JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is filed by the defendant in O.S.No.29/2021 on the file of Prl. Sr. Civil Judge, Puttur. The appellant has questioned the correctness of the order dated 18.11.2021 on I.A.2. 2. I.A.2 is an application filed by the respondent under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC being the plaintiff in the suit for restraining the appellant-defendant from alienating plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties. The respondent is the husband of the appellant and it is his case that he purchased plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties in the name of his wife when he was serving in Indian Army as a Subedhar. He borrowed money from a bank for purchasing one of the properties and that he himself was repaying the loan though the loan was obtained in the name of his wife. When he learnt that the appellant was about to sell away the properties, he brought the suit claiming declaration of title over the properties and ancillary relief of permanent injunction. Along with the plaint, he made an application for temporary injunction to restrain the appellant from alienating the properties and as it stood allowed by the impugned order, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant. 3. The appellant does not dispute that she is the wife of the respondent, what she has contended is that she purchased the properties from her money without the aid of the respondent. She admits that the respondent made some payments towards loan installments and submits that over time, he stopped making payments. The loan has not been cleared yet and that she has school going children. She has found it difficult to maintain the family without any help from the plaintiff and in this view she has got every right to dispose of the properties for the benefit of the family. 4. Heard the arguments of Sri. K. Ravishankar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. Chandranath Ariga, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. Sri. K. Ravishankar argued that the trial court should not have granted an order of temporary injunction when apparently the suit appears to be highly time barred. He referred to para 14 of the plaint and submitted that therein it is clearly written that the cause of action of the suit arose on 18.6.2012, again on 24.11.2017 and then on 1.6.2021. K. Ravishankar argued that the trial court should not have granted an order of temporary injunction when apparently the suit appears to be highly time barred. He referred to para 14 of the plaint and submitted that therein it is clearly written that the cause of action of the suit arose on 18.6.2012, again on 24.11.2017 and then on 1.6.2021. Once the cause of action arises, it begins to run and it never stops. Therefore from 18.6.2012, the suit should have been filed within three years according to Article 58 of the Limitation Act. Thus the suit is time barred. 5.1. It was his second line of argument that the respondent claims to have purchased the properties in the name of his wife. But the fact remains that the wife has got independent income. No document is produced to show that the respondent made payment of the sale consideration. He might have paid some money towards loan installments, but by that itself he cannot claim right over the property. Even otherwise according to Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the appellant becomes the absolute owner of the property and in this view she has every right to alienate the property. Since the respondent has neglected to maintain the wife and his children, there is absolute dearth for money and the wife is compelled to alienate the property for the maintenance of the family. In these circumstances the trial court should not have granted injunction. The respondent has failed to make out prima facie case. Balance of convenience lies in favour of the appellant. In support of his argument he placed reliance on the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of R.Dilip Kumar Vs. S. Ramu (ILR 1992 Kar. 2905). 6. On the other hand Sri. K. Chandranath Ariga for the respondent argued that the cause of action for the suit actually arose when the respondent learnt that the appellant was attempting to sell the properties. The date of cause of action should be taken as 1.6.2021, not 18.6.2012 and 24.11.2017, which are the dates of execution of the sale deeds. The suit is not time barred. 6.1. His next point of argument was that till the year 2015, the respondent, the appellant and their children were all living together. The date of cause of action should be taken as 1.6.2021, not 18.6.2012 and 24.11.2017, which are the dates of execution of the sale deeds. The suit is not time barred. 6.1. His next point of argument was that till the year 2015, the respondent, the appellant and their children were all living together. Respondent was a personnel in the Indian Army and he used to take his family with him wherever he was being posted. In the year 2015, the respondent was posted to a place in Nagaland state. There he was not provided with a residential quarters and for this reason, and also for safety and security reasons, he did not take his family to Nagaland and therefore, rented a house at Puttur for their living. The respondent gave his ATM card to the appellant for withdrawing money every month for house hold expenses. The respondent misused the liberty given to her and she became a spendthrift. This resulted in differences between the husband and wife and they got separated. 7. Sri. K. Chandranath Ariga argued that the plaint schedule properties were purchased by him in the name of this wife for the sake of convenience. Till 2015, the appellant was living with the respondent and she had no independent source of income. In fact it was he who borrowed money in the name of wife and cleared the loan also. The bank statements produced by the respondent disclose the payments made by him. The loan was obtained in their joint names and this was admitted by the appellant also. Therefore the respondent has every right to seek declaration of title over the plaint schedule properties. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is not applicable in a circumstance like this. The trial court has come to right conclusion on the materials placed before it for granting temporary injunction. When discretion is properly exercised, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of granting injunction. He argued for dismissing the appeal. 8. The trial court has recorded the findings that the documents such as bank statement and the pass book show very clearly that the loan raised for purchase of the property was in the joint names of the appellant and the respondent and that the respondent himself repaid the loan amount. He argued for dismissing the appeal. 8. The trial court has recorded the findings that the documents such as bank statement and the pass book show very clearly that the loan raised for purchase of the property was in the joint names of the appellant and the respondent and that the respondent himself repaid the loan amount. Whether the appellant holds the property in the fiduciary capacity or as a trustee of the appellant is a matter to be decided after recording evidence. It is further held that the documents produced by the respondent show that the sale consideration amount was mobilized by him to purchase ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties and that the appellant has not produced any document to show her independent source of income. In this view the respondent has been able to make out a prima facie case in his favour. He has also shown existence of balance of convenience in his favour and if interim order of temporary injunction is not granted, the interest of the respondent would be affected in the sense that if the schedule properties are alienated by the appellant, it would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. 9. If the findings of the trial court are examined in the light of the points of arguments, unhesitatingly it may be stated that the trial court has not committed any error in exercising discretion to grant temporary injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Though the appellant has contended that she purchased the suit properties from her own income, there is no material to substantiate her contention. Rather she has admitted that loan was raised in their joint names for purchasing the property and that the respondent repaid the loan. The appellant is a housewife and for this reason, it is difficult to believe that she could purchase the suit properties. It is the clear case of the respondent that he was working as a Subedar in the Indian Army and till 2015, the appellant and the children were living with him. In this view, it may not be possible to hold at this stage that she had independent source of income. It is the clear case of the respondent that he was working as a Subedar in the Indian Army and till 2015, the appellant and the children were living with him. In this view, it may not be possible to hold at this stage that she had independent source of income. Moreover purchase of a property by husband in the name of the wife cannot be called a benami transaction and such type of transaction falls within the exception no.3 to clause ‘A’ of sub-section 9 of section 2 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. In this view the respondent has made out a prima facie case that he has got the right to seek declaration of his title over the suit properties. 10. The appellant has made her intention very clear to alienate the property. She may have stated that because the respondent neglected to maintain her and their children and this has necessitated the alienation, but this reason cannot be considered to hold that she has every right to alienate the property, especially in a circumstance where she has not produced any material to show that the suit properties can be considered as her absolute properties. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act does not apply to the present circumstance. In this view if the alienation takes place, certainly the respondent’s interest would be affected. Circumstances indicate the balance of convenience being in favour of the respondent. The principle laid in the case of R. Dilip Kumar Vs. Ramu is actually not helpful to the appellant. The principle that no order of injunction can be issued if the plaintiff’s case is doubtful, is restated in the said decision. On the premise of the facts of that case, the co-ordinate Bench of this court declined to grant an order of temporary injunction. 11. As it is found that discretion is properly exercised by the trial court for granting temporary injunction, there cannot be interference in the appeal filed under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC. 12. Regarding the limitation period as argued by the appellant’s counsel, it may be stated that the date of purchase of the property, in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, cannot be considered as date of accrual of cause of action. 12. Regarding the limitation period as argued by the appellant’s counsel, it may be stated that the date of purchase of the property, in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, cannot be considered as date of accrual of cause of action. The date of denial of the right of the plaintiff is what matters for reckoning the period of limitation and therefore the argument of the learned counsel cannot be accepted at this stage. The trial court may give a finding with regard to limitation if an issue is framed to that effect. Therefore from the above discussion I find that this appeal has to fail and is ordered accordingly.