Bazaar was being used as tailoring shop by one single person, whereas, the shop in dispute i.e. Shop No. 139, Lower Bazaar, Shimla is being used for the purposes of running a successful and effluent cloth retailing store. It has been further submitted that the shop in question is situate in the middle/prime location of Shimla known as Lower Bazaar, which is thronged by thousands of local people and tourists from morning till night everyday. It has been stated in the application that the commercial value of a shop in Middle Bazaar Shimla is less than 50% of the value of a shop such as the one in the use and occupation of the tenants and proforma respondents and as such, landlords are entitled to use and occupation charges at the rate of Rs.500/- per square feet. Since the area of shop in question is stated to be 220 square feet, as such, monthly use and occupation charges of Rs. 1,10,000/- have been claimed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4, to be paid jointly and severally by the petitioners/tenants and proforma respondents Nos. 4 and 6 from the date of eviction order i.e. 17.1.2009 till the vacation of the demised premises. 1,10,000/- have been claimed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4, to be paid jointly and severally by the petitioners/tenants and proforma respondents Nos. 4 and 6 from the date of eviction order i.e. 17.1.2009 till the vacation of the demised premises. It is also averred in the application that the petitioners/tenants themselves are landlord of Shop No. 87, Lower Bazaar, Shimla which is of the same size as that of the demised premises, same has been rented out to Crazy Readymades for monthly rent of Rs. 1,50,000/-. It is further averred that the tenants are landlords of another shop i.e. Shop No. 75, The Mall, Shimla, which has also been rented out to Van Heusen, on monthly rent of Rs.4,50,000/- per month, as such, they are liable to be directed to pay use and occupation charges at the rate of Rs.1,10,000/- per month from the date of eviction order dated 17.1.2009. 8. Mr. R.L. Sood, learned senior counsel duly assisted by Mr. Arjun Lal, Advocate, appearing for landlords/respondents Nos. 1 to 4, while inviting attention of this Court to the judgments passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ama Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 705 and judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Champeshwar Lall Sood & Anr. V/s Sh. Gurpartap Singh & Ors., reported in Latest HLJ 2017 (HP) 589, argued that a tenant after his eviction, will not remain tenant and his occupation after eviction order will be of an ‘unauthorized occupant’, as such, such tenant is liable to pay use and occupation charges. Learned senior counsel also invited attention of this Court to order dated 23.8.2022 passed by this Court in CMP No. 10164 of 2018 in Civil Revision No. 190 of 2018 titled Shambhoonath Sharma v. Randip Singh Parmar, wherein this Court, while placing reliance upon Atma Ram supra, held that tenant becomes an unauthorized occupant, after his being ordered to be evicted by the learned Rent Controller, as such, he/she becomes liable to pay the use and occupation charges till the time, tenants remain in unauthorized occupation of the premises. 9. Aforesaid submissions made on behalf of Mr. Sood, learned senior counsel for respondents Nos. 9. Aforesaid submissions made on behalf of Mr. Sood, learned senior counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 4/applicants are refuted by the tenants by way of reply, wherein though they have admitted the facts as taken note herein above, but claimed that the petitioners/tenants cannot be termed to be unauthorized occupants, because, they have not ceased to be tenants. 10. Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned senior counsel duly assisted by Mr. Ajay Kumar Sharma, Advocate, appearing for the petitioners/tenants, vehemently argued that since the eviction order passed by learned Rent Controller stands modified to the extent that the tenants shall be evicted from the demised premises on the production of a duly sanctioned plan, they cannot be termed as ‘unauthorized occupants’ till the time, duly sanctioned plan of the building in question is produced. Mr. Bawa, learned senior counsel further argued that though in the execution petition, executing court has erroneously returned the finding that the plan of the building has been duly sanctioned but such finding being contrary to the findings recorded in judgment dated 11.4.2013 passed by the Appellate Authority, whereby order passed by learned Rent Controller came to be modified, is not binding and cannot be made basis to draw a conclusion that the tenants have become ‘unauthorized occupants’ after passing of eviction order against them, which was conditional. 11. Mr. Bawa, learned senior counsel representing the non-applicants/ petitioners vehemently argued that bare perusal of S.24(5) of the Act, nowhere provides condition, if any, for depositing use and occupation charges for staying the execution of the eviction order. He further argued that the definition of ‘tenant’ as given in S.2(j) of the Act nowhere suggests that on passing of eviction order against tenant, his occupation becomes unauthorized and he would not be treated as ‘tenant’ under the Act. Mr. Bawa further argued that since civil revision having been filed by non-applicants/petitioners laying therein challenge to order passed by learned executing Court is pending adjudication, non-applicants/ petitioners cannot be held to be in unauthorized occupation of the demised premises, which have been otherwise ordered to be evicted on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction. While inviting attention of this Court to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram supra, Mr. While inviting attention of this Court to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram supra, Mr. Bawa attempted to carve out a case that in the said judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has considered definition of ‘tenant’ as provided in Delhi Rent Control Act and Madhya Pradesh Rent Control Act, wherein it is provided that the tenant against whom eviction order is passed, will not remain tenant under landlord and his occupation will become unauthorized. He submitted that the definition of ‘tenant’ as given in S.2(j) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, nowhere provides that a person, against whom eviction order is passed, will not remain tenant under the landlord and his occupation becomes unauthorized with the passing of eviction order. Lastly, Mr. Bawa contended that otherwise also, use and occupation charges being claimed by the applicants/respondents Nos. 1 to 4 at the rate of Rs.17.1.2009 Lakh are on higher side, especially when rent qua similar shops in the same vicinity is on lower side, as has been stated in the reply. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties. 13. Before ascertaining the correctness of the rival submissions made by Learned Counsel appearing for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant application, it may be apt to take note of the fact that this Court having taken note of specific averments contained in the application with regard to ownership of the non-applicants/petitioners qua Shops Nos. 87 and 75, Shimla, directed the non-applicants to place on record lease deed if any, arrived inter se them and the Van Heusen and Crazy Readymades qua aforesaid shops, within a period of two weeks. 14. Pursuant to aforesaid direction, tenants placed on record a lease and licence agreement entered inter se Jeevan Khanna, one fo the non-applicants/ tenants and Mr. Biplav Gupta, qua Shop No. 87, Lower Bazaar, Shimla, wherein it came to be agreed inter se aforesaid parties that the licencee Biplav Gupta will pay Rs. 80,000/- per month. Tenants also placed placed on record tax invoice to demonstrate that Shop No. 75 has been rented out to Aditya Birla Fashion Retail Ltd. on monthly rent of Rs. 2,25,000/-. 15. 80,000/- per month. Tenants also placed placed on record tax invoice to demonstrate that Shop No. 75 has been rented out to Aditya Birla Fashion Retail Ltd. on monthly rent of Rs. 2,25,000/-. 15. Vice CMP No. 6575 of 2021, whereby aforesaid documents came to be placed on record, tenants also placed on record lease and licence agreement dated 20.8.2021 entered inter se them and Biplav Gupta, proprietor Crazy Readymades to demonstrate that licence fee, which was earlier being paid at the rate of Rs.80,000/- per month has been reduced to Rs.67,800/- +18% GST. 16. First and the foremost question, which needs decision in the present application is whether this court has the jurisdiction in the present proceedings to issue a direction to the tenants to pay the use and occupation charges, qua the demised premises, during the pendency of the revision petition, whereby order dated 20.7.2021 passed by learned executing Court dismissing the objections under S.47 CPC filed by the petitioners have been laid challenge in the main civil revision. 17. Careful perusal of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram (supra) would reveal that following questions arose for its consideration : “(i) in respect of premises enjoying the protection of rent control legislation, when does the tenancy terminate; and (ii) upto what point of time the tenant is liable to pay rent at the contractual rate and when does he become liable to pay to the landlord compensation for use and occupation of the tenancy premises unbound by the contractual rate of rent?” 18. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court specifically referred to provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 CPC, and held that the appellate court does have the jurisdiction to put the applicant on such reasonable terms, as would, in its opinion, reasonably compensate the decree-holder for the loss occasioned on account of delay in execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event of the appeal being dismissed and in so far as those proceedings are concerned. The conclusions were summed up by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the following terms : “To sum up, our conclusions are:- (1) while passing an order of stay under Rule 5 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellate Court does have jurisdiction to put the applicant on such reasonable terms as would in its opinion reasonably compensate the decree-holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event of the appeal being dismissed and in so far as those proceedings are concerned. Such terms, needless to say, shall be reasonable; (2) in case of premises governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in view of the definition of tenant contained in clause (l) of Section 2 of the Act, the tenancy does not stand terminated merely by its termination under the general law; it terminates with the passing of the decree for eviction. With effect from that date, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent effective for the period preceding the date of the decree; (3) the doctrine of merger does not have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely because the decree of eviction stands merged in the decree passed by the superior forum at a latter date. 19. In case the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram Properties (supra) is read in its entirety, it is clearly elicited that the rationale, for directing the tenant to pay use and occupation charges, is that there was a need to deter the tenant from perpetuating the life of litigation and thereby depriving the landlord of the fruits of litigation, even if successful. 20. The main argument of Mr. 20. The main argument of Mr. Bawa, learned counsel representing the tenant, is that the aforesaid observations came to be made by Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram (supra) in view of specific definition of ‘tenant’ contained in Delhi Urban Rent Control Act, as such, much emphasis can not be laid on the same, while deciding the case at hand, which is governed by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act. Mr. Bawa, further contended that, in case of the Delhi Act, ‘tenant’ does not include a person against whom, an order/decree of eviction has been passed as provided under S.2(1)(ii) thereof, whereas, under Section 2(j) of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, ‘tenant’ means a person, by whom or on whose account, rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant in continued possession after termination of tenancy in his favour. Mr. Bawa further contended that the aforesaid definition of ‘tenant’ clearly suggests that the tenancy of a tenant does not terminate after termination of tenancy. ‘Tenant” in the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act is defined as under : “Section 2. Definitions .. .. (j) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule-I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation-I and Explanation-II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building of rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a municipal committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board’;” 21. Hence, this court is not persuaded to agree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bawa, because careful perusal of definition of ‘tenant’, as given in Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, suggests that it does not include a person, continuing in possession after order of ejectment is passed against him/her. Hence, this court is not persuaded to agree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bawa, because careful perusal of definition of ‘tenant’, as given in Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, suggests that it does not include a person, continuing in possession after order of ejectment is passed against him/her. Otherwise also, very object of payment of damages/compensation, as has been stipulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram Properties (supra), is to deter a tenant from perpetuating the life of litigation, as such, once this is the object, argument having been advanced by Mr. Bawa, that since observations/findings came to be made by Hon'ble Apex Court in Atma Ram Properties (supra) in terms of S.38(3) of Delhi Urban Rent Control Act, ratio of the same can not be applied in the case at hand, cannot be accepted because in the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that the rationale for providing compensation for use and occupation charges in favour of the landlords, is to deter the tenant from perpetuating life of litigation. 22. Otherwise also, in the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has candidly held that the tenant having suffered decree /order of eviction, may continue his fight before the superior forum but, on the termination of proceedings and the decree or order of eviction first passed having been terminated, tenancy stands terminated from the date of decree passed by lower forum. 23. Hon'ble Apex Court in Martin & Harris Private Limited v. Rajendra Mehta, reported in SCC OnLine SC 792, while following judgment rendered in Atma Ram supra, has held as under : “12. Now, reverting on the issue of determination of the amount of mesne profits @ Rs.2,50,000/ per month is concerned, the guidance may be taken from the judgment of Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Another – (1999) 2 SCC 325 , in which this Court held that once a decree for possession has been passed and the execution is delayed depriving the decree holder to reap the fruits, it is necessary for the Appellate Court to pass appropriate orders fixing reasonable mesne profits which may be equivalent to the market rent required to be paid by a person who is holding over the property. In the case of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. – (2005) 1 SCC 705 , this Court held that Appellate Court does have jurisdiction to put reasonable terms and conditions as would in its opinion reasonable to compensate the decree holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of the decree while granting the stay. The Court relying upon the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, observed that on passing the decree for eviction by a competent Court, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profit or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have able to let out the premises in present and earn the profit if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The Court has explained that because of pendency of the appeal, which may be in continuation of suit, the doctrine of merger does not have effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely because the decree of eviction stands merged in the decree passed by the superior forum at a later date. 13. Thus, after passing the decree of eviction the tenancy terminates and from the said date the landlord is entitled for mesne profits or compensation depriving him from the use of the premises. The view taken in the case of Atma Ram (supra) has been reaffirmed in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. and others (2009) 9 SCC 772 by three Judges Bench of this Court. Therefore, looking to the fact that the decree of eviction passed by Trial Court on 03.03.2016 has been confirmed in appeal; against which second appeal is pending, however, after stay on being asked the direction to pay mesne profits or compensation issued by the High Court is in consonance to the law laid down by this Court, which is just equitable and reasonable. 14. The basis of determination of the amount of mesne profit, in our view, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case considering place where the property is situated i.e. village or city or metropolitan city, location, nature of premises i.e. commercial or residential are and the rate of rent precedent on which premises can be let out are the guiding factor in the facts of individual case. In the case at hand, the High Court in the impugned order observed that the tenanted property is located on the main road of New Colony near Panch Batti which is a commercial area in the heart of Jaipur City. The said finding has been arrived considering the voluminous documentary record dispelling the plea taken by the Appellants. However, the Court in the facts and circumstances found it reasonable to determine Rs.2,50,000/- per month as mesne profit. As per the discussion made hereinabove so far as the area of the tenanted premises and the location of the property is concerned, the findings of fact have been recorded by the High Court, in our considered opinion, those findings are based on the material brought on record which are neither perverse nor illegal. The amount of mesne profit as fixed @ Rs.2,50,000/- is also just and proper looking at the span of time i.e. 10 years from the date of fixing of the standard rent and six year from the date of passing of the decree of eviction. Therefore, the amount of mesne profit has rightly been decided by the High Court while passing the order impugned. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, in our considered opinion, the order fixing the mesne profit and the order passed on the review petition, filed by the Appellants, are just and proper which do not warrant any interference. Therefore, both the appeals are dismissed.” 24. Taking cue from judgment in Atma Ram supra, A coordinate Bench of this court in Sh. Champeshwar Lall Sood & Anr. V/s Sh. Gurpartap Singh & Ors., reported in Latest HLJ 2017 (HP) 589, has held as under : “13. It would be evidently clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that the courts after passing of an order of eviction can always put the occupant of the premises to terms including payment of mesne profit. The very purpose of awarding mesne profit or use and occupation charges is to put a check on the diabolical plans of the tenant who has been ordered to be evicted and ensure that he does not squat on the premises by paying a meager rent. At the same time even the landlord is also compensated to receive higher rent than the contractual rent. 14. At the same time even the landlord is also compensated to receive higher rent than the contractual rent. 14. In Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it has been clearly laid down that the tenant with the passing of the decree of eviction is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation charges of the premises at the same rate on which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises. 15. Likewise, in Marshals Sons and Co.(I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. (supra), it was categorically held that once a decree for possession has been passed and execution is delayed depriving the judgment-creditor of the fruits of decree, it is necessary for the Court to pass appropriate orders so that ‘reasonable’ mesne profits which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. 16. At the same time, it was also held that while fixing the amount, subject to payment of which the execution of the order/decree is stayed, the Court would exercise restraint and would not fix any excessive, fanciful or punitive amount. 17. What is ‘reasonable’ is difficult to define and this expression being a relative term is required to be considered vis-à-vis, the fact situation obtaining in a particular case. A three Hon’ble Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rena Drego (Mrs) vs. Lalchand Soni and others (1998) 3 SCC 341 , considered the expression ‘reasonable’ in the following terms:- [9] It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. It is often said that "an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word 'reasonable' is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space." The author of 'Words and Phrases" (Permanent Edition) has quoted from In re Nice and Schreiber, 123 F, 987, 999 to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He says "the expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined." It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly something more than that. He says "the expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined." It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly something more than that. While interpreting the word 'reasonable' in Section 13 of the Act, the Bombay High Court has suggested in Krishchand Moorjimal v. Bai Kalavati, AIR 1973 Bombay 46, "that the word 'reasonable' cannot mean convenient or luxurious, though it may not necessarily exclude the idea of convenience and comfort." However, the expression reasonable can be taken as providing an angle which is conformable or agreeable to reasons, having regard to the facts of the particular controversy. [10] In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 : ( AIR 1987 SC 2316 ), this Court has stated that "the word 'reasonable' has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know." This has been reiterated by Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) P. Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 : ( AIR 1989 SC 973 ). 18. The expression reasonable again came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 . It was held as under:- “[8] The word "reasonable" has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, page 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word "reasonable'. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy. (See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and another (1987) 4 SCC 497 , and Gujarat Water Supplies and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. and another [ (1989) 1 SCC 532 ]. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy. (See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and another (1987) 4 SCC 497 , and Gujarat Water Supplies and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. and another [ (1989) 1 SCC 532 ]. [9] It is often said "an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word 'reasonable' is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space". The author of 'Words and Phrases' (Permanent Edition) has quoted from in re Nice & Schreiber 123 F. 987, 988 to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He says, "the expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined". It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly something more than that. [10] The word 'reasonable' signifies "in accordance with reason". In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact, whether a particular act is reasonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and another v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315 ).” 19. Even otherwise the expression ‘reasonable’ would only mean “rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate”. An act is said to be reasonable when it is conformable or agreeable to reason, having regard to the facts of the particular controversy. In other words ‘reasonable’ would mean what is just, fair and equitable in contradiction to anything whimsical, capricious etc. The word ‘reasonable’ has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word ‘reasonable’. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks, as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal (2002) 1 SCC 134 . 20. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word ‘reasonable’. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks, as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal (2002) 1 SCC 134 . 20. Therefore, the term ‘reasonable’, as has been used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court is required to be interpreted in a manner so as to ensure that the landlord is reasonably compensated for the loss occurred by the delay in execution of the decree by grant of stay order. The rent has to be determined on case to case basis depending upon the cogent material placed on record by the parties and would therefore, normally be dependent upon the occupation, trade or business etc. of the tenant and would further not be dependent solely on the capacity to pay or actual earning of the tenant, who has suffered an order of eviction. 21. The fixation of mesne profits and use and occupation charges are to be assessed on the basis of the evidence led by the parties as to the prima facie market value existing at the time of admission of the appeal after the eviction order, which has been exclusively bestowed on the landlord so that he would be able to reasonably compensate for loss caused by delay in execution of the decree by grant of stay order. The Court while doing so is not to be guided by the factors that the parties at one point of time while creating the tenancy had agreed at a meager amount of rent, it would depend upon the material produced before the Court which under no circumstances can be ignored even though thereafter the rent so fixed may work out to be multiple times to the one which was fixed at the time of creation of the tenancy. 22. Noticeably, even the tenant had not disputed the agreement entered between one of the landlord with Bata India Ltd., before the appellate authority wherein the rent fixed works out to Rs. 295.56 paise per sq. feet and with the increase contemplated in the agreement, the same on the date of admission of the appeal was @ Rs. 325/- per sq. feet. 23. 295.56 paise per sq. feet and with the increase contemplated in the agreement, the same on the date of admission of the appeal was @ Rs. 325/- per sq. feet. 23. The agreement reveals that the rentals therein have been fixed for two premises i.e. 42, the Mall, Shimla and 14/1, Middle Bazaar, Shimla. From the photographs appended alongwith the petition filed by the landlord being Civil Revision Petition No. 212 of 2016, which have not even being disputed by the tenant, the premise No. 42 is admittedly located on the prime location i.e. Mall Road, Shimla, whereas the premise No. 14/1 is sandwiched between the premises let out to the tenant and premise No. 42 is approachable only through the narrow lane of about three feet. Therefore, obviously, the rental of these properties would be presumed to be worked out after taking into consideration the comparative advantage and disadvantages of both the premises. 24. So far as the premises which are in possession of the tenant are concerned, the same admittedly are situated on the main Middle Bazaar, at the heart of Shimla town which over the years have now been come to be reckoned as ‘Middle Mall’ and is one of the important hub of business activity and has great commercial potential though less than that of the premises located on the Mall Road. 25. Therefore, the fixation of the monthly rental of Rs.12,000/- per month by the learned first appellate Court, even after concluding that the premises in question are in heart of the city is obviously erroneous because such rental is based upon the alleged earning of the tenant instead of the same being based upon the prima facie market rent that the landlord would have been able to let out on vacation by the tenant at the time of the admission of the appeal after eviction order. Moreover, once the Court has before it a lease deed of the premises which pertains to a part of the same building then it will not normally be wise, safe or prudent to rely upon any other document like rent deed of the so called adjoining premises in the vicinity to work out the prima facie market rent.” 25. Moreover, once the Court has before it a lease deed of the premises which pertains to a part of the same building then it will not normally be wise, safe or prudent to rely upon any other document like rent deed of the so called adjoining premises in the vicinity to work out the prima facie market rent.” 25. Hon'ble Apex Court, in Marshall Sons and Co.(I) Ltd. vs. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and another (1999) 2 SCC 325 has categorically held that once a decree for possession has been passed and execution is delayed depriving the judgment-creditor of the fruits of decree, it is necessary for the Court to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profits which may be equivalent to the market rent are paid by a person, who is holding over the property. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that, while fixing rent, court would exercise restraint and would not fix any excessive, fanciful or punitive amount. Hon'ble Apex Court, in Rena Drego (Mrs) vs. Lalchand Soni and others (1998) 3 SCC 341 , while interpreting the expression, ‘reasonable’ observed that it is difficult to give an exact definition of the word 'reasonable', however, expression, ‘reasonable’ can be taken as providing an angle which is conformable or agreeable to reasons, having regard to the facts of the particular controversy. Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. Shiv Shankar Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 , while interpreting the expression, ‘reasonable’ ruled that the word ‘reasonable’ has, in law, prima facie, meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. Hon'ble Apex Court further held that it may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word ‘reasonable’ and expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined. Hon'ble Apex Court further held that it may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word ‘reasonable’ and expression 'reasonable' is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined. Word/expression, ‘reasonable’ signifies “in accordance with reason”, therefore, coordinate Bench of this court, while taking note of the various judgments passed by Hon'ble Apex Court, while pronouncing judgment in Champeshwar Lall Sood (supra) rightly held that the term, ‘reasonable’ as has been used by Hon'ble Apex Court and this court is required to be interpreted in the manner, so as to ensure that the landlord is reasonably compensated for the loss occurred by delay in execution of decree on account of stay order. Rent is to be determined on ‘case to case’ basis, depending upon cogent material placed on record by the parties. 26. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition that a tenant cannot claim himself/herself to be tenant qua the premises in question after passing of eviction order and courts after passing of eviction order can always put the tenant of premises to terms of mesne profits. Since it is not in dispute that the appellate authority has held non-applicants/ petitioners liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction, subject to production of a duly sanction plan of the building, the non-applicants/petitioners cannot be permitted to claim themselves to be tenants, as has been held in Atma Ram supra that the tenancy terminates with the passing of eviction order. Once, it is not in dispute that the tenants have been ordered to be evicted, yet they continue to be in possession of the demised premises, they are liable to pay the use and occupation charges qua the premises in question. 27. Though Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned senior counsel made an attempt to carve out a case that the eviction order passed by the learned Rent Controller/appellate authority is conditional one and till the time, sanctioned plan is produced by the landlords, tenancy of the non-applicants/ petitioners cannot be said to have terminated, however, this Court finds no force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. Bawa, learned senior counsel. Bawa, learned senior counsel. Tenancy stands terminated with the passing of eviction order but order of eviction can be executed by learned executing Court on the production of the sanctioned plan. 28. While considering prayer made on behalf of the landlord for issuance of direction to pay the use and occupation charges, this court is only to see whether the tenancy of the tenants stands terminated on account of passing of eviction order and in these proceedings, it is not to be seen by this Court how the said order is to be executed, which shall be decided by learned executing Court. 29. In Atma Ram supra as well as other judgments, it has been repeatedly held by Hon'ble Apex Court and this court that the tenancy terminates with the passing of eviction order. Herein the case at hand, eviction order already stands passed by learned Rent Controller, which has been further upheld by the appellate authority, however, execution of the eviction order passed by learned Rent Controller has been made subject to production of sanctioned plan/map. 30. Though, this Court is not required to go into the question of production of map/plan in the instant proceedings, but even otherwise, order dated 20.7.2021, impugned in these proceedings, reveals that the learned executing Court after being satisfied that sanctioned plan exists in favour of the landlord, has already issued warrant of possession in favour of the landlords. 31. In the civil revision, wherein present application has been filed, eviction order passed by learned Rent Controller, which has been further upheld by the Appellate Authority has not been laid challenge, rather, order passed by learned executing Court, thereby issuing warrant of possession has been laid challenge on the ground that there is no valid sanctioned/approved map in favour of the landlords, as such, till the time, same is produced, non-applicants/petitioners cannot be evicted. 32. Since, there is no dispute qua passing of eviction order by competent Court of law, which has attained finality, this court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made in the instant application for paying use and occupation charges by the non-applicants/petitioners. 33. 32. Since, there is no dispute qua passing of eviction order by competent Court of law, which has attained finality, this court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made in the instant application for paying use and occupation charges by the non-applicants/petitioners. 33. Orders passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Champeshwar Lall Sood supra as well as this Court in Shambhoonath supra, if read in their entirety, clearly suggest that the use and occupation charges should commensurate with the amount which landlord would have fetched, had the tenant vacated the premises. 34. In the case at hand, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have claimed the rent at the rate of Rs.500/- per square feet of the shop in question. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have successfully proved on record that the shop situate in Middle Bazaar, which is having lesser commercial value than the shop situate in Lower Bazaar, is fetching rent of Rs.250/- square feet, whereas, shop in question is situate in the middle of Lower Bazaar itself, which is main shopping centre for the residents of entire Shimla as well as other neighbouring Districts. This court can take judicial note of the fact that the Lower Bazaar is thronged by thousands of people daily and as such, shop situate in such location has great commercial value. 35. Interestingly, in the case at hand, non-applicants/petitioners besides having possession of demised premises also own two shops i.e. Shop No. 87, Lower Bazaar and Shop No. 75, The Mall, Shimla, which they have let out to some other persons on handsome rent. Non-applicants/ petitioners despite having two shops are attempting hard to unauthorizedly occupy the shop of respondents Nos. 1 to 4, that too on very meager rent. As per material available on record, Shop No. 87 situate in Lower Bazaar owned by non-applicants/petitioners Jeevan Khanna, has been rented to Crazy Readymades for Rs. 80,000/- and similarly, aforesaid non-applicants/tenants have rented out shop at Mall, Shimla for a consideration of Rs. 4,50,000/- per month. Though, it has been claimed on behalf of the non-applicants/petitioners that they receive only Rs.2,25,000/- per month qua the aforesaid shop and remaining rent is paid directly to other co-owners i.e. Sarthak Khanna, but the fact remains that the aforesaid Shop owned and possessed by the non-applicants/ petitioners has been rented by them for monthly rent of Rs.4,50,000/-. 36. Though, it has been claimed on behalf of the non-applicants/petitioners that they receive only Rs.2,25,000/- per month qua the aforesaid shop and remaining rent is paid directly to other co-owners i.e. Sarthak Khanna, but the fact remains that the aforesaid Shop owned and possessed by the non-applicants/ petitioners has been rented by them for monthly rent of Rs.4,50,000/-. 36. Though, the non-applicants/petitioners have placed on record certain documents procured by them from Municipal Corporation, Shimla, to demonstrate that rent qua shops situate in the vicinity of the demised premises is quite less, but this Court having taken note of the fact that the non-applicants/petitioners despite having two shops in their names, have rented out the same to other parties, that too on the handsome rent, as has been taken note herein above, documents of Municipal Corporation, Shimla, with respect to rent being paid qua other shops in the vicinity are of no relevance. 37. Having taken note of the fact that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Champeshwar Lall Sood supra fixed rent of the shop in Middle Bazaar, which is less commercial than Lower Bazaar, where the shop in question is situate, at Rs. 250/- per square feet per month, this Court deems it fit to accept the prayer made on behalf of the respondents Nos 1 to 4 to fix use and occupation charges of the demised premises at Rs. 500/- per square feet. 38. Though, the non-applicants/petitioners have claimed the area of demised premises to be less than 220 square feet, but having perused the plan of Shop No. 139, which came to be placed/exhibited on record and stands annexed as Annexure R-1/B, this court finds that area of shop in question is 220 square feet and as such, use and occupation charges are to be assessed accordingly by taking into consideration various aspects i.e. location, potential and area etc. of building. Location, potential, area etc. which are prime factors for fixation of use and occupation charges are not in dispute. 39. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the demised premises are situate at a prima location having great business potential. of building. Location, potential, area etc. which are prime factors for fixation of use and occupation charges are not in dispute. 39. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the demised premises are situate at a prima location having great business potential. It is not the case of the non-applicants/petitioners that the condition of the building is so bad that it cannot be put to any use, rather, during the pendency of the rent petition before learned Rent Controller, non-applicants/petitioners tried to prove that the building is safe and there is no requirement of rebuilding and reconstruction. Since non-applicants/petitioners have already rented out their shops for Rs.80,000/- per month and Rs. 4,50,000/- per month, use and occupation charges of demised premises at the rate of Rs.1.10 Lakh per month cannot be said to be on higher side. 40. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above, this court finds merit in the present application and accordingly the same is allowed and non-applicants/petitioners are directed to pay the use and occupation charges qua the demised premises at the rate of Rs.1.10 Lakh per month from the date of passing of the eviction order dated 17.1.2009 passed by learned Rent Controller. Arrears of use and occupation charges with effect from 17.1.2009 till the date of passing of this order, shall be deposited by the non-applicants/petitioners within a period of two months from today, whereas, the current use and occupation charges shall be paid by the non-applicants/petitioners to the applicant/respondent by 10th of every month from next month i.e. October, 2022. It is clarified that in case of omission on the part of non-applicants/ petitioners to comply with this order, interim order dated 29.7.2021, whereby interim protection has been granted to the non-applicants/ petitioners, shall stand vacated and respondents Nos.1 to 4 shall be at liberty to get the order of learned Rent Controller executed in accordance with law. However, in case, non-applicants/petitioners comply with the instant order, order dated 29.7.2021, shall be made absolute. Application stands disposed of in the afore terms.